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Preface 
This book documents the result of a Ph.D. project undertaken partly in 
South Africa, partly in Denmark.  The project was made possible with 
a grant from the Danish University Consortium for Environment and 
Development – Industry and Urban Areas (in short: DUCED I&UA) 
which financed two-thirds of the project, the reminder being financed 
by Aalborg University, Denmark.   
The study has been led by Prof. Per Christensen of Aalborg University.  
Prof. Per Langaa Jensen of the Denmark's Technical University has 
supervised the project. 
This book is structured in the following manner 
Chapter 0, Summary, provides a short overview 
Chapter 1, Introduction, describes the what and the why of the project 
Chapter 2, Methodology, describes how this is accomplished 
Chapter 3, Integration, introduces a simple model for analysing 
integration 
Chapter 4, Planning, introduces two competing theories on planning 
that informs the analysis of the empirical observations in later chapters 
Chapter 5 provides a short introduction to the South African context 
Chapte 6 presents the results of two case studies on Danced cleaner 
production projects 
Chapter 7 presents the results of a study on integration in a large 
company setting -- the formal management system 
Chapter 8 presents the results of a small company intervention method, 
based on networking and informal exchange of information  
Chapter 9 provides a short conclusion 
The sequencing of the chapters follows a logical thread, somewhat 
reflecting the sequencing of the empirical work.  The chapters are 
written in a style that should permit them being read independently of 
each other.  It will, however, be helpful to read the what, why, and 
how of the project, essentially chapter 1 and to some extent chapter 2 
(in particular Figure 3, The four research activities in this study, on 
page 30), before talking on the next chapters. 
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Summary 
The purpose of this research is to reveal ways in which occupational 
health and safety can be integrated in environmental cleaner 
production projects.  Of particular interest are those cleaner production 
projects that are run by the Danish government's environmental 
assistance agency, Danced, in South Africa.   
The study explores two main avenues of integration.  First, integrating 
through better planning, focussing at the tools and procedures in use 
by Danced for project management -- integrating occupational health 
and safety into the project specification, so to speak.   
Second, integrating occupational health and safety into the 
environmental activities that take place at company level.  Two ways 
of doing so are explored, the main distinction being company size.  For 
large companies, integration of management systems may be attractive.  
For small companies, integration into a less formal network approach 
may be pursued.  This is integrating occupational health and safety in 
the project implementation phase, so to speak. 
The problem 
The first chapter introduces a hypothesis that informs most of this 
work -- i.e. that environmental interventions may be pursued narrow-
mindedly with little or no attention paid to occupational health and 
safety.  The chapter then identifies two potential negative outcomes 
from this, essentially that it leads to sub-optimal solutions.  The first 
negative outcome is the potential for media-shifting -- that the 
'resolution' of a problem within the environmental domain creates a 
new problem in the occupational health and safety domain, leading to 
a deterioration of workplace conditions.  The second negative outcome 
is the potential for opportunities foregone -- that an environmental 
intervention fails to address occupational health and safety problems 
that may be unrelated but could have been resolved at little or no 
additional cost.  From a rational point of view, both outcomes are sub-
optimal.  Furthermore, on ethical grounds, it is morally repulsive if 
endeavours to improve environmental performance disregard the 
environment of the workers. 
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This study finds ample empirical evidence supporting the general 
hypothesis, that environmental objectives are pursued quite narrow-
mindedly.  This is also true for Danced's cleaner production projects.  
They do not specifically address occupational health and safety issues.  
Workplace conditions are therefore largely ignored.   
It is argued that this state of affairs is regrettable -- in itself an 
opportunity foregone.  An analysis of the developments of 
environmental paradigms identifies cleaner production (henceforth 
CP) as the most obvious candidate for integration of environmental 
and occupational health and safety (henceforth OHS) interventions.  
Cleaner production is the only environmental paradigm that is 
concerned with detailed analysis of the production process.  It is the 
only environmental paradigm that shares this focus with occupational 
health and safety.   
The study has examined in detail an environmental intervention in a 
small company setting, reported in Chapter 8.  This so-called Club 
study concerns the metal finishing industry.  It is comforting to 
observe that the small companies in the Club study address many so-
called twin-problems even if they largely ignore workplace conditions.  
Twin problems are characterised as those in which problems in the 
external and the internal environment have the same root cause: the 
use of a toxic or obnoxious substance in the production process.  
Addressing this root cause solves both an environmental problem and 
an occupational health and safety problem at the same time.  For 
instance, if a decision to end cadmium electroplating or a decision to 
move away from cyanide process technology is taken strictly on 
environmental grounds, it is also beneficial to workers because those 
hazardous chemicals are removed from the workplace.  However, the 
chapter agues that there are opportunities foregone. 
Integration, a framework 
Chapter 3 introduces a model for analysing possibilities for 
integration.  The model identifies three main areas where to identify 
opportunities for integration.  The three areas are tools, actors, and 
structure integration.  Each represents a different understanding of 
organisational behaviour, which in turn entails different strategies for 
accomplishing integration.  They are summarised in the table below 
and are used to guide the discussion of integration options. 
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The perils of planning 
Chapter 6 argues that the dominant project planning tools used by 
Danced, if applied rigidly, can influence environmental assistance 
projects negatively.  It is argued that a dilemma of rigour or relevance 
exists.  If, on the one hand, the rigour of planning is adhered to, we 
have to sacrifice relevance of project contents.  On the other hand, if 
only relevant project objectives are pursued, we must sacrifice the 
rigour of planning.  The chapter analyses two CP case studies from the 
perspective of this dilemma.  Regarding the first case study, the 
chapter argues that a reverse process may have determined project 
objectives.  It is plausible that objectives were decided from the 
availability of measurable and objective indicators of outcomes -- it is 
not the other way around: that objectives are first determined, then 
indicators.  The indicators chosen enabled objective measurements of 
an ex-ante baseline and of ex-post performance, and hence permitted 
an objective quantification of project impact.  The main quality of the 
indicators appeared to be their quantifiability (rigour) -- not their 
Table A Summary model for analysing possibilities for integration 
 
 
Strategy 
for 
integration 
Process  
of integration is  
analysed from an 
understanding of 
Task  
of integration is 
explained from  
the view-point of 
Means --  
to accomplish  
integration, do ... 
Tool rational  
behaviour 
decision- 
making  
capability 
strengthen decision- 
making capability -- 
integrate OHS in the 
intervention methodology  
used to promote CP 
Actor social  
systems 
interpretation  
and negotiation  
of goals and  
objectives  
introduce an actor who can -- 
identify opportunities,  
re-interpret goals,  
negotiate and safeguard  
OHS interest 
Structure organisational  
processes 
formal lines of  
authority, 
hierarchy and 
power 
integrate in reward and 
punishment structures of 
project management --  
set and communicate goals, 
employ accountability  
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relevance.  The second case study points to similar evidence.  The 
small companies are needy and highly relevant to target from an 
environmental point of view.  However, they do not meet the rigorous 
criteria for being eligible for support.  In many respects, the large 
companies have the resources to help themselves and are therefore less 
needy.  They are perhaps also less relevant to target.  Yet, they are the 
ones that are eligible for support. 
Chapter 6 specifically argues that inter-agency rivalry between Danced 
and Danida and a lack of broad political support lead Danced to apply 
planning tools rigorously.  The chapter argues that this would lead to 
particular problems for integration of OHS issues in such projects 
because of a general unavailability of quantifiable and objective 
indicators.  Later developments have proven that Danced had a real 
reason to be concerned over the organisation's survival.  Within weeks 
after the new right-wing government took seat in November 2001, 
when this study was in its terminal phase, Danced was amalgamated 
with Danida.  Danced personnel were scattered to different Danida 
units and assimilated there.  Danced effectively ceased to exist as an 
independent organisation with specific policy aims.  This summary 
will therefore not deal in detail with the (now past) special 
complications arising from the application of the rigour of planning 
due to rivalry with Danida.   
The two case studies in Chapter 6 lead to the following two general 
conclusions: 
• First, that OHS issues must feature in the project specification, 
the so-called Project Document, that is, integration at the 
structure level.  If the Project Document is silent on 
occupational health and safety issues, this can only be 
interpreted by the implementing consultant as evidence that 
OHS is not a legitimate project objective.  In turn, this entails 
that OHS must appear more prominently in the Terms of 
Reference  that start the process of planning a new CP project. 
• Second, that it is important to integrate OHS into the 
methodologies that the implementing consultant uses, when he 
pursues a CP intervention.  This is integration at the tools level.   
This second type of integration, at the tools level, is then the subject of 
detailed empirical examinations in the following two chapters.  One 
empirical study concerns interventions in large companies to which 
formal management systems may be attractive.  The other empirical 
study concerns interventions in small companies.  Both empirical 
studies are independent of Danced CP projects.   
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Study on large companies 
Chapter 7 examines CP interventions aimed at large companies.  This 
study is a direct continuation of the first CP case study of Chapter 6 in 
which environmental management systems played an important role in 
the implementing consultant's promotion of CP in the fish industry.  
The basic research question of this chapter is whether a similar 
approach could be employed within the OHS domain. 
The chapter explores two major themes.  The first concerns the 
effectiveness of top-down systematic management approaches to OHS 
prevention -- seeking to answer the question:  Do such approaches 
improve firm's OHS performance? 
The second theme concerns the ability to measure the quality of 
proactive efforts within the OHS domain.  It is argued that traditional 
measures of OHS are principally inadequate, being reactive in nature 
and focussing on undesired outcomes.  In contrast, proactive indicators 
focus on upstream indicators of the processes that determine these 
outcomes.  The question is -- Can we find upstream indicators of the 
processes that determine these outcomes, so-called proactive OHS 
indicators, that are auditable and certifiable?   
Surprisingly little empirical research has been undertaken to evaluate 
the effectiveness of systematic management approaches to OHS 
prevention.  Even more surprisingly, what little available empirical 
evidence there is paints a dismal picture, depicting such systems as a 
sham.  In the year 2000, a report prepared by Australian researchers for 
the National Occupational Health and Safety Commission on the 
effectiveness on occupational health and safety management systems 
stated that  "... several experts asserted »they don't work«   [...].  More 
common was conditional agreement that they could work, but »the 
jury is still out«".  The report continues, "Very little empirical research 
has been done to evaluate the effectiveness" 1  
Answers to the above questions therefore have relevance beyond this 
Ph.D. study's immediate research question of how to integrate OHS in 
Danced's cleaner production projects.  Companies increasingly address 
OHS issues in top-down formal management systems, for instance in 
ISO series management schemes.  In addition, there are ongoing 
discussions regarding the development of international guidelines on 
occupational safety and health management systems, for instance the 
British Standards Institute OHS management schemes (OHSAS 
18001), and others.  The question regarding effectiveness is crucial to 
the adoption of such systems.  Should it be true that they have no 
effect within the OHS domain, as some authors have suggested, there 
would be no reason for companies to embark on them.  Should the 
systems be effective, the question whether companies' proactive efforts 
                                                          
1
  Gallagher et al. 2000:21, 22 emphasis in original, also quoted in  
Chapter 2, the section starting on page 33 
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are auditable and certifiable becomes extremely relevant to ISO-type 
schemes. 
Two quantitative surveys were carried out in order to evaluate the 
effect of a South African OHS management system.  The results of this 
empirical work refute the negative portrayal of the failure of top-down 
formal management systems within the OHS domain.  The two 
surveys find consistent empirical evidence that companies that have 
implemented top-down formal OHS management systems have a 
reduced incidence of injurious accidents.  The chapter concludes that 
integration at the level of methodology is a viable approach.   
The answer to the second question, whether such systems are auditable 
and certifiable, is more complex.  The answer to the first part of the 
question is affirmative:  Overall, empirical evidence support that 
proactive safety performance indicators can be devised, which show 
improvement in processes rather than outcomes.  The answer to the 
second part of the question is cautiously affirmative.  It is plausible 
that such proactive indicators are certifiable although they seem less 
able to handle only partial disclosure of information or wilful 
deception on the part of the audited entity. 
Study on small companies 
The next Chapter 8 repeats this exercise but this time in a setting of 
small companies.  Top-down systematic formal management 
approaches to OHS prevention have little or no appeal to owner-
managers of small companies.  A considerable body of literature 
suggests that owner-managers of small companies generally view 
authorities and consultants with mistrust; that they perceive systematic 
methods to be overly complex; and that written material is often not 
read and generally has little impact.  Interventions in this segment of 
companies are therefore generally considered to be complex and 
difficult.   
Yet, the ability to effectively target this segment is becoming 
increasingly important.  The last 10-20 years have seen a substantial 
increase in the proportion of small and medium-sized enterprises.  
Their proportion of total employment in industry is growing and 
evidence suggests that their environmental and OHS performance is 
substandard to that of large companies.  Small firms often lack the 
resources, sophistication and motivation to attain minimum legal 
standards.  Small firms generally experience much higher accident 
rates than large enterprises.  At the same time, they are difficult to 
target for regulators. 
Chapter 8 first describes a cleaner production intervention in the metal 
finishing industry of Durban, South Africa, an industrial sector in 
which small companies prevail.  The intervention was of an 
experimental nature, set up to examine if a networking approach 
developed in Europe in the 1990s could be successfully transferred to 
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the South African setting.  The intervention concept is that a limited 
number of companies form a Club in which they share information and 
experiences regarding preventive approaches to pollution.   
The chapter then identifies and describes an earlier OHS intervention 
concept, developed in the 1980s under the auspices of the International 
Labour Organisation.  The main argument of the chapter is that the two 
concepts share so many similarities that the conditions are met for a 
successful integration of environmental and OHS issues.  It is also 
argued, however, that the two concepts share the same vulnerabilities.  
Specifically, it is argued that favourable financial cost-benefit 
arguments are too simplistic drivers.  They ignore both scarcity of 
managerial attention and opportunity costs, and are therefore, although 
important, inadequate to predict and explain company behaviour.  The 
intervention becomes far more effective if supported on a broader 
front, notably if backed by regulatory action.   
Raising intervention effectiveness through 'wielding a stick', involving 
more regulation or higher financial charges, is probably unrealistic, 
however.  Many of South Africa's contemporary problems regarding 
poverty and crime are perceived as inseparable from high 
unemployment rates.  Job creation is a major priority to the 
Government and small and medium sized enterprises are seen as the 
most realistic, perhaps the only, providers of new jobs.  Regulatory 
action or financial charges that would conflict with the objective of 
encouraging growth of the small business sector are therefore unlikely 
to be implemented.  This leaves the carrot (subsidies) as the most 
realistic option to improve implementation efficiency. 
In summary, the chapter argues that integration at the level of 
methodology is a viable approach.  
Conclusions 
In summary, the key conclusions on how to integrate occupational 
health and safety in cleaner production projects are: 
1. It is a necessary precondition that OHS be established as a 
legitimate project objective.  OHS must feature in the project 
specification, specifically in the so-called Terms of Reference and 
in the Project Document.    
2. OHS issues should be integrated at the level of methodology in the 
implementation phase.  The methodology used by the consultant to 
promote CP in industry should be modified also to accommodate 
OHS issues.  Research undertaken in this study provides consistent 
empirical evidence in support of the viability of this approach -- 
both for large companies for which a formal management system 
approach may be attractive, and for small companies for which an 
informal network intervention approach may be more attractive. 
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3. Positive incentive structures should be established that reward 
companies which address twin problems.  As noted earlier, twin 
problems are those where problems in the external and the internal 
environment have the same root cause.  The most efficient manner 
of focusing on twin problems is to target the physical investment 
subsidy element, simply giving preference to investment proposals 
that improve both OHS and environmental performance. 
4. It is likely to be quite effective to enlarge the actor system and 
introduce an actor that can safeguard OHS interest while the 
project is being planned and implemented and who can seize on 
unexpected opportunities for integration as they arise.  This 
approach should be considered in the planning phase.  However, in 
the protracted implementation phase, the costs of such an actor will 
likely be prohibitive.  While effective, enlarging the actor system 
is unlikely to be an efficient means of integration. 
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
Background 
Danced projects 
The Danish Co-operation for Environment and Development (Danced) 
is a state run aid agency, which specialises in environmental assistance 
projects2.  The agency was born out of the recommendations of the 
1992 UN conference on Environment and Development in Rio de 
Janeiro, Brazil.  The Rio declaration outlined, among others, that 
environmental assistance must form an integral part of development 
policy and that all countries should have shared, but diverse, 
responsibility for solving global environmental and developmental 
problems. 
Danced began to co-operate with the South African government in 
1995.  Its project portfolio by mid 2000 is quite broad.  Support is 
given to environmental NGOs (non-governmental organisations), to 
capacity building in local environmental administrations, to 
strengthening of the general awareness and public participation in 
environmental matters, and to white-book studies and the development 
of national environmental policies in the central administration. 
Danced also supports projects aimed at the private industrial sector.  
The most prominent of these industrial sector projects is the initiative 
to promote the use of cleaner production technologies in the South 
African industrial sectors of fish, textile, and metal-finishing.   
These projects are the objects of interest for this Ph.D. research study.  
The purpose of the research is to reveal ways in which an integrated 
approach to cleaner production can be pursued.  An approach that 
deals both the external environment and the working conditions -- the 
environment of the workers.  
                                                          
2
  In December 2001, Danced was amalgamated with the state run development 
agency, Danida, due to a new government coming into power -- well after the 
majority of this thesis had been written.  Danced was formally closed down by 
late December 2001 and environmental assistance projects will from that date be 
within the purview of Danida. 
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Cleaner production 
The principal focus of cleaner production (CP) is the anticipation and 
prevention of pollution and waste generation at the source coupled 
with an overall strive to use resources (raw materials) more efficiently.  
The concept emerged in the 1980s where it represented a radical 
departure from earlier environmental approaches, most notably 
because cost-efficiency became a major driver.  Cleaner production 
initiatives were in many instances marketed to companies under the 
slogan that pollution prevention pays.   
Private consulting companies embraced CP as a new production 
concept, which could be marketed to companies together with other 
efficiency oriented manufacturing concepts of Japanese origin, popular 
at the time, such as the just-in-time reduction of inventories, the strive 
for quality and zero defects etc.   
Regulators also embraced the concept as a new regulatory strategy, 
which held promises of easing the traditional adversarial nature of the 
relations between environmental authorities and companies.  The 
interests of regulator suddenly were coincident with the interests of 
industry.  The regulators had interests in improved environmental 
performance of firms.  Companies had interests in more cost-efficient 
production methods.  A number of national as well as international 
bodies (for instance UNIDO) therefore launched initiatives to 
encourage the adoption of cleaner production techniques in industry.   
Danish experiences with cleaner production 
In Denmark, the first initiative towards the promotion of CP in the 
Danish industry came with the government's development programme 
for cleaner technology, presented to parliament in 1986.  The Council 
for Reuse and Less Polluting Technologies was formed in 1987, 
which, backed by public funding, offered financial support to the 
development of cleaner technologies.  The council could for instance 
provide financial support to promising new CP pilot project with the 
aim to underwrite some of the business risk inherent to all 
development of new production processes.  The policy purpose was to 
establish and demonstrate in practice the potential of cleaner 
technologies to improve the environmental performance of companies.   
Three such support programmes were carried out in Denmark over a 
period of 10 years, one programme in the period 1987-1989, one in 
1990-1992, and one in 1993-1997.  The total budget for these CP 
programmes is estimated at approximately DKK 620m (  83m)3.  
                                                          
3
   Program details from Andersen and Jørgensen (1995:15-16),   
financial details from Jensen et al. (1998:2) 
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The CP support programme in South Africa 
The aim of the Danced CP support programme in South Africa is to 
share the knowledge and experience that has been developed in 
Denmark as a consequence of this national 10 year effort in the 
promotion on CP techniques.  There is, however, a clear scope 
difference between the activities in Denmark and the Danced support 
programme.  A considerable amount of effort in the Danish 
programme has gone into the development of new technologies that, 
while promising, also represented uncertainty in terms of actual 
performance, costs, and benefits.  The national support programme 
thus had elements of applied research and development.  In contrast 
hereto, the intent of the Danced support programme is to transfer 
practical knowledge and experiences, not to undertake development 
efforts.  
The problem -- CP is too narrowly focused 
The United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) defines cleaner 
production as "the continuous application of an integrated, preventive 
strategy applied to processes, products and services in pursuit of 
economic, social, health, safety and environmental benefits." (UNEP 
2001).  This brief yet concise definition does include workplace health 
and safety which, in principle, is put on the same footing as 
"environmental benefit".   
In practice however, this is seldom so.  A review of cleaner production 
reports, case studies, conference proceedings, articles in journals, and 
other CP material will quickly reveal that only passing reference is 
made to worker health and safety issues, if at all mentioned.  This fact 
is also evident in the naming of other environmental concepts such as 
pollution prevention, waste minimisation, eco-efficiency, green 
productivity, etc., for which cleaner production is often used as an 
umbrella term.  The naming of these concepts associates more with 
environmental issues, 'pollution', 'waste', and 'green' than with 
workplace conditions.  Interestingly, advocates of the environmental 
cause have been able to monopolise the word 'environment' in the 
public and academic debate in a sense that it excludes the environment 
of the workers.4 
Why integrate? -- the sub-optimality argument 
Two types of sub-optimalities 
Various authors have raised concerns that cleaner production, as 
currently practised, poses a risk of media shifting from environmental 
problems to worker (and sometimes community) health and safety 
problems.  The argument is basically one of the existence of 
undesirable sub-optimalities.   
                                                          
4
  I am paraphrasing Goldschmidt (1995:29) in making this point 
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Two distinct types of sub-optimalities can be identified.   
1 Media shifting occurs if problems, when 'solved' within the 
environmental domain, give rise to new, and unforeseen, 
problems within the workplace domain.   
2 A missed opportunity occurs if a cleaner production practice, 
while improving environmental performance, is only sub-
optimal, because a better practice could have been chosen, which 
also improved workplace conditions. 
It follows, that some sort co-ordination or planning activity that could 
eliminate or at least reduce the probability of occurrence of this type of 
undesirable media shifting would be beneficial. 
Evidence of media shifting in Denmark 
There is some empirical evidence supporting that the risks of media 
shifting are not entirely hypothetical.  Handberg (1993:23) provides 
two examples where projects to reduce environmental pollution 
resulted in serious and unforeseen occupational health and safety  
problems.   
The first example involved a waste sorting and re-cycle facility in 
which some manual sorting of waste took place.  Unfortunately, toxins 
created from microbiological activity in the waste caused a number of 
adverse effects on workers, ranging from acute poisonings to the 
development of chronic asthma.  The problems were so severe that the 
factory inspector closed down the facility on several occasions.   
It is debatable whether this particular environmental project falls under 
the concept of cleaner production.  The environmental intervention 
does not take place at the source, preventing waste from being 
generated in the first place.  Yet, it confirms the general suspicion that 
environmental projects may be undertaken with little attention paid to 
workplace health and safety.   
The second example by Handberg involved "an ambitious" cleaner 
production project which was backed by funding from Miljøstyrelsen, 
the Danish Environmental Protection Agency.  The project comprised 
recycling of process water at Grenå Pap, a Danish paper pulp producer.  
The project was subsequently awarded the prestigious European Union 
Environmental Prize.  However, microbiological activity was again not 
sworn in and a number of employees developed symptoms of ill 
health, which were eventually traced to toxins in the process water.   
Embarrassingly, the environmental prize winning recycling system had 
to be re-designed because the workers fell ill. 
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The CP clearinghouse study 
Nicholas A. Ashford, a researcher at the Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology, USA, has reported the results of a study conducted for the 
European Union.  The study examined the nature of the information 
that is available in the International Cleaner Production Information 
Clearinghouse (ICPIC).  This is a knowledge bank under the United 
Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP) set up to facilitate the 
dissemination of promising cleaner production techniques.  In the 
study, a representative selection of cases in the ICPIC system were 
examined.   
Ashford (1997:117-118) observes that the "most striking feature" of 
the case studies was the "complete lack" of information regarding 
interactions of humans with the production processes, materials, or 
products.  From a worker health perspective, Ashford observes, this is 
a serious problem that must be solved if media shifting is to be 
avoided.  In addition, information was lacking about the manner in 
which materials were added to a process, maintained, stored and 
disposed.  Moreover, information on the physical forms of the 
substances at certain stages in the process was limited.  Potential 
occupational exposure to hazardous chemicals could thus not be 
predicted because basic information was omitted.  This state of affairs 
obviously hampers an assessment of the possible occupational risks of 
the new cleaner production techniques in the ICPIC clearinghouse. 
The study then carried on with an in-depth analysis of eight 
technologies that represented a process or product line that had 
significance from an economic or industrial policy perspective.  Four 
of the technologies worsened the health and safety of workers -- of 
which two were classified as a "deterioration", and the other two as a 
"significant deterioration" (media shifting).  Of the remaining four 
technologies, three did not trade off environmental benefits for 
worsened health and safety but were sub-optimal, because missed 
opportunities for even better environmental and worker protection 
performance were identified by the study participants.  The last case 
was an example of a technology, which both deteriorated worker 
health and safety and represented a missed opportunity.  Indeed, a 
dismal performance from the point of view of occupational health and 
safety . 
Is lack of integration a material issue? 
The study reported by Ashford is unclear on how prevalent this state of 
affairs is.  But the study clearly demonstrates that a narrow focus on 
environmental concerns can overlook problems created or missed with 
regard to occupational health and safety.   
This revelation can be put in a broader economic perspective.  There is 
consistent evidence that the societal costs from work-related injuries 
and ill-health are very considerable, although also that their size escape 
a precise computation.   
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In the United States, workplace injury costs have been estimated at  
$140bn, some 2.4 percent of that country's gross domestic product5.  
Lanoie and Tavenas (1996:181) observe that in a typical year in the 
US, more than 50 times as many working days are lost to work injuries 
as to labour strikes.  Additionally, they observe that from one-half to 
one-third as many working days are lost to work injuries as to 
unemployment.   
In Australia, the 'total costs' of workplace injuries are estimated at 
about five percent of that country's gross domestic product6.  Estimates 
in Denmark indicate that the 'direct costs' from poor working 
conditions amount to about 2.5 percent of the gross national product7, 
very close to the figure of the United States.  Direct costs in the Danish 
estimate comprise hospitalisation, pensions, and earnings foregone 
while disabled from work.  The cost estimates inevitably depend on 
the accounting principles in use.  Whatever the exact costs are, 
however, it is clear that we are dealing with very large figures, both in 
absolute terms, and in proportion to the total wealth produced in the 
society.  Nor should it be overlooked that these cool financial figures 
represent a considerable amount of human suffering. 
In summary, the line of reasoning so far has lead to the recognition of 
the following points of views: 
• That environmental issues easily can be, and often are, pursued 
narrow-mindedly with little attention paid to workplace conditions. 
• That this may lead to the implementation of sub-optimal solutions, 
either because environmental benefits are traded for a deterioration 
in workplace health and safety (media-shifting) or because less 
than optimal solution are being implemented (opportunities 
foregone). 
• That adverse occupational health and safety conditions lead to very 
substantial costs to the society. 
These three arguments form the both the starting point and the main 
justification for this Ph.D. study. 
                                                          
5
  Estimate provided in Miller and Galbraith (1995:746) to $140bn (1990 dollars).  
Word Bank statistics report that the US GDP was $5,750.8bn in 1990 (United 
States at a glance - World Bank 2001) 
6
  Figures from Industry Commission (1995), Canberra, Australia, as quoted  
in Hopkins (1999:144) 
7
  Cost figure referred to in report issued by the Danish National Audit Office 
(Rigsrevisionen) (NAO 2000:clause 67) amounts to DKK 23bn, a figure that was 
estimated in 1994.  Percentage computed from the Danish GNP for 1993, DKK 
900bn as provided by Danmarks Statistik.   
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Cleaner production -- a paradigm based on 
prevention 
Defining and understanding CP 
The definition of cleaner production used in this thesis will be the most 
recent by the United Nations Environment Programme, which defines 
cleaner production as  
"The continuous application of an integrated, preventive strategy 
applied to processes, products and services in pursuit of economic, 
social, health, safety and environmental benefits."8   
It is probably more illuminating to review the road that took us to 
cleaner production than going into the intricacies of the written 
definition.  Over the past half century9, the industrialised nations have 
responded to pollution and environmental degradation in (at least) four 
characteristic ways.   
• First, by ignoring the problem.   
• Second, by diluting or dispersing the pollution, so that its effects 
are less harmful or apparent.   
• Third, by trying to control the pollution, utilising filters or 
cleansing processes.   
• Fourth, by employing cleaner production through the prevention of 
pollution at the source of production.   
The sequence has thus been one of:  ignore, dilute, control, and 
prevent. 
The key difference between pollution control and cleaner production is 
one of timing.  Pollution control is an after-the-event, react-and-treat 
approach.  In contrast, cleaner production is a forward-looking 
anticipate-and-prevent philosophy.  Prevention, as is well known, is 
always better than cure. 
                                                          
8
  As defined in UNEP's "International declaration on cleaner production" (UNEP 
2001).  This definition differs slightly from earlier UNEP definitions.  For 
instance, the one in use in the late 1990s, which reads:  "The continuos 
application of an integrated preventive environmental strategy applied to 
processes, products and services to increase eco-efficiency and reduce risk to 
humans and the environment".  Still earlier, in a 1994 UNEP publication, the 
concept was defined as:  "The continuous use of industrial processes and products 
to prevent the pollution of air, water and land, reduce wastes at source, and 
minimise risks to the human population and the environment".  I conclude that 
the object of interest gradually has been broadened from the production process 
to also the product, the scope of actions expanded from equipment and 
technology to also services, and workplace health and safety have been more 
explicitly phrased. 
9
  Much of this and the following three paragraphs are paraphrasing text in  
UNEP (1994:3-4) 
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Cleaner production can be achieved in a number of different ways, of 
which three important are:  changing attitudes, applying know-how, 
and improving technology.  Technology can be improved in several 
ways, for instance: 
• Change the process or manufacturing technology 
• Change input materials 
• Change the final product, and 
• Reuse or recycle materials on-site, preferably within the 
production process.  (Off-site recycling is not part of cleaner 
production, though it may bring substantial environmental 
benefits) 
Waste minimisation techniques, for example, emerged as an early form 
of CP.  As documented in a United Nations publication (UNEP 1991), 
this approach calls for a listing of the production sub-processes, 
keeping account of the material streams that enter and leave each sub-
process.  A mass balance is established for each sub-process in which 
the material streams going into the sub-process (raw materials, utility 
materials, etc) are balanced with the material streams that leave it 
(products, waste, etc).   
The core idea is that generation of waste represents an inefficient 
usage of the raw materials.  The ideal production process will convert 
all raw materials to valuable products.  Pollution is, in this view, 
valuable raw material that simply failed to be converted to valuable 
product due to inefficient practices or production methods.   
While the core idea is simple, perhaps bordering to trivial, the 
techniques are able to produce dramatic results, for instance order-of-
magnitude reductions in water consumption.  There are also important 
trickle-down effects.  If water consumption is reduced, so is the 
wastewater volume, which allows a smaller wastewater treatment unit 
that, in turn, demands less capital outlay.   
It is probably difficult to overestimate the significance of this new 
perception of pollution.  When pollution was suddenly viewed as a 
production inefficiency, pollution prevention became synonymous 
with more efficient operations, and investments in pollution prevention 
practices would suddenly show positive pay-back periods.  This is in 
stark contrast with pollution control.  Payback periods and other 
indicators of financial feasibility are invariably unfavourable to 
investments in pollution abatement.   
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Related CP terms 
Pollution Prevention.  The terms pollution prevention and cleaner 
production are often used interchangeably.  The distinction between 
the two tends to be geographic -- the term pollution prevention tends to 
be used in North America, while cleaner production is used in other 
parts of the world.  Both cleaner production and pollution prevention 
(sometimes abbreviated: P2) focus on a strategy of continuously 
reducing pollution and environmental impact through source reduction 
Eco-Efficiency.  This term was coined by the World Business Council 
for Sustainable Development in 1992.  However, the concepts of eco-
efficiency and cleaner production are almost synonymous.  The slight 
difference between them is that eco-efficiency starts from issues of 
economic efficiency which have positive environmental benefits, 
while cleaner production starts from issues of environmental efficiency 
which have positive economic benefits. 
Green Productivity.  Green productivity is a term used by the Asian 
Productivity Organization (APO) to address the challenge of achieving 
sustainable production.  The APO started its green productivity 
programme in 1994.  Just like cleaner production, green productivity is 
a strategy for enhancing productivity and environmental performance 
for overall socio-economic development. 
Waste Minimisation.  The concept of waste minimisation was 
introduced by the United States Environmental Protection Agency in 
1988.  In this concept, waste prevention approach and its techniques 
are defined as on-site source reduction of waste by changes of input 
raw materials, technology changes, good operating practices and 
product changes. Off-site recycling by direct reuse after reclamation 
are also considered to be waste minimisation techniques, but have a 
distinctly lower priority compared to on-site prevention or 
minimisation of waste.  The waste minimisation concept is used in the 
Pollution Prevention Directive (1992).  Currently, waste minimisation 
and pollution prevention terms are often used interchangeably.  Waste 
minimisation is a broader term that also includes off-site recycling and 
other means to reduce the amount of waste which must be 
treated/disposed of. 10 
Cleaner Technology.  The terms cleaner production and cleaner 
technology are used interchangeably in Denmark.  Cleaner technology 
may convey an undertone of a more narrow view of cleaner 
production, that specifically considers technology solutions to 
pollution prevention, thereby excluding other types of preventive 
approaches such as production planning, environmental management, 
and good housekeeping practices.  Because of this slight ambiguity, 
the term cleaner production should be preferred. 
                                                          
10
  Most of the definitions in this section are based on UNEP 2001a 
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Evolution of environmental paradigms 
The last fifty years or so have seen an accelerated development of 
environmental paradigms.  Describing the development on a rough 
time line, first-generation approaches to pollution alleviation were 
mostly concerned with dilution of waste streams.  Long wastewater 
pipelines would discharge effluents far away from shorelines to ensure 
adequate dilution of the pollutants.  Tall smokestacks would release 
airborne pollutants high above ground to ensure good dispersion and 
tolerable concentrations at ground level.   
However, as it became increasingly clear that the ambient environment 
had only limited dilution capacity, this approach gradually gave way to 
new abatement measures based on cleansing or filter technologies.  
Treatment plants would separate pollutants from wastewater streams, 
filters would be installed at smokestacks to remove particles and other 
specific pollutants, incinerators would combust harmful compounds, 
before releasing the remaining effluent streams into the ambient 
environment.  These second-generation approaches are under one 
referred to as End-of-Pipe (EOP), highlighting the fact that abatement 
measures are applied at some stage after the pollutants have been 
created.  Filter solutions pay no particular attention to the processes 
that generate the pollutants but instead to techniques that can take out 
and concentrate pollutants from the waste streams prior to release.   
There are two major drawbacks associated with this second-generation 
approach.  The first is that pollutants are seldom removed, but often 
merely change medium.  Most EOP strategies are thus creating new 
waste problems, concerning the disposal of the filter products.  To 
make matters worse, in many instances the waste disposal problem is 
aggravated because most filter solutions consume raw materials -- 
filter bags, filter aid material, etc. -- increasing the total amount of 
waste which has to be disposed off.  The second major drawback, 
which filter solutions share with the first-generation dilution 
approaches, is that pollution abatement is an activity that does not add 
value to industrial production.  Payback periods and other indicators of 
financial feasibility are invariably unfavourable to investments in 
pollution abatement. 
It is on this background that the concept of CP emerged in the late 
1980s as a radically new environmental strategy based on prevention.  
While the earlier environmental strategies largely viewed the 
production process as a black box, CP unveils the production process 
and maintains a clear focus on the processes and sub-processes that 
generate pollution.   
Other environmental paradigms have evolved after CP.  It is true for 
many products that the pollution arising from the production process 
itself constitutes only a small fraction of the total pollution during the 
lifetime of the product.  The pollution arising from the production or 
winning of raw materials, the product's usage of various resources (for 
instance energy) during its lifetime, and the environmental impacts 
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associated with the disposal of the product, will often outweigh the 
pollution narrowly associated with the production of it.  Life cycle 
analysis (LCA) has emerged as a fourth generation paradigm to 
address the complexity of these problems.  In response thereto the 
Environmental Protection Agency in Denmark renamed its 'cleaner 
production' unit to a 'cleaner products' unit in 1998. 
The developments have not stopped here, however.  There is 
increasing interest in the overall environmental performance of 
networks of companies.  Companies may in some instances benefit 
from each other in cases where waste from one company may serve as 
raw material to another.  An interesting example is found in 
Kalundborg, Denmark, where a refinery, a power plant, and a producer 
of gypsonite boards exchange streams of waste material and energy.  
The power plant's waste product from the desulphurisation of flue 
gasses finds usage as a raw material in the production of gypsum.  
There is furthermore a complex exchange of streams of energy, where 
the 'waste energy' of one company is useable in the other.  These types 
of considerations are the core of the fifth generation environmental 
strategies termed 'industrial ecology' (as in Oldenburg and Geiser 
1997) or 'industrial symbiosis'. 
An overview of the succession of environmental paradigms is shown 
in Table 1 overleaf.  It is noteworthy that the paradigms do not replace 
each other.  Even if a company has adopted cleaner production 
practices, there is still likely to be need for various end-of-pipe filter 
measures as well as a need for dilution of the effluent streams.   
This is clearly espoused in the 'hierarchy of environmental 
management' which places the highest priority on 1) preventing 
pollution through source reduction, 2) only then on reuse techniques, 
or closed-loop recycling, and only then on 3) treatment, and finally 4) 
disposal.  That is, in fact, a hierarchy of principles of preventive 
action11. 
 
                                                          
11
  This 'environmental management hierarchy ' is reinforced in e.g. the US 
Pollution Prevention Act of 1990 
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From this analysis of paradigms, I will argue that the cleaner 
production approach is the only environmental paradigm that pays 
detailed attention to the production process.  This is an issue of 
considerable importance to a research project that is concerned with 
integration of occupational health and safety into cleaner production 
projects.   
Precisely because OHS is intricately connected with the production 
process, I will argue that the environmental strategy of CP is the one 
that has the most promising prospect for integration with OHS 
initiatives. 
 
Table 1 Succession of environmental paradigms 
 
Environmental 
paradigm 
Ethos  Actions aim to Object of 
interest 
Deals with 
production 
process  
First generation dilute and 
disperse 
reduce effects of  
pollution --  
after release 
the  
recipient 
issue  
ignored  
Second generation 
End-of-Pipe (EOP) 
cleanse and 
filter 
abate pollution at the 
point of discharge --  
prior to release  
the  
emission 
black-box 
Third generation 
Cleaner  
production 
prevention is 
better than 
cure 
prevent pollution at  
the source --  
when the product is 
produced 
the 
production 
process  
(the firm) 
detailed 
analysis 
Fourth generation 
Life cycle  
analysis (LCA) 
cradle to  
grave 
Prevent pollution at  
the source --  
the product is the main 
cause of pollution 
the  
product 
some 
analysis 
Fifth generation 
Industrial symbiosis 
Industrial ecology 
symbiosis and 
the materials 
cycle 
optimise resource flows 
within networks of  
firms 
material 
flows in 
networks  
of firms 
coarse 
analysis 
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Preventive strategies within OHS 
Dilute, filter, prevent 
Similarities can be identified between the environmental strategies 
described above, and developments within the field of occupational 
health and safety strategies.  Traditional measures to control risks from 
e.g. exposure to harmful chemical substances have comprised a mix of 
first and second generation measures.  For example measures to ensure 
adequate ventilation of the workplace (a dilution strategy) and 
measures to protect the employee from those substances by means of 
personal protective equipment (a filter strategy).   
Strategies involving elements of prevention and combating risks at the 
source have, however, also played some role for at least a century.  
The Safety Movement in the USA, which emerged in the early 1900s, 
campaigned actively for the prevention of accidents through 
engineering revision.  For example by safeguarding the transmission 
shafts, belt, pulleys and other rotating machinery parts, that were 
omnipresent at the workplaces of the time and exposed the workers to 
extreme dangers. 
The most important similarity, however, is the prominent position 
given to prevention as the major strategy to improve occupational 
health and safety.   
General principles of prevention 
The 1989 European Union Framework Directive (89/391/EEC) on 
health and safety at work provided a set of "general principles of 
prevention", which the employer shall apply to protect the safety and 
health of workers (EU 1989: article 6).  The principles are presented 
below because they so clearly portray a hierarchical and systematic 
approach to the prevention of adverse workplace conditions. 
The principles shall be applied in the following order of priority: 
1 avoid risks  
2 evaluate the risks which cannot be avoided:  
3 combat the risks at source;  
4 replace the dangerous by the non-dangerous or the less 
dangerous (substitute);  
5 give collective protective measures priority over individual 
protective measures  
6 give appropriate instructions to the workers. 
The emphasis on prevention is unmistakable.  Workplace hazards are 
to be avoided altogether.  Only if they cannot be avoided, they are to 
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be assessed and reduced.  First, as close to the source of the hazard as 
possible.  Second, by substituting the dangerous with the less 
dangerous.  Third, only after source reduction and substitution have 
taken place, should mitigating measures be employed.  Collective 
measures, such as the shielding of a noisy machine, shall have 
preference over individual measures, such as providing the workers 
with personal protective equipment.  Only then should instructions 
(behavioural modification) be considered.  
Basic preconditions for integration met 
I will therefore argue, that important initial preconditions for a 
successful integration of occupational health and safety into cleaner 
production projects are met, at least at their face value 
• Both subjects pursue prevention as the prime goal (same objective) 
• Both subjects direct their analysis at the production process (same 
object of interest) 
• Both subjects employ prevention through established hierarchies of 
principles (same analytical methodology) 
This initial line of reasoning, while quite simplified of course, provides 
a first optimistic view of the prospects for integrating cleaner 
production and occupational health and safety.  The emphasis of both 
subjects on the same object of interest, the production process, and on 
preventive strategies and source reduction, bodes well for the 
prospects for integration.  Of all the environmental paradigms 
contemplated above, the paradigm of cleaner production is the most 
obvious candidate for integration with occupational health and safety. 
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Chapter 2.  
Empirical field and research methodology 
The empirical field 
The title of this project is integration of occupational health and safety 
in cleaner production projects.  Hence, the basic empirical field of this 
study is 'a cleaner production project' sponsored by Danced and 
implemented in South Africa.   
The term 'project' could perhaps, misleadingly, suggest that the 
empirical field is narrow, confined to a single project, or to a single set 
of activities undertaken in a company.  This is not so.  I will lay out a 
description of the empirical field over the next couple of pages based 
on a discussion of actors, activities, the process, and the concept of a 
standard CP project.  Reference will continuously be made to  
Figure 1 on page 17. 
Major actors 
While Danced is accountable to the Danish parliament for public funds 
spent on cleaner production projects, it is important to realise that the 
Danced organisation itself, in terms of total number of man-hours 
spent over the project's life, only undertakes a small amount of the 
actual work.  Rather, Danced assumes a project management and co-
ordinator role and relies extensively on subcontracting arrangements in 
which consultants and other actors carry out work on behalf of 
Danced.  These actors are deeply involved in decisions that range from 
strategy formation and project planning to the more operational day-to-
day decision-making activities.  They are typically from a consulting 
company, sometimes a non-governmental organisation, or 
occasionally, an academic institution.  These consultants have 
considerable influence over the projects and are actors of major 
importance to this study. 
The purpose of the cleaner production project is to bring about some 
sort of change at company level.  The companies that participate in the 
project are thus major actors (see Figure 1).  It is true that they make 
up a highly heterogeneous group.  This thesis will make a crude 
distinction between two groups of companies, the large and the small.  
While this operational distinction usually refers to the number of 
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employees in the company, usually drawing the line at about 100-200 
employees12, this is slightly misleading.  The management structure of 
the firm would be a better criterion.   
Large companies are characterised by a professional management 
structure.  The term 'professional' is not normative, suggesting that 
they should have superior intellectual capabilities or aptitudes.  Rather 
it refers to a situation where individuals in managerial positions have 
entered into an agent-principal arrangement with the equity holders of 
the company to run the company on their behalf.  Management 
structures in these companies tend to be hierarchic and bureaucratic 
with well-defined areas of responsibility compartmentalised into a 
number of staff functions.  There is a general manager, a sales 
manager, a production manager, perhaps a quality manager, a safety 
officer, etc.  Organisational stability and predictability are prized 
values and systematic 'methods' or rational 'management systems' that 
bring order to a disorganised world can be attractive to this group of 
companies. 
This is in contrast with small companies in which one individual, 
usually the owner, handles the majority of the day-to-day issues of the 
business.  He deals with negotiations with new customers, the daily 
production planning, the occasional hiring and firing of workers, 
handling the contact with authorities, etc.  Lack of time on the part of 
this individual and the large amount of very different issues that 
constantly compete for his attention are the important characteristics of 
this group of companies.   
It is sometimes argued that most owners of small and medium sized 
enterprises (SMSEs) by very nature are different from those of large 
companies.  Many owners of SMSEs have previously been employed 
and acquired skills in larger companies, the argument goes.  But they 
chose to set up their own company precisely because they wanted to 
have more direct control and greater flexibility to adjust quickly to 
business opportunities.  Systematic 'methods' and 'planning tools' that 
intend to bring order to chaos may therefore be perceived as simply 
being incompatible with the core values of small companies.  
Perceived disadvantages of such methods include that they are time 
consuming, may limit the prized flexibility and perhaps threaten the 
owner's perception of control.  There is a considerable body of 
literature that suggests that SMSEs generally view consultants with 
mistrust, and that they perceive systematic methods to be overly 
complex.  Written material, for instance, is often not read and has 
generally little impact on this group of companies13.  
The last actor depicted on Figure 1 is the National Accounting Office 
(NAO) which oversees that public funds are spent efficiently by 
Danced and in accordance with the guidelines laid out by parliament. 
                                                          
12
   For instance as defined in South African legislation (Act 102, 1996,:schedule) 
13
   Sacob (2000).  Tait and Walker (2000). Limborg and Hasle (1996). 
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Figure 1 Outline of a Danced cleaner production project --  
the empirical field of this study 
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Activities 
Three major activities can be identified in a cleaner production project: 
planning, implementing and completion.  The activities are 
conceptually straightforward.  The purpose of the planning activity is 
to identify and focus the project on a set of problems, which within the 
constraints in terms of funding, time and available knowledge and in 
combination with opportunities and other external factor are likely to 
yield the best attainable project results.  Implementation is also 
conceptually straightforward, simply to implement the planned 
activities.  In the completion phase a review is carried out where 
results actually achieved are compared against the planned expected 
outcomes of the project and lessons learnt recorded. 
The process 
The description that follows below is very simplified and only serves 
to provide an overview of the process.  Reference is again made to 
Figure 1, numbers in parentheses corresponds with the numbers on the 
figure. 
The process starts with the Danish government in parliament giving 
Danced a mandate to carry out environmental assistance projects.  
Based on this mandate, Danced produces a number of overall strategy 
papers, including a South African country programme (1) that defines 
the areas of priority.  Within the bounds of this strategy projects may 
be defined and supported financially by Danced. 
At some stage in time, a decision is made to support a cleaner 
production programme in the South African industry.  This begins the 
project preparation (PLAN) phase.  Danced then subcontracts the actual 
task of project planning to a consultant based on (2) a contractual 
agreement, a so-called Terms of Reference (TOR).  Subcontracting is a 
commercial business activity and the consultant is selected after a 
competitive tender procedure has concluded. 
The selected consultant (3), henceforth: the planning consultant, then 
starts the planning task in accordance with the guidelines laid out in 
Danced's two major planning tools for programming new projects:  the 
so-called Logical Framework Approach (LFA) and the Project Cycle 
(PC).  These two tools prescribe at length which good-planning-
practices and procedures that are to be followed.  The LFA tool, for 
example, defines a two-phase, seven-step approach to be used during 
the project preparation phase.  As the planning task is advancing, 
progress meetings (4) are held with Danced.  The final outcome (5) of 
the project preparation task is a Project Document.   
In principle, this central and highly structured document constitutes an  
all-inclusive specification of the project.  It includes detailed 
descriptions of the objectives and results that the project shall attain, 
the activities necessary to achieve those objectives, and the 
corresponding inputs, e.g. financial inputs, required.   
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The project now moves into the implementation (IMPLEMENT) phase.  
With the Project Document serving as the Terms of Reference (6), 
laying out the details of the contractual agreement, a consultant (7), 
henceforth: the implementing consultant, is selected for 
implementation of the project.  The selection is again preceded by a 
competitive tender procedure.   
Over the next three years the implementing consultant undertakes the 
day-to-day management and major decision-makings (8) of the project, 
guided by the intentions and objectives set out in the Project 
Document.  There is a formal fixed-interval reporting procedure (9) in 
which Danced may monitor and review project progress.  The industry 
association of the companies that participate (10) in the project have 
representatives on a Project Steering Committee, in which also Danced 
has a seat, which gathers at fixed intervals providing Danced with a 
further opportunity to monitor (11) project progress.  
As the project ends some results (12) have materialised.  In the 
completion phase that follows (EVALUATE) a new consultant (13) will 
be appointed to review the quality, quantity and sustainability of those 
results and compare them with those that were anticipated in the 
Project Document.  Lessons learned, positive and negative, are to be 
fed back (14) into the Danced organisation to enhance the planning of 
future projects.  At any time may the National Accounting Office 
(NAO) carry out its own evaluative investigations (15) and channel 
this information back to parliament. 
Fragmentation, potential for disorganisation and a profound 
reliance on written documentation 
The course of events described here cannot do justice to the 
complexity of the planning and project management tools that are in 
use and Danced's project management procedures.  For instance, the 
Project Cycle (PC) planning tool identifies twelve distinct phases in a 
project, starting with project identification, and ending with impact 
evaluation.  Other consultants than those mentioned above may be 
involved in pre-appraisal, appraisal, monitoring and review activities.  
There are also other important pieces of written information than the 
Project Document and the TORs, etc.  
Nevertheless, the description above suffices to illustrate three major 
points.  First, that there are multiple principal-agent relationships, that 
is, contractual arrangements between a principal (Danced) and an 
agent (a consultant) acting on behalf of the principal.  The role of 
Danced is to co-ordinate and manage the process, not to enter into 
detailed planning or implementation activities. 
Second, that there are manifest forces at work that tend to fragment 
activities and disorganise the process.  There are many interfaces and 
there is a lack of continuity arising from the use of different 
consultants.  This discontinuity, or segmentation, is a deliberately 
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sought feature of the project management approach, as it is a 
mechanism to control any vested interests of the consultants.  
Experience and common sense tell us that an individual (consultant) 
who implements a project cannot be expected to evaluate his own 
efforts in an impartial manner.  The same line of reasoning lies behind 
the use of different consultants in the identification, planning, 
appraisal, implementation, monitoring and evaluation phases.   
Third, that the fragmented approach leads to a heavy reliance on 
written documentation as the carrier of information and continuity.   
In fact, the objectives oriented project planning and management tool, 
LFA, was originally developed in order to enhance the quality of the 
project documentation.  The LFA tool structures the main elements in 
a project, highlighting the logical linkages between intended inputs, 
planned activities and expected results.  It also organises important 
assumptions, indicators, and means of verification, which shall assist 
subsequent evaluation activities14. 
The Project Document -- management by specification 
The implication is that the controls are of a bureaucratic and hierarchic 
nature.  Development organisations manage their projects almost 
exclusively through written specifications.  A multitude of actors may 
undertake the actual work, often in competition with each other based 
on parameters of price and professional capability, but the project 
specification, primarily as expressed in the Project Document, is the 
principal means of control.  This specification defines the project in its 
entity and assures continuity and consistency over the project's life 
cycle. 
In principle, the project document constitutes an all-inclusive 
specification of the project.  It constitutes the contractual basis 
between the sponsor (Danced) and the implementing consultant.  The 
project document lists a number of objectives that the project must 
achieve in conjunction with a set of indicators of how to verify if those 
objectives have been met when the project ends.  The project 
document is therefore also an instrument of control that holds the 
implementing consultant accountable for his performance on the job. 
It is in this context that the Project Document becomes a document of 
key importance.  The Project Document becomes the glue that binds 
together the web of actors and activities that constitute a project.  
The structure and elements of a CP project  
By mid 1998, Danced planned to undertake three cleaner production 
projects in South Africa:  one project in each of the three industrial 
sectors of fisheries, textile, and metal finishing.  
                                                          
14
   The PC and LFA tools are described in more detail in e.g. Mikkelsen (1995). 
The topic of planning in environmental projects is dealt with in more detail in 
Chapter 4. 
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Strategic analysis had preceded the selection of these three industrial 
sectors.  One of the considerations that influenced the choice of sectors 
was that cleaner production demonstration projects had been 
undertaken in similar Danish industrial sectors.  There was thus a 
knowledge base in Denmark, not only concerning specific technology 
solutions at company level, but also concerning managerial 
technology, including a number of analysis and decision support tools.   
Analysis of lessons learnt from earlier CP projects had furthermore 
revealed the importance of an early involvement of key actors within 
the sector, specifically the sector's employer association as well as the 
sector's normal providers of expertise, for instance a sector research 
institute.  Experience had shown that the involvement of these actors 
greatly facilitated the dissemination of results (within the sector) after 
project completion, thereby increasing overall project impact.  
Involvement of these actors was therefore laid out as a precondition if 
Danced was to provide financial support. 
 
A typical project would comprise four main activities: information, 
analysis, implementation and dissemination (Table 2).  The first phase 
would comprise an information campaign to arouse interest amongst 
potential industrial enterprises and address negative myths, in 
particular myths concerning the unfavourable financial feasibility of 
CP pollution abatement.  An important activity in this phase was a 
study tour to other industries, which had successfully implemented CP 
 
Table 2 Elements of a 'typical' Danced cleaner production project,  
as it was conceived for the South African fish industry 
 
Project phase Main activities Outputs Danced support 
Information Study tour and 
training course 
Participating companies 
have a general knowledge 
of CP opportunities 
Financial support to 
study tour (100 %) 
Analysis CP audits and 
feasibility studies 
Investment proposals Lump sum subsidy to CP 
audit (estimated at 25 %) 
Physical 
investments 
Carry out the 
investment projects 
New plant hardware in 
operation 
Subsidy to capital outlay 
(20 %) 
Dissemination of 
results and 
awareness creation 
Information 
campaign 
Other companies are 
aware of CP opportunities 
Subsidy to information 
dissemination activities 
Note:  The typical total budget of a Danced cleaner production project is around DKK 12m.  About 40 percent of 
that amount goes into the physical investment subsidy. 
 
Source:  Information in the Project Document (Danced 1998) 
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measures.  The second phase would deal mainly with technical 
analysis.  Interested enterprises would conduct environmental audits in 
which CP options would be identified and their feasibility evaluated.  
The output of this phase would be a number of CP investment 
proposals, which would be forwarded to Danced as part of an 
application for financial subsidy.  Actual investments would then be 
carried out in the third phase.  The fourth phase would comprise 
dissemination of the positive experiences with CP, in order to promote 
a more widespread adoption of CP practices in the South African 
industry.   
The underlying assumptions of a Danced cleaner production project 
are thus that CP options are fundamentally favourable to industry but 
that a number of barriers are first to be overcome.  In particular 
barriers associated with lack of knowledge, misconceptions about poor 
financial feasibility, and lack of seed capital.  The fundamental project 
idea is that the successful implementation of a limited number of 
demonstration projects and subsequent promotion of the benefits of 
these projects will significantly facilitate the promotion of CP in South 
African industry.   
The description so far has concerned the empirical field of this study, 
in particular outlining the concept of a Danced 'cleaner production 
project'.  The description will now move on to a discussion of the 
research strategies that have been chosen to examine this empirical 
field. 
Four research types 
Launsø and Rieper (1997:39) provide a typology involving four 
distinct research types: the 1) descriptive, 2) explanatory, 3) 
understanding, and 4) action oriented research types.  A typology 
always involves some reductionism in order to be able to fit a number 
of complex, and to some extent overlapping, concepts into an orderly 
framework.  It is nevertheless a useful vehicle to describe and add 
perspective to the research activities undertaken in this study, which 
draw rather freely from all four main categories.  With this caveat in 
mind, I will proceed with a brief review of the typology. 
The descriptive research type 
This research type has its historical origins in the production of 
national statistics.  How many people were in injured in workplace 
accidents last year?, how long was the average recovery period?, 
the 25 percentile recovery period?, the 50 percentile?, etc.  Which type 
of workplaces produced which injuries?, what is the distribution of 
accident rates in terms of company size?, in terms of management 
structure?, in terms of safety committee meeting frequency?, etc.  The 
core question in this type of research is: What is the distribution of x in 
terms of y?  An often-used methodology is the sample survey. 
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Some central quality requirements must be met for this positivist 
research type.  The phenomena must be described (measured) 
'accurately', that is, the measurement must reliable, valid, precise, and 
generalizable.   
Reliability refers basically to repeatability, that the operations of the 
study, such as data collection procedures, can be repeated with the 
same results by different researchers.  This implies that the researcher 
is neutral and that neither he nor his techniques of measurement 
influence the subject of the research in any manner.   
Validity (sometimes construct validity) means that the correct 
operational measures are established.  Does the researcher really 
measure what he claims to be measuring?  The issue of construct 
validity in OHS studies is not trivial and laden with difficulties.  In the 
measurement of occupational illness, for instance, construct validity 
would be compromised if a measurement of occupational sickness, 
which is related to social role performance, were confused for 
occupational illness, which is biology based.  When researching 
accident rates, the researcher must be cognisant of the intricacies of the 
various data sources.   
In South Africa, for instance, non-fatal accidents are only reportable to 
the Department of Labour (DOL) if they result in 14 days or more off 
work, while they are reported to the Workmen's Compensation 
Commissioner (WCC) if they result in one day or more off work.  But 
on the other hand does DOL reporting comprise accidents to all 
workers, while WCC reporting only comprises accidents to insured 
workers, leaving out uninsured groups of workers.  Reporting of 
accidents may furthermore be influenced by a number of other factors 
not related to the occurrence of accidents, for instance financial 
incentives to over- or underreport accident, coercive pressures of overt 
or more subtle sorts if somebody is embarrassed by the occurrence of 
an accident, etc.  Improper use of data sources may thus easily 
compromise the validity of the findings. 
Precision refers to the unit of measure being employed, for instance if 
absence from work is measured in hours or in days. 
Generalizability, sometimes termed external validity, refers to the last 
stage of the research activity -- if the findings have greater validity 
than merely for the project in which they were generated, if the 
findings from a sample are generalizable  to a larger population. 
The dominating perspective in the descriptive research type is that of 
the researcher.  He identifies the problem to be researched, he defines 
the data collection instrument, and he controls the data collection 
procedure.  The subject of the research is basically seen as a passive 
provider of information.  The relation between the researcher and the 
subject of the research is one of distance and minimal interaction in 
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order not to compromise the quality requirements associated with 
positivism15. 
The explanatory research type 
The major aim of explanatory studies is to indicate causality between 
variables or events, to attempt to explain a given phenomenon in terms 
of specific causes.  The core questions in this type of research are:  
which x are causes to y?, or which y are consequences of x? 
The general quality requirements are the same as for the descriptive 
research type.  But a valid causal explanation must meet three 
additional requirements (Mouton and Marais 1990:43): 
- That a demonstrable relationship exists between the 
phenomena or, stated differently, that the causal (or 
independent) variable x co-varies with the dependent variable 
y, and 
- That there is a specific sequence of cause of effect (temporal 
sequence) 
- That a specific phenomenon, x, is the real cause of y 
There is a direct link between explanatory research and predictive and 
evaluative research.  If it were possible to construct a causal and 
universally valid model of x leading to y, it would, in principle, be 
possible to make generally valid predictions of future interactions of x 
onto y.   
This research type is in extensive use in the medical community where 
it is embodied in the so-called controlled experiment, in which study 
units (patients) are allocated at random to either experimental 
(treatment) or control (non-treatment) conditions.  A characteristic of 
this approach is that causality is defined in terms of an underlying law 
of nature.   
However, critics of this positivistic tradition have argued that similar 
laws have yet to be discovered in the social sciences.  Causal 
relationships in the social sciences would imply determinism, the 
argument goes.  But if it is assumed that human activity is free, as 
implied in voluntarism, causality in the explanation of human 
behaviour cannot be supported. 
Evaluative research is concerned with the assessment or evaluation of 
a given practice or intervention.  For example, if the implementation of 
a set of systematic safety management activities leads to a reduction in 
the number of accidents.  However, because controlled experiments 
are very difficult to undertake in a social setting, and because the entire 
                                                          
15
   For a more in depth discussion of positivism see, for instance, Mouton (1993) 
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concept of causality can be contested on philosophical grounds, 
evaluative research activities cannot be expected to yield 'solid 
evidence' in favour of certain propositions in the social sciences (and 
in much OHS research). 
The interpretative research type 
Interpretative social research is concerned with the discovery of 
meaning -- of finding out what people think, and how their personal 
reasons and motivations can be used to understand them.  An often-
used methodology is the case study in which the researcher attempts to 
discover meaning through interviews, participant observation and 
content analysis of written material. 
Interpretative research holds that meaning is created in a social system.  
Meaning is a social construction in which the observer cannot escape 
his own social experiences and tacit knowledge.  It is therefore 
impossible for an observer to ask an 'objective' or value-free question, 
because a question will always be constructed from the (unique) set of 
tacit knowledge, that make up the researcher's background.  A problem 
can never exist in isolation, a problem is always a problem to 
somebody, and this is as important to discover, as to discover the 
problem itself.   
Traditional positivist notions of objectivity and quality are discarded in 
interpretative research.  Indeed, most adherents of interpretative 
research are firmly rooted in a critique of positivism16.  Instead, they 
seek to define different sets of quality criteria, for instance methods of 
triangulation, in which a result is trustworthy, if several different 
methods lead to the same result.  The reader is referred to literature in 
the footnote for a more detailed discussion of these issues.  
The core question in the interpretative research is: What is x?  This 
type of research is therefore often generating new hypotheses or new 
theory.  For instance, a case study referred to in Yin (1989:37) was 
based on experiences from a single city, New York.  However, it 
                                                          
16
  Pauw (1993:99) gives a lucid introduction to phenomenology starting with the 
punchline of a catholic congregation joke: 'Are you confessing or are you 
bragging?'.  In order to tell, we must attempt to understand from within this 
person's mind, we cannot expect to be successful if we seek to explain from the 
outside as a positivist would attempt to do.  Also, a very well articulated 
phenomenological critique of positivism and, at the same time, a balanced 
recognition of the problems arising from discarding the notion of objectivity, are 
presented in Silverman (1973) and Walsh (1973).  For example, Silverman 
(1973) quotes Pollner that  "All inquiry has a domain which is presumptively 
independent of its being taken up in concern, indeed, without the presumption of 
an essentially objective world, inquiry loses its sense of inquiry." (ibid:6, 
emphasis in original).  Interpretative research is also closely related to 
hermeneutics and the hermeneutic circle (e.g. Launsø and Rieper 1997:28).  See 
also Schön's convincing account of how problem setting is a process in which we 
name the things to which we will attend and frame the context to which we well 
attend to them (Schön 1983:44).  A review of validity requirements for 
qualitative case research is provided by Yin (1989:44). 
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covered broad issues in urban planning, such as the role of sidewalks, 
the role of neighbourhood parks, the need for small blocks, etc.  The 
study challenged existing theories and eventually led to new empirical 
inquiries to examine some of the new propositions.  Although findings 
from a case study 'sample' cannot be generalised to a broader 
population, Yin argues that findings from a case study can be 
generalised to theory. 
The action research type 
Action research is, at its name implies, specifically committed to the 
use of action as a means to bring about social change.  Most action 
research takes its point of departure in a clearly expressed political 
agenda: one of empowerment, especially of less powerful people, one 
of social change, one of democracy, and one of bringing about a 
change in people lives towards the better.  Action research embodies 
elements of learning and change, which are seen as inseparable from 
the research process itself.  The core question of action research is:  
How do actors develop new patterns of acting (or behaviour) as they 
acquire new knowledge, either presented to them by the researcher or 
through a process of self-discovery, as the research activity proceeds? 
Action research is a research practice with a clear social agenda.  It 
promotes broad participation in the research process and supports 
action leading to a more just or satisfying situation for the stakeholder.  
Its aim is to democratise the relationship between the professional 
researcher and the local interested parties.  Action researchers criticise 
the interpretative approach for being too subjective and relativist -- the 
interpretative approach is seen as passive, not helping people to see 
illusions around them so that they can improve their lives.17 
Action researchers thus discard standard notions of positivist 
objectivity.  They do so overtly and with pride, claiming that they face 
a fundamental choice that hinges on a dilemma of rigour or relevance 
-- the dilemma of rigour of science or the relevance for usable 
knowledge.  Quoting Argyris and Schön (1991): "If social scientists 
tilt toward the rigor of normal science that currently dominates 
departments of social science in American universities, they risk 
becoming irrelevant to practitioners' demands for usable knowledge.  
If they tilt toward the relevance of action research, they risk falling 
short of prevailing disciplinary standards of rigor." (ibid:85).  
Action research can produce insights, and in particular bring about 
changes in the existing situation, that the other types of research 
cannot.  However, the continuous blending of intervention, 
observation, and theory construction in action research creates severe 
                                                          
17
  The core question is paraphrased from Launsø and Rieper (1997:33).  The 
strongly articulated positions in favour of action research are taken from 
Greewood and Levin (1998:3-4) and Neuman (1994:66-68).  For a discussion of 
the possible validity shortcomings of action research activities I will refer to an 
illuminating analysis provided by Argyris and Schön (1991). 
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and largely unresolved problems for evaluating the quality of action 
research interventions and the validity of their findings.  This caveat 
should be borne in mind but is not dealt with further in this chapter.  
Readers are referred to the references provided in the footnote. 
Four research types brought together 
As was noted in the beginning of this chapter a typology always 
involves elements of reductionism, highlighting core features of the 
different research types in their pure form, and emphasising the 
differences amongst them.  Yet, this section will conclude precisely 
with presenting a typology of the four research types (Table 3). 
Table 3 Differences among the positivist, phenomenological and  
post-modern research approaches 
 
 Descriptive and explanatory 
research (positivism) 
Interpretative research Action research 
Reason for 
research 
To discover natural laws so 
that people can predict and 
control events 
To understand and 
describe meaningful 
action 
To smash myths and 
empower people to 
change society 
Nature of 
social 
reality 
Stable pre-existing patterns 
or order that can be 
discovered 
Fluid definitions of a 
situation created by 
human interaction 
Conflict-filled and 
governed by hidden 
underlying structures 
Nature of 
human 
beings 
Self-interested and rational 
individuals who are shaped 
by external factors 
Social beings who create 
meaning and who 
constantly make sense of 
their worlds 
Creative, adaptive 
people with unrealised 
potential, trapped by 
illusion and exploitation 
An 
explanation 
that is true 
Is logically connected to laws 
and based on facts 
Resonates or feels right 
to those who are being 
studied 
Supplies people with 
tools needed to change 
the world 
Good 
evidence 
Is based on observations that 
others can repeat 
Is embedded in the 
context of fluid social 
interactions 
Is informed by a theory 
that unveils illusions 
Place for 
values 
Science is value free and 
values have no place except 
when choosing a topic 
Values are an integral 
part of social life: no 
group's values are 
wrong, only different 
All science must begin 
with a value position, 
some positions are right, 
some are wrong. 
 
Based on Neuman 1994:75 
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It is true that there are fundamental and severe epistemological 
differences amongst them, and that differences on this level tend to 
group the research types into competing, and somewhat mutually 
exclusive, approaches for research.  Indeed, when the research types 
are grouped by their epistemological underpinnings, as in the typology 
in Table 3, there appears to be little prospect of bringing the research 
approaches together in one single research project.  They appear as 
competing, and mutually incompatible, views on how research can be 
conducted. 
However, the research types may also be seen as complementing (in 
contrast to competing) each other, bringing together insights that 
neither technique cannot provide by itself alone.  This more benign 
view of the different opportunities that each of the research traditions 
offer, is one that is pursued in this thesis.   
Mouton and Marais (1990:168) illustrate this point of view in their 
presentation (after Van Leent) of a 'scientific space' (Figure 2) 
consisting of three dimensions.  In this view, a research project can 
combine methodologies from both quantitative and qualitative research 
methodologies, supplementing rather than excluding each other. 
 
Quantitative
Explanatory research
Level: Height
Goal: Explain
Quantitative
Descriptive research
Level: Breadth
Goal: Describe
Qualitative
Interpretative research
Level:  Depth
Goal:  Understand
 
 
Figure 2 Research within three dimensions of the 'scientific space' 
After Mouton and Marais 1990:170 
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• On the breadth dimension in the 'scientific space', the scientist 
attempts to describe a phenomenon as exhaustively as possible, for 
instance using survey research techniques within the descriptive 
research tradition.  Approaches to theory development on this 
dimension would, for example, include the construction of 
typologies. 
• On the height dimension of the 'scientific space', the researcher 
concentrates on a detailed investigation of a single variable, 
attempting to explain phenomena in terms of causal relationships.  
This activity falls within the explanatory research tradition.  
Research techniques would include experimental designs seeking 
to control nuisance variables as stringently as possible.  In the field 
of theory construction the researcher tends to follow a hypothetico-
deductive approach. 
• The third dimension is characterised by attempts to penetrate the 
nature of phenomena, seeking to understand how our research 
subjects construct meaning from their experiences in real life.  
Questionnaires and other pre-constructed measuring instruments of 
inquiry are not suitable for this purpose.  Instead, we must turn to 
qualitative methods, conducting unstructured interviews, 
participant observation etc, activities that fall within the 
interpretative research tradition. 
Compared with the typology in Table 3, Mouton and Marais' scientific 
space does not accommodate action research.  A fourth imaginary 
dimension could be added to the figure representing the extent to 
which it is the purpose of the research to bring about change.  That is, 
the extent to which research is oriented towards action or merely 
towards the provision of new insights.  Mouton and Marais do not 
include action research in their figure, probably because that research 
type was only in its embryonic stage in the mid-1980s.  Still, a fourth 
dimension can be included conceptually, but not visually, of course. 
This Ph.D. study has taken the approach of positioning itself rather 
freely in the expanded 'scientific space' of four dimensions.  The basic 
position is that we must be open to those insights that the different 
techniques can provide us with, as long as the shortcomings of the 
various techniques are kept clearly in mind, in particular what 
concerns the questions of validity and quality.  As will be described 
below, this study employs research activities that draw generously 
from all four research traditions. 
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Research activities and methodologies 
Activities relate to distinct segments of the empirical field 
The research undertaken in this Ph.D. study can be grouped under four 
separate headlines.  This differentiation is based on how the research 
activity relates to the large and quite complex empirical field, as it was 
unfolded in the earlier Figure 1.  Each of the four research activities 
thus deal with a defined segment of the empirical field as visualised in 
Figure 3 below.   
 
 
 
The first two research activities relate to two of the Danced cleaner 
production projects, the ones for the fish and for the metal finishing 
industrial sectors.  The main difference between them is one of timing, 
as the two CP projects are in different phases of their project cycle.  
The fish CP project provided an opportunity to gain insights into what 
happens in the implementation phase, whereas the metal finishing 
study was an opportunity to examine the initial planning phase.  This 
Figure 3 The four research activities in this study 
Plan
Implement
TOR
Large 
companies
Small 
companies
Evaluate
Pr
oje
ct 
Do
cu
me
nt
Danced
Parliament
NAO
1
1.
Fish case study:
Interpretative research type
- participant observation
- interviews
- document analysis
- hypothesis generation
3. 
OHS management system study:
Decriptive research type
- analysis of published statisitcs
Explanatory research type
- postal questionnaire
- WCC sample survey
- hypotheses testing activity
Interpretative research type
- participant observation
- interviews
- document analysis
- hypothesis generation
2.
Metal finisher case study:
Interpretative research type
- participant observation
- interviews
- document analysis
- hypothesis generation
4.
The Durban club study:
Action research type
- intervention
- interviews
- hypothesis generation
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was more or less in accordance with what was initially planned in the 
study plan of this Ph.D. project.  But, the CP project for the textile 
sector, which was planned to be the main study object, was delayed for 
about one year, partly due to considerations whether a more product 
oriented approach should be pursued in this project.  Fortuitously, 
opportunities for two highly relevant research activities emerged, one 
concerning the application of formal management systems to OHS, the 
other concerning an intervention in small business setting.  
The fish case study (project implementation activity) 
The fish cleaner production project should abate pollution from a 
relatively small number, less than twenty, large companies.  By the 
end of 1998, precisely when this study was initiated, the fish project 
was about to start its implementations phase.  The final Project 
Document had been prepared, the tendering process had been 
completed and the implementing lead consultant was appointed shortly 
thereafter.  The timing and setting for the fish CP project was therefore 
ideal for undertaking a case study of the activities and processes that 
take place in the initial implementation phase.   
The first phase of the CP project, the two-week study tour, took place 
in April 1999.  The study tour comprised two elements; partly visits to 
Danish industries that had successfully implemented various CP 
technologies and partly presentations on CP concepts and techniques.  
I joined this study tour as a participant observer.  At the end of the 
study tour I undertook a survey of the tour participants' expectations 
prior to the tour, their attitudes towards CP and which activities they 
would engage in when they returned to their companies in South 
Africa.  The survey took the form of a questionnaire in which the 
respondent marked their responses on a Likert scale, a few questions 
were open-ended. 
Back in South Africa I visited six of the fish companies and undertook 
unstructured interview with the participants from the study tours.  The 
fish case study was furthermore based on content analysis of written 
material, primarily of the Project Document and of the written training 
materials that were part of the study tour.   
These activities in this case study generally fall under the heading of 
the interpretative research type, where the purpose of the research 
activities is to discover meaning and generate hypotheses.  The general 
industrial setting of the research activities is one of large companies, 
apparently receptive to 'management system' approaches. 
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The metal finisher case study (project planning activity) 
Metal finishing covers a potentially large number of operations in 
which a metal product is given some sort of surface treatment.  It 
comprises galvanising, electroplating, painting, coating, and other 
processes.  Of particular interest is the electroplating industry which 
coats metal products with layers of other metals of choice, for example 
zinc, chrome, copper, nickel or cadmium. 
From an environmental point of view, the electroplating sector is 
highly relevant to target.  The sector is also highly relevant from an 
occupational health and safety point of view.  There are many 'twin-
problems' of which problems in the external and the internal 
environment have the same underlying cause: the use of a toxic 
substance in the production process.  
Many of the processes are relatively simple, require limited capital 
outlay, and only modest technical knowledge.  A number of small 
companies are active, some with only a few employees and operating 
from interim facilities.  The industry is also highly disorganised.  
Factors such as over-capacity in the sector, extensive price competition 
and general mistrust are barriers to the formation of an effective 
industry association.  
By early 1999, a consultant had begun the task of defining the strategy 
and identifying the major elements of the project.  The project 
document was completed by the end of 1999 and went into tendering 
in early 2000.  Project implementation was initiated by mid-2000, at 
the same time as I left South Africa.   
The metal finisher activity therefore constituted a good opportunity to 
carry out a case study of the activities that take place during the project 
preparation phase.  The research activities were mostly participant 
observation, unstructured interviews, and documentary analysis. 
I generally followed the consultant as a participant observer, 
sometimes taking active part in the activities.  In the problem analysis 
phase this included visits to factories, interviews with representatives 
from industry associations, service providers and public authorities, as 
well as taking part in a so-called stakeholder workshop.  I also joined 
the consultant in a number of meetings with the to-be project 
preparation committee and with Danced representatives.  During thus 
activity, I sought to bring forward suggestions for how to introduce 
OHS considerations into the Project Document.  
The same consultant was also involved in the planning of the CP 
project in the textile industry and I joined him in some these activities 
as well.  However, the textile project was delayed for other reasons, 
and the observations that I made there are equally applicable to the 
metal finishing planning phase. 
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These research activities in this case study are generally similar to 
those of the other case study, i.e. mostly of a hypotheses generating 
nature, seeking to discover meaning.  The general industrial setting is 
one of a mixture between a few large and well-organised hot-dip 
galvanising companies and a large number of small and medium sized 
enterprises (SMSEs) in a disorganised environment. 
The OHS management system study 
As the fish case study proceeded, a hypothesis slowly took form: that a 
potential manner of integrating CP and OHS would be integration at 
the level of methodology18, that is, for large companies, integration at 
the management system level.  However, as I went further into the 
topic of systematic OHS management, I was surprised to discover the 
almost complete lack of studies evaluating the effects of OHS 
management systems.  
As chance would have it, a South African organisation, Nosa, partly 
financed through the workmen's compensation system, had developed 
a system for the systematic management of occupational health and 
safety.  The so-called Nosa 5-Star system had been in operation for 
close to two decades.  A number of the fish companies referred me to 
the Nosa system, and it was apparently in broad use in the South 
African industry.   
However, the only study reported in the scientific literature, which was 
based on own empirical data, depicted that type of 5-Star systems as a 
sham, finding no evidence that the system was able to lower accident 
rates (Eisner and Leger 1988a).  In Australia, the National Safety 
Council of Australia (NSCA) also operate a 5-Star safety rating 
system.  Yet, in the year 2000, a report prepared by researchers at 
Victoria University for the National Occupational Health and Safety 
Commission on the effectiveness on occupational health and safety 
management systems (OHSMS) stated that  "... several experts 
asserted »they [OHSMS] don't work«   [...].  More common was 
conditional agreement that they could work, but » the jury is still out«"  
(Gallagher et al. 2000:21 emphasis in original).  The report continues, 
"Very little empirical research has been done to evaluate the 
effectiveness of OHSMS" (ibid:22).   
The following hypothesis therefore slowly took shape:  A top-down 
management approach to occupational health and safety within a 
predominantly cost-efficiency discourse, such as the one by Nosa, is 
largely ineffective in improving the occupational health and safety 
performance of companies.   
Should this hypothesis be true there would be very little reason to 
embark on a methodology-level integration strategy in the Danced CP 
projects.  It was therefore decided to undertake a study evaluating the 
                                                          
18
   A discussion of the concept of 'integration' and how this may be accomplished 
is provided in the next chapter. 
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effect of the Nosa system in order to test this hypothesis.   The first 
part of the research was based on participant observation as I joined 
the Nosa auditors and sat in as an observer during the star auditing 
sessions.  I attended four Nosa audits in August – September 1999 
amounting to 9 days of participant observation.  On one occasion I was 
able to go back to the company after the audit had taken place and 
conduct unstructured in-depth interviews with a company 
representative on his perceptions of what had happened during the 
audit.  Again, this activity is within the interpretative research 
tradition, seeking to discover meaning. 
The second part was a comparative study of the accident performance 
of Nosa companies compared to general industry.  This part is based 
on two cross sectional surveys.  The first activity was a postal survey 
sent to all manufacturing companies in South Africa that had been 
committed to the Nosa system within a specified 3-year period, in total 
399 companies.  The second activity was sample survey of those 
companies' claims reported to the Workmen's Compensation system, 
drawn from that organisation's database.  This research activity thereby 
positions itself in the positivist tradition of explanatory research, that 
is, a hypothesis testing research activity. 
Baseline data on occupational safety in South African manufacturing 
industry were required in order to complete the explanatory activity 
above.  A review of almost 30 years accident statistics combining data 
from various official sources was therefore undertaken.  This research 
activity is of the positivist descriptive type.  The quantitative parts of 
this research took place October 1999 – May 2000. 
The Durban Club study 
The last research activity in this study is related to a project that the 
University of Natal (Durban) was running with a so-called Waste 
Minimisation Club (WMC) of small metal finishing companies.    
There are about 90 metal finishing operations in Durban, many of 
them small operations, the owner typically having an artisan 
background.  Many are operating in a competitive jobbing market and 
they are not organised in any type of industry association.  In 1997-
1998 the Durban municipality embarked on an aggressive campaign to 
limit pollution from that industrial sector.  The elements of the 
campaign were so stringent that the business owners felt it would 
effectively force all of the electroplating companies either out of 
business or out of town.  Some of the electroplating company owners 
took the unusual step of organising themselves in order to challenge 
the authorities in a unified manner.  A group of about 30 platers then 
formed a WMC with the aim of sharing experiences and knowledge on 
waste minimisation techniques.  The WMC was set up on an 
experimental basis, backed mainly by researchers at the University of 
Natal.   
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As I have been informed, the Durban Club is the first example in 
South Africa of small and medium sized companies organising 
themselves in an information sharing network type organisation.  
Waste minimisation falls under the umbrella cleaner production 
concept and it would clearly be relevant to the present study if the 
Club would take on OHS issues as well.  The Club accepted my 
proposal to make regular OHS presentations at their meetings. 
The OHS approach chosen was that developed by the International 
Labour Organisation (ILO) in which OHS issues are tied to general 
productivity and cost efficiency interventions; the co-called 
International Program for the improvement of Working Conditions and 
Environment (known as PIACT, after its French name).  The approach 
had been developed and tested in a SMSE environment in Asia 
(Thurman et al. 1994, Kogi 1990).   
Important features of this approach are that 1) the activities are 
adjusted to meet real needs and local conditions, 2) through sharing 
and reinforcing positive experiences, 3) in an action-oriented 
environment that, 4) encourages participatory action.  Learning from 
others positive experiences is a main strategy in this approach.  This 
entails that the researcher prior to the presentations visits companies 
and familiarises himself with their operations and collects information 
on good practices already in place.  With the permission from the 
company owner, the good practices are presented at club meetings 
along with more general OHS and productivity improvement 
information. 
Over the period September 1999 – June 2000 fourteen factory visits 
were undertaken and unstructured interviews conducted.  Two 
presentations were prepared.  One presentation was given on two 
different sites encouraging the company owner to bring in employee 
representatives.  Two presentations were given to the company owners 
at club meetings.   
The interactions between the researcher and the company club 
members have been of a cyclic nature, first to collect information, then 
actively to intervene by providing them with specific information 
seeking to influence their behaviour, then to observe the effect, if any, 
that intervention had.  The cycle then starts over again with collecting 
new information, intervening, etc.  In this process, the researcher 
actively interferes with the subject of the research throwing overboard 
standard positivist quality criteria to research.  This research thereby 
clearly positions itself in the action research tradition, actively 
attempting to bring about change, and where hypotheses are generated 
and tested on a continuing basis. 
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Chapter 3. Integration 
Structurally different, yet inseparable 
There are major structural differences between the areas of 
occupational health and safety and the environment.  They are dealt 
with separately from a regulatory and enforcement perspective.  This is 
partly due to the historical developments within to two areas, and 
partly due to different actor constellations.   
The timing has been different.  Worker protection concerns became a 
feature of the 1800s19 while environmental concerns appeared on the 
scene about a century later.  Occupational health and safety is widely 
regarded as an industrial relations issue in which only few actors 
groups have legitimate interest.  This is in stark contrast with the 
sprawling actor constellations within the environmental area, which, 
for instance, could even include representatives from future, yet 
unborn generations.  The two areas are regulated by two different state 
institutions, which have no particular tradition of co-operation. 
However, studies also indicate that some companies, in particular the 
smaller ones, do not maintain a clear separation between the external 
and the internal environment.  This is particularly true for the 
employees, who find it difficult to view workplace exposure issues 
separate from company emission issues (Rasmussen 1995:245).   
                                                          
19
   Indeed, the concept of an unsafe workplace can probably only be traced back 
to the dawn of industrialisation in the 1700s.  This is not suggest that work was 
free from danger before the industrialisation but the conceptual separation 
between living and livelihood (working) had not yet been well developed.  It was 
William Blake and Karl Marx who identified the degradation of labour in the 
Lancashire textile factories, the infamous 'dark satanic mills' of England.  Marx' 
contribution was to describe the concept of unsafe workplaces in a theory of 
domination and exploitation.  This new critical and pessimistic view of 
workplaces is, in my opinion, ever so evident in the work of Foucault, who has 
argued at length that the rise of the factory and the prison occurred 
simultaneously and involved exchanges between the two in the development of 
technologies of discipline and control (!) . Aldrich (1997),  Peña (1997:25-30, 
346). 
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This chapter attempts to examine in more detail what different options 
are available in an integration context.  The chapter will first examine 
how the two areas relate to each other.  It will then be argued that these 
relations call for an integrated approach.  The concept of integration 
will then be examined after which various means to accomplish 
integration of OHS into a CP projects will be discussed. 
Relationships 
At the company level, Zwetsloot (1994:33-37) and Kamp (1997:29-31) 
identify and discuss different types of relationships between problems 
regarding working conditions and the environment.  The 
characteristics of five such relationships are shown in Table 4 
overleaf.   
Twin problems are those in which a negative environment impact and 
poor working conditions can be traced back to the same root source, 
for instance the usage of a specific chemical substance or the use of a 
particular process or technology.  The proper identification and dealing 
with twin problems is optimal as one intervention will produce 
benefits in both working conditions and in reduced environmental 
load.  Twin problems are at the core of an offensive integration 
strategy -- seeking optimal solutions. 
The relationships environmental, or working, conditions as a cause are 
essentially similar to the earlier discussion of media shifting.  In this 
case the intervention fails to identify twin problems and therefore 
gives rise to new problems in the other field.  Media shifting is at the 
core of a defensive integration strategy -- avoiding sub-optimal 
solutions.  
A missed opportunity refers to situations where an intervention in the 
one field does not produce a new problem in the other field, but fails to 
alleviate one.  The basic argument is one of sub-optimality.  If, for 
instance, a process is redesigned to address problems in the one field, 
unrelated problems in the other field could also be solved at little or no 
additional cost.  The identification of such opportunities is part of an 
offensive integration strategy -- seeking optimal solutions. 
Indirect causal linkages are similar in nature to twin problems, the 
main difference being one of timing.  Twin problems relate to the 
production process, indirect causal linkages take a life cycle approach. 
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Table 4 Type of relationships between problems regarding  
working conditions and the environment 
 
Type Characteristic Examples 
Twin 
problems 
Problems in the fields of 
working conditions and 
environment arise from the 
same source 
The use of pesticides in agriculture is affecting both 
farm workers and the eco-system 
The use of cyanide electroplating technology 
constitutes a hazard to workers and to the 
environment from extremely toxic cyanide. 
Organic solvents in the printing industry affect both 
the workers and the environment 
Environ-
mental 
conditions as 
a cause 
The dealing with an 
environmental problem 
causes a new problem with 
working conditions -- 
media shifting 
The installation of filters to limit emissions of 
harmful substances create a new occupational hazard 
when those filters must be serviced  
The replacement of non-toxic but ozone depleting 
CFCs in refrigeration units with highly toxic 
ammonia has created a new hazard in the workplace 
and a new hazard in urban areas from the road 
transport of toxic ammonia 
Working 
conditions as 
a cause 
The dealing with a 
workplace problem causes 
a new environmental 
problem -- 
media shifting 
A ventilation unit creates a noise problem for the 
nearby local community  
Resolution of indoor climate problems for instance 
related to thermal comfort or indoor air quality lead 
to the installation of heating, ventilating, and air 
conditioning units that consume large amounts of 
energy, operate with toxic chemicals, and create 
environmental problems when disposed of. 
Missed 
opportunity 
The dealing with a problem 
in one area misses an 
opportunity to resolve a 
problem in the other area 
Measures to reduce the emission of hydrocarbons at 
fuel depots and consumer outlets fail also to address 
ergonomic problems 
Indirect 
causal 
linkage 
Different stages in the life 
cycle of materials being 
relevant to working 
conditions and 
environmental problems 
PVC plastics involve use of carcinogenic MVC 
during the production phase and constitute a hazard 
to the workers 
Softening agents in the PVC is a problem for the 
users of the product. 
When the PVC product is discarded, dioxin may be 
formed in the incineration plant and emitted to the 
environment  
 
Based on Zwetsloot 1994:35, Kamp 1997:30-31 
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Defining integration 
This chapter attempts to examine in more detail what different options 
are available in an integration context.  The starting point will be to 
define integration not in terms of the form it takes, but in terms of what 
it does and what it attempts to bring about.  Within this definition 
integration of OHS and environmental issues takes place, when:  
• considerations about solutions within one field do not take 
place without simultaneous considerations about possible 
consequences for the other field.   
Integration attempts to bring about the following benefits 
• to achieve a better prioritisation and more efficient utilisation of 
the resources spent on OHS and environmental issues, because 
attention and higher priority is given to root problems that cause 
adverse effects within both areas -- an offensive integration 
strategy 
• to prevent media shifting in which environmental problems are 
shifted to worker health and safety problems, or vice versa -- a 
defensive integration strategy 
• not to overlook opportunities for improvements in e.g. the working 
conditions when environmental objectives are pursued, or vice 
versa -- an offensive integration strategy 
• ideally, to achieve synergy effects; environmental work can benefit 
from the workers' involvement in OHS work and their detailed 
knowledge of the production processes; and OHS work can benefit 
from the top management leadership and attention usually reserved 
for environmental work only -- an offensive integration strategy 
Having defined integration in terms of what is to be achieved, the 
discussion will then turn to how integration can take place.  Before this 
discussion can take place however, a conceptual model of 
organisational change will be outlined. 
A simple conceptual framework for integration 
Leavitt (1965) provides a conceptual framework that identifies four 
distinct, yet interdependent, variables in an organisation that must all 
be considered if organisational development is to be effective (Figure 
4).  Few people would argue that the model is overly complex or 
sophisticated.  Rather, the model appears to be decidedly simplistic.  
Yet, the value of a model lies with its ability to guide concepts and 
analysis, not with its level of sophistication.  Leavitt's conceptual 
framework for analysing organisational change has passed this test by 
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providing a foundation for earlier work20 concerned with identifying 
different types of and levels of integration.   
 
Tools
Actors
Structure
Tasks
 
 
An organisation is producing some sort of goods, material or 
immaterial, which are in demand from the external world, the 
organisation's raison d'être.  To produce, a series of tasks must be 
accomplished by the people (actors) in the organisation.  They do so 
within an organisational structure defining the division and co-
ordination of subtasks as well as hierarchy and lines of authority.  The 
people (actors) carry out their work using different types of technology 
(tools) broadly defined as hardware tools, skills and knowledge, or 
specific methodologies of work, for instance a systematic approach to 
problem analysis and solution.   
Leavitt's main point is that these four subsystems are highly 
interdependent and that any change in either one system must be 
accommodated by change processes in the other three as well.  In other 
words, successful organisational change must involve a unified and 
coherent change approach involving all four components.  With this 
conceptual model as a starting point three major understandings, can 
be identified of how to change the organisation's tasks so that greater 
emphasis is placed on OHS or environmental issues.  These 
understandings focus in turn on tools, actors, and structure. 
 
                                                          
20
  This framework forms the basis for integration discussions in e.g. Kamp 
(1997), Rasmussen (1995), and probably also Broberg (1997). 
Figure 4 A simple model to analyse organisational change 
Source: Leavitt 1965:1145 
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Applying the framework to identify means of 
integration 
Looking at tools  
The 'tools' (technology) concept is broad, comprising the knowledge 
and skills of the people in the organisation and of the methodologies 
they make use of when dealing with their tasks.  The prime areas of 
concern are those of planning and decision making.   
In order to make informed decisions people must have information and 
knowledge about the issues that they confront.  This is normally 
provided for in the OHS legislation, which comprises right-to-know 
clauses, for instance a right-to-know about workplace chemical 
substance hazards.  This includes information on the hazardous nature 
of the chemicals in use (e.g. labelling symbols) and material safety 
data sheets (MSDS) with e.g. information on recommended work 
practices to be followed.  Within the tools domain, an OHS 
intervention could for instance start with an information campaign to 
inform the workers of their rights as specified in the national 
legislation.  
The tools subsystem also comprises knowledge about methodologies 
which assist decision making.  This could for instance comprise 
guidelines on how to undertake a systematic review of ergonomic risks 
and a methodology on how to rank those risks according to their 
severity.  It could be a 'catalogue of ideas' on how certain classes of 
problems had been successfully dealt with in other companies.   
The example that follows is taken from the Danced fish CP project.  
The project comprises a study tour activity, which deals specifically 
with information and knowledge.  "The candidates participating in this 
training should be fully equipped to go-back-home and make 
environmental assessment of their own companies; their toolbox 
should therefore also include a generic Terms of Reference for such 
plus the format for applications to Danced [...] for incentive grants.  
Other useful ‘tools’ could be manufacturer’s catalogues, lay-out 
examples, compendium of key figures on equipment water usage, 
environmental key figures (energy per ton raw material, etc.)" (Danced 
1998, p 3-7, emphasis added). 
The understanding of an organisations behaviour will therefore be 
embedded in a rational choice discourse.  Decision making is seen as a 
sequential process, advancing in certain phases and managed by key 
point decisions. The goals of the organisation are assumed to be 
unambiguous and people are assumed to agree on and strive to achieve 
those goals.  People are assumed to decide and behave in a manner 
more or less consistent with rational choice theory21. 
                                                          
21
  This theory and a contrasting one are discussed in more detail in the next 
chapter from page 62 and onwards. 
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It is true that criticism22 has been raised concerning the apparent 
inability of people to act in manners consistent with rational choice 
theory.  Nonetheless do interventions that focus on the provision of 
information, and supporting of the decision making process by 
providing systematic methods, manuals, guidelines etc, have great 
appeal.  Many consultants develop and market proprietary 'systems' 
and 'tools', which assist in systematising information, ranking 
alternative scenarios, deciding which issues to deal further with, and 
which to let go.  Most of the United Nations CP guidelines and most 
textbooks on both environmental and OHS issues fall within this 
technology (and rational choice) approach. 
A clear example of this tools approach can be found in the Danish 
EPA's project 422 which reports the development of a 'tool box' that 
couples environmental knowledge with management decisions.  The 
report states: "The present environmental situation of the company, the 
level of ambition of the management as well as the available resources 
are always decisive for the prioritization.  Consequently, the tools 
focus on the possibilities for the company to systematically evaluate 
the importance of each individual environmental impact as well as to 
prioritize its environmental effort and render visible the reasons for the 
choises (sic) made by the management.  Thus, the tools support the 
company in elaborating a basis for decisions intended for the 
prioritization by the management of the environmental effort." 
(Nielsen et at. 1998:eng. summary) 
Another clear example of the tools approach can be found in Danida's 
guidelines on how to ensure that environmental issues are considered 
in Danida's development projects (Danida 1994), i.e. a quite related 
agenda of integration.  The target group of the guidelines are 
"Embassy staff and country desk officers" (ibid:2), i.e. the persons 
who shall use the methodology outlined in the guidelines.  The 
guidelines' point of departure is the standard planning tool, the Project 
Cycle tool, into which additional analysis of environmental issues shall 
be undertaken; for instance an overall environmental policy check, an 
environmental screening, an environmental assessment, an 
environmental appraisal, etc.  Projects are classified into three 
categories according to their likely environmental impacts, so-called 
black, grey and white projects; black projects are given a full range of 
environmental assessments and appraisals; white projects minimal, and 
so on. 
In much the same vein, guidelines on how to integrate OHS into 
Danida development project have focussed on integrating working 
environment assessments (WEAs) into the project cycle (Hasle and 
Nielsen 1994).  Project are again classified into three categories: black, 
grey, and white.  Black projects are given extensive WEAs and white 
projects minimal WEAs (ibid:31).  The focus is on 'tool kits' for 
screening, for assessments etc. 
                                                          
22
   See for instance March (1994, 1999), Rasmussen and Jensen (1994).  
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Looking at actors  
If we try to understand an organisation in term of the actors, or people, 
in the organisation, the unit of analysis becomes the individual person 
and the issue of interest becomes the patterns of social interaction 
between those individuals.  The goals and objectives of the 
organisation are then no longer the prime field of interest, rather how 
the people perceive those goals and objectives.  Nor is it taken for 
granted that all individuals pursue the same goals.  It must be accepted 
that there is a general disagreement on goals and that conflicts of 
interest are legitimate and play a major role in shaping the behaviour 
and informing the decisions of people. 
The understanding of an organisation is therefore embedded in a social 
systems discourse.  The focus is therefore on the building of formal as 
well as informal alliances amongst actors, on processes of negotiations 
and re-interpretation of goals, and of reaching compromises between 
actors who pursue different agendas.  Decision-making is no longer 
perceived as a linear process, advancing in a sequential manner, 
informed by key decision.  Rather, decision making is better 
understood as an iterative or cyclic process in which goals are 
uncertain and re-interpreted, and decisions are the outcome of coalition 
building, negotiation and compromise between key actors.  
Within the OHS field, an 'actors' approach can be identified in OHS 
legislation that mandates joint safety committees at the workplace, 
thus establishing an organisational platform for workers where they 
can safeguard their interests in negotiations with management.  OHS 
legislation in most countries have provisions for such joint liaison 
committees, following the recommendations of the highly influential 
UK Lord Robens committee of inquiry, that: " The primary 
responsibility for doing something about the present levels of 
occupational accidents and diseases lies with those who create the risk 
and those who work with them" Robens (1972:7). 
An 'actors' approach is also clearly identified in a Danish research 
project on employee participation in the preventive environmental 
activities at firm level.  The overall purpose is to improve the quality 
of the preventive activities and to entrench the focus on prevention in 
the organisation.  However, the purpose is also explicitly to ensure that 
OHS issues and environmental issues are considered at the same time 
(Aldrich et al. 1995:18), i.e. an integration agenda.   
The instrument to achieve these ends is to introduce an actor group 
onto the arena where negotiations and decisions take place.  
Integration is expected to be a more or less natural consequence of 
their participation because it is in the self-interest of this group of 
actors to safeguard OHS interests while at the same time deal with 
environmental issues. 
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Looking at structures  
Finally, organisational behaviour may be understood in terms of the 
organisation's formal structure, which it is usually at display in its 
organisation charts.  The focus will then be on the division and co-
ordination of tasks and the management structures that oversees, 
controls and maintains it.  An important issue is how resources are 
allocated within the organisation.  The focus is on the organisation's 
mechanisms for reward and punishment, on how goals and objectives 
are communicated, on formal responsibility, on any financial 
incentives (or disincentives) which could influence motivation, and 
finally but not least, on the mechanisms of accountability in use that 
serve to measure and keep people accountable to meeting agreed 
targets or objectives. 
Understanding organisational behaviour as an organisational process 
underlies commonly heard dictums such as "The first essential step is 
to obtain top-level management support and then to use this to 
leverage broad-based support".  If top-management level support is not 
secured, the argument goes, the project will be starved of resources, 
will fail to meet its targets and most probably collapse.  Securing top 
management's support is also necessary to establish the issue as a 
legitimate objective that the organisation should pursue.  
Guidelines on how to implement safety management systems provides 
a clear example of this approach in its recommended three-tier 
approach.  First, a so-called Key-Advocate (an executive in top 
management echelons) must be identified and his support won.  This 
individual will endorse the initiative, support the goals and provide the 
necessary resources.  Second, support must be won from the so-called 
Prime-Mover or Sponsor in the upper management structure, for 
instance a division manager.  He will oversee the initiative and 
supervise the resources.  Third, ownership for the actual project lies 
with the Champion who drives the initiative and makes things happen 
(CCPS 1993:9).  
Similarly, the dominant tool for project planning and control, the 
Logical Framework Approach (LFA), relies heavily on the 
specification of unambiguous, specific, measurable, and time-based 
objectives which are used as instruments to maintain and enforce 
accountability for achieving project success. 
Guidelines on how to integrate OHS into Danida development projects 
also have 'structure' elements, beyond the 'tools' elements that were 
mentioned earlier.  For instance, the guidelines recommend that 
working environment assessments (WEAs) are to be included in the 
contractual documents, the so-called Terms of Reference (TOR), in the 
project identification' stage23.  "The embassy or country desk are 
responsible [for this]" (Hasle and Nielsen 1994:32).  The focus is thus 
                                                          
23
  Chapter 4 gives an overview of the special parlance in use in development 
agencies, project life cycle stages, Logical Framework Approach, etc. 
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on the setting and communication of objectives, on allocation of 
formal responsibility, on the contractual specification etc. 
Combining the discussion of Chapter 2 of the empirical field, that is, 
of what constitutes a cleaner production project, and the discussion 
above of the different means of integration, the following summary 
can be produced. 
Summary --  
means to integrate OHS into CP projects 
We can now combine the discussion of Chapter 2 of the empirical 
field, that is, the discussion of what in effect constitutes a 'cleaner 
production project', with the analysis and discussion above of the 
different means of integration.   
The summary that follows below is sketchy and seeks to establish a 
broad range of options for integration.  It is probable that not all are 
feasible, either for reasons of economic efficiency or because they may 
be incompatible with the user-orientation of international assistance 
projects, that only 'demand-driven projects' are implemented.  This is a 
different discussion.  For now, the concern is to establish the range of 
options.  Two distinctions are made.  The first distinction follows the 
conceptual framework laid out above: integration at the tools, actors, 
or structure level.  The second distinction concerns which area of the 
empirical field that is targeted: is it integration in the Danced 
organisation, or is it in the web of activities that are subcontracted to 
agents. 
Integrate at the Tools level 
Conceptual basis  
An understanding organisational behaviour in a rational choice context 
In the Danced organisation 
Integrate OHS into the project planning tools and manuals in use in 
Danced, notably the Project Cycle and the Logical Framework 
Analysis.  For instance, specify in these planning tools that the 
following activities must be undertaken: 
• an overall working environment policy check,  
• a working environment impact screening,  
• a working environment impact assessment,  
• a working environment impact appraisal, etc.   
Specify a methodology ('tool kit') to identify and asses working 
environment impacts, rules for how to classify an impact into three 
categories depending on severity, black, grey and white projects; etc. 
  
Chapter 3   Integration   
47 
Hedlund 2002.doc 
In the activities that are undertaken by agents (consultants) 
Integrate OHS in the same methodologies that the cleaner production 
projects employ.  For instance, if a cleaner production project 
embraces the common management methodology of identify–analyse–
prioritise–implement–check, to achieve its objective, then integrate 
OHS into this methodology. 
This is integration at the level of methodology of the intervention.  This 
is a major theme of this study, which will be examined in depth in 
chapters Chapter 7 and Chapter 8 for large and small companies, 
respectively. 
Integrate at the Actors level 
Conceptual basis  
Understanding organisational behaviour in a social systems context 
In the Danced organisation 
Modify (enlarge) the actor system to ensure that OHS interests are 
continuously being safeguarded.  Introduce an actor into the Danced 
organisation who can look after OHS issues, monitor opportunities and 
act as a resource person with in that organisation.  
In the activities that are undertaken by agents (consultants) 
Introduce an actor that can safeguard OHS interest while the project is 
being implemented and who can grab unexpected opportunities for 
integration as they arise. 
Strengthen local actors who have interests in OHS, for instance the 
workers and/or workers' unions 
Modify (enlarge) the actor system to ensure that OHS interests are 
being safeguarded on a continuos basis and who can grab unexpected 
opportunities for integration as they arise.   
Introduce an OHS actor: 
• during project identification (OHS expert) 
• during project implementation (OHS expert) 
• during project life, e.g. an OHS representative to sit in project 
preparation and project steering committees 
Give access to local actors who have interests in OHS, for instance the 
workers and/or workers' unions 
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Strengthen local actors, for instance by provide them with technical 
knowledge or train employees so they can perform more efficiently in 
negotiations 
Pursue employee participation in CP projects 
Integrate at the Structure level 
Conceptual basis  
Understanding organisational behaviour in an organisational process 
context 
In the Danced organisation 
Define OHS a as prominent and legitimate objective of the Danced 
organisation.  Define it in the Vision Statement and espoused policy, in 
the Strategy Papers, etc. and communicate this in the organisation 
Specify and assign clear formal responsibility that also include OHS 
into the job descriptions of Danced employees. 
Establish mechanisms of accountability that keep Danced employees 
accountable to achieving that OHS is being considered in CP projects 
Make OHS issues explicit and mandatory in the written specifications 
that control activities by subcontractors.  Specifically: 
• Introduce OHS as a legitimate objective in the TOR of CP projects 
• Specify OHS objectives in the CP Project Document  
• Insert appraisal events in Project Cycle tool, in which checks for 
OHS are conducted 
In the activities that are undertaken by agents (consultants) 
Make consultants accountable to achieving OHS objectives (and not 
only accountable to achieving environmental activities) 
Integrate in reward, punishment structures and employ accountability.  
Defined criteria for determining upon project completion if the CP 
project was successful in achieving its OHS objective 
Specify mandatory OHS skills and activities in contractual documents 
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Chapter 4. Planning in 
environmental assistance projects 
Introduction 
Development agencies, of which Danced is one, are extensive 
producers and consumers of formal planning tools and methodologies.  
Such donor agencies administrate large amounts of cash on behalf of 
parliament.  They develop policies and strategies that conform with the 
mandate given by parliament, they negotiate with governments of the 
recipient countries on strategies and priorities, and they run or 
administrate a large number of diverse projects, each with its own 
budget, objectives, and time frame.  Additionally, much of the actual 
work regarding project planning, implementation, monitoring and 
evaluation is subcontracted to third-party agents, for instance non 
government organisations (NGOs) or consultants.  In short, a complex 
affair which requires great deal of planning and co-ordination. 
The reasoning presented in Chapter 2 (page 19) identified three key 
features of this system: 
• First, that there are multiple principal-agent relationships, that is, 
contractual arrangements between a principal (the donor) and an 
agent acting on behalf of the principal.   
• Second, that there are manifest forces at work that tend to fragment 
activities and disorganise the process, in particular the many 
interfaces and the lack of continuity arising from the use of 
different consultants in the same project.   
• Third, that this fragmentation leads to a heavy reliance on written 
documentation as the carrier of information and continuity.   
The implication is that the controls are of a bureaucratic and hierarchic 
nature.  Development organisations manage their projects almost 
exclusively through written specifications.  A multitude of actors may 
undertake the actual work, often in competition with each other based 
on parameters of price and professional capability.  The project 
specification, primarily as laid down in the Project Document, is the 
principal means of control, meant to assure continuity and consistency 
over the project's life cycle. 
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This chapter will review and describe major features of the dominant 
planning methodologies that development agencies use to produce 
those written specifications and to manage their many projects 
accordingly.  The purpose of this descriptive exercise is to prepare the 
ground for the two case studies of the Danced fish and metal finishing 
CP projects in Chapter 6, which deal with the planning and 
implementation phases. 
The chapter will then present two major, and competing, sets of 
theories on planning.  It will be argued that the dominant planning 
tools in use in Danced are consistent with 'rational choice' theories of 
organisational behaviour.  In particular will it be argued that the LFA 
planning tool has unmistakable roots in Scientific Management and 
Taylorism.  The competing set of theories will present an alternative 
perspective on planning that primarily serves to soften the hard core of 
rational planning methodologies.  The quite controversial view, that 
certain problems escape rigorous planning efforts, will be presented.  
The chapter will close with a broader view on the benefits of planning, 
that includes not only the face-value objective of improving efficiency, 
but also that planning may serve as instruments to legitimise 
organisational decisions, acting as means to shield the organisation 
from blame from its rivals or foes. 
Planning tools in use by Danced 
Two dominant planning tools 
Danced employ two major tools to assist project planning and 
management.  The first tool is the Project Cycle (PC), which is mostly 
used inside the Danced organisation as a general project management 
tool -- an approach to manage a project from cradle-to-grave, so to 
speak.  The second methodology, the Logical Framework Approach 
(LFA), prescribes a set of 'good practices' to follow when a new 
project is being conceived and detailed.  The LFA tool also serves to 
assure consistency in the planning efforts, which is particularly 
necessary when this task is subcontracted to consultants that are 
selected from competitive bidding procedures. 
The LFA planning tool is particularly relevant for this study because it 
comprises a methodology to use in the project definition phase.  It will 
later be argued in Chapter 6 that proper attention must be paid to OHS 
issues in that initial project definition phase if they ever are to gain 
foothold in the project at its later stages.  The description that follows 
will therefore provide a relatively detailed account of the approach to 
problem analysis and project design that the LFA prescribes.  Other 
aspects of the LFA will be considered to the extent that they are 
important for an understanding of the problem analysis and project 
design activity.  Similarly will only passing reference be made to the 
Project Cycle to the extent that it supports the description of the LFA. 
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It should be observed, however, that the LFA methodology is highly 
integrated.  It is so by design.  It is a deliberately sought feature of the 
LFA that it shall guide the activities over the entire lifecycle of the 
project.  For instance, the mechanics of the LFA are such that the 
outputs of the planning process are structured in a manner that allows 
them to be used directly as inputs in later progress monitoring 
activities.  The LFA planning tool thus serves the dual purposes of 
planning and subsequent project monitoring and management.  
Conceptually, it thereby becomes a supplement to the Project Cycle 
methodology.   
Adherence to the LFA methodology is a major strategy of 
development assistance agencies in Denmark and other countries.  It is 
mandatory to apply LFA methodology when designing new 
development assistance projects.  The guidelines for project 
preparation specifies that the LFA activity must be documented and 
included in the documentation forwarded to the development 
assistance agency when funding is applied for.  Hence, an analysis of 
this tool, of its epistemological foundation, of how it interferes with 
the process of project definition is central to a deeper understanding of 
development assistance projects.   
Why plan ? 
The two quotes below capture quite precisely the nature of the 
perceived problems and the rationale for more formal approaches to 
project planning and design:  
" ... evidence of inadequate project designs have surfaced with 
regular frequency.  The problems are numerous.  They include 
implementation delays, cost overruns, changes in objectives, 
unforeseen effects of activities, failure to include intended 
beneficiaries and so forth.  Project planners have often 
overlooked the dynamic environment of political factors, social 
interactions and the complex and uncertain nature of 
development problems" (Danida 1990:1, emphasis added). 
"Inadequate planning is a persistent fundamental problem in 
international development aid.  Planning documents are often 
specific and clear as to the physical and financial inputs, 
personnel, activities and expected physical results.  But thorough 
assessment of the overall objectives, the target group and the 
external factors which determine success or failure is often 
lacking.  ...[...]...  As a result, projects often develop in 
unintended directions, and fail to respond to the needs of the 
intended beneficiaries.  Projects may have unforeseen negative 
results which could have been avoided with more systematic 
planning. ...[...]...  There is ample evidence to show that a 
modest investment in improved planning usually pays off in 
terms of better projects and direct savings.  In many cases the 
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rewards can be considerable"  (NORAD 1990:3, emphasis 
added). 
It is evident that the argument is one of improving efficiency.  In fact, 
the LFA methodology was specifically conceived as a response to the 
problems listed above (Norad 1990:3). 
The Project Cycle 
The project Cycle (PC) establishes a conceptual framework for 
systematically dealing with a project over its entire life, from the first 
inception to its conclusion.  This tool serves to aid donor agency staff 
to manage projects systematically and consistently. 
The PC divides a development project into three distinct phases: 
preparation, implementation and completion.  A simplified project 
cycle comprises more than ten distinct steps that are assumed to 
proceed sequentially.  Based on Mikkelsen (1995:49) they are: 
Project preparation 
- identification 
- pre-appraisal 
- feasibility study 
- appraisal 
- prepare project document 
- agreement and contract 
Project implementation 
 monitoring 
- review 
Project completion 
- transfer to normal administration 
- termination 
- evaluation of project 
- evaluation of impact and of potential for replication) 
A graphical illustration of the project cycle is shown on Figure 5 
overleaf. 
 
LFA -- tracing its origins and developments 
Danida’s LFA manual (Danida 1990:5) observes that the ancestor to 
the LFA was the so-called Logical Framework (LF), which was 
developed by USAID in the late 1960s.  Since then, several donor 
organisations including FAO, ILO, GTZ (the German development 
agency), and others, first adopted it, later modified it and made further 
developments.  Danida eventually decided to introduce the 
methodology in 1989.   
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In its early version, the Logical Framework was mostly descriptive -- a 
matrix that systematically organised and described project objectives, 
outputs and inputs, important assumptions, indicators, and means of 
verification.  Developments of later versions of the tool were 
particularly concerned with improving its analysis and planning 
capabilities (Danida 1990:1-5).   
 
 
 
Each new version of the LFA tool has thus seen a broadening of the 
scope.  The rather limited scope of the so-called first generation LF 
was mainly descriptive -- enhancing the project documentation by 
providing a methodology for a systematic, standardised and 
comprehensive description of a development project.  The second 
generation combined a problem analysis with an analysis of objectives.  
In its third (and present) generation, LFA has evolved into a general 
tool for managing and monitoring projects as well as a tool to enhance 
stakeholder communication (Bech-Hansen 2001). 
Figure 5 The Project Cycle 
Source: Mikkelsen 1995:49 
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While each generation of the LFA tool has sought to increase its 
planning content, it is still a key purpose of LFA to provide a  
standardised project description. 
LFA -- aims and structure 
We can therefore identify the following aims of the LFA tool 
1. To guide the problem analysis activity, ensuring that key 
problems are identified and addressed in a standardised, 
systematic and proper way, ensuring consistent planning effort 
across projects and over time, and not the least to lay down some 
minimum requirements to written documentation of these 
project analysis activities 
2. To guide the project design activity, ensuring that the activities 
of the project address the key problems in an efficient manner, 
again while meeting the same requirements to a systematic and 
consistent approach, and written documentation of the process 
3. To describe the project in a standardised, systematic, consistent 
and comprehensive manner that highlights logical linkages 
between inputs, activities and results, and also identifies 
important assumptions and risks.  This description must have 
sufficient detail and precision to serve two major purposes: 
4. First, that the description can form the contractual basis for a 
competitive tendering procedure.  Subcontractors who wish to 
implement the project shall be able to estimate the time and 
effort necessary to do so and make a commercial bid based on 
this description.  Subcontractors will scrutinise this description 
when making their bids, because the successful subcontractor is 
chosen from a competitive bidding process. 
5. Second, that the description specifies in detail the objectives that 
are to be achieved and the indicators to verify that objectives 
have been met upon project completion.  The description will 
therefore also form the basis for a subsequent evaluation 
exercise - - both of the project and of the subcontractors 
performance.  This evaluation exercise can be carried out by a 
subcontractor, again chosen from a competitive bidding 
procedure. 
In summary, the LFA deals with systematic problem analysis and 
project design.  It structures the project description enabling this 
information to form the basis for implementation and subsequent 
monitoring and evaluation activities.  LFA thereby becomes an 
integrated tool that embraces not only the planning phase, but also 
pervades the implementation and completion phases - the entire 
Project Cycle. 
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The LFA is divided into two phases and seven steps.  Four steps 
concentrate on analysis, three steps on design as follows (after 
Mikkelsen 1995:50): 
Analysing the situation 
1 participation (stakeholder) analysis 
2 problem analysis 
3 objectives analysis 
4 analysis of alternatives, formulation of strategy 
Designing the project 
5 identification of project elements 
6 identification of external factors (assumptions and risks) 
7 identification of indicators 
LFA -- the analysis phase 
The LFA is an objectives oriented project planning and management 
tool.  The identification and specification of objectives are the core 
tasks of the project analysis phase.  It comprises four steps: 
The first step is to identify major stakeholders.  If possible, stakeholder 
representatives should be involved in the next core step (step 2) of 
LFA - the problem analysis - in which problems are identified and 
causal linkages elucidated.  The LFA guidelines stress that a problem 
be defined as an existing negative state, not as the absence of a 
solution -- thus "lack of pesticides" is not a problem, whereas "crops 
are infested with pests" is.  Problems are then structured according to 
causal linkages among them.   
This produces a rough but structured model of the problem 
environment.  The output of this exercise is visualised in a problem 
hierarchy, the so-called problem tree.  Figure 6 shows an example.  
The core problem is placed in the centre, in the example the core 
problem is that bus accidents happen too frequently.  The causes of 
this negative situation branch out below the core problem: drivers are 
not careful, bad condition of road etc.  The effects branch out above 
the core problem: passengers are injured or late, leading to overall loss 
of confidence in this particular bus company. 
The problem analysis step of the LFA thus combines idea generation 
and brainstorming activities with structure and analysis.  The active 
involvement of stakeholders, or their representatives, in the discussion 
and analysis that eventually lead to generation of the problem tree is 
also a consensus building activity.  The participants reach a common 
understanding of the problems to be addressed, how, and under what 
constraints. 
The third step, objectives analysis, takes its input directly from the 
problem analysis.  Problems, which were formulated as existing 
negative states, are simply rephrased into positive statements.  This 
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procedure transforms the cause-effect problem tree into a means-ends 
tree in which problems are transformed to objectives (Figure 7). 
Loss of confidence
in bus company
Passengers are
injured
Passengers arrive
too late Ef
fec
ts
Frequent bus
accidents Core problem
Drivers are
not carefull
Poor conditions
of vehicles
Poor conditions
of roads Ca
us
es
Vehicles are
too old
No regular
servicing
 
 
 
 
Public considers 
company reliable
Fewer passengers
are injured
Passengers arrive
puncturally En
ds
Bus accidents
less frequent Core objective
Drivers are
carefull
Vehicles in
good condition
Conditions of roads
improved M
ea
ns
Old vehicles are
replaced regularly
Vehicles are
serviced regularly
 
Figure 6 The LFA problem tree (step 2) outlining cause-effect 
relationships 
Source:  After GTZ (1991) as quoted in Mikkelsen (1995:53) 
Figure 7  The LFA objectives tree (step 3) is obtained by inverting the 
problem tree 
Source:  After GTZ (1991) as quoted in Mikkelsen (1995:54) 
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In the example, the core problem that bus accidents happen too 
frequently is inverted into a core objective of less frequent bus 
accidents.  The specific negative cause of poor conditions of vehicles 
is inverted into a positive means of bringing the vehicles into good 
conditions.  The negative effect that passengers are injured is inverted 
into a positive ends, that fewer passengers are injured, ultimately 
leading to better public confidence in the bus company. 
The next step in the LFA (step 4)is to isolate a number of alternative 
scenarios (or strategies) from the problem tree.  Each alternative 
scenario is assessed on a range of parameters, for instance the costs of 
the scenario, its chance of success, its time horizon etc.  An overall 
scoring and ranking exercise then permits the best alternative to be 
chosen.   
An example of this analysis, scoring and ranking of alternatives  is 
provided in Table 5 below.  Scenario 1, better drivers, score 
consistently more favourably than scenario 3, better roads.  Costs are 
lower, the chances that the project will complete successfully is higher, 
results are achieved earlier, etc.   
 
This extremely simplified account of the LFA methodology is 
described here to demonstrate the conceptual logic that pervades the 
planning tool -- how systematic analysis and application of a 
structured approach will guide a group of people to  
• potentially identify a multitude of problem in a brainstorming 
exercise 
• identify and agree on a single one as the core problem 
 
Table 5 Alternatives analysis (LFA step 4).  Scenario number 1 
appears to be the most attractive alternative 
 
 Scenario 
 1 2 3 
Parameter Better drivers Better busses Better roads 
Cost low medium high 
Chance of success medium medium low 
Benefit / Cost ratio medium medium low 
Time horizon short medium long 
Social risk medium medium medium 
 
Source: Bech-Hansen 2001 
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• identify causes and effects and highlight logical relationships 
• transform problems into objectives, that is, identifying which 
objectives an intervention should have 
• transform causes into means,  that is, identifying the inputs that 
the intervention must provide or bring about,  
• transform effects into ends, that is, identify the results that the 
intervention must produce 
• analyse intervention alternatives and pick the most optimal one. 
 
LFA -- the design phase 
After having conceived the strategy the LFA activity moves into its 
second phase, designing the project.  The design phase comprises three 
steps, as noted earlier 
Designing the project 
5 identification of project elements 
6 identification of external factors (assumptions and risks) 
7 identification of indicators 
The purpose of the design phase it to structure the main elements of an 
intervention, highlighting the logical linkages between intended inputs, 
planned activities and expected results.  The design phase shall also 
identify and organise important assumptions.  Additionally, it shall 
specify indicators, and means of verification, which shall assist 
subsequent evaluation activities. 
This entails setting up a hierarchy of objectives, with the so-called 
development objective at the top, followed by the immediate 
objectives, project outputs, etc.  For each of these objectives, key 
assumptions and risks are identified which could hinder that objective 
in being achieved.  In addition, indicators are listed which serve as 
means of verification if objectives have been fulfilled.   
The final step is to compile this information into a project matrix (see 
example in Table 6).  The project matrix is the condensed output of 
the LFA exercise. 
The purpose of this step-by-step exercise, which is sometimes called 
the LFA workshop, is to ensure that the following two fundamental 
requirements are fulfilled: 
1 a minimum degree of consensus is reached between 
stakeholders over what the basic problem to be addressed  
2 the problem is formulated in such a way that it can be 
addressed by specific interventions - i.e. the problem is 
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analysed in its entirety, specifying causes and effects 
(Mikkelsen 1995:50)  
 
 
Table 6 The LFA project matrix -- a systematic and comprehensive 
description of project contents 
 
DEVELOPMENT 
OBJECTIVE 
High service level for bus 
passengers 
INDICATORS 
 
90 % of departures with 
less than 5 minutes delay 
Company's market share 
on the increase 
EXTERNAL FACTORS 
 
Passengers continue using 
company buses 
IMMEDIATE  
OBJECTIVE 
Frequency of bus 
accidents reduced 
INDICATORS 
 
Less than x accidents 
annually after 12 months 
Less than y serious 
injuries after 12 months 
EXTERNAL FACTORS 
 
Road conditions are 
improved 
OUTPUTS 
1. Drivers trained 
2. X new busses 
operational  
3. Maintenance 
workshop equipped 
4. Maintenance routines 
established 
INDICATORS 
See opposite page 
EXTERNAL FACTORS 
Trained drivers remain 
with the bus company 
ACTIVITIES 
1. Undertake training 
programs 
2. Procure buses 
3. Procure tools and 
spare parts 
4. Develop maintenance 
routines 
INPUTS 
1. Bus instructor  
x months 
2. Funds for busses 
3. Funds for tools  
and spare parts 
4. Maintenance 
instructor y months 
EXTERNAL FACTORS 
Tool and spares supplied 
and cleared in time 
 
Source: Norad (1990:102) 
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A few additional purposes/benefits of the LFA project matrix can be 
listed 
3 that a hierarchy of objectives has been defined which permits 
later differentiated evaluations of project success.  At what 
level were objectives met? - for example did project outputs 
materialise but without achieving the immediate objective etc. 
4 that the indicators to verify if objectives have been met, and 
the means of obtaining these indicators, have been agreed upon 
prior to project execution.  In this manner the project matrix 
bears resemblance to the making of a contractual arrangement, 
a detailed specification the inputs required to achieve certain 
outputs, accompanied by criteria of how to measure inputs and 
outputs, together with a timing schedule. 
5 the LFA project matrix structures information in a manner 
which permits its direct use in subsequent project monitoring 
and evaluation activities.   
LFA - indicators 
Indicators function as measures of output and impact and as proxies 
for attainment of objectives, indeed, the availability of indicators is a 
key precondition for the use of planning-by-objectives methods such 
as LFA.  The proper definition of indicators thereby becomes a task of 
key importance for the project planners.   
It may also be expected that the project implementation consultant will 
scrutinise the indicators well cognisant that those indicators will form 
the basis for the subsequent evaluation of their success (or possibly, 
failure) in achieving project objectives.  Indicators become politically 
charged issues.  I will revert to this point at a later stage.  Various 
authors therefore deal with indicators in detail.  Mikkelsen (1995) note 
that ideally, indicators are objective and specific measures of the result 
of the project.  Indicators of output are usually simple, e.g. numbers of 
units produced, persons trained, etc.  However indicators of the 
fulfilment of objectives may be complex, if at all possible, and in such 
cases must qualitative and less objective assessments be relied on.   
A good indicator is said to be 1) substantial in relation to an objective, 
2) independent at the different levels of objectives, 3) factual rather 
than a subjective impression, 4) plausible, and 5) based on obtainable, 
preferably existing data.  (Mikkelsen 1995:89 quoting Norad and 
Danida sources).  In development agency parlance, the ideal indicator 
is SMART, that is: Specific, Measurable, Achievable, Realistic, and 
Time-based (Bech-Hansen 2001).  
This brief and highly simplistic review can off course not do justice to 
the full complexity of the LFA method.  In its full elaboration the LFA 
is a major task which by intrinsic definition should comprise an all-
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inclusive problem analysis, covering all relevant conditions and every 
conceivable major external risk to successful project completion.  
However, the review suffices to provide an idea of the mechanics of 
the method, the tempting simplicity of its stringent conceptual logic, 
the emphasis on bureaucratic controls through indicators, and a hint at 
the method's epistemological underpinnings. 
Theories on planning 
Taylor and scientific management 
An account of planning cannot escape24 the contributions of Frederick 
Winslow Taylor (1856-1915) who greatly influenced the methods of 
production planning and of workplace organisation.  F.W. Taylor was 
an American industrial engineer and sheet metal expert who gained 
fame with a production concept based on task specialisation and 
bureaucratic rule in the early 1900s.  He has given name to a set of 
manufacturing principles known as Taylorism, or what Taylor himself 
referred to as the Scientific Management of work. 
One of Taylor's greatest concerns was that workers tended to restrict 
output by deliberately slowing down the pace of work - ‘soldiering’ as 
he named it.  In the late 1800s, craft workers exercised considerable 
autonomy over their labour and their helpers.  Taylor recognized, for 
instance, that the Midvale Steel Company's machine shop, during the 
late 1870s, "was really run by the workmen and not by the bosses.  The 
workmen together ... carefully planned how fast each job could be 
done..." (Taylor 1912, quoted in Taksa 1992:384).  Workers could 
uphold systematic soldiering by various means of peer pressure, 
harassment or physical confrontation.  'Binging' was one of those 
means -- a too productive worker (a quota violator) was ridiculed by 
co-workers or threatened with social exclusion or physical punishment, 
which could include a slap ('bing') to the head of the rate-buster (Peña 
1997:345).  Taksa (1992) attributes the soldiering phenomenon to a 
deep rooted perception on the part of the workers that increases in 
productivity will result in employment insecurity, and is to be resisted. 
In order to control this counter-productive behaviour Taylor sought to 
establish a system where management could exercise full control over 
the work processes.  His first step was to decompose complex work 
operations into smaller sets of standardised tasks, which could be 
carried out independently of each other.  These new standardised tasks 
required only modest training to carry out and reduced the dependency 
on skilled artisan workers.  Workers could not only be shifted between 
different work tasks more easily -- it was also relatively unproblematic 
to take in new hires and train them to fill in for experienced workers in 
case of industrial conflict.   
                                                          
24
  Indeed, I will argue in one of the next sections, that LFA has unmistakable 
roots in Taylor's Scientific Management. 
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Taylor's quest for absolute managerial control over the work processes 
and of the knowledge and skill required to carry out work is evident in 
the following quote:  "The managers [must] assume ... the burden of 
gathering together all of the traditional knowledge which in the past 
has been possessed by the workmen and of classifying, tabulating, and 
reducing this knowledge to rules, laws, formulae ....  All possible brain 
work should be removed from the shop and centered in the planning or 
laying-out department .... The work of every workman [must be] fully 
planned by management in advance.  " (Taylor 1911, quoted in Peña 
1996:342) 
The hallmarks of Taylorism are thus a distinct separation of mental 
and manual labour, a separation of the planning of task from their 
subsequent execution, which relies on hierarchical command structures 
and bureaucratic rules to co-ordinate and control work.  Taylor 
perfected these manufacturing principles with the development of the 
time and motion study in which every movement is identified and 
optimised.  When tasks are so precisely defined in terms of 
movements, operations and the time required to carry them out, they 
become a powerful tool to measure and control the execution of work.   
Taylor thus established powerful principles to measure and control the 
execution of work.  It is probably difficult to underestimate the 
importance of his work.  The Society for the Advancement of 
Management, an American organisation, was originally started as the 
'Taylor Society' (Leavitt 1965:1150).  Later principles of workplace 
organisation are often positioned relative to Taylorism, either as a 
continuation or a departure from it.  A large body of Marxist informed 
literature devotes introductory chapters to examining Tayloristic 
division of labour as a strategy for capitalist control over production.  
The sheer amount of literature that refers to Taylor's principles is 
indicative of its ground-breaking nature.  
Rational choice  
In everyday language, the word 'rational' has many meanings.  In many 
of its uses, 'rational' is approximately equivalent to 'intelligent' or 
'successful'.  It can also mean 'sane' referring to the sanity of a decision 
or an action.  By contrast 'irrational' actions are commonly 
synonymous to senseless or foolish acts.   
In theories of Rational Choice, however, the term 'rational' has a very 
specific meaning referring to the processes of making choices.  A 
rational choice procedure is one that pursues logic of consequence.  It 
anticipates future consequence of possible actions in the present and it 
seeks to evaluate those consequences and rank them according to their 
preference.  Theories of rational choice make a choice conditional on 
the answers to four basic questions25: 
                                                          
25
  The accounts of theories of decision making in this and the next section are 
based on March (1994:1-62) and March (1999:13-51).   
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• The question of alternatives: what actions are possible? 
• The question of expectations:  What future consequences might 
follow from each alternative?  How likely is each of these future 
consequences? 
• The question of preferences: How valuable are those 
consequences to the decision maker? 
• The question of a decision rule:  How is a choice to be made 
among the alternatives in terms of values of consequences? 
This is an extremely powerful theory.  The general framework is the 
basis for many explanations of behaviour.  People may explain their 
own behaviour in terms of the alternatives available to them and the 
desirability of the consequences of those alternatives.  Similarly, 
people may explain the actions of others by imagining their 
alternatives, consequences and preferences.  Theories of rational 
choice are epitomised in classical economic theory in which a rational 
individual with given tastes and preferences trades in a market, seeking 
to spend resources in such a way as to attain their most preferred 
basket of goods at the least cost.  But 'individuals' can also be 
aggregated entities.  Milton Friedman26 explicitly compares the 
decision processes of a firm to those of an individual playing a game, 
arguing that it is but a short step from the rationality of individual 
behaviour to the rationality of a firm's decisions.  Similarly has a 
rational actor model been applied to countries bargaining with one 
another.  Theories of rational choice have been used to explain the 
emergence of public regulation in terms of market failures, multiple 
person prisoner's dilemma, and the need to curtail opportunistic 'free-
rider' behaviour.  Indeed, the assumption of rationality is deep-seated 
in the Western civilisation -- it is rooted in the ideas of the 
Enlightenment 
In one of its more rigorous versions, the theory of rational choice 
assumes that people have  
- full knowledge of the present situation  
- a complete set of alternatives for action 
- full knowledge about the consequences of those actions 
- a consistent preference ordering, that is, consistent values by 
which alternative consequences of action can be compared in 
terms of their subjective value 
                                                          
26
  The reference to Friedman and international bargaining is from Weale 
(1992:38-46) 
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- a decision rule by which they select a single alternative of 
action on the basis of its consequences for the preferences 
Bounded rationality, a competing set of theories 
The earliest challenges to Rational Choice questioned the information 
assumptions observing that the human mind has serious limitation in 
terms of attention, memory, comprehension, and computation.  
Identification of all possible actions is hardly possible, the argument 
goes, and even less so with determining the future consequences of 
those actions.  Furthermore, an assessment of consequences presumes 
that future preferences with respect to those consequences are stable, 
consistent, precise and exogenous.  Neither condition is likely to be 
met.   
Theories of limited (or bounded) rationality have therefore evolved, 
and to a large extent replaced pure theories of rational choice.  The 
core notion is that individuals are intendedly rational.  Although 
decision-makers try to be rational, they are constrained by limited 
cognitive capabilities and incomplete information.  Their actions may 
thus be less than completely rational in spite of their best intentions 
and efforts.  Not all alternatives are known and not all consequences 
are considered.  Instead of having a complete and consistent set of 
preferences, decision-makers have incomplete and inconsistent goals, 
which are not all considered at the same time. 
Theories of bounded rationality lead to a wholly different class of 
theories to explain behaviour and decision making.  The next two 
sections will briefly explore four of these, the theory of satisficing, the 
theory of attention and search, the theory of role following, and the so-
called garbage can theory of decision making. 
Satisficing, rationing of attention, and roles 
The bounded rationality theory of satisficing explains decision making 
in terms of processes where individuals chose an alternative if it 
exceeds some criterion or target.  By contrast, rational choice theory 
assumes that individuals maximise, choosing the best alternative, the 
one with the largest expected return.  Under satisficing, an alternative 
that is better on each preference criterion will not be chosen over one 
that is good enough on each criterion, if the latter is considered first.  
Satisficing also makes it possible, that no alternative will satisfy all 
criteria, in which case no decision will be made. 
In the process of buying a new video home appliance, a consumer is 
not likely to survey the market in its entirety, listing the pros and cons 
of all alternative models comparing benefits to costs, and choosing the 
one with the highest benefit-cost ratio.  Rather, a search process could 
be initiated in which alternative products are evaluated from a pre-
established set of performance criteria and a maximum price limit.  In 
a pure satisficing context the search stops when the fist video model 
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that satisfies all criteria and falls within the budget is encountered.  A 
mixture of satisficing and maximising strategies could also be 
employed in which considerations continue for some more or less 
predetermined time, rather than strictly until the first satisfactory 
alternative is found. 
In personnel decisions, a maximising procedure would involve finding 
the best possible combination of persons and tasks.  A satisficing 
procedure would, on the other hand, involve finding a person good 
enough to do the job.  The process of establishing aspirations, of 
setting targets, of determining what is 'good enough', therefore 
becomes crucial in a satisficing context of decision making.  
Satisficing is an attractive notion from a cognitive perspective.  Instead 
of having to worry about an indefinite number of gradations in the 
environment, individuals simplify the world into two parts -- good 
enough and not good enough.  Satisficing would be attractive to 
individuals that seek to optimise on the amount of attention and time 
they are prepared to spend on a given problem. 
In theories of bounded rationality, attention is a scarce resource.  Not 
all alternatives are know, they must be sought.  Not all consequences 
are known, they must be investigated.  Not all preferences are known, 
they must be evoked.  The allocation of attention affects the 
information that is available, and thus the decision.  The core ideas are 
that information has to be discovered through search and that the key 
scarce resource is attention.  Theories of bounded rationality assume 
that there are more things to do than there is time to do them; that there 
are more claims on attention than can be met. 
If attention is rationed, decisions can no longer be predicted simply by 
knowing the features of alternatives and desires.  Decisions will be 
affected by the way decision-makers attend to, or fail to attend to, 
various alternatives.  Interested participants may not be present at a 
given decision because they are somewhere else.  Something may be 
overlooked because else is being attended to.  Decisions happen the 
way they do because of, more or less haphazard, timing and 
mobilisation of attention.  
Theories of bounded attention analyse and understand decisions in a 
framework of attention and search.  Satisficing is actually less a 
decision rule than a search rule.  It specifies the conditions under 
which search is triggered or stopped.  Search is controlled by a 
comparison between performance and targets.  If performance falls 
below a target, search is increased.  If performance achieves its target, 
search is decreased.  In this context, decision making is understood in 
a framework of search, and of limited attention.  In order to economise 
on time and attention, individuals will simplify complex situations and 
use various strategies to cope with excessive information, for instance 
ignoring some information, and focusing on other.  Individuals may 
ignore interactions and work backward from desired outcomes to 
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necessary preconditions.  In its extreme version, decision making 
becomes a theory of the first-guess. 
Another efficient strategy for an individual who seeks to economise on 
time and attention is to follow rules of identity.  In this framework 
decision-makers are imagined to ask three questions: 
- The question of recognition: What kind of situation am I in? 
- The question of identity: What kind of person am I 
- The question of rules: What does a person such as I do in a 
situation like this? 
The process is not random, arbitrary or trivial; it is systematic, 
reasoning, and often quite complicated.  The reasoning process thereby 
becomes one of establishing identities and matching rules to situations.  
This type of decision logic inverts many of the notions of rational 
choice.  The notions of anticipatory, calculated and consequential 
action are contrasted to notions of appropriateness, obligation, duty 
and role.   
In support of this position it is argued that people in organisations 
often follow rules even when it is not obviously in their self-interest to 
do so.  Decisions are shaped by the roles played by decision makers -- 
family roles, organisational roles, civic roles.  Individuals learn what it 
means to be a student, a teacher, a manager, a parent -- how a doctor 
acts, how a business owner acts.  The decision framework thereby 
becomes one of role and duty rather than one of anticipatory and 
consequential choice.  The question becomes one of roles and values 
rather than filling a basket of goods at the least cost. 
Garbage can processes 
March, Cohen and Olsen have developed an extremely important and 
highly provocative theory of organisational behaviour, with the 
infelicitous title of the 'garbage can model'.  In this model, 
organisations are described as contradictory 'organised anarchies', 
which exhibit three general properties.   
First, instead of having clear and consistent objectives the organisation 
operates on the basis of inconsistent and ill-defined preferences.  
Different individuals at different levels in the organisation may hold 
conflicting goals; the same individuals may hold different and 
incompatible goals at different times; and organisations may not even 
know their preferences until after decisions have been made.   
Second, the organisation's own processes may not be understood by its 
members; the left hand does not know what the right hand is doing; 
what happened in the past and why it happened is not clear; and the 
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connections between the organisation's actions the consequences of its 
actions are obscure.   
Third, there is extremely fluid participation in the decision making 
process.  There are unclear rules for who can participate in the 
decision; participants come and go; some pay attention, while others 
do not; key meetings may be dominated by biased, uninformed, and 
even uninterested individuals.   
This mixture is often haphazardly dumped together at 'choice 
opportunities' -- such as budget conferences or board of directors 
meetings, referring to the 'garbage can' in the title -- during which the 
"organisation is expected to produce behaviour that can be called a 
decision"27 
In a garbage can process it is assumed that there are exogenous time-
dependent arrivals of choice opportunities, of problems, of solutions, 
and of decision-makers.  Problems are attached to solutions, not 
because of any linkage between means and ends, but because of their 
temporal proximity.  In the extreme, almost any 'solution' can be 
associated with any 'problem' -- provided that they are evoked at the 
same time.   
These conditions break radically with those that reign under rational 
choice models, where organisations pursue clear and consistent goals.   
Rather, 'solutions' are actively looking for problems to attach 
themselves to, 'problems' are ill-defined and may even by 
unrecognised, and 'participants' are ill-defined, have limited attention 
and uncertain intentions.  At certain instances, largely determined by 
exogenous and uncorrelated events, a 'window of opportunity' may 
open, in which opportunistic actors championing  'solutions' that 
benefit themselves may be able to convince decision-makers to link 
their 'solutions' to the problem.   
In contrast to the rational choice means-ends perspective on decision-
making, the decision-making process becomes characterised by 
opportunities for access and attention.  Access in terms of fluid rules 
for admitting new actors onto the decision-making arena, and attention 
in terms of getting their point of view onto the agenda, winning the 
information overload battle.  
While March et al. acknowledge that such extreme properties will not 
be found at all times in all organisations, they insist that the theory 
explains many of the actions of some organisations, and some of the 
actions in most organisations.  Andersen and Hansen (1991) identified 
                                                          
27
   The garbage can model was presented by March and Olsen (1986) in 
"Ambiguity and Control" referred to by Andersen and Hansen (1991:23-25); as 
well as in March, Cohen and Olsen (1988) in "Decisions and Organizations" 
referred to in Sagan (1993:29-31).   I have neither original reference and the 
account given here is based on Sagan's (1993),  Andersen and Hansen's (1991) 
descriptions and to a lesser extent on March (1996:198-219). 
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garbage can processes in the political decision to spend DKK 12bn 
(1.8 percent of the GNP) on an environmental initiative, which was 
reckoned to have no effect on the stated problem of oxygen depletion 
phenomena at the sea bed in shallow Danish offshore waters.  Much in 
the same vein, Scott Sagan (1993) presents highly convincing (and 
truly disturbing) evidence, that the garbage can model explains 
significant elements of the organisational behaviour of the US nuclear 
forces' command and control structure during that period of the cold 
war for which he could gain access to information under various 
Freedom of Information Acts.  
Wicked problems -- a constructionist view 
Some 17 years ago Rittel, and Webber (1984) noted that some 
planning problems are what they termed wicked problems, intrinsically 
ill-defined and with no test of a solution available.  I will quote them at 
length below. 
"As distinguished from problems in the natural sciences, which 
are definable and separable and may have solutions that are 
findable, the problems of governmental planning - and 
especially those of social or policy planning - are ill-defined; and 
they rely upon elusive political judgement for resolution.  (Not 
'solution'.  Social problems are never solved.  At best they are 
resolved - over and over again.).  ...[...]...   
The formulation of a wicked problem is the problem.  The 
process of formulating the problem and of conceiving a solution 
(or re-solution) are identical, since every specification of the 
problem is a specification of the direction in which a treatment is 
considered.  Thus, if we recognise deficient mental health 
services as part of the problem, then - trivially enough - 
'improvement of the mental health services' is a specification of 
solution.  If, as the next step, we declare the lack of community 
centres one deficiency of the mental health services system, then 
'procurement of community centres' is the next specification.  If 
it is inadequate treatment within community centres, then 
improved therapy training of staff may be the locus of solution, 
and so on.  ...[...]... 
One cannot understand the problem without knowing about its 
context; one cannot meaningfully search for information without 
the orientation of a solution concept; one cannot first understand, 
then solve."  (Rittel and Webber 1984:136-138, original 
emphasis). 
The two authors adhere to a constructionist view of human perception, 
that humans are actively constructing a view of the world based on 
personal experiences.  Or, paraphrasing Schön -- problems do not 
present themselves as givens.  They must be constructed from the 
materials of problematic situations, which are puzzling, troubling and 
  
Chapter 4   Planning in environmental assistance projects 
69 
Hedlund 2002.doc 
uncertain.  Problem setting is a process in which, interactively, we 
name the things to which we will attend and frame the context in 
which we will attend to them.  But the problem with Technical 
Rationality is that although problem setting is a necessary condition 
for technical problem solving, it is not itself a technical problem.  Ends 
are often conflicting and confusing.  It is in the process of naming and 
framing that we may organise and clarify the ends to be achieved and 
the means to achieve them (Schön 1983:40-41). 
This returns the focus to the problem definition step in the LFA, and 
emphasises its paramount importance.  It is also obvious that the 
stakeholder analysis (LFA step 1) and the subsequent stakeholder 
participation in the LFA workshop, are the intended means to get 
around the problem of top-down identification of development 
problems, which as Mikkelsen (1995:50) notes, is widely accepted as 
one of the basic causes, why development projects fail.  She advocates 
strongly for participatory approaches, but laments that the LFA all too 
often is carried out by external people, donor representatives and 
consultants (ibid:51).  There is a danger that the LFA will be used as a 
ritual, by donor representatives, rather than enhance communication 
and dialogue, thus becoming a straitjacket [rather than an aid], she 
notes. (ibid:55).   
Discussion 
LFA and scientific management 
LFA's intellectual debt to Taylorism is evident in at least five respects.  
First, its overarching concern with issues of increased productivity and 
improved efficiency of development assistance projects.  This is in line 
with Taylor’s preoccupation with the workers' output restriction, or 
soldiering. 
Second, its explicit separation of planning and execution.  This 
separation not only pervades the design-implementation phasing 
approach but also the staffing policy, which sets exclusion criteria for 
participation at different phases in the project's life cycle.  It is 
common for Danida, and in particular for Danced, to subcontract 
discrete parts of the work in the project cycle to external consultants.  
The tasks of project identification, pre-appraisal, feasibility, design, 
etc. are therefore often carried out as independent activities, possibly 
by different consultants due to legal requirements for tendering of 
public works.  Separation is also deliberately built into the tendering 
procedure for reasons of fair and efficient competition (NAO 
1999:clauses 19, 101). 
Third, it's hierarchical approach to planning with layers of objectives, 
outputs and inputs and its concern with managerial control through 
setting the basis for monitoring and evaluation activities.   
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Fourth, its cook-book approach, revealing a fundamental (implicit) 
assumption about "one best way" of achieving a task 
Fifth, its preoccupation with quantification of goals; the use of 
indicators for precise and objective measurements of outputs and as 
quantitative proxies for abstract development objectives. 
More generally it may be argued that LFA is an expression of the 
scientific management in line with the paradigm of Technical 
Rationality.  
Bounded rationality -- implications for planning 
The theories of bounded rationality have at least two major 
implications for theories of planning.  First of all, that it softens the 
hard core of Rational Choice embodied in the ideal of one-best-way.  
As March (1999:17) argues, it rather turns "theories of choice into 
theories of information and attention, that is, into theories of the first 
guess".  In other words, when humans set targets, they look for 
alternatives that would satisfy those targets, rather than try to find the 
best imaginable solution.  When those targets are satisfied, the search 
ceases, and attention is diverted to other pressing issues.   
Adherents of planning may object that this is precisely what planning 
intends to improve.  However, in a perspective informed by theories of 
bounded rationality, this would be difficult to surmount -- it might 
simply be an unattainable ideal.  Rasmussen and Jensen (1994:45) note 
that the dilemma in short (in-a-nutshell) is, that there is a gap between 
the ideal of rational decision making and the inability in practice of 
people to decide and behave in a rational way 
The second implication follows from the recognition of attention as the 
key scarce resource.  The merits of planning may thus stem from the 
allocation of time and attention to a specific set of issues, that it 
entails, rather than the more concrete nature of those tasks and issues.   
Heald and Rakusin (1996) advocate precisely this point.  They argue 
that the chief benefits of planning are not derived from the 
consumption of plans but from engaging in the process of planning.   
In part because it focuses attention, and in part because it entails 
communication and consensus building.  In an extreme version of this 
theoretical line of reasoning, the process becomes more important than 
the actual activities that take place in that process. 
Heald and Rakusin (1996) therefore emphasise the 'participative 
principle' of planning, that it allows various stakeholders to design a 
future, which they jointly desire.  Planning in this sense becomes 
inseparable from action research, scenario workshops etc.  The 
participative principle raises another important issue:  Effective 
planning cannot be done to or for an organisation -- it must by done  
by it (ibid:47). 
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Dismal experiences with strategic business planning  
The important critique of planning that is raised above gives rise to 
quite pessimistic predictions of the benefits of planning.  This section 
will look a little broader, to the business community, in search of 
empirical evidence that would support such a pessimistic view  
In the business literature there is a large body of anecdotal evidence on 
the failure of (rational choice) strategic planning.  The Fortune 
magazine once polled consultants who claimed that less than 10 
percent of (rational choice) strategies are successfully implemented.  
Tom Peters (a management guru) referred to that figure as "wildly 
inflated" (Kiechel 1984, quoted in Mintzberg 1994:25).  Interestingly, 
it is quite unclear whether strategic planning really pays, despite its 
enormous popularity in the 1960-1970s.  A comprehensive meta-
review of evaluation studies found that the overall effect of planning 
on economic performance ranged from "weak" to "modest" (Mintzberg 
1994:97).    
A study on the experiences with the French government's 
comprehensive national planning system noted that "it simply could 
not predict the economic and social future with any accuracy" and 
overall that "the Plan was never executed according to Plan" 
(ibid:116).   
Mintzberg also mentions the experiences with the US Planning-
Programming-Budgeting-System (PPBS) on several occasions, 
characterising its as the biggest planning failure ever.  McNamara 
imposed the PPBS on the military establishment in the early 1960s and 
President Johnson later decreed its use throughout the government.  
The core idea of PPBS was to tie analysis, planning, strategic decision-
making, and budgeting together into a unified structure.  Steps were 
delineated as:  formulate objectives, relate program outputs to 
objectives, relate outputs to inputs (Mintzberg 1994:117-118), and so 
forth.  In an LFA perspective there are two notable points; first a 
temporal coincidence with the emergence of PPBS and with USAID's 
development of the Logical Framework (LF), and second, a striking 
similarity in terminology.   
The PPBS experience is generally recognised as a complete failure.  A 
highly respected student of the system observed that:  "Nowhere has 
PPBS (1) been established and (2) influenced governmental decisions 
(3) according to its own principles.  The program structures do not 
make sense to anyone.  They are not, in fact, used to make decisions of 
any importance".  The overall experience with the PPBS was 
summarised as "PPBS has failed everywhere and at all times."  
(Wildavsky 1974, quoted in Mintzberg 1994:117,121). 
The business literature also offers support to the views of Heald and 
Rakusin (1996), presented above, that the process of planning is more 
important than the actual outcomes of this process.  Mintzberg 
(1994:138) finds support of the this point of view in old maxims, such 
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as 'plans are sometimes useless but the planning process is always 
indispensable'.  One is reminded of the clergy whose sole purpose is to 
get people inside the door, no matter what happens inside, he notes. 
This point of view is so eloquently presented in the quote below, 
which not only has informative value, but also a considerable amount 
of amusement value. 
"A good deal of the corporate planning I have observed is like a 
ritual rain dance; it has no effect on the weather that follows, but 
those who engage in it think it does.  Moreover, it seems to me 
that much of the advice and instruction related to corporate 
planning is directed at improving the dancing, not the weather" 
(Quinn 1980, quoted in Mintzberg 1994:139). 
Management by objectives, long out of fashion 
The concept of management by objectives (MBO) was conceived by 
Peter Drucker, a management guru, in the mid 1950s.  The concept 
emphasised rational problem solving methods and focussed on goals, 
planning, control, appraisal, and accountability.  A paper in the mid 
1970s observed that the MBO management methodology were found 
to have a number of potential dysfunctional spin-offs in organisations.  
The deficiencies included sub-optimal co-ordination of objectives, 
inflexibility in coping with system dynamics, and a role 
incompatibility on the part of the superior, both being a coach and 
judge, thus in most cases worsening the superior-subordinate 
relationship (French and Hollmann, 1975).  
By and large, MBO appears to have gone out of fashion.  Modern 
textbooks on management pay little or no attention to MBO 
approaches but emphasises system diagnosis and re-diagnosis, system 
dynamics, empowerment and innovative capabilities.  In short, it 
appears that the emphasis on goal setting has given way for emphasis 
on how goals are being perceived and reacted upon.  
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Concluding remarks  
What planning does -- and symbolises  
Why, then, are development organisations in the 21st century 
attempting to address complex, and perhaps wicked, problems (1) in a 
Rational Choice hierarchy of objectives, (2)  employing a conventional 
linear planning approach, (3) with distinct planning and 
implementation phasing, and (4) employing a planning-by-objectives 
methodology?   
I will again quote Wildavsky who captures issues of a broader political 
perspective quite precisely in: 
"Planning is not really defended for what it does but for what it 
symbolizes.  Planning, identified with reason, is conceived to be 
the way in which intelligence is applied to social problems.  The 
efforts of planners are presumably better than other people's 
because they result in policy proposals that are systematic, 
efficient, coordinated, consistent and rational.  It is words like 
these that convey the superiority of planning.  The virtue of 
planning is that it embodies universal norms of rational choice."  
(Wildavsky 1973, quoted in Mintzberg 1994:18-19, emphasis 
added) 
This view, or more precisely: this hypothesis, so eloquently phrased by 
Wildavsky, will be pursued in the first case study on the fish CP 
project.  This case study will offer a glimpse into the political context 
in which Danced operate, with rivals and foes, drawing on material in 
a recent evaluation of Danish development assistance carried out by 
the Danish National Accounting Office (NAO 1999).  It will be argued 
that planning according to LFA guidelines is not only conducted for 
the face-value objective of improving efficiency, but also that planning 
may serve as instruments to legitimise organisational decisions, acting 
as means to shield the organisation from blame from its rivals or foes. 
Two competing sets of theories 
One the one hand, we have a set of theories which argue for the merits 
of planning and give rise to quite optimistic predictions that increased 
levels of planning will lead to better and more efficient projects.  We 
can label them Rational Choice or Technical Rationality -- their 
epistemology is that of positivism.   
On the other hand, we have a set of alternative and competing theories 
that offer a quite different perspective on the merits of planning.  The 
theory of bounded rationality, in its more benign form, argues that 
limitations in the information processing capabilities of humans in 
effect short-circuit the planning process.  The theory argues that a 
planning exercise is better explained from a perspective of attention 
  
Chapter 4   Planning in environmental assistance projects 
74 
Hedlund 2002.doc 
and search, than from an inventory of existing problems and available 
solutions.   
In its more malign forms, it leads to the caricature view of a decision-
making process as a 'garbage can' process, where solutions are actively 
looking for problems to attach themselves to, and where (in rational 
theories, irrelevant) issues of timing, access to decision-makers, 
attention, and the occurrence of exogenous freak events that make 
competing claims on attention, are decisive for the outcome of the 
planning process.  In its extreme version, the process of planning 
becomes more important than the outcome of the planning.  This leads 
to the view that the chief benefits of planning are not derived from the 
consumption of plans but from engaging in the process of planning -- 
caveat, consumers of plans!  Additionally, other authors argue from a 
constructionist perspective, that people problems simply escape 
rigorous planning, they are 'wicked problems', intrinsically ill-defined 
and with no test of a solution available.  Naming and framing 
processes are at play -- different individuals will inevitably produce 
different plans no matter the efforts to structure and standardise.  Their 
epistemology is largely that of post-modernism. 
Which of the two sets of theories should we trust?  In my opinion 
none, and both.  Theories on rational planning are tempting with their 
ability to present highly complex situations in a neat and orderly 
manner28, highlighting logical linkages, providing guidance for action.  
However, the competing theories alert us that this view is far too 
simplistic -- rational planning concerns ideal situations that do not 
exist in practice, they are utopian.   
This theme of rationality versus bounded rationality will be taken up 
again in later chapters that present the empirical work of this study.  
The theories outlined in this chapter will find use there, to offer 
competing explanations for observed decisions and behaviours. 
The catch 22 of criticising planning  
This chapter started with a presentation of the mechanics of the LFA 
planning tool and has thereafter provided ample room for theories that 
question and generally decry the merits of planning.   
However, a pejorative presentation of planning that highlights its 
intrinsic deficiencies and other weaknesses may easily act as a 
boomerang that turns around and haunts the basic proposition of this 
study.  There is a catch 22 of criticising planning.  I am acutely 
cognisant, that a critique of the intrinsic inadequacies of planning 
methodologies is incompatible with the basic purpose of this study, 
which is to improve the quality of cleaner production projects through 
-- precisely, better planning!  A too stark critique will defeat the 
study's own ends. 
                                                          
28
  Note that this is conceptual simplicity only, merely rendering the world simple 
enough to comprehend. 
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The critique of planning provides new perspectives and illuminating 
insights to differences between our conceptions of reality, as these 
conceptions are presented in written documentation and plans, and the 
real world 'out there'.   
It is noteworthy, however, that the critique is important mostly for the 
insights it offers.  It offers preciously little guidance on what else to 
do.  With this general caveat in mind, this study will use the two sets 
of competing theories as alternative sources of illumination when 
interpreting and discussing the empirical observations. 
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Chapter 5.  
The South African context 
Introduction 
This study accepts the point of view, that occupational health and 
safety cannot be seen in isolation from other and more general 
workplace conditions and the manner in which work is organised.  
These, in turn, cannot be seen in isolation from the conditions that 
prevail in the general society, the people, the political factions, the 
general standard of living, etc.   
The empirical observations concerning workers, working conditions, 
perceptions of business owners, the organisation of OHS work, etc., 
will therefore have to be viewed in a broader perspective than just that 
of the workplace.  It is the purpose of this chapter to provide the reader 
with that perspective and prepare the ground for the interpretation of 
the observation from the case studies, in particular those observations 
which involve owners of small businesses. 
The setting up till the mid-1980s 
Wealth and inequality 
The mineral resources of South Africa are truly outstanding.  South 
Africa contains major proportions of known world reserves in respect 
of manganese (82%), platinum (69%), chrome (56%), gold (44%), 
aluminium silicates (37%), and vanadium (33%).  Indeed, this richness 
is best captured in listing, not the resources that are, but those that are 
absent, of which the most significant are petroleum and bauxite (Tarp 
1993).   
South Africa also has a large and diverse manufacturing base and its 
economy is truly a regional giant.  The South African gross domestic 
product (GDP) makes up 30 percent of that of the entire African 
continent, all 53 countries combined29. 
The distribution of this wealth amongst South Africans is highly 
unequal.  The Gini coefficient, a measure of income inequality, is 
                                                          
29
   Source: Computed from World Bank 2000, table 2-1, 1997 figures 
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among the highest in the world, superseded only by that of Gabon, and 
closely followed by those of Malawi, Honduras, Brazil and Sierra 
Leone30.  Income inequality is closely linked to rural poverty and 
above all to racial inequality.  The United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP) regularly releases a so-called Human 
Development Index (HDI).  A report observed, that if racially 
disaggregated, the HDI puts the black population on a par with the 
Congo while whites score on a level with Canada (Standing et al. 
1996:20).  
It was the discovery of diamonds in 1867 in what became Kimberley 
and of large deposits of gold in 1886 in what became Johannesburg 
that transformed South Africa from an agriculturally based to an 
industrial economy.  Johannesburg is literally built on top of gold 
deposits, which is still evidenced by place names in Johannesburg 
Central such as Main Reef Road and City Deep.  Today, Johannesburg 
is the provincial capital of Gauteng Province.  That province is the 
economic powerhouse of the country, claiming less than 2 percent of 
the country's area but contributing with about 40 percent of its gross 
national product. 
Racial discriminatory practices of the past -- containment of 
urbanisation amongst Africans 
The Republic of South Africa gained independence from the British in 
1910 and its first constitution gave the white minority an almost 
complete control of political authority.  The 1913 Land Act created 
reserves for the blacks31 with the intention to consolidate white 
possessions of land outside the reserves, and to destroy the 
independence of African peasant workers.  Africans were denied the 
right to buy land in white areas, from which they were also evicted on 
a large scale.  The dispossession of land and a 'hut tax' that forced men 
to work for a wage to pay their taxes meant that large numbers of 
African workers were forced onto the cheap labour market.  The 
Natives (Urban Areas) Act of 1923 deprived Africans of rights to live 
in towns unless their services were required by whites.   
These and other Acts passed in the 1950s and 1960s founded an 
economy, which was extensively based on migrant labour.  Except for 
African labourers needed by whites, blacks were relegated to 'Bantu 
Homelands'.  As a result, millions of blacks were forced to relocate to 
desolate areas with poor infrastructure, rudimentary public services 
                                                          
30
   Source: World Bank (2001) based on a 1996 data set provided by Deininger 
and Squire.  Only data that qualified to enter the 'high quality' data set have been 
considered.  The ranking involves the latest Gini coefficients but from different 
years: Gabon 63.18 (1977), South Africa 62.30 (1993), Malawi 62.00 (1993), 
Honduras 61.88 (1968), Brazil 61.76 (1985) and Sierra Leone 60.79 (1968). 
31
  There are other major ethic groups in South Africa.  For instance, there is a 
large Indian community in Durban.  For simplicity, this thesis will only refer to 
blacks and whites, essentially meaning historically disadvantaged and historically 
favoured population groups. 
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such as health care services and education, and far from employment 
opportunities.  
While urbanisation in other industrialising societies was a transitional 
phenomenon in the shift from an agrarian to an urban-industrial 
society, the Bantu Homelands system entrenched migrant labour, with 
extensive movement between rural and urban areas, at the centre of the 
economic system.  The rural Homelands were populated with women 
and children, while the men lived around urban or industrial areas 
where employment could be found, seriously disrupting family and 
social patterns32.  
Early apartheid policies were essentially concerned with containing the 
process of urbanisation amongst Africans.  While the unworkable 
nature of this approach was soon evident, it was highly durable.  Jan 
Smuts, twice South Africa's Prime Minister, observed already in 1942 
that "You might as well try to sweep the ocean back with a broom" 
(quoted in Lemon 1991:6).  Yet, kind of a reform was only initiated by 
P.W. Botha in the 1980s, after which shanty towns and squatter 
communities began to proliferate in metropolitan areas. 
Africans with jobs in white areas had to reside outside town, in the so-
called Townships, thereby also distorting residential patterns.  The 
Stallard commission of 1922 condensed the official attitude to African 
labourers in the dictum that "the natives should only be allowed to 
enter the urban areas, which are essentially the White mans creation, 
when he is willing to enter and minister to the needs of the White man, 
and should depart therefrom when he ceases so to minister" (Transvaal 
1922, para 42; quoted in Lemon 1991:4).  Africans coming to town 
were allowed 14 days to find work (reduced to 3 days in 1945) 
(ibid:5).   
Urban areas were in this manner highly segregated along racial lines.  
This segregation comprised all population groups.  White areas were 
usually near the city centre followed by coloured and Indian group 
areas, and finally an African area.  The spatial segregation was 
intended to last, hence racial zoning in urban areas allowed space for 
future growth of the areas.  Urban sprawl and long commuting hours 
evolved as a consequence of racial segregation. 
For sheer economic survival, many rural households simply had to find 
access to employment in urban economies.  They found various means 
of doing so, ranging from backyard shacks in formal townships to 
squatter camps within a less burdensome commuting distance from 
work.  By the end of the 1980s, there was an estimated 7 million 
informal settlers in and around the urban areas (Lemon 1991:20), that 
is roughly 20 percent of the population (SA Yearbook 1998)   
                                                          
32
   This account is largely based on Webster (1997) and Tarp (1993) 
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Apartheid accentuated racial and ethnic conflicts 
The apartheid policies have created fertile grounds for conflict and 
hostilities.  Authors point to the irony that the human damage inflicted 
by race zoning 'unquestionably' has accentuated and even initiated the 
racial antipathy it was intended to prevent.  Many African 
communities were emotionally impoverished by the destruction of 
their community and their remoteness from the area in which they had 
grown up (Lemon 1991:10).  Moreover, many informal settlements fell 
in violent conflict with each other, in part due to unequal access to 
basic urban necessities, in part due to ethnic rivalry.  Thus, very poor 
shanty-town resident have attacked the still poor, but relatively better 
off, township residents.  In a similar vein have the hostel dwellers, the 
poorest and socially most marginalised of the black urban 
communities, been in conflict with the shanty and township residents.   
The system also accentuated ethnic conflicts.  There is some evidence 
that Xhosa speakers from the Transkei region tended to be less 
attached to the land than Zulu speakers from the KwaZulu (Natal) 
region, who had stronger links to subsistence agriculture and 
traditional social structures in their home towns.  Xhosa speakers 
would thus move into shantytowns or squatter camps to set up an 
urban family while Zulu speakers tended to populate the male-
dominated hostels, which became "increasingly ethnically introverted, 
organisationally isolated, and socio-economically marginalised" 
(Morris and Hindson, 1992:48).   
Explosive conflicts at the workplace could arise between permanent 
township residents with families and migrant workers living in hostels 
-- two groups with different material needs.  Most Xhosa speaking 
people would support the African National Congress, ANC and be 
organised in ANC dominated unions, to which shorter working hours, 
for example, would be attractive.  Zulu speakers would on the other 
hand support the Inkatha Freedom Party, IFP, and organise themselves 
in an IFP led union.  Recreational time with family is not a possibility 
for a migrant worker who is instead keen to maximise his working 
time and hence his earnings.  Harvey (1996:30) identifies such 
differences of material interests and inter-union rivalry as the reason 
behind a massacre outside a Johannesburg factory in 199633. 
Early industrial relations system  
The early division between white and black in the workplace has 
created two distinct labour markets.  The first, primary, labour market 
consisted of English speaking white workers who had access to skills, 
education and political power.  Later they were joined by Afrikaner 
(white Afrikaans speaking) workers who initially had few skills to 
offer and struggled to compete with expatriate artisans from Britain.  
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 ,  Eight men were killed and more than 20 injured when a group armed with 
AK-47 assault rifles and 9mm pistols opened fire at a crowd outside the factory 
gates (MG 19960202) 
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Early unionism in the mining sector was thus characterised by the 
conflict of Afrikaners who found themselves between three hostile 
forces -- British mine owners, black labour, and an unsympathetic 
government.  This conflict culminated in a bloody 1922 strike in which 
army and airforce intervention killed 153 miners and wounded 500.  
Five thousand were arrested and four leaders hanged for treason.  After 
this strike, however, the government committed to practice a form of 
'affirmative action' for white workers, particularly Afrikaner workers, 
through the creation of job opportunities in parastatal establishments, 
such as the railways (Webster 1997:19).   
The second, secondary, labour market consisted of black workers who 
were denied access to education and political power. The Industrial 
Conciliation Act of 1924 – later renamed the Labour Relations Act 
(LRA) – entrenched this division, providing trade union rights for non-
African workers and denying such rights to African workers.  So-
called 'pass-bearing natives' were simply excluded from the definition 
of an employee.  Black workers were subjected to a Master and 
Servants Act, which criminalised those who broke their contracts.  
And the Bantu Education Act of 1955, which placed African education 
under the Native Affairs Department, led to deliberate inferior 
education of blacks sufficient only for 'certain forms of labour' (Tarp 
1993:11, Webster 1997:22), for example by curtailing the curricula 
taught in black schools. 
The white unions, particularly those of the parastatals (railways and 
steel), were virtually co-opted by the state.  They achieved gains for 
their members through their political access to the state.  Members did 
not participate in most decision making, and strikes became 
increasingly unheard of.   
Commissions of inquiry into the industrial relations system 
Mass strikes in Durban in early 1973 by an estimated 100.000 workers 
were an unprecedented expression of African worker dissatisfaction 
and capacity to organise and marked the beginning of a period with 
increased levels of industrial action.  As a result, several commissions 
were set up over the following span of years (Webster 1997:23; Zwi et 
al. 1988:693) of which the Erasmus and the Wiehahn Commission will 
be detailed below.  
The Erasmus Commission was established in 1974 to undertake an 
enquiry into the state of occupational health in South Africa, thereby 
opting for a narrow interpretation of health, excluding accidents.  The 
Commission's report in 1976 painted a dismal picture; it was critical of 
statutory protection of health at work, which was found to be 
fragmented, incomplete and out of date.  The Commission 
recommended that legislation be promulgated before occupational 
health and safety became a source of conflict in the workplace (Zwi et 
al. 1988:693).   
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Management "should be obliged to consult workers or their 
representatives on industrial health problems and working conditions 
and to grant them a hearing when they have complaints" (quoted in 
Macun 1989:54).  This approach reflected recent international trends 
on deregulation and employee participation, for example as espoused 
in the influential 1972 UK Robens Report.  However, the Erasmus 
Commission interpreted employee participation narrowly as 
consultation, not co-operation.  It also rejected the possibility of unions 
appointing representative who would have the right to inspect a 
workplace.  The Commission argued that South Africa's trade union 
history was not as old as that of Britain; that races in South Africa had 
different norms and would not always agree on demands; and that 
many miners were foreigners, who might "become the biggest pressure 
groups with the most unreasonable demands and as aliens they may 
even seek to dictate labour policy in this country" (op. cit.:54).   
Many of the recommendation of the Erasmus Commission were quite 
radical, for example that a single national occupational health Act 
should be promulgated, which should fall under the auspices of the 
Department of Health (DOH)– thus bypassing the Department of 
Labour (DOL), the customary authority on workplace occupational 
health and safety – and that all factory inspectors should be transferred 
to the DOH (Wiehahn 1980:37).  Consequently, only a few minor 
recommendations were accepted and implemented in subsequent 
legislation, and a new commission was appointed only one year later.  
The emergence of black unions  
The Wiehahn Commission was set up in 1977 to review the industrial 
relations system with particular regard to review the resolution of 
labour disputes.  But included in its terms of reference was also a 
review of the protection of the safety and health of workers in South 
Africa.  The Wiehahn commission believed that conflict could be 
removed from the shop floor and institutionalised in the existing 
industrial relations system.  Therefore, the Labour Relations Act was 
amended to allow for the recognition of black unions for the first time 
in South African industrial relations history.   
The intention was to draw the emerging black unions into the existing 
Industrial Councils structure, thus pre-empting attempts by these 
unions to establish a presence at the shop floor (Webster 1997:23).  In 
response to the prospect of legal black unions "employers rushed to 
form [management - shop floor] liaison committees" (Macun 
1989:55).  The purpose was clearly to establish a channel of 
communication between management and the shop floor, controlled by 
management, through which grievances and disputes could be handled, 
in order to pre-empt and possibly prevent unionisation; and if unions 
gained foothold, that the union should not gain control over grievance 
and dispute handling.   
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The Wiehahn Commission also observed that a worker's "safety at 
work now features as an important component of a company's 
industrial relations" (quoted in Zwi et al. 1988:697).  Following the 
Wiehahn Commission's recommendations, new occupational health 
and safety legislation was enacted in 1983, to take effect in 1984.  This 
Machinery and Occupational Safety Act (MOSA) provided for a 
system of factory safety committees consisting of representatives of 
both management and workers, which would meet regularly.   
However, the Act was ambiguous with respect to the appointment of 
safety representatives: employers were to "designate in writing one or 
more safety representatives" (quoted in Macun 1989:64).  In practice, 
this gave management the dominant role in establishing a safety 
committee and in deciding its composition, not the employees, let 
alone the unions.  MOSA was in many ways an attempt to avoid 
industrial conflict over workplace health and safety by granting 
employees an, at best, advisory role, rather than a decision making 
role.  This system was in place for close to ten years until a new 
occupational health and safety Act, enacted in 1993, provided for the 
election of safety representative amongst the employees and also set 
up various arbitration procedures in case of controversies (OHS Act 
No. 85, 1993, section 17). 
Unionism a part of wider struggle for liberation 
After Wiehahn, the membership of the newly legalised black unions 
grew dramatically, and with this their political power.  Several 
federations of unions were formed of which the Congress of South 
African Trade Unions (COSATU), formed in 1985, is the most 
significant, having more members than all the other federations put 
together.  The formation of COSATU in 1985 also marked a shift 
where unions with their newly won power overtly confronted the 
apartheid regime, taking on national policy issues of democracy and 
equality, and voicing the aspirations for political representation of 
Africans.  Cyril Ramaphosa, then general secretary of the National 
Union of Mineworkers, opened COSATU's inaugural congress, stating 
that:   
"We all agree that the struggle of workers on the shop-floor 
cannot be separated from the wider struggle for liberation ... 
Our most urgent task is to develop unity among workers.  We 
would wish COSATU to give firm political direction" 
(Ramaphosa quoted in Webster 1997:24, emphasis added) 
Ramaphosa's statement clearly linked black unions newly established 
industrial powers with a wider struggle for African political power.   
It also worked the other way around, taking the struggle for freedom to 
the workplace, beginning a period of union militancy.½ 
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Workplace relations under apartheid 
A general view of blacks as servants to whites 
Holdt (1995) provides a gloomy picture of workplace relations under 
apartheid.  All managers and foremen were white; and they managed 
black workers in the same way as whites in general related to black 
people: as servants with no rights of citizenship.  White foremen and 
managers could dismiss black workers at will, without following any 
procedure.  They hit and swore at black workers.  Black workers were 
expected to buy cigarettes for whites, or wash their cars during 
working hours.  There were no clear lines of authority; any white 
foreman could issue an order to a black.  If he refused a second 
foreman's orders to start a different task, he could be disciplined for 
'refusing to carry out instructions' (Holdt 1995:5). 
The general view of blacks as servants to whites is witnessed in the 
following practical guideline to the mine safety practitioner on general 
rules and regulations, in which black workers are viewed as 
commodity comparable with e.g. company tools:   
(i) All accidents, including minor ones, must be reported before 
the end of the shift 
(ii) First aid must be obtained immediately for any injury 
sustained, however minor 
(iii) Private work may not be carried out on the mine without the 
manager's permission 
(iv) Mine labour may not be used for private purposes without the 
manager's permission 
(v) Alterations may not be made to company houses (including 
painting) without the manager's permission" (Anon. 1982:22, 
emphasis added) 
There was also a widespread belief that certain ethnic groups were 
better at some jobs than others.  Top executives from the mining 
industry, who gave evidence before the Myburgh Commission into 
mine violence in the mid 1990s, believed in genetic skills.  An 
executive director said, "It is well accepted in the industry that persons 
from Lesotho are skilled in shaft sinking activities".  A general mine 
manager told the commission that Zulus make good drillers and 
Shangaans are good mechanics.  However, Afrikaners are good at a 
number of jobs (Paton 1996:49). 
A manager of a car manufacturer gave the following account of 
workplace relations during the 1970s: "In the 1970s the workers were 
very docile.  They would do whatever you told them to do, but they 
didn't bring their brain to it, there was no participation.  It was a baas-
boy relationship [baas means boss in Afrikaans].  I remember when we 
used to have a workers council, before the union came, and prior to 
that there was nothing: production foremen had the full authority to 
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hire and fire people.  It was exactly as you hired and fired a garden 
boy" (Barchiesi 1997:84). . 
Company documents revealed stories like this:  "F. Mashabane, 
[..(company id..] 1979:  was having epilepsy and asked foreman to go 
and see African doctor (herbalist) and foreman agreed, but on going 
back to work he was terminated on arrival" (ibid.) 
A white staff officer at a South African car manufacturer gave me the 
following account: 
"... historically, all the foremen where white, usually Afrikaans, 
and the operating level were black.  So you had a situation:  I’m 
the white, I’m the boss, I say, you do.  Very little interaction 
between the two.  If you think of some of the old foremen we 
used to have -- they used to wear heavy boots and khaki -- Do 
you remember those old days?  [the white staff officer turns to 
the black shopsteward who nods and says something inaudible] -
-- and carry a big stick -- and if I said, and you didn’t do, you got 
a clonk"34 
 
 
                                                          
34
   Own interview with Allan Nichols, training consultant, and Andrew 
Msimango, shopsteward and NUMSA representative at Samcor, a South African 
car manufacturer, Oct 26, 1998 
Figure 8  Training black mine workers basic working skills  
in the early 1980s 
Many mine workers were migrant workers from remote rural areas having little 
experience with formal employment and industrial work organisation. 
Source: On the front page of Loss Control Survey, a  
Chamber of Mines publication, November issue, 1982: 1(2).   
White stripe from copy facility at the State Library in Pretoria 
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Taking the war of resistance to the shop floor  -- 
ungovernability of the workplace 
While Ramaphosa's statement above linked the unions' newly 
established shop floor presence to a wider struggle for African political 
power, it also worked the other way around, taking the struggle for 
freedom to the workplace at an unprecedented scale.  This began, in 
the terms of Karl von Holdt from the sociology of work unit at the 
University of the Witwatersrand, a period of union militancy and of 
shop floor 'ungovernability'.  He explored this phenomenon in several 
factory studies where he identified a pattern of frequent stoppages, 
ignoring of agreed procedures, and a culture of informal resistance to 
white authority.  Violence in the workplace, especially the intimidation 
and killings of scabs, became a feature of strikes (Webster 1997:24).  
In a detailed study of Highveld Steel, a large steel company, Holdt 
(1995) gives a vivid description of the emergence of union militancy.  
After the union came to the plant in the early 1980s shopstewards first 
began to contest management's disciplinary powers and decisions.  The 
shopstewards noted that: "It would be highly unimaginable from the 
workers to see a shopsteward fighting to defend another worker by 
fighting management, who was a white person that nobody would dare 
to challenge at the time". "Once some cases had been won, gradually 
people started to see their Messiah having now arrived on the 
workplace" (ibid.:6). 
In 1988, the company brought a legal case against the union for unfair 
labour practices.  In the documentation of the case, the company 
complained that more than 4,000 workers had engaged in an 11 hours 
stay-away, demanding that four former employees be reinstated, who 
had been dismissed for participating in an earlier stay-away.  The 
company also alleged that when two white employees approached a 
mob to investigate reports of assaults on scabs, there were shouts that 
they should be grabbed: they retreated "fearing for their lives".   
An angry mob danced around while exhibiting a red flag.  Workers 
"armed with sticks and iron bars" entered the administration building 
and "forcefully removed black staff members from their places of 
work", coercing them to join a spontaneous strike.  Then "a large 
group of strikers" armed with sjamboks (a sjambok is a whip) forced 
their way to the security gates, "rounded up all those at work and 
marched them to the Steel works" (company documents quoted in 
Holdt 1995:8,13).   
A shopsteward recalled:  
"The culture of resistance meant that at that time we were faced 
with the system of apartheid which was working hand-in-hand 
with the capitalist system, and naturally as the union we had to 
resist.  One way of resisting was through the industrial action: 
the strikes, the stayaways, the go-slows, the overtime bans.  At 
that time we were never concerned about economy.  In fact, we 
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wanted to see this economy suffering because it had no 
significance for us other than keeping the very system of 
apartheid alive" (shopsteward quoted in Holdt 1995:14). 
Sabotage of production equipment took place.  While automation of 
plant layout reduced the direct need for manpower it also could 
increase plant vulnerability.  At a newly automated line in an 
automobile plant outside Pretoria in 1985 frequent breakdowns of the 
installed robot and conveyor systems were reported.  A manager 
complained that the systems just introduced "made it easy for 
employees to damage parts"(Barchiesi 1997:87-88).  
Factories under worker control 
Holdt also undertook an in-depth study on a 1990 strike at Mercedes 
Benz South Africa (MBSA) in which a trivial wage dispute between 
the workers and the company, flamed tensions between two rivalling 
factions within the union.  In the intra-union power struggle that 
followed, the conflict escalated out of control and about two thousand 
workers "flouted all agreements and »ran amok« in the plant" (Holdt 
1990:43).   
Köpke, the MBSA chairman, contended that the entire factory had 
been under worker control since 1987. "Supervisors used to clock in 
and then lock themselves in their offices for the whole day.  They 
didn't dare go out on the assembly lines" (chairman Köpke quoted in 
Holdt 1990:38).  At times some workers even stood at the assembly 
lines with mock AK-47s or bazookas strapped to their backs.  This was 
a symbol of defiance and rejection of the company, which many 
workers believed was merely an extension of the repressive apartheid 
structures.   
Production was severely affected, the chairman said:  "Since 1987 we 
have never achieved our weekly production targets.  Five years ago the 
Honda plant built 70 Hondas a day.  In August 1988 workers said they 
were working too hard, and since we've only built 40 a day".  After a 
dispute, which closed the plant for 10 days, the company said that 
workers could get back-pay if they made up lost production.  "By 3pm 
we hit 70 cars a day.  The same workers with the same tools did it with 
ease.  That's what I call worker control.  These are the most capable 
workers in the world.  If you can steer that energy in the right direction 
this would be a land of milk and honey" (chairman Köpke quoted in 
Holdt 1990:39).   
To honour the political leader Nelson Mandela, who had recently been 
released from 27 years of imprisonment, the workers built him a 
Mercedes car that "... came off the line with nine faults.  In this 
company cars don't come off the line with less than 68 faults.  In 
Germany, about 13 faults.  Normally it takes 14 days to build that car – 
Mandela's car was built in four days.  Only 9 faults!", the chairman 
said (ibid.). 
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OHS and the apartheid state 
Trade unions saw occupational health and safety issues as an integral 
part of apartheid as captured in a quote by Paul Benjamin, a union 
lawyer:  "What ... the system really meant was when workers got sick 
or injured they got sent back to the homelands with little or no money, 
and somebody was hired in their place.  Nothing was done to prevent 
similar accidents happening again.  The system meant that accidents 
were cheap for bosses and expensive for workers" (Benjamin in 
Magane et al. 1997:181).  In fact, Benjamin argued at a COSATU 
(union) conference in 1995 that "the health and safety legislation is 
one of the last bastions of apartheid" (ibid:189) 
Miller, a union health and safety officer, has given a lucid account of 
the problems that unions faced under the apartheid regime.  In a 1993 
paper, she observed that workers and unions were denied basic 
democratic rights such as right-to-know about exposures to hazardous 
chemical substances used in the production.  The right-to-know, she 
said, must comprise information on the actual chemical compounds 
and not just trade names.  It must comprise knowledge of hazards and 
symptoms, disclosure of hygiene measurements, and workers' access 
to their own medical records.  But, "obtaining such information is 
often like dragging blood from a stone.  South Africa is a very secret 
society and this is mirrored at the workplace".  "Some bosses suggest 
that if workers know what the symptoms are, malingering will 
increase" (Miller 1993:96-97).   
Workers had no access to information held by state bodies.  "For 
example, Cape Gas is a particularly old, dirty and problematic factory.  
The company refuses us access but says it is inspected under the 
[MOSA] Act.  The inspectorate claims that conditions are satisfactory, 
but refuses to give us access to their reports."  (ibid.) 
The starkest evidence is probably found in the mining sector, in which 
very high accident rates prevailed.  Leger (1992:89) noted that "at 
current accident levels, a black underground miner who spends twenty 
years underground faces a one in thirty chance of being killed and a 
risk of nearly one in two35 of being permanently disabled". The risk 
increased with mining depth; in deep36 mines "one out of eleven 
miners working for twenty years [...] is likely to be killed in an 
accident" (ibid.).   
The official indifference to this state of affairs is captured in the 
official accident statistics of the Department of Mines and Energy 
Affairs (DMEA).  A monstrous 98.33 percent of all accidents in 1983 
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  The permanent disablement figure is probably grossly underestimated due to 
systematic under-reporting of occupational diseases of migrant workers (White 
1997:22) 
36
   The South African mining industry is internationally renowned for pioneering 
technology to mine at great depths.  By convention (Leger 1992:78), 'shallow' 
mines involve mining less than 1,000 m deep, 'intermediate' depth is defined as 
between 1,000 and 2,250 m, and 'deep' mining is below 2,250 m.  
  
Chapter 5   The South African context 
89 
Hedlund 2002.doc 
were caused by "Danger inherent to work or misadventure", i.e. causes 
supposedly beyond human control and to which mitigating action 
would likely be futile.  In stark contrast, for example, only 0.05 
percent of the accidents were caused by "Fault of management", and 
0.42 percent as "Fault of others"  (DMEA statistics quoted in Eisner 
and Leger 1988b:6). 
With occupational health and safety so intricately connected with 
racial discrimination and repression it became inseparable from 
industrial conflict, simply seen as part of a wide struggle for liberation.  
Unsurprisingly, occupational health and safety found use as a union 
organising tool.  In a campaign to have the byssinosis ('brown-lung') 
condition amongst textile workers recognised as a compensable 
occupational disease, workers were organised at the same time of 
carrying out medical tests (Magane et al. 1997:180).  Also, in the 
mining sector, Ramaphosa stated that occupational health and safety 
was an important organising tool (Zwi et al. 1988:700). 
The post-apartheid era 
Easing tensions in the post-apartheid labour market 
The first all-inclusive democratic elections in 1994 led to the 
formation of a government led by the African National Congress 
(ANC) political party.  The situation with labour unrest, socio-
economic conflict and political violence was for obvious reasons 
unsustainable and the government launched a number of initiates to 
enhance social dialogue and provide mechanisms for problem solving 
and conflict resolution.   
Of great importance to stabilising the industrial relations system has 
been the establishment of an independent institution, now the 
Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration (CCMA), to 
provide a formal mechanism to resolve labour disputes.  The 
institution offers a dispute settlement process based on conciliation and 
arbitration.  The idea is to reach consensus through negotiation, backed 
by legal action.   
The government also set up a three pronged effort to enhance dialogue 
and facilitate conflict resolution between organised labour and 
organised business.  At the macro level it established the National 
Economic Development and Labour Council (Nedlac) as a 
"representative and consensus-seeking body where the parties ... will 
seek to reach agreement through negotiation and discussion based on 
proper mandates" (Nedlac 2000).  Nedlac is an expanded tri-partite 
body for general discussion on social and economic policy, i.e. a clear 
attempt to pursue social corporatism (Michie 1997:162).  The parties 
represented are organised labour, government, organised business and, 
interestingly, the community, represented by organisations for women, 
youth, rural, disabled and civic sectors.  
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At the intermediate sector level, the government established so-called 
National Bargaining Forums (NBFs) as vehicles that attempt to lift the 
highly conflictual issues of wage bargaining away from the workplace 
up to a more detached meso-level.  Finally, various initiatives have 
been launched to enhance dialogue at the company level through 
workplace forums and joint liaison committees. 
The government also passed major pieces of new labour legislation to 
enhance the formal rights of workers, most notably the Labour 
Relations Act (LRA 1995) and the Basic Conditions of Employment 
Act (BCEA 1997). 
By and large, these initiatives appear to have had the intended effect, 
easing the level of workplace tension.  Macro-indicators of industrial 
action, such as strike statistics based on levels of workdays lost, 
declined sharply in the first post-apartheid years 1995-1997 while the 
years 1998 and 1999 saw marked upsurges, however not reaching pre-
1994 levels.  The overall downward trend has continued and workdays 
lost reached a ten-year low in 2000 (Baskin 1998, Levy 2000, MG 
20010117). 
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Analysis of the first upsurge in strike action in 1998 revealed that most 
of the strikes were concerned with wage issues suggesting that other 
rights-based issues - such as grievances, dismissals or retrenchments - 
indeed were being solved at the CCMA and elsewhere (Baskin and 
Grawitsky 1998:7).  There was little evidence of the 1998 strikes being 
political, they were almost entirely caused by economic factors, in part 
because global and competitive pressures constrained employers form 
offering significant real wage increases.  A further key feature was that 
most strikes were procedural following the provisions laid out in the 
new LRA  (Baskin 1998:21, 28). 
Figure 9 Million man-days lost to strikes 1990-2000 
Source: Levy (2000), MG 20010117 
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Although on a declining scale, violence continues to be a feature of 
workplace conflict.  In 1997 about 3,000 construction workers went on 
the rampage in the Saldanha Steel site burning cars and offices, looting 
and damaging the new plant.  The cost implications of the riot were 
about R 50m.  The causes behind this conflict deserve mention as they 
were related to the 'independent contractor' exclusion clauses in the 
newly passed labour legislation37.  This exclusion clause and its 
relation to macro changes in the employment structure are dealt with in 
more detail a few sections down.  
Key 1998 strikes were also marred by high levels of violence, conflict 
and damage to property.  An estimated eleven people lost their lives, 
there were numerous injuries, shootings outside companies, and in one 
incident a mob destroyed a company conference centre.  Much of the 
aggression was directed at replacement labour (scabs), which firms are 
allowed to take in accordance with provisions in the new LRA.  But a 
contributory factor was also "the culture of violence or the tolerance of 
violence which still exists in South Africa" (Baskin 1998:23).  
Militancy and determination to act among much of the union's middle 
management layers, and 'delivery pressures' facing many union leaders 
were also contributing factors (ibid:21). 
Furthermore, in the year 2000 a conflict at Volkswagen South Africa 
between two rivalling unions was apparently close to run out of 
control.  Eventually the conflict was resolved peacefully, but the 
minister of labour at a certain stage was prompted to warn that the 
atmosphere was "highly charged" and that the dispute "could explode 
into violence in the local community and disrupt industry in the 
Eastern Cape" (BR 20000329). 
A neo-liberal stance on macro economics 
These 'delivery pressures' facing unions, as noted above, must be seen 
in the context of the government's political and economic policy.  
During the years of apartheid, when the ANC was in opposition, it was 
blatantly communist.  However, when it came into government in 
1994 it took a clear neo-liberal stance on economic policy pursuing 
such goals as macro-economic stability, containment of inflation, 
redistribution through economic growth, liberalisation of the trade 
regime, lowering import customs, and a drive to stimulate exports.   
The policy shift is lucidly illustrated through the shift from ANC's 
1990 demands for nationalisation of mines, banks and monopoly 
industries, to open support by President Mandela (ANC) for 
privatisation on his 1996 trip to Germany to encourage foreign 
investments (Webster 1997:12, Bell 19990212).  
                                                          
37
  An account of the grievances leading to the riot is given in Numsa News (1) 
1998.  The government acknowledge that some employers seek to circumvent the 
new LRA labour legislation using the independent contractor loophole, and that 
this is "unstable", see DOL 1999:32.  The costs in ' Saldanha is ready to roll after 
rehearsals' (BT 19980628). 
  
Chapter 5   The South African context 
92 
Hedlund 2002.doc 
This macro economic policy is embodied in the government's so-called 
Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) doctrine, which 
closely follows policy recommendations laid out by the IMF and the 
World Bank.  The GEAR policy is incompatible with traditional 
Keynesian macro economic policy, that economic growth can be 
attained through public spending -- an alternative policy preferred by 
the union movement to advance the process of redistribution of wealth.  
After the ANC-led government took seat in 1994, the ANC sought to 
maintain its close relationship with the trade union movement by 
entering into a so-called tri-partite alliance with the largest trade union 
federation, COSATU, and the South African Communist Party 
(SACP), the so-called alliance of social partners.  However, serious 
cracks were developing within this alliance over differences of opinion 
on economic policy with unions overtly opposing GEAR38.   
That the government is determined and committed to GEAR can be 
illustrated by the fact that the State Tender Board awarded an order for 
20,000 defence force garments to China.  The bid from the domestic 
textile industry, which is in serious crisis due to import tariff 
reductions, was not competitive.  The decision gave rise to loud union 
discontent.  In particular, as the garment order was awarded just prior 
to a large-scale union campaign comprising a general strike and a 
march in Johannesburg against job losses39.    
Hence the growing frustrations and 'pressures for delivery' within the 
union movement, which Baskin (1998) identified as contributing 
factors behind militancy and the 1998 surge in strike action.   
 
                                                          
38
  'There is an alternative to GEAR, and the unions wrote it' (Bell 19990528).  
'Tripartite tensions may come to a head' (Bell 20000114).  'Demonstrations 
merely reflect subterranean rumblings' (Bell 2000519).  Various aspects of the 
tensions are also discussed in 'Fight against water privatisation has finally dried 
up' (Bell 19990507), Time to swap sophistry for tough talk' (Bell 19990521), 'It's 
pay-back time, say unions after landslide victory' (Bell 19990709), and ' South 
Africa`s giant step to international norms' (Bell 20000211). 
39
   Textile unions call for inquiry after Chinese win state contract (BR 
20000411a).  The march and general strike in 'Cosatu campaign strikes Gauteng' 
(BR 20000411b) and 'Cosatu gives May Day deadline to business' (BR 
20000413).  Employment in the KwaZulu-Natal province's textile industry has 
fallen from 45,000 (1990) to 19,000 (2000) in' Strike gets thumbs down from 
textile bosses' (BR 20000416).  A major South African textile manufacturer later 
relocated to Botswana citing dumping, illegal imports, and high labour costs.  'SA 
leaves blanket maker cold' (MG 20001103b) 
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Violence and personal safety in South Africa  
The above mentioned 'culture of violence' in South Africa manifests 
itself as political as well as criminal violence.  Violent crime is a major 
problem that has instilled a fear in most South Africans irrespective of 
race and wealth.  In absolute terms, blacks are affected the most.  In 
terms of the rate of declining personal safety, whites have taken the 
blunt.  The perceived level of off-the-job safety is relevant to OHS 
because it may influence the attitudes of people and the priorities of 
decision makers while on the job.  Three selected extreme incidents 
from one newspaper over a period of only five days reveal the gravity 
and omnipresence of this phenomenon.   
Friday night in Edenpark, east of Johannesburg, unknown gunmen 
armed with heavy weaponry (AK-47 assault rifles and 9 mm pistols) 
entered a shebeen, a bar frequented mostly by blacks, and opened fire 
on the patrons killing four men and two women.  As they fled they 
fired on another group of people, leaving nine wounded.  Monday 
evening in Johannesburg, a one-and-a-half-year-old child and her 
mother was in a car outside a house waiting for a relative to open the 
gate.  Gunmen who attempted to hijack their car shot the toddler in the 
head and killed the mother.  Tuesday evening in the Soshanguve 
Figure 10 This flirtation has come between us -- Cracks in the alliance  
over macro economic policy 
ANC African National Congress, the political party that leads government.  
SACP South African Communist Party.   
COSATU The largest trade union confederation.   
Source: In Khoza 1998:16 
  
Chapter 5   The South African context 
94 
Hedlund 2002.doc 
township outside Pretoria two paramedics were assaulted while 
transferring a pregnant patient to another ambulance.  Two attackers 
suddenly appeared and shot them in the head at point-blank range, 
killing them.  The shooting continued when the attackers hijacked a 
passing motorist.  They shot him in the neck, stole his cell-phone, and 
took his Mazda Midge.40   
Innocent bystanders or children are not spared from extremely violent 
crime.  Heavily pregnant women have been shot in the abdomen.  
Rocks have been put on roads at night to wreck cars after which the 
motorist is ambushed and killed41.   
Electronic immobiliser systems, which block the engine ignition 
circuitry, make normal theft of cars extremely difficult.  After they 
have become a standard feature on cars, primarily due to pressures 
from insurance companies, hijacking has become the preferred method 
of car theft, stealing the car at gunpoint with the engine running.  The 
practice is widespread.  One in four judges at the Johannesburg High 
Court had over a period of three years fallen victim to a hijacking42.   
While on a factory visit I heard a roar of laughter at the morning coffee 
break.  The amusement stemmed from an attempted hijacking outside 
the factory gate earlier that morning, which had failed because the 
nervous hijacker had reversed into a wall, damaging the car.  The 
production manager told me, still smiling, that he thought that 
everybody in the room had either experienced a hijacking personally, 
or knew a close relative, who had.  The statistics were true for his own 
family.  He had not been hijacked himself, but his wife had.  For the 
rest of that day, while I was examining the details of that company's 
OHS efforts, I had an awkward feeling that the workplace was safer 
than the outside environment. 
In a 1999 study, comprising both focus groups, in-depth interviews 
and a nation-wide survey, both blacks and whites cited crime as one of 
the chief problems of South Africa, if not the chief problem.  However, 
while whites tended to view it as a wholly new phenomenon, blacks 
saw the increase in crime as more of a diffusion to whites of a problem 
that long existed, but was cordoned off, within the country’s 
segregated black communities.  The two groups also expressed a 
divergence of opinion on the country's prospects for peace.  By an 
almost 6-to-1 margin, 46 to 8 per cent, blacks believed that peace will 
last.  In stark contrast, whites believed by more than a 3-to-1 margin, 
59 to 17 per cent, that there will be more armed conflict (ICRC 
1999:39-40).  The figures are truly flabbergasting.  More than half (!) 
of the white population felt that there would be more 'armed conflict' -- 
armed conflict being a benevolent paraphrase for civil war. 
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 Gunmen kill six in shebeen attack (Star 20000422).  Baby hijack victim fights 
for her life (Star 20000425).  Attack on paramedics (Star 20000427). 
41
  'Baby born with bullet wound after hijack' (Star 20000330).  'Ambush victim 
tells of his terror after he hit rock on N12' (Star 20000321). 
42
  'Top judge gets to experience hijacking first-hand' (Star 20000309a). 
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In response to concerns about lack of personal safety, and perhaps also 
reflecting doubts if they have a future in the new South Africa, white 
South Africans increasingly emigrate to other countries.  In particular 
the highly educated ones leave in numbers that has raised concerns if 
this 'brain drain' may threaten the economic growth of the country43. 
 
 
 
Simple transportation involves considerable risks for the black 
population, of which only very few own a car.  They use minibus taxis, 
usually a Toyota minivan with room for about 10 people, as a means 
of transportation.  These taxis are notoriously unsafe.  Poor 
maintenance of the vehicles, reckless driving, overloading and 
speeding are blamed for many of the approximately 10,000 road deaths 
that happen every year in South Africa.  Passengers furthermore face 
risks arising out of a so-called taxi-war between rivalling taxi operator 
syndicates.  The syndicates have taken on 1930s Chicago style 
gangster methods comprising, for instance, seemingly random attacks 
with automatic weapons on minibusses of competing taxi operator 
syndicates.  The shooting and killing of passengers are meant to 
discourage customers of using taxis from the competing taxi 
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   'Is it any wonder that law-abiding South Africans pack for Perth?' (Star 
19991227).  "Brain drain `biggest threat` to growth" (BR 20000410).   
Figure 11  Grim humour in the white suburbs.   
Madam and Eve is a popular cartoon in major South African daily newspapers.  
Madam is an elderly white woman.  Eve is a black domestic worker employed by 
Madam.  Both are, in different ways, struggling with the transformation.   
Madam is habitually depicted with a gin and tonic in her hand, in these strips she 
drinks one with Death while talking about hijackings and emigration. 
Source: Francis et al. 1999:128 
  
Chapter 5   The South African context 
96 
Hedlund 2002.doc 
operator44.  It is furthermore commonplace to transport people, mostly 
blacks, in the open back of small pick-up utility vehicles, an unsafe 
practice known to increase crash severity (Nelson and Strueber 1991) 
The reason for dwelling on the issue of off-the-job personal safety is 
that it could be speculated if there may be spill-over effects into on-
the-job safety attitudes.  If, for example, it is far more dangerous to 
commute to work than actually carrying out a day's work, the 
argument goes, it could be difficult to motivate workers and 
management to strive for higher levels of occupational health and 
safety performance.  This line of reasoning is essentially rooted in a 
Maslow type hierarchy of human needs, assuming that humans 
maintain reasonably accurate risk estimates of the activities they 
undertake. 
The risk homeostasis theory, first laid out by Wilde in 1989 and later 
elaborated in a 1994 book, claims that humans do so.  According to 
this theory, individuals will engage in more risky behaviour when they 
perceive conditions to be safer.  The theory presumes that individuals 
have a relatively accurate perception of the level of risk they are 
subjected to and that they modify their behaviour when the level of 
perceived risk changes.  Empirical support for the risk homeostasis 
theory has come mostly from the fields of traffic safety and driving 
behaviour.  For example, that ABS brakes have failed to reduce car 
accident rates because the drivers engaged in more aggressive and, 
hence, more risky driving behaviour; presumably because the felt safer 
(Wilde 1994:sec.7.1).  But the theory has also been taken onto the 
OHS scene.  For example, Klen (1997:99) reports that Finnish chain 
saw loggers became less careful, anticipating fewer dangers, after they 
were equipped with personal protective equipment.  It is not my 
intention to test the propositions of the risk homeostasis theory in the 
South African setting.  The purpose of calling attention to it is merely 
to add perspective to a complex debate.   
OHS and the role of the state 
There was a serious fire in a Lenasia, Johannesburg, floor-polish 
factory in November 2000, in which eleven workers were killed.  The 
authorities announced a general clampdown on dangerous working 
conditions after it was revealed that the workers had been unable to 
escape.  Doors and gates had been locked because the owner was 
afraid that the workers would steal items from the factory.  It was also 
revealed that flammable liquids had been stored illegally, next to gas 
burners. 
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  On taxi violence see for example President Mbeki's State of the Nation 
Address (Mbeki 2000).  Gunmen kill seven in taxi ambush (Star 20000413).  
Seven die in taxi tyre-burst accident (Star 20000605).  Twelve dead in SA taxi 
smash (MG 20010605).  Taxis blamed for surge in traffic deaths (Star 
19991217).  Hail a taxi and die (Economist 19990516). 
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"Employers who do not adhere to occupational health safety 
regulations should expect a zero tolerance approach from the 
department, which will not tolerate any employer who does not place 
priority on worker safety," the labour department director general said 
after the accident45.  There were, however, also allegations of 
negligence on the part of the Labour Department, for example, for 
lumping occupational health and safety inspectors together with other 
general inspectors, thereby outwatering inspection efficiency46. 
But already in a 1997 document, the department reckoned that it only 
had about one OHS inspector for every 58.000 workers in the formal 
sector and, furthermore, that one third of its OHS inspector positions 
were vacant (DOL 1997:8).  It is simply implausible that the 
department should be able to root out unsafe factories through a large-
scale inspection campaign.   
In addition, the inspection approach is somewhat incompatible with 
the department's overall labour market policy, which is to create a 
business friendly environment that promotes and stimulates job 
creation.  Or, as it is phrased in the Labour ministry's 15 point 
programme for 1999-2004: "...to secure an appropriate balance 
between security and flexibility in the labour market" (DOL 1999:22), 
well cognisant that this entails "a need to avoid over-regulation" 
(ibid:6).   
The very high level of unemployment, which ranges from 20 to well 
above 30 percent depending on the definition used47, is seen as the root 
cause for the high level of crime in the society.  Hence, employment 
generation is the major challenge facing the department.  Indeed, OHS 
does not even feature in the Department of Labour's seven point list of 
'major problems in the labour market', which focuses on 
unemployment, extreme levels of inequality along lines of race and 
gender, the legacy of adversarial labour relations, and inadequate 
protection of certain groups of low-wage earners (DOL 1999:3).  
These policy priorities appear to have strong support in public opinion.  
Two top priorities emerged from a 1999 national survey conducted by 
the Human Science Research Council: job creation (41 percent) and 
                                                          
45
  Deadly blaze sparks workplace probe (MG 20001120).  Biscuit factory dodges 
safety inspection (MG 20001128). 
46
.  It was also revealed that many OHS inspectors were resigning in frustration 
with the department's alleged low priority on OHS issues --  97 inspectors had 
lodged a grievance with the CCMA against the department for the way in which 
occupational health and safety inspectors have been lumped together with other 
general inspectors.  'Department knew about death-trap factory' (MG 20001124).  
Disillusioned safety inspectors claimed the inspectors were inadequately trained, 
only "counting toilets".  'Department to blame for fire' (MG 20010202). 
47
  The narrow definition, which is consistent with international practice, includes 
only people who are actively looking for work.  This rate is 22 percent (27 for 
blacks, 4 for whites), and rising.  The broad definition also includes those who 
have given up looking for work.  This rate is 37 percent (45 for blacks, 6 for 
whites), and rising.  The figures are for 1997, the most recent ones provided by 
Klasen and Woolard (2000:2,24). 
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fighting crime (31 percent).  Although they were also top national 
priorities in 1998, they had reversed positions.  Crime had been the top 
priority the previous year (Star 20000309b).  
OHS priorities of workers and unions 
It is difficult to find information on how workers prioritise OHS 
issues.  A worker representative survey of about 100 unionised 
establishments in the Johannesburg area in late 1995 provides some 
information on the topic (Table 7).  Worker representatives identified 
discrimination and poor working conditions and conditions of service 
as the major problems facing them.  'Poor working conditions' is, 
however, a concept much broader than occupational health and safety.   
Half (52 percent) of the respondents said government regulation 
should be improved (not reported in Table 7).  They wanted inspectors 
to visit plants regularly and enforce existing laws such as those 
regulating OHS, indicating that indeed, OHS is a high priority at the 
workplace (Macun et al. 1997:38) 
 
Despite these espoused priorities by worker representatives in 
unionised workplaces, unions do not appear to define OHS as one of 
their top priorities.  In the face of the alarming accident rates in the 
mining industry in the 1980s, described earlier, and despite the union's 
expressed commitment to OHS as an organising tool, Zwi et al. 
(1988:700) observed that the union was still able to spare only two 
 
Table 7 Problems identified by worker representatives 
 
Problem Percentage of establishments 
reporting the problem 
Discrimination and segregation 91 
Poor working conditions and 
conditions of service 47 
Trade union capacity and activity 41 
Lack of communication 30 
Benefits from the company 30 
Poor industrial relations 29 
Employment policy 15 
 
 Source: Macun et al. 1997:38 
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full-time employees for this task.  This may be compared to the 
employment in the mining sector in the second half of the 1980s, 
which consistently exceeded 700.000 workers (SALS 1995:table 
2.2.1.2).  Likewise, in the mid-1990s only two (perhaps four) unions 
out of sixteen COSATU affiliated unions had dedicated health, safety 
and environmental officers (Magane et al. 1997:184).  In October 1998 
a minority of union OHS professionals openly complained in a union 
newsletter that Cosatu was only doing "very little" to push for changes 
within OHS (Numsa News 1998). 
Unions under pressure 
South Africa is one of the few countries in the world, which has 
experienced a rising proportion of the workforce organised in unions 
over the last 10-20 years.  Above all, this is due to the emergence of 
black unions in the 1980s.  An upper estimate for union density is 
around 50 percent of the workforce (Standing et al. 1996:156-162).  
Although union membership apparently continued to rise in 1997, this 
trend was likely due to the growth encouraged under the new Labour 
Relations Act in previously unorganised sectors.  Many, including the 
then General Secretary of COSATU, Sam Shilowa, believed that 
membership was actually falling due to unemployment and local 
structures not functioning effectively (Catchpowle et al. 1998:276).  
Based on an analysis of a labour representative survey, Macun et al. 
(1997:39) characterised South African unionism as one that has 
substantial breadth, but little depth.  In their predictions for the next 
decade, the normally well informed Andrew Levy and Associates, a 
South African labour consultancy, expect that the pattern seen in other 
Western economies, where power and influence has shifted away from 
trade unions, will also come to South Africa (Levy 2000).  Unions are 
thus under pressure. 
South African companies have over time sought to use employee 
involvement structures, e.g. liaison committees, to seek to side-step 
and weaken union controlled shop-steward structures or simply to 
avoid unionisation.48  Unions are critically aware of this danger and 
remain sceptical of participatory structures that are not under full 
union control.  Phillips from the Trade Union Research Project 
(TURP) observes that unions have been reluctant to introduce 
Workplace Forums because they have the potential to undermine the 
union and perhaps may even conflict with the very culture of a union.  
"Consultation is a toothless dog", he notes (Phillips 2000:40), while at 
the same time reckoning that health and safety committees are helpful 
not to overload shopstewards.  The OHS Act (1993) may contain the 
seeds to conflict, as it makes safety representatives accountable to the 
workers in general, not to unions. 
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   For instance employers' response to the recommendations of the Wiehahn 
Commission, as discussed in an earlier section, page 82. 
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Contemporary restructuring of the labour market may 
influence OHS negatively 
There is rising evidence of a large-scale restructuring taking place in 
the South African labour market towards converting permanent 
employees into free-lance contractors.  Many companies are forced to 
downsize because of the neo-liberal economic policies pursued by the 
Government that gradually reduces import tariffs and exposes the 
economy to international competitive pressures.  Such downsizing and 
subcontracting of non-core business activities to other firms is one 
likely motivator for converting permanent employees into independent 
contractor because it provides them with better hiring and firing 
flexibility.  The same economic policies also seek to stimulate 
entrepreneur-ship and micro-enterprises, of which many evidently will 
be self-employed.   
This restructuring process may have at least four negative implications 
for OHS.  First, some evidence indicate that subcontracting tends to 
influence working conditions negatively -- companies appear to 
subcontract the more dangerous work operations to shunt themselves 
from legal liability and, perhaps, from high costs of worker protection.   
For instance, Mayhew et al. (1997:165) refer to USA data where self-
employed workers account for 19 percent of all fatal work injuries, but 
only for 9 percent of the workforce.  Mayhew and Quinlan (1997:195) 
report that the incidence of fatalities is significantly higher amongst 
self-employed building workers than employees, and argue that 
subcontracting undermines regulatory standards (ibid:202).  Blank et 
al. (1995) conclude that contractors in the Swedish mining industry 
seem to get injured more often and sustain more severe injuries. 
Rebitzer (1995) clearly links outsourcing to disorganisation in the 
workplace and OHS regulatory failure.  
Second, the restructuring is associated with a growth in the number 
of small and mediums sized businesses (SMSEs).  The small firms 
may expect their life-span to be short, hence longer-term planning, 
investment and staff training may have a lower priority.  Evidence in 
the UK is that small firms experience much higher accident rates than 
large enterprises (Clifton 2000). 
Third, the restructuring process seems to undermine recently passed 
labour legislation regarding worker protection.  While tightened 
labour protection standards were passed with the new Labour 
Relations Act (LRA 1995) and the new Basic Conditions of 
Employment Act (BCEA 1997) the Acts specifically exclude 
independent contractors from their provisions.  Converting permanent 
employees into free-lance contractors many thus be a means of 
bypassing, not only the stricter, but the entire labour legislation.  This 
could be one likely explanation for the apparent rise in the number of 
independent contractor arrangements.  Some trade unionists claim that 
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it [... is not uncommon for an unscrupulous employer to disguise an 
employee's service contract as that of an independent contractor.]49.   
An assistant compensation commissioner in the South African 
Workmen's Compensation system (WCC) told me of a recent case in 
which a worker had suffered a serious injury in a brick works.  But the 
employer contested compensation coverage because "all the workers 
were independent contractors" and therefore not covered by the 
provisions in the compensation Act (COID Act of 1993)50.  The 
Minister of Labour has admitted that some firms use labour sub-
contracting to escape compliance with tightened labour standards, 
especially in the construction sector, but can do little about it51. 
Fourth, the restructuring process may distort established statistics 
over occupational accidents and injuries.  The self-employed and 
the independent contractors are excluded from the workmen's 
compensation statistics.  Self-employed workers cannot or do not 
make worker's compensation claims and their injuries may not picked 
up by reporting requirements under OHS legislation either (Mayhew et 
al. 1997:176,  Mayhew and Quinlan 1997:195).  Effects of such 
restructuring processes will be masked, understated or missing entirely 
from statistics derived from worker's compensations claims data 
(Quinlan 1999:431).  Australian data indicate that underreporting of 
occupational injuries is a problem particularly in the small companies 
(Larsson and Betts 1996) 
It is highly difficult to gauge how widespread independent contractor 
arrangements are in South Africa, but data on the use of general 
subcontracting, of which some evidently will be independent, may be 
taken as a first yardstick.  Ulicki (1999) reports that the mining 
industry is hiring subcontractors for an increasing number of core 
functions that were traditionally performed by regular workers.  Rees 
(1998:30) reports that 58 percent of companies in the metals and 
engineering sectors employ contract workers.  Horwitz (1995) 
provides numerous examples: that the chemical industry subcontract 
non-core work to small businesses, that a forestry company has 50 
percent of it forestry work being done by contract workers and a 
brewery that subcontracts it distribution system to drivers formerly 
employed by that company.   
Using the Internet, a search engine on the South African Labournet 
service provided an extensive (comprising 71 clauses) standard form 
"Agreement for the provision of services by an independent contractor 
to a labour broker"  - with a few blank fields, ready for the employee 
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  The phenomenon is also called casualisation -- the turning of permanent posts 
into freelance posts.  In 'Conflict beckons over casual labour and pensions'  
(Bell 19991217) 
50
  Interview Jan 18, 2000, with Assistant Commissioner, Statistics, Mr. H. Flint 
of the Compensation Fund 
51
  Minister of Labour Membathisi Mdladlana in 'State can't stop subcontracting' 
(MG 20001019) 
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and company name to be filled in (Labournet 2000).  Kenny and 
Bezuidenhout (1999) report that the Confederation of Employers of 
Southern African (COFESA) claim to have converted 300,000 
employees at 6,000 different companies into independent contractors.  
In a personal communication, the director of COFESA told me that the 
figure is now closer to one million (Personal communication, Hein van 
der Walt, Feb 2, 2000), a claim which was later repeated in a major 
business newspaper52.   
I will revert to this issue in a later chapter on safety management 
systems.  One large company, which I interviewed, had undergone an 
extensive downsizing process and used a certifiable management 
system as a means of control to ensure that OHS compliance did not 
drop below a certain level of standard in the subcontracting companies. 
A new workplace order? 
Holdt (2000a) has undertaken a new round of interviews at the same 
steel company that he studied in detail under the apartheid years, 
forging the concept of workplace 'ungovernability'.  He now53 reports 
of a new strategic vision of the union involving an attempt to shape a 
new democratic order in the workplace and eradicate the legacy of 
apartheid.  The once highly militants union now reckons that it should 
play a proactive role in increasing productivity and quality. 
"Now that we have a democratic government, we want it to 
succeed, and of course no political power can be maintained if 
there is no economic power.  Our economy has been devastated 
by the system of apartheid, and we need to rebuild it now.  So I 
therefore believe that the culture definitely has to change from 
the culture of resistance to the culture of productivity" (Malinga, 
chair of joint shopstewards committee, quoted in Holdt 
2000a:61, emphasis added).   
The goal of the union now is to empower the workers and to improve 
production, recognising that competitiveness is essential for the 
company to survive.   
"Firstly, our goal is to give more control, more power, to the 
workers in their activities.  Secondly, to make work easier for 
workers.  Thirdly, one of the most important points is to change 
the relationship between management and workers, so that there 
should be mutual understanding between them.  Fourth, we want 
to make sure that at the end the workers benefit from the process 
of producing steel.  Fifth, the end result will be more 
productivity and better quality goods.  Finally, not to forget that 
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  'Letters to the editor: Contracting expands employment' (BR 20000310) 
53
   At the time when presenting these far more positive views of the industrial 
relations system, he was no longer with the Department of sociology at the 
University of the Witwatersrand, but with the National Labour & Economic 
Development Institute (Naledi), a trade union institute. 
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whatever is happening within the factory or industry must 
benefit those outside as well.  [...]   It's either things must 
continue as they are, and eventually Highveld Steel could close 
because we cannot compete with other companies;  or we say we 
want to be part of Highveld Steel truly, by committing ourselves 
to our responsibilities, and sharing part of that cake that will 
come out at the end" (Nhlapo, chair of steelworks shopstewards 
committee, quoted in Holdt 2000a:62).  
The union identified apartheid's legacy of low levels of education and 
skills among black workers as the major obstacles to worker 
empowerment and productivity improvement at Highveld Steel.   
A massive training programme and a new skills-based grading system 
were the first steps.  The union has also been successful in 
implementing new forms of work organisation based on multi-skilling, 
teamwork and greater worker control of the production.  Self-directed 
teams have been formed at the tap floor leading to the removal of the 
foreman level that normally supervises shop floor workers.  In these 
teams workers discipline each other.  Management's disciplinary 
procedures remain in place only if the problem cannot be solved by the 
workers themselves (Holdt 2000b:69-70). 
Holdt's account is interesting on several points.  First, that the official 
position of the union has changed to one of a responsible and non-
adversarial nature, that it acknowledges that market forces and 
competitive pressures for quality and productivity are essential for 
survival in a market economy.  Second, that the trends in the 
reorganisation of work mimic those at the international level of 'lean 
production' and 'flexible specialisation', which involve flatter 
hierarchies, increased team autonomy, multi-skilling and fewer job-
grading categories54.  Third, that new skills formation structures for 
blacks are essential in this process.  And fourth, that conflicts exist 
over the removal of the (usually white) foreman level.   
For many whites, transformation equals job insecurity 
Most changes in the South African workplace are directly challenging 
white males.  To many whites, calls for transformation, non-
discriminatory practices, and equal opportunity schemes, are 
inseparable and indistinguishable from job insecurity fears.  Whites 
may feel tempted and perhaps even feel compelled to emphasise and 
highlight every possible inadequacy, real as well as imaginary, of 
blacks' skills and work capabilities in order to justify that whites keep 
positions and command salaries, which are far higher than those of 
blacks55.  It is ironic, if the breakaway from the racist apartheid 
workplace regime in this manner spurs espoused racist attitudes. 
                                                          
54
   See for example MacDuffie and Pil (1997) for an overview of lean production 
55
   There were, for instance, racial undertones in the critique of the insufficient 
DOL labour inspection efforts that was voiced after the Lenasia floor polish 
factory fire.  It was suggested that transformation had driven white competent 
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This may be particularly true for OHS 'safety manager' and 'safety 
officer' positions in medium sized and large companies -- positions 
which have traditionally been occupied by whites.  Upper management 
may see OHS as an ideal area in which to nurture black middle-layer 
professionals.  OHS issues are intricately connected with everyday 
work life and could be a natural first choice for initiatives aimed at 
improving communication between (white) management and the 
(black) shop floor.   
There are several lines of reasoning, which would lead to the 
conclusion that blacks are promoted into these positions.  There are the 
obvious reasons; that blacks are able to communicate with the shop 
floor in an African language56.  Many blacks speak more than one 
African language, few whites do so.  There are also more subtle 
reasons.  The appointment of a black safety officer is a visible signal 
that employment equity and affirmative action policies are in fact 
being implemented.  It could be speculated that if management are to 
give concessions to the shop floor it would be opportune if a black 
safety officer takes the credit for it.  
                                                                                                                                   
inspectors out, leaving the departments with only inexperienced inspectors.  
'Department to blame for fire'  (MG 20010202) 
56
   There are eleven official languages of South Africa.  The five most commonly 
spoken home languages are IsiZulu (22.9%); IsiXhosa (17.9%); Afrikaans 
(14.4%); Sepedi (9.2%) and English (8.6%). 
Figure 12  Affirmative action policies pursued by Tito Mboweni, then 
Minister of Labour 
Source: in de Klerk 1998:18 
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The unemployed and those in the informal sector 
Finally, concerns over the wellbeing of another population group is 
increasingly appearing in the South African public debate -- the 
unemployed, the most vulnerable of the labour market.   
This chapter has dealt extensively with the formal structures of the 
industrial relations system, the new councils and forums where 
organised labour, organised business, and the government negotiate 
and seek consensus.  The unemployed, in principle represented by 
government, have no strong voice in these new structures.  Nelson 
Mandela acknowledged that the unemployed and the unions have 
different interests, saying that the ANC cannot "... act as the political 
representatives solely and merely of the progressive, organised and 
employed sections of the working class ...  The ANC represents the 
people as a whole, and the African working masses in particular." 
(Mandela 1998:42). 
Neither have those who make a living in the informal sector of the 
economy benefited from the increased levels of worker protection as 
promulgated in new labour legislation, the LRA and BCEA.  Data on 
the informal sector are sparse and it difficult to ascertain their 
reliability.  It appears that the informal sector created more than 1 
million jobs between 1996 and 2000.  At the same time the formal 
economy was shrinking.  Informal and domestic service now makes up 
about one-quarter of total employment57. 
In fact, if tightened legislation simply causes the economy to shed jobs 
in the formal sector, that will only benefit those who remain employed 
in that sector.  Business organisations have argued that the present 
labour regulation imposes significant additional costs on business, 
constitutes a high 'hassle factor' associated with compliance, and robs 
the business owner of control and flexibility.  This impedes job 
creation (Sacob 2000a, 2000b:5).  President Mbeki appears to be 
sensitive to these views58.  
                                                          
57
  Jeremy Baskin in 'The facts behind the figures' (MG 20001127) 
58
  See for instance his State of the Nation Address (Mbeki 2000) or ' Labour laws 
killing small business, says Mbeki'  (MG 20000216) 
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Essentially, this is an argument in favour of deregulation.  Certainly, it 
is an argument against increased regulation and other burdens (taxes) 
laid on the business sector.  I will revert to this issue when discussing 
interventions in small enterprises (SMSEs) 
Concluding remarks 
There are thus many indications that workplace relations are changing 
towards being more co-operative and less adversarial.  The industrial 
relations system has been transformed and social cooperatism is being 
pursued.  New bodies (Nedlac) have been established to enhance social 
dialogue and provide a mechanism for problem solving and conflict 
resolution.  The conflict ridden wage negotiations issues have been 
lifted from the firm level to negotiations at a meso-level in NBFs.   
Holdt gives an account of a union, which was highly militant during 
the apartheid years, but now espouses concerns over the wellbeing of 
the broader community, accepts the competitive conditions of the free 
market, and appears to pursue a 'culture of productivity' -- truly a 
remarkable transformation to a mature and responsible organisation.   
Macro economic indicators point in the same direction.  Strike action 
hit a ten-year low in the year 2000.  Indeed, Webster's (1997) fears of 
an unstable molotov cocktail may be about to be defused.   
On the other hand, it would be presumptuous to assume that deep-
seated inequality and frustrations accumulated over generations can be 
Figure 13 The LRA and the unemployed 
The governments after 1994 have passed major pieces of new labour legislation 
to enhance the formal rights of workers 
Source: In Khoza 1998:16 
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dismantled over a time span of only few years.  Indeed, many of my 
observations suggest that conflicts lurk just beneath the surface.  It is 
also an open question how unions will deal with joint OHS safety 
committees, well knowing that such forum in the past have been 
deliberately used by employers to weaken or bypass the union 
movement.  
At the very least, contemporary South African workplace conditions 
cannot be understood without maintaining some longer-term 
perspective that also comprises conditions under the apartheid years.   
It has been a purpose of this chapter to provide the reader with that 
perspective. 
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Chapter 6. Case studies on 
two cleaner production projects 
Key lines of reasoning of this chapter  
Overall structure 
This chapter reports the findings of two case studies.  The first is on 
the fish CP project, in which I followed the implementation consultant 
in the project's early implementation phase.  The second is on the 
metal finishing case study, in which I followed the planning consultant 
during the project planning phase59.  In between comes a short 
documentary analysis of en evaluation report issued by the Danish 
National Accounting Office (NAO).  This chapter thus covers the 
findings from research activity 1 and 2 as marked on the earlier Figure 
3 (page 30).  The reader is referred to to the overview description on 
pages 31-33 for a short intro on how these two study activities relate to 
the other research activities of this thesis. 
The sequencing of the two studies is slightly unusual, first looking at 
implementation, and then at planning.  This reversal of the normal 
order of a study only reflects chance -- that the first study, which I had 
a chance opportunity to follow, was in its implementation phase.  
Some of the insights and hypotheses generated in this study influenced 
the next study involving the planning phase.  The original order of 
those two case studies has therefore been maintained in this 
description. 
The fish case study 
The first study on the fish project (the implementation phase) will start 
with an examination of the very first the theme raised in chapter one -- 
that cleaner production projects may be undertaken narrowly with little 
or no attention paid to occupational health and safety.  Documentary 
analysis of the Project Document (PD) will confirm that this is indeed 
the case.   
                                                          
59
  Note that the two consultants referred to here are two different individuals.   
To maintain a clear distinction, this study will refer to them as the 
implementation consultant and the planning consultant, respectively. 
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The case study will then look into the causes of this state of affairs.  
The implementing consultant who was responsible for implementing 
the fish CP project on behalf of Danced plainly felt that OHS was 
outside the scope of his job description.  OHS was simply not 
perceived as a legitimate project objective.  The case study will 
therefore look into the processes of interpretation of which objectives 
the project legitimately should strive to attain.  The reader is reminded 
that there are forces at work that may disorganise and fragment a 
'cleaner production project', which is characterised by many distinct 
phases, carried out by different individuals in agent-principal 
relationships, and in which written documentation, the PD, is the main 
carrier of information.  The implications for an agenda of integration 
will be examined. 
A slightly intricate hypothesis will be pursued.  It will be argued that 
the planning consultant initially contemplated that the CP project 
should focus on issues of CP environmental management, i.e. a 
process approach to CP.  This was unattractive, however, to Danced, 
which prefers projects with unambiguous, quick, visible, measurable 
and cost-effective results.  The weight of the project was therefore 
shifted towards a technology oriented approach to CP, which focus on 
the introduction of new and more environmentally friendly production 
equipment.  Hence the focus of the Project Document (PD) on 
investment subsidies.  However, the implementing consultant re-
interpreted the PD and decided to pursue an environmental 
management process approach to CP, as originally contemplated by 
the planning consultant.   
Rigour versus relevance 
What should motivate this twisting of project objectives?  This chapter 
offers two different sets of explanations.   
The first concerns the LFA planning tool.  It will be argued that the 
LFA tool is not a benign tool that merely helps to structure and 
streamline a project.  Rather, it entails a real risk that it will distort a 
project due to its obsession with quantifiable indicators.  It will be 
argued, that indicators are the tail that wags the LFA dog.  This 
discussion introduces a key theme that runs through this chapter -- the 
dilemma of rigour versus relevance60.  If the rigour of planning is 
adhered to, we have to sacrifice relevance of project contents.  On the 
other hand, if only relevant project objectives are pursued, we must 
sacrifice the rigour of planning.  This discussion kicks into an analysis 
of the events and experiences of the CP project, as they are illuminated 
by two competing sets of theories -- that of Rational Choice, and that 
of Bounded Rationality.  Again, based on documentary analysis of the 
Project Document , we will look for evidence of standard rational 
planning  and competing evidence of garbage can processes.   
                                                          
60
  This dilemma was first introduced in the discussion of the action research type 
on page 26.  
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The political context 
The second set of explanations concerns the political environment in 
which Danced operates.  It will be argued that rivalry with Danida 
motivates Danced to strive for efficiency as a means to justify its 
existence.  It is imperative for Danced to be more efficient than 
Danida.  It will be argued that Danced therefore prefers bang-for-the-
buck projects in which visible and measurable results are achieved 
within short timeframes for limited budgets.  This returns the focus to 
indicators: how to demonstrate unambiguous success of a CP project.  
This focus on indicators entails rigour. 
Additionally, that broad political support for Danced is, at best, murky, 
perhaps even non-existent, and that an unsympathetic political 
opposition keeps a watchful eye on Danced's performance.  These 
pressures motivate Danced to emphasise rigour, to go-by-the-book, 
following the procedure laid out in the systematic and rational 
planning tools, that is: the LFA, to the letter.  It will be argued that the 
projects thereby sacrifice on relevance, i.e. a return to the underlying 
theme of this chapter -- the dilemma of rigour versus relevance.  In its 
examination of the political themes, this chapter will draw on 
documentary analysis of an evaluation report by the National Audit 
Office (NAO). 
The metal finishing case study 
The next case study on the metal finishing project (the planning phase) 
will examine the problem analysis phase in more detail.  It will be 
argued that this is a messy affair with conflicting evidence and unclear 
cause-effect relationships.  The metal finishing sector spans wide, from 
very small environmentally irresponsible firms to large corporations 
that act responsibly.  The small-firm sub-sector is large, highly 
fragmented and disorganised, sometimes anarchistic, with backyard 
and moonlighting cowboy operators working from makeshift facilities.  
In complete contrast is the large-company sub-sector well organised in 
an industry association that effectively speaks on behalf of the whole 
sub-sector.  This chapter will argue that the small firms are the most 
needy for assistance while the large companies in many respects have 
the resources to help themselves.  It is plausible that the large 
companies also pollute less than the small firms.   
How does the LFA planning tool perform in this messy setting?  -- and 
how do the preferences of Danced for bang-for-the-buck projects in 
combination with the realities of the political context manifest 
themselves?  The chapter will argue that from an environmental point 
of view, the small firms are highly relevant to target.  However, they 
do not meet the rigorous requirements for eligibility to receive 
support.  On the other hand, that the large companies probably are less 
relevant to target, but they meet the rigorous requirements laid down 
for support.  
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Implications for integration 
In between this chapter's concern with the rigour versus relevance 
dilemma, it will discuss the implication for integration of CP and OHS.  
Based on insights from the fish case study it will be argued that OHS 
issues must find their way into the project specification, especially 
concerning its mechanisms for reward and blame, that is: 
accountability.  Following the terminology laid out in Chapter 3, this is 
integration at the structures level.  In the metal finishing case study, 
this type of integration is attempted, letting OHS issues feature in 
objectives, outputs and indicators of the LFA matrix. 
In the fish case study, the chapter will furthermore look into the 
methodology the implementing consultant employed in his endeavours 
to motivate the large fish companies to adopt CP environmental 
management.  A description and analysis of this methodology is 
relevant, because it led to the hypothesis (hypothesis generation), that 
OHS could be integrated in this type of top-down management 
approach. Following the terminology, this is integration at the tools 
level.  The discussion in this chapter thereby sets the stage for the next 
Chapter 7, which is devoted to an empirical test of this hypothesis 
(hypothesis testing research activity). 
The fish CP project 
Absence of OHS issues in the fish Project Document 
Analysis of the fish CP Project Document (PD) seemed to confirm the 
initial hypothesis of this study; that CP projects may be implemented 
with a narrow focus on environmental outcomes only.  There is only 
very limited mention of OHS issues in the first two sections of the 
otherwise lengthy PD; if fact so limited that it can be quoted in full 
below.  The numbers refer to the section numbering in the PD. 
1 Background and context 
1.4 Socio-economic context 
"The fishing industry is hazardous in terms of occupational 
health and safety issues ..." (Danced 1998:1-7). 
2 Analysis 
2.1 Problem analysis 
Nature of the problem: 
"The environmental problems fall into 4 groups:   
• Smell and poor visual environment around the fishing 
factories 
• Marine pollution of the coastal waters 
• Resource use of water, fish and energy 
• Health and Safety in the Work Place including 
hygiene" (Danced 1998:2-3, italics added) 
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Section 1 of the PD, which stages the background and context of the 
project, identifies the fish industry as 'hazardous' but provides no 
further information on neither the nature nor occurrence of those 
hazards.  OHS then briefly reappears in the problem analysis in section 
2 as being part of 'the problem' but OHS issues are not considered in 
more detail.  Several opportunities foregone to introduce OHS can be 
identified.  The section on stakeholder analysis identifies the dominant 
union FAWU, however only insofar as the union "expressed a keen 
interest in environmental matters" (ibid:2-6).  The analysis on the 
broader dissemination of project results and general CP awareness 
creation states that "Environmental NGOs, and local environmental 
interest groups and a well informed industry can be efficient promoters 
of clean environment" (ibid:3-5) thereby ignoring the earlier 
mentioned FAWU union as potential promoters of CP.  In annex D 
(Legal framework), the analysis of noise, a suspected 'twin problem', is 
only analysed in terms of the Environmental Conservation Act, the 
Aviation Act, etc. (Danced 1998:D-9).   
The attention given to OHS in the PD can thus be characterised as 
quite superficial, also evidenced by the ill-placed "including hygiene" 
comment, which makes little sense.  The PD shows signs of having 
been prepared without any initial attention to OHS and only at a very 
late stage, for cosmetic reasons, of having had OHS issues 'added-on'.  
During a conversation with a Danced official, he reckoned that the fish 
project "paid lip service" to OHS without dealing genuinely with the 
issue. 
The Danish consultancy Dansk Teknologisk Institut (DTI) had won the 
task of implementing the fish CP project in South Africa.  The lead 
consultant from DTI, henceforth the implementing consultant, told that 
he had not given much consideration to OHS issues in the bidding 
phase.  He simply felt that the topic was outside the scope of the 
project.  He reassured me however, that, of course; he would not 
approve of any investments in cleaner production technologies that 
would cause a deterioration of OHS.  He was unclear, though, on how 
he would determine if a specific investment proposal had the potential 
to cause such deterioration. 
Integration required to make OHS a legitimate  
project objective 
As discussed earlier (Chapter 2, page 20), the Project Document (PD) 
is of paramount importance, as it is the glue that binds together the 
complex and disorganised web of actors and activities that constitute 
an environmental project.  The PD constitutes the contractual basis 
between Danced and the implementing consultancy.  The PD lists a 
number of objectives that the project must achieve in conjunction with 
a set of indicators of how to verify if those objectives have been met 
when the project ends.  The PD is therefore also an instrument of 
control that holds the implementing consultant accountable for his 
performance on the job.   
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Based on the contents of the PD the implementing consultant may 
therefore conclude that OHS is not a legitimate project objective.  Had 
it been so, he could rightfully reason, it would have been included in 
the list of objectives.  A first, and very early, finding of this study was 
thus that OHS must feature in the PD, that is, integration at the 
'structure level' in the terminology introduced in Chapter 3, page 45.   
If the PD is silent on occupational health and safety issues, it is likely, 
and natural, that the attention given to occupational health and safety 
issues during the project cycle will be minimal, if any attention is paid 
at all. 
What are the legitimate project objectives? --  
examining the LFA matrix 
Returning to the fish PD, it is interesting to examine the types of 
objectives that this project legitimately should strive to attain.  
Relevant excerpts from the LFA matrix are presented in Table 8 
overleaf.   
There are two levels of objectives in the LFA matrix.  The super 
(development) objective is to reduce the pollution from the fish 
industry to comply with international standards largely due to a 
preventive approach.  The super objective can be attained by 
accomplishing three lower level project (immediate) objectives, which 
are  1) to implement CP processes and practices, 2) to develop CP 
capacity within the industrial sector, and 3) to increase the general 
awareness within the industry on the positive benefits of CP. 
The second column, verifiable indicator, is very specific for the 
immediate objective 1 only, comprising, for instance, a 50 percent 
reduction in the water usage in the canning industry.  Specific means 
of verification are suggested for this objective in the third column, 
sampling and measurement plans.  For immediate objective 2 the 
indicators are more vague, and none are listed for objective 3.  
Regarding means of verification, none are listed for objectives 2 and 3.  
Focus is clearly on the easily quantifiable and visible measures; above 
all: water savings. 
To attain the three immediate objectives a number of activities must be 
carried out (not shown in the abbreviated LFA matrix in Table 8).  
Those activities are grouped into four major components: training, 
assessments and actions plans, physical investments, and, 
dissemination and monitoring.  
1. Training component.  The purpose of the training is to boost 
practical knowledge on cleaner production.  The major training 
activity is a study tour to selected Danish fish industries, which 
have successfully implemented CP option.  "The candidates 
participating in this training should be fully equipped to go-back-
home and make environmental assessment of their own 
companies; their 'toolbox' should therefore also include a generic 
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Terms of Reference for such plus the format for applications to 
Danced [...] for incentive grants.  Other useful ‘tools’ could be 
manufacturer’s catalogues, lay-out examples, compendium of key 
figures on equipment water usage, environmental key figures 
(energy per ton raw material, etc.)". (Danced 1998:3-7) 
2. Assessments and action plans.  The desired result of the second 
component, environmental audits, assessments & action plans, are:  
"The result of this phase will be the environmental action plans 
developed by the factory themselves, possibly with some input 
from private consultants […].  This plan should contain 
suggestions as to short, medium and long terms actions: CP project 
descriptions including detailed investment schedules and an 
Environmental Impact Assessment.  To assist with special or 
generic problems the Danish lead consultant could be asked to 
provide international experts."  (ibid:3-8).  For this component, 
Danced grant a lump sum subsidy to individual companies which 
is expected to cover about 25 percent of the cost61.   
3. Physical investments.  Regarding the third component, actual 
implementation, Danced may grant a 20 percent subsidy to 
investments and improved management practices.  It is noted that:  
"A focus should be maintained on good housekeeping which costs 
little but is probably harder to implement.  (ibid:3-4). 
4. Dissemination and monitoring.  The fourth component comprises 
information activities targeted at stakeholders, the general public, 
production of progress reports, newsletters etc. 
 
 
                                                          
61
  A typi cal study is estimated at R 40,000, equivalent to the cost of a local 
consultant for about one-month.  Bearing in mind the quite comprehensive scope 
of the studies, which should produce detailed plans for implementation, it would 
appear, that the studies would deal mainly with cost-benefit evaluation of 
different solutions and only to a modest extent with analysis and search for 
solutions. 
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Table 8 Excerpts from the LFA matrix for the fish CP project 
 
Objective Verifiable indicators Means of verification External factors and critical assumptions 
Development objective: 
The negative environmental impact of the South African 
fishing industry reduced to comply with international 
standards, largely due to a preventative approach 
Pollution reduced and environment round 
the fishing industries improved. 
 
Visual improvements,  
Benthic zoological surveys,  
End of pipe measurements 
That the fishing industry is interested to make use of 
the facility 
That the availability of quotas and the general 
economic conditions for the fishing industry do not 
change negatively 
Immediate objectives: 
1. Cleaner production processes and practices 
implemented in the canning and white fish industries 
with sustainable results 
Sustainable reduction in water usage  
(50 % in canning, 25 % in white fish) 
Reduction in pollution load in the 
effluent to meet South African standards  
Increase of production yield through 
resource recovery (1 % in canning,  
½ % in white fish) 
Sampling and measurement of water 
usage 
Sampling and analysing of effluent 
streams  
Measurement of yield 
2. Sustainable and accessible capacity within the sector to 
further implement and develop cleaner production 
processes and practices 
 
3. Increased awareness amongst the general public and the 
fish industry sector in particular on the current negative 
environmental impacts of the sector and the possibilities 
and opportunities to mitigate these impacts through the 
introduction of cleaner production processes and 
practices 
Sustainable ISO 14001 certification 
Ability of in-house technicians, local 
consultants and FIRI to further develop 
and implement CP. 
 
The involved factories implement cleaner 
technology either in the form of improved 
management and household practices or by actually 
investing in new technology or measures to improve 
the production 
Source:  Danced 1998:Annex A 
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The LFA matrix -- indicative of an equipment  
approach to cleaner production? 
It can be argued that the project, as its components and its activities are 
laid out, invites to a relatively narrow 'equipment focused' 
understanding of CP -- as a transfer of more advanced technology, i.e. 
better equipment, which has shown its worth in the Danish fish 
industry.   
The study tour, the assessments and, indeed, the subsidy component, 
all relate quite narrowly to equipment issues.  The LFA immediate 
objective level 1 output indicator: 'reduction in water usage' does also 
appear to support this interpretation, certainly it does not contradict it.  
The observations that "a focus should be maintained on good 
housekeeping which costs little but is probably harder to implement" 
further tend to reinforce the narrow focus on equipment issues rather 
than softer issues such as work practices. 
Hence, it would not be unreasonable to presume that the implementing 
consultant, who in principle only has the information in the PD, would 
interpret the main idea of the project in the following manner:   
1) the study tour could focus on presenting practical equipment 
solutions, 2) the feasibility studies could focus on ranking their 
application in South African industry in terms of economic feasibility 
and 3) the equipment could be acquired by means of the investment 
subsidy.   
A danced executive expressed a similar understanding of the project.  
He expected that all major decisions in the project would be made 
within 'the first half year or so'.  This is only plausible if major 
decisions are perceived as physical investment decisions. 
The implementing consultant's approach to  
cleaner production 
The Danish consultancy DTI had been involved in several CP projects 
with Danish fish companies.  The experiences gained there had lead to 
the development of a particular DTI approach to CP.  This approach 
was presented to the industry participants during the study tour.   
The DTI approach had three major dimensions 1) what to focus on, 2) 
how to do it, and 3) why it should be done. 
Regarding the first dimension, the DTI concept of CP listed five major 
intervention areas: 1) good housekeeping practices, 2) 
change/modification of processes, 3) change of raw materials, 4) re-
use, and 5) re-cycling of material streams.  Moreover, regarding the 
second dimension, the most efficient and sustainable way to carry out 
CP was to enter environmental management, specifically the so-called 
management cycle, the implementing consultant said.   
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In a presentation to the study tour participants, the implementing 
consultant made the following presentation of environmental 
management (Figure 14).  The process starts with an environmental 
review leading to an environmental report.  The company shall then 
define its environmental policy and in accordance herewith set 
priorities.  The company will then define specific objectives to be 
achieved and make action plans to achieve them.  A monitoring plan is 
required to provide key environmental figures, which can be subjected 
to a formal audit control mechanism.   
The management circle is completed with the management review, 
which leads to a revised environmental report, and the setting up of 
new priorities and objectives, and the process will start a new cycle. 
 
Management 
review
List of 
priorities
Environmental  
report
Monitoring plan
Environmental 
records Action plans
Environmental 
policy
Detailed 
assessments
Environmental 
review
 
 
The implementing consultant emphasised the methodology of the 
management circle and likened it with rolling a ball uphill (Figure 15).  
The rolling movement is the continual application of the Plan – Do – 
Check – Act and Analyse, in shorthand the PDCA circle.   
In the literature this is known as the Deming planning circle -- a 
method of problem solving often referred to in the quality management 
literature.  A triangle prevents the ball from rolling back downhill if no 
longer pushed.  The triangle represents written standards, specifically a 
3-tier hierarchy of management guidelines at the top, followed by a 
procedures manual and finally written instructions.  
Figure 14 The DTI approach to cleaner production 
Source:  DTI Cleaner production Presentation  
by Mr. Lars Seiersen (DTI) April 8, 1999.  Hotel Skagen, Denmark 
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I was able to find a similar visualisation in the total quality 
management literature (in Willems 1994:177) in which the vertical 
axis is the level of control62 that management has over operations when 
employing total quality management (TQM) principles.  This 
visualisation is repeated here in Figure 16.  
The Danish experiences with cleaner production had clearly shown 
that this approach was the most efficient one to implement it in the 
most sustainable way, the implementing consultant said. 
The third dimension of the DTI approach, why should you embark on 
CP, the answer was unambiguous: to save money.  The training 
material consistently supported this view of CP.  Matcon, another 
Danish consultancy, which were active in a Danced CP project in 
Namibia, had prepared a 'catalogue of ideas' for CP options in the 
fishing industry that was included in the training material.  This 
catalogue simply reads:  "From the Danced perspective, cleaner 
technology is a comprehensive, preventive approach that has 
practically demonstrated that 'pollution prevention pays'. (Matcon 
1999:Gi010-1, emphasis added). 
                                                          
62
  I will revert to the terminology of management control in the next chapter  
Figure 15 The Deming circle in environmental management -- 
emphasising a systematic approach, which is applied 
continuously 
Note:  The Deming planning circle is also known as the PDCA circle 
PDCA:  Plan – Do – Check – Act & Analyse. 
Source:  DTI Cleaner production Presentation  
by Mr. Lars Seiersen (DTI) April 8, 1999.  Hotel Skagen, Denmark 
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Many who advocate CP do so with within a cost-efficiency discourse.  
I came across an iceberg representation of costs in an article on 
chemical supply chain management, a later CP development that seeks 
to optimise relations between suppliers and consumers of chemicals.  
Both parties benefit financially from this supply chain business 
relation and the environmental performance is also improved, 
primarily due to waste minimisation.  I have included the visual 
iceberg representation of the cost here (Figure 17) for two reasons.  
First, that it in a fine way epitomises the CP rhetoric on pollution-
prevention-pays.  Second, that it resembles a quite similar but much 
older discourse within the OHS domain, introduced by Heinrich in the 
1930s, a topic I will revert to in Chapter 7. 
 
 
Figure 16 Continuous improvement by applying TQM principles 
 Source: Willems 1994:177 
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Summary of DTI concept to cleaner production 
Four major component can be identified in the DTI approach to 
cleaner production.  They are: 
1. The major driver is economic cost-efficiency and sound business 
rationale.  This is achieved through a combination of less wasteful 
use of resources, primarily water, and a higher yield accomplished 
through improved recovery of valuable product, primarily fats and 
protein that can go into the animal foods business, that would 
otherwise end up in waste streams. 
2. The implementation methodology is the application of a 
systematic and formal 'management system approach' based on 
systems, procedures and manuals, emphasising continuous 
improvement.  Important milestones in the process are defined by 
the timely production of written documentation, in particular the 
production 1) of an environmental report, 2) of a policy document, 
3) of exact environmental objectives, 4) of written responsibilities 
and work procedures, and 5) a manual.  The approach owes 
obvious intellectual debt to developments within quality 
management. 
Figure 17 The chemical cost iceberg in cleaner production 
Source: Bierma and Waterstraat (1999:147) 
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3. The process is expert driven and the approach is systematic, 
formal, and control is exercised though hierarchic and bureaucratic 
rule. The approach is of a top-down type, starting with 
management commitment and orders are assumed to cascade down 
through the organisational hierarchy in an autocratic manner.  The 
process is championed by an in-company expert, who is usually 
located in a staff company position. 
4. There is little involvement of the employees at the shop floor.  
Many activities are focussed towards changing established work 
practice.  The workers are requested to be co-operative, but they 
are generally not asked for their advice or suggestions in this 
process. 
 
The DTI concept bears resemblance to the ISO 14000 approach to 
certifiable environmental management systems, although the DTI 
system, the implementing consultant stressed over and again, was 
based on an absolute minimum of paperwork.  An efficient 'quick and 
dirty' approach gave good results.  The environmental report, for 
example, should be no longer than 12 pages.   
The implementing consultant also repeatedly stressed that while the 
DTI concept was not certifiable in a strict sense, the concept would 
prepare the company to environmental management methodologies.  It 
would thereby pave way for a later ISO 14000 certification, should the 
company be interested in doing so.   
I later asked him if his description of the amount of written procedures 
required for an ISO system wasn't overly simplistic, for instance 
ignoring the requirements for detailed job descriptions.  He answered 
that he deliberately downplayed those bureaucratic aspects.  He just 
wanted them to get started.  Once started, he would exert maximum 
pressure to make them continue their efforts.  The hurdle was to get 
them started.  He thereby pursued a clear process approach to CP. 
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The study tour participants 
During my conversations with the study tour participants, several 
company representatives expressed interest in an ISO 14000 
environmental management certification although they also had 
reservations about what they perceived as excessive paper work and an 
overly bureaucratic nature of such a system.  Many companies were 
seeking to enter export markets and an ISO 14000 environmental 
management certification was perceived as an important, although not 
critical, competition parameter.  Many companies were already 
familiar with formal certification schemes, in particular the so-called 
HACCP63 scheme used in the food industry.  Some companies were 
also considering ISO 9000 series quality management certification 
schemes.  The DTI concept appeared to have appeal to them due to the 
pledged minimal amount of paper work involved and the promised 
level of control over the change process it would bring about. 
I also sought to inquire why they took part in the project.  Curiosity 
was a common reason.  Most middle management of South African 
industry had lived in isolation during the apartheid era sanctions.  The 
participants were curious to see the environmental standard of the 
European industry, against which they had a desire to compete.  Many 
participants also felt a need to become aquatinted with new 
environmental concepts because the South African environmental 
legislation was in the process of being tightened.   
A common motive was interest in the subsidy element, which was 
available for investments in new plant hardware.  Many 
representatives gave accounts of a cash-strapped industry, which faced 
an uncertain future.  The prime source of uncertainty was allegedly 
associated with the fish quota system.  A new Act64 had recently been 
passed which took the quota distribution from a Quota Distribution 
Board and put it with the minister.  The ownership structure and 
management level in the fish industry was mostly white and they 
openly wondered if the government would continue to allocate fish 
quotas to whites, or if affirmative action policies would shift fish 
quotas to consortiums with black ownership.  This created 
considerable level of uncertainty in industry, which, I was told, also 
affected investment policies.  The industry had a short-term 
perspective and there was little desire (or will) to embark on long-term 
investment projects.  The plant hardware subsidy was therefore highly 
welcome.  During my later visits to the plants of some of the 
participants, the attractiveness of the plant hardware subsidy element 
was again highlighted to me.  Some of the interviewees had very 
specific wishes to new types of plant hardware.  For instance one 
                                                          
63
  HACCP - hazard analysis and critical control point - a certifiable scheme in 
the food industry, which is often required for gaining access to export markets.  It 
covers good manufacturing principles related to hygiene and product quality. 
64
   Marine Living Resources Act, No.18, 1998, under the Department of 
Environmental Affairs and Tourism (DEAT) 
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interviewee65 was interested in a new unit that thawed frozen fish 
using heated air, replacing one that used heated water, which he had 
seen at a visit to a Danish equipment manufacturer during the study 
tour.  That new unit would bring about a substantial reduction in water 
consumption. 
Certainly, the commercial and legislative environment in the fish 
industry exhibits special traits.  For instance, during a visit to a fish 
canner66, I asked the factory manager to the surprising tranquillity of 
the factory works.  His responses concerned production over-capacity 
and uncertainty.  Despite the fact that there are seven canning 
companies in South Africa, he claimed that his factory alone had 
enough processing capacity to supply the entire domestic market (the 
export volume of canned fish is negligible).  He also lamented about 
quota uncertainties.  A company group profitability study had 
suggested that a smaller canning facility up-coast be closed.  However, 
the authorities had indicated that the resulting loss of jobs would likely 
result in a lower company quota for next year in order to render this 
option unattractive to the company.   
Potential conflicts over the handling of the subsidy  
The plant hardware subsidy also became a potential source of conflict.  
How should the subsidy be administrated?  Should it be on a first-
come first-served basis or should some other set of criteria be applied?  
Some of the industries were in a more advanced stage of undertaking 
an environmental review than others, etc.  The participants decided to 
pre-empt this conflict in a decision to delay the investment subsidy 
decisions.  It was decided that the project management steering 
committee should not consider applications for subsidies to plant 
hardware until after one year. 
This conflict and the management committee decision that it brought 
about, were highly welcome to the implementing consultant.  His 
strategy, he told me, was to pursue a fast implementation of the DTI 
concept at the companies.  He wanted to get the organisational process 
at the companies started, of making a coarse environmental audit, 
defining some objectives to be attained, and then to take the necessary 
steps to fulfil those objectives.  In fact, he asserted that he "couldn't 
care less" about the specific nature of the initial objectives that the 
companies defined, because he would expect the companies to revise 
those objectives anyway, as a natural consequence of the 'management 
review' element, in the DTI management cycle.  He also indicated, that 
the extent to which the companies were able to go through several 
cycles of the process, i.e. of setting goals, attaining them, and then 
setting new goals, would be an important criteria that would go into his 
                                                          
65
  Talked to Engineering Manager Suleiman Salie, Irvin and Johnson, 
Woodstock, Cape Town, June 10, 1999 
66
  Talked to Director Production Adrian Smuts, St Helena Bay Fishing 
Industries, Stompeneus Bay, June 11, 1999 
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considerations of which companies would be eligible for capital 
investment subsidies. 
The study tour questionnaire 
I ran a small questionnaire survey amongst the study tour participants 
from the fish industry (Hedlund 1999).  The results (Figure 18) 
indicated that whilst there were mixed feeling towards bureaucratic 
management systems this was not deterring them from entering into 
such systems.  In Q25 when asked if they already have a certified 
control system, the respondents refer to their HACCP certification, 
only two respondents were in companies that were ISO 9000 quality 
certified. 
 
 
25. Does your company have a certified 
quality control system? 
10
7
0
0 2 4 6 8 1 0 1 2
Yes
No
Don't know
 
27. We already have enough bureaucracy 
in our company, I wish we had less 
4
5
2
5
1
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
Agree
Mostly agree
Mostly disagree
Disagree
Don't know
 
 
28 The benefits of bureaucracy are 
generally larger than the drawbacks 
 
2
5
5
4
1
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
Agree
Mostly agree
Mostly disagree
Disagree
Don't know
 
29. We are hesitant about formal quality 
control systems because we are concerned 
that it will introduce too much 
bureaucracy 
1
3
12
1
0
0 5 1 0 1 5
Agree
Mostly agree
Mostly disagree
Disagree
Don't know
 
 
Figure 18 Views on bureaucratic management systems amongst study tour participants 
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The questionnaire results also indicated (Figure 19) that the major 
drivers for improving the environmental performance were related to 
conflict with the local community and with environmental authorities, 
not because of a perceived demand from customers or consumers.  A 
majority expected that customers or consumers would voice such 
demands in the foreseeable future, here defined as within 5 years.  The 
most important driver is sound economic feasibility 
19. Our customers demand improved 
environmental performance of our 
company 
4
3
9
1
0 2 4 6 8 1 0
Agree
Disagree
Not now, later
Don't know
 
20. The consumers demand improved 
environmental performance of our 
company 
3
6
7
1
0 2 4 6 8
Agree
Disagree
Not now, later
Don't know
 
21. The local community demand 
improved environmental performance of 
our company 
13
2
2
0
0 5 1 0 1 5
Agree
Disagree
Not now, later
Don't know
 
22. Public regulation demands improved 
environmental performance of our 
company 
13
1
2
0
0 5 1 0 1 5
Agree
Disagree
Not now, later
Don't know
 
 
23. Our mother/holding company 
demands improved environmental 
performance of our company 
8
4
2
3
0 2 4 6 8 1 0
Agree
Disagree
Not now, later
Don't know
 
24. To our company, the most important 
driver of improved environmental 
performance is sound economic 
feasibility 
13
4
0
0
0 5 1 0 1 5
Agree
Disagree
Not now, later
Don't know
 
Figure 19 Drivers for improved environmental performance in the fish industry as 
perceived by study tour participants 
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Six questions (Figure 20) were designed to discover priorities for 
either an equipment oriented CP approach or a softer one focussing on 
changed work practices. 
30. The most efficient way of improving 
the environmental impact of our 
company is to focus on technical issues 
rather than changed work practices 
1
3
4
8
1
0 2 4 6 8 1 0
Agree
Mostly agree
Mostly disagree
Disagree
Don't know
 
 
31. Changing the attitude of our workers 
is a major barrier for introducing better 
housekeeping techniques 
10
3
2
2
0
0 2 4 6 8 1 0 1 2
Agree
Mostly agree
Mostly disagree
Disagree
Don't know
 
 
32. Our workers are the single most 
important asset of our company 
 
12
4
1
0
0
0 5 1 0 1 5
Agree
Mostly agree
Mostly disagree
Disagree
Don't know
 
33. The low educational skills of our 
workers (illiteracy etc), makes it very 
difficult to use written procedures in our 
production 
7
4
4
2
0
0 2 4 6 8
Agree
Mostly agree
Mostly disagree
Disagree
Don't know
 
34. Our workers could contribute with 
many valuable suggestions on how to 
reduce the environmental impact of our 
company 
11
5
1
0
0
0 2 4 6 8 1 0 1 2
Agree
Mostly agree
Mostly disagree
Disagree
Don't know
 
 
35. I would label the relationship between 
workers and management as adversarial 
rather than co-operative at our company 
5
1
7
2
2
0 2 4 6 8
Agree
Mostly agree
Mostly disagree
Disagree
Don't know
 
Figure 20 Views on relationships between workers and environmental performance in 
the fish industry amongst study tour participants 
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The majority believed that better house keeping was an efficient way 
to improve the environmental performance but more than three fourths 
reckoned that workers' attitudes are a major problem. Still, a large 
majority reckoned that workers are an extremely valuable asset.  This 
is particularly remarkable bearing in mind the high number of 
unskilled and casualised workers in the fish processing industry. 
About two-thirds agreed with the common perception that workers' 
low level of skills is a major problem.  It is notable however, that one-
third do not agree with this point of view.  Still, more than 9 out of 10 
of the respondents believed that workers could contribute with 
valuable suggestions on environmental matters.  About half of the 
respondents did not believe that their industrial relations were of an 
adversarial nature.  The results therefore indicate that strategies of 
worker involvement could be a reasonable option. 
The implications for integrating OHS 
After the study tour, it was clear that the implementing consultant did 
not share the 'equipment approach' to CP, which could be inferred 
from the PD.  He did not view the project as linear sequence of events: 
of undertaking a CP audit, preparing investment proposals and making 
decisions on which proposals to subsidise, as specified in the CP.  In 
the DTI concept, CP was not a linear sequence of events, but a 
process, in which the concept of continuous improvement played a 
major role.  The implementing consultant was thus pursuing an 
immediate objective 2 strategy, an ISO 14000 certification approach.  
He cleverly used the subsidy element to leverage this process strategy, 
first by postponing the subsidy decision, and second by seeking to 
make it conditional on having implemented the DTI CP concept. 
The implications for integrating OHS are straightforward.  Suppose 
that a tools integration' measure had led to mandated OHS appraisals 
at certain key points during the project, for instance when the 
investment decisions were being made.  The objective of these 
appraisals would be to give preference to investments proposals, which 
addressed twin problems and to oppose investments, which would 
cause a deterioration of OHS.  
However, if the implementing consultant pursued the DTI concept 
successfully, this OHS appraisal activity would take place too late.  It 
would have missed the phase of the project where most of the action 
would take place -- where most of the implementing consultant's 
attention, and perhaps also the companies' attention, would be directed.   
For an effective integration to take place OHS issues would have to be 
integrated in the management methodology embedded in the DTI 
approach.  As the main CP driver was improved cost-efficiency, a 
sincere integration of OHS into CP would likely be most successful if 
a similar type of incentive structure regarding OHS could be identified.  
This topic will be dealt with in the next Chapter 7. 
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Evidence of Rational Choice or Garbage Can 
processes during project planning? 
In the following sections some of the planning efforts, as they are 
presented in the PD, are examined in more detail.  Two competing 
views of the planning efforts are then presented67.  The first view 
relates to a Rational Choice (or LFA) description of the planning 
process.  In this view the planning process should be understood as a 
top down sequence of logically connected events.  The process starts 
with a detailed examination of the problem, then systematically 
examines various alternatives after which the most optimal alternative 
is chosen.  The process is characterised by unambiguous problems, 
stringent conceptual logic and a linear sequencing of events -- 
problems come before solutions, and solutions come before means.   
The competing view presented here is that of the Garbage Can.  In this 
view problems are ill-defined and ambiguous.  The connection 
between problems and solutions is not necessarily characterised by 
conceptual logic but more by temporal proximity.  Solutions may 
actively look for problems to attach themselves to, perhaps in order to 
justify their existence.  The process is not linear or characterised by 
stringent logic but by choice opportunities, access to decision arenas, 
and lack of time and attention on the part of decision-makers. 
The problem analysis -- what is the problem? 
The PD identifies two industrial sectors as eligible for support:  The 
white fish sector (fresh or frozen fillets) in which two dominant 
companies account for 75 percent of that sector's activities, and the 
fish canning sector in which seven companies are active.  The 
immediate target group likely to benefit from this project is thus quite 
narrow, comprising only 9 companies. 
As mentioned earlier, the problem analysis in the PD identifies four 
groups of general environmental problems:  1) smell and poor visual 
environment, 2) marine pollution of coastal waters,  3) resource use of 
water, fish and energy,  and 4) health and safety in the workplace 
including hygiene (Danced 1998:2-3).   
At face value, these problems appear simple, clearly defined and 
reasonable -- and probably omnipresent in any fish processing 
industry.  However, in the later sections of the PD this orderly set of 
problems gives way to a more messy picture of the general 
environmental problems.  For instance, the first general problem 
regarding smell and poor visual environment have "only recently" 
become a problem as the remote areas where many of the fishing 
factories are located are now being developed for tourism.  They are 
"essentially aesthetic in nature" and represent one of the main driving 
forces behind the negative public image of the fishing industry  
                                                          
67
  For a more detailed description of competing theories on planning,  
see Chapter 4, in particular pages 61 and onwards 
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(ibid:2-3).  It is notable however, that problems with smell are mostly 
related to the fishmeal sector, which is not eligible for support68, and 
which the project therefore cannot address.   
Regarding the second general problem, marine pollution, the extent of 
the problem is "difficult to judge".  Even after years of research the 
"evidence in inconclusive" (ibid:2-3).  Representatives from the fish 
industry pointed out to me that the two coast lines to the Indian and the 
Atlantic Ocean have 'high kinetic energy' characteristics indicative of a 
large dilution and absorption capacity.  The situation may however be 
different if the fish industry is located in a bay.  Studies on marine 
pollution in Saldanha Bay indicated that "whilst gross effects were 
confined to an area adjacent to the major fish factories (within 200 m 
of the outfall) the data did suggest a broader impact" (ibid:2-2).   
The PD continues: "the relative contribution of the fishing industry, 
other pollutors and natural events are not known.  What is clear is that 
the fishing industry lowers the natural absorption capacity of the 
receiving waters and that, any reduction in the pollution load would 
have a beneficial effect.  This must remain the main justification of the 
project combined with the fact that the [cleaner production] approach 
promises a process of continuous improvements." (ibid:2-4 emphasis 
added).   
This section is interesting because it reckons that while the evidence 
on environmental marine pollution is inconclusive it remains the main 
justification of the project.  Marine Pollution thereby becomes the 
main problem.  The "promise of continuos improvements" also plays a 
role, presumably because the process of introducing CP into the South 
African fish industry appears to be in a stalemate and the Danced CP 
project could add momentum and bring it out of the deadlock. 
The PD identifies earlier attempts to launch cleaner production like 
initiatives.  It also notes that there is a significant amount of local 
technical expertise.  An early study from Binnie and Partners dating 
back to 1986 gives "advice on how to minimise pollution; to recover 
valuable products from the waste streams and, in particular, to 
conserve all sources of water so as to reduce the waste-water volume 
as well as to check pollution at source" (ibid:2-2, emphasis added).  
And furthermore:  "The general level of awareness of the importance 
of the environmental problems is high.  The local technical knowledge 
of cleaner production technologies is also impressive.  Nevertheless 
this has not been reflected in the workings at the factory level.  There 
may be a number of reasons for this related to the long term 
establishment of working practice norms, lack of investment capital, 
                                                          
68
   Structural problems prevail in the fishmeal industry related to outdated 
technology, production over-capacity, and low profitability.  In the opinion of the 
planning consultant, the problems of this sector cannot be solved by introduction 
of cleaner production.  More radical measures, e.g. rationalisation, have to be 
considered (Danced 1998:2-3). 
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uncertainty in future quotas and markets and lack of environmental 
legislation and consumer pressure." (ibid:2-4, emphasis added).  
The concept of cleaner production is thus not breaking new ground 
within the South African fish industry but the industry does not appear 
to have given it sincere attention so far.  A complex set of barriers is 
hinted at:  lack (or lack of will) of investment capital, a focus on short 
term projects due to uncertainty of future quotas, lack of legislative 
pressure etc.  In this setting, the main problem is different, more like 
'The process of promoting CP in the fish industry is in a stalemate".  In 
an LFA tree for this alternative core problem the barriers just listed 
could branch out below as causes of the problem.  And the lack of CI 
could be an effect of this core problem. 
Interestingly, the last annex in the PD, the Overall Strategy Analysis, 
argues along similar lines of reasoning.  Two potential areas for 
technical assistance are identified: technical assistance and 
management assistance (Table 9).  The need is with the management 
issues, not technical expertise. 
 
 
In a similar vein, the annex identifies a list of constraints to effective 
technology transfer, notably "that much the technology may not be 
appropriate for South Africa due to differences in the price levels of 
water, energy and manpower and due to regulatory and market 
differences" (ibid:H-4).  It is interesting, that despite these pieces of 
analysis, the final project positions itself in a narrow equipment 
interpretation of CP. 
Table 9 Potential areas for technical assistance identified in 
the overall strategy analysis in the Project Document  
 
Type of technical assistance Nature of the need 
Technical expertise with  
cleaner production in the  
fishing industry 
This seems more limited, that first 
assumed, given the degree of 
knowledge within South Africa 
Management of  
Cleaner Production  
Programmes 
There is a need.  There is limited 
experience of running cleaner 
production programmes and such 
assistance would be valuable for 
South Africa 
 
Note:  The overall strategy analysis in the Project Document  identifies a need 
with management issues, not with technical expertise 
Source: Danced 1998, page H-3 
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Problems or solutions -- which come first? 
The LFA methodology puts great emphasis on keeping problems and 
solutions apart, underlining that problems must not be worded as an 
absence of a solution.  However, it is difficult to maintain this 
separation in practice as the following excepts from the third problem 
area, general wasteful use of water, fish and energy resources, will 
show.  Within this problem area, the PD lists the following specific 
problems of the white fish sector: 
"The emissions of organic material in the discharged waste 
water are mainly caused by excessive water usage, insufficiently 
trained staff and lack of recognised environmental responsibility 
at factory management level.  Inadequate or lack of water 
treatment system cause waste of saleable raw material to the 
waste water" (ibid 2-3).  And furthermore:  "Water saving 
systems are not installed at the factories and in general no 
appropriate equipment for reliable measurements are available at 
the factories" (ibid:1-3) 
And, regarding the canning sector: 
"Most of the companies in the canning industry have installed a 
rotating screen to separate offal from water but only 2 factories 
have installed oil skimmers and one a DAF system.  The waste 
water with offal is, in general, transported by means of pumps 
causing dilution of materials into the water.  The off-loading and 
transport of raw materials to processing takes place with an 
excessive water usage.  Only a few factories are using any form 
of water saving equipment or cleaner technologies apart from 
the re-use of retort water.  In general, no appropriate equipment 
for reliable production flow measurement are in use at any of the 
factories" (ibid:1-3). 
A parallel can thus be drawn to Rittel and Webber's (1984) so-called 
wicked problems (see page 64) where the formulation of the problem is 
the problem since every specification of the problem is also a 
specification of the direction in which a treatment is considered.  Thus, 
if 'pumping of waste water with offal' is recognised as a problem then, 
implicitly, the specified solution is a different means of transporting, 
for example 'dry transport' on a band conveyor, precisely a solution 
suggested in two handouts from a Danish fish industry consultant69.   
Some of the PD excerpts above lists precisely the absence of specific 
solutions, which have been implemented in the Danish CP programme. 
Therefore, in these sections of the project document both problems and 
solutions are identified a priori and the focus is narrowly on 
technology and equipment issues.  
                                                          
69
 The handout: 'Green & clean technology. For increased profit in the seafood 
industry' (Matcon, undated) and an article by two Matcon consultants: 'More 
food, less waste in seafood processing' (Andersen and Jespersen 1995) 
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Indicators -- the tail that wags the LFA dog? 
The LFA immediate objective level 1 output indicator was 
"Sustainable reduction in water usage (50 % in canning, 25 % in white 
fish)".  The savings in water usage achieved through investments in 
new equipment may be labelled 'sustainable', in the sense that the 
water savings would be lasting.  However, it is debatable whether the 
process of the South African fish industry adopting the cleaner 
production concept would be sustainable.  That is, if the water savings 
would be an isolated event or if they would form part of a broader set 
of CP initiatives. 
During conversations with the consultant who prepared the project 
document, i.e. the consultant in the planning phase, he said that a 
narrow focus on equipment issues was not his first intention with the 
project.  Rather, he felt that organisational issues should play a 
prominent role, in particular introducing the concept of continuous 
improvement.  This was a major reason behind the mentioning of 
continuous improvement as part of the project justification (page 130) 
and behind the wording of the Immediate Objective 2 output indicator 
"Sustainable ISO 14001 certification".   
However, in his perception there was a pressure from Danced to 
formulate objectives and outputs in a narrow and quantifiable manner.  
As discussed in the next section of the NAO evaluation of Danced, this 
would be a logical consequence of the LFA objectives oriented 
planning tool and consistent with the need for un-debatable means of 
ex-post verification, if the project successfully was able to achieve its 
objectives.  It is true that it is difficult to define unambiguous 
objectives and specific outputs for a process, the ISO 14000 
certification is probably the best one available. 
In a Rational Choice account, the selection of suitable indicators would 
happen after activities had been decided upon.  It would not be the 
reverse order, that indicators dictate activities, which again define the 
objectives.  This leads to the second point, that the LFA is not a value 
neutral tool that simply helps to maintain project focus and ensure 
logical consistency.  Rather, this particular application of LFA offers 
the potential to distort the project aims.  It has become the tail that 
wags the dog.  
Garbage can processes in play? 
There is no single-true-narrative of the environmental situation in the 
South African fish industry.  For the sake of argument, let me present 
an alternative narrative, admittedly on some accounts a speculative 
one, to contrast the one in the LFA. 
At face value, the South African fish industry is well established, well 
organised, commercially viable, and, despite some fluctuations, 
appears to be in a financially stable and at least not unsound condition.  
High levels of technical competence are available, both within the 
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individual factories and within the sector, in the form of a research 
institute.  Knowledge of cleaner production alternatives has been 
available from 1986, if not earlier.  However, the CP concept has never 
gained enough momentum to sustain itself.  There have been a 
complex set of barriers from perceived lack of enforcement of 
legislation, quota uncertainties, a cautious investment policy, perhaps a 
wait-and-see managerial attitude, and, recently, exceptional quota 
uncertainties arising from the post-apartheid transition.  Low utility 
prices, primarily of water, may play a role as well. 
The situation in the Danish fish industry one or two decades ago 
would, by and large, fit this description.  Again, at face value, it 
therefore appears plausible that Danish cleaner production experiences 
could be applicable and valuable; that the Danish assistance could 
bring new life to an existing but dormant process and nudge it over 
some initial barriers, in particular regarding industry scepticism and 
myth busting.  Case examples of successful and financially feasible 
applications of cleaner production principles could probably also 
improve the general reputation of cleaner production although the 
effects are difficult to predict and to quantify.  
In this setting, Denmark (Danced) has a solution and South Africa 
appears to have a problem, suitable to that solution.  The industry is 
well-organised and with considerable technical knowledge, i.e. an 
attractive partner.  This is a choice opportunity project with a low risk 
of implementation failure.  In this account, the solution precedes the 
problem. 
However, the LFA planning exercise masks this situation and turns it 
upside down.  First, there are no unambiguous output indicators for 
'promoting the cleaner production concept'.  Instead, indicators for 
project success focus narrowly on easily quantifiable water savings.    
Second, although it is acknowledged that better housekeeping and 
improved shop floor practices are important elements, it is recognised 
such issues are “harder to implement” -- and from a donor view point 
presumably also more difficult to monitor and verify.  Therefore, the  
focus turns to a narrow equipment and technology centred 
interpretation. 
Third, the hierarchy of project objectives, the hallmark of rational 
planning, appears to be forced upon the project rather than having 
facilitated the problem definition.  The wording of the development 
objective is notable in this respect, bringing compliance with 
"international standards" onto the scene, despite that such standards are 
not mentioned elsewhere in the PD and probably do not exist. 
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Fourth, marine pollution is identified as the major problem.  As argued 
earlier, the emphasis on marine pollution is debatable due to the 
alleged high-kinetic energy characteristics of the Ocean coastlines70.  
In this alternative narrative, the solutions are not carefully thought out 
responses to unambiguous problems as would bee expected in the 
Rational Choice version.  Rather the solution seems to have actively 
sought out a problem in order to attach itself to it and justify its 
existence.  The project design procedure has worked backwards in 
order to legitimatise the solution.   This is more in line to what would 
be expected from a Garbage Can model point of view. 
Above all, however, the study of this project left me with a feeling that 
Danced has indicated to the planning consultant that the project must 
conform to a specific paradigm in order to be palatable.  In particular, 
the project must attain results, which are quick, visible, and objectively 
verifiable.  A management approach does not meet any of these 
requirements, but an equipment approach, with a specific focus on 
water savings, does.  As noted in the section on indicators above (page 
133) the planning consultant at one instance lamented the pressure 
from Danced for highly quantifiable and verifiable indicators.  
However, during a later conversation, when I specifically inquired for 
any pressures from Danced, he declined to comment in more detail.   
The question is, why would Danced have an interest in pursuing 
results that are quick, visible, and objectively verifiable -- I will seek 
to shed some light on that issue in the next section on the evaluation 
carried out by NAO. 
The political context and the 1999 NAO report 
Introduction to Danish environmental assistance:  the Rio 
summit and the EDRF 
In order unfold the background for the evaluation study undertaken by 
the National Accounting Office (in Danish: Rigsrevisionen), 
henceforth NAO, the background for Danish environmental assistance 
will briefly be reviewed. 
Development assistance has for decades been a part of the official 
Danish foreign policy.  The policy expenditure target has been one 
percent of the GNI.  That assistance has been administered Danida 
organised under the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs.  
Environmental assistance has been a priority of some of Danida's 
development assistance projects but seldom as stand-alone 
environmental projects and generally only to the extent that 
                                                          
70
   At worst, the environmental effects mentioned in the development objective 
are strictly local, not regional, and certainly not global.  At the extreme, the 
marine pollution impact of the South African fish industries may be more 
comparable to the fish industry of Greenland or the Faeroe Islands, which also 
discharge effluents into large water bodies. 
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environmental aspects would fit in under the overall Danida policy of 
poverty alleviation. 
The 1992 UN conference on Environment and Development in Rio de 
Janeiro, Brazil, changed this picture.  The Rio declaration outlined a 
number of principles, among others that environmental assistance must 
form an integral part of development policy and that all countries 
should have shared, but diverse responsibility for solving global 
environmental and developmental problems.  In response to this, 
Denmark set up the Environment and Disaster Relief Facility, 
henceforth EDRF, in 1993.  This facility included resources for a 
number of different purposes: environmental assistance to Eastern 
Europe and the Arctic, efforts as part of global environmental 
programmes and aid in connection with e.g. assistance granted to 
refugees.  The relative distribution of EDRF funds to the various 
purposes is shown in Figure 21. 
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(Danida)
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Funding to the facility was to be ramped-up over period of about 10 
years with a final expenditure target of 0.5 percent of the GNI in the 
year 2002.  The EDRF expenditure is independent and additional to 
the development assistance expenditure under Danida, already 
amounting to one percent of the GNI.  
Environmental assistance within the EDRF framework is jointly 
administered by Danida and Danced (Figure 21).  Danced came into 
existence in 1993.  Whereas Danida is organised under the Ministry of 
Figure 21 Distribution of EDRF funds (percent)  
Half of the funds go to disaster relief administered by Danida.  The other 
half to environmental assistance, of which the part to developing countries is  
administered jointly by Danida and Danced 
Source: Danida and Danced, 1997 
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Foreign Affairs, Danced is organised under the Ministry of 
Environment and Energy.  The division of labour is such that Danida 
oversees assistance to the poorest countries while Danced oversees 
assistance to the more developed countries71.  (Danida and Danced, 
1998) 
Why divide EDRF administration between  
Danced and Danida? 
There are at least three official reasons for why environmental 
assistance under the EDRF was organised under two different 
administrative agencies.   
The first reason concerns the different nature of environmental 
problems in the countries for which EDRF funds were destined.  In 
middle income developing countries such as Malaysia, Thailand and 
South Africa, environmental problems are closely related to industrial 
and economic development.  In less developed countries, however, 
like Vietnam and Malawi, they are associated with the depletion of 
natural resources, such as deforestation, which are intricately 
connected with general poverty problems.  The causes of the 
environmental problems and the level of administrative capacity of the 
government bodies in the two groups of countries would be expected 
to be of a different nature and thus call for different type of assistance 
activities. 
Second, a division would follow the lines of competencies in the two 
ministries.  Expertise with regard to industrial pollution was located in 
Ministry of Environment and Energy while expertise with poverty 
alleviation and land use was located in Danida 
Third, the Ministry of Environment and Energy was already active in 
some environmental assistance projects in Eastern European countries, 
which were similar in nature to the EDRF middle income developing 
countries.  Likewise, was Danida already active with projects in the 
poorer countries focussing on poverty problems.  It would therefore be 
a natural continuation of existing activities if the Ministry of 
Environment and Energy would organise assistance to the more 
developed countries, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Danida) to 
the less developed.  (NAO 1999:4,16,37,51) 
There is, however, circumstantial evidence that other less official and 
more political reasons played a part in organising EDRF assistance 
                                                          
71
  The scope of the EDRF (in Danish: Miljø- og katastroferammen, MIKA) was 
broadened in 1999 and the name changed to the Environment, Peace, and 
Stability Facility, EPSF, (in Danish: Miljø-, Freds- og Stabilitetsrammen).  This 
report is concerned primarily with the events leading to the initiation of 
environmental assistance and will consequently refer to the original name, EDRF.   
A new system for national accounting, (ENS95) introduced as part of a European 
Union harmonisation drive was implemented in Denmark in 1997 resulting in a 
technical increase in the Danish BNI.  The expenditure target of 0.5 percent of 
BNI was therefore delayed to the year 2005  (NAO 1999:42, 91) 
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under the two different bodies.  In 1992 the Danish coalition 
government since 1982 led by the conservative Prime Minister 
Schlüter was defeated by a coalition government led by the social 
democrat Nyrup Rasmussen, who became Prime Minister.  The 
minister of foreign affairs under the conservative government, Mr. 
Ellemann-Jensen, was a highly charismatic person and the ministry 
had under his leadership become increasingly powerful.  It has been 
suggested to me that the new government could have felt that the 
ministry of foreign affairs had become too powerful.  In the first 
coalition government under Prime Minister Nyrup Rasmussen the 
ministry of foreign affairs was broken up in three competence areas: 
foreign policy issues, development issues and the Baltic countries, 
each with its own minister!  The minister for Baltic affairs was a short-
lived construction, but to date (2001) there are two ministers in the 
ministry of foreign affairs, a minister for development (Danida) and a 
minister for foreign policy.  If the purpose of this break-up was to 
reduce the relative power of the ministry of foreign affairs, the 
argument goes, there would be little political will to locate EDRF and 
the administration of another 0.5 percent of GNI with that ministry. 
Second, the social democrat party were led by Mr. Auken during the 
years of opposition in the 1980s.  In a painful power struggle between 
two factions in the social democrat party, however, Mr. Auken was 
narrowly defeated by Mr. Nyrup Rasmussen at a party congress in 
1992.  The dethroned Auken, a highly capable and charismatic person 
and the most obvious rival to Mr. Nyrup Rasmussen, then became 
minister of environment and energy in 1992.  A possible reason for 
creating Danced under the auspices of the ministry of environment and 
energy is that it is part of a take-and-give affair, a concession given by 
Mr. Nyrup's winning faction to Mr. Auken's loosing faction72. 
Structural considerations (ministerial power) as well internal party 
squabble (political) could therefore offer alternative explanations for 
why the newly formed EDRF assistance was located with two different 
public bodies.  It could also hint at potential barriers to the smooth co-
operation between the two agencies.   
The reason presenting this alternative view is the simple hypothesis, 
that the behaviour of an organisation should not only be understood 
from the official policy and strategy documents but also from the 
political context in which it operates.  It therefore positions the 
administration of EDRF funds in an alternative context of struggle for 
power and influence between two ministries.  I will argue that 
understanding this context is a necessary precondition for 
understanding the type of projects Danced can engage in.  I will argue 
that the political context determines the type and content of 
environmental assistance projects Danced will engage in. 
                                                          
72
  That such check-and-balances deals have been struck between the two 
rivalling factions in the social democratic party is discussed, for instance, in WA 
20011123. 
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Background and mandate for the NAO report 
The National Audit Office is an independent institution set out to 
ensure democratic control with public expenditure.  Its main task is to 
audit the state accounts and to examine whether state funds are 
administered as Parliament intended.  It can carry out a wide range of 
control activities, among others performance audits in order to 
examine whether institutions have spent state appropriations in a sound 
financial manner taking into consideration economy, efficiency and 
effectiveness.  The NAO may also examine whether the activities of 
the institutions comply with the objectives.  In principle, everybody 
can suggest that the NAO examines a particular subject, however, only 
the Parliament’s Public Accounts Committee (PAC) may request that 
the Office examines certain matters. 
In April 1998, the PAC requested NAO to review the environmental 
assistance activities, which were financed by the EDRF.  In effect, that 
would be a comparative evaluation of the activities carried out by 
Danced and Danida.  The PAC request took the form of a number of 
specific questions, inter alia regarding (NAO 1999:42): 
- impact - if the effect of the assistance continued after projects were 
completed (lasting effects) 
- organisational issues - if there were any particular conditions in 
favour of this type of development assistance being managed 
solely by Danida, solely by Danced, or if the present organisational 
division between the two agencies was the most expedient 
- co-ordination - if the two agencies collaborated in relevant matters 
- administrative capability - if Danida was capable of administrating 
(the new type of) environmental assistance projects, and if (the 
new organisation) Danced was capable of administrating the 
expected increase in funds for environmental assistance 
As such, the NAO study appears not only as a benign comparative 
evaluation of the two agencies, Danida and Danced.  The mandate of 
the study explicitly questions if the division of labour between the two 
is expedient.  For Danida a potentially unpleasant conclusion could be 
that all activities should be organised under the other agency, leaving 
Danida with the traditional development assistance activities only.  For 
Danced however, a potentially unpleasant conclusion would be that the 
organisation would cease to exist under the auspices of the ministry of 
environment and energy. 
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NAO evaluates from a paradigm of strategic planning 
The NAO combined the resolution of these questions with a general 
assessment of the two agencies' administration of funds earmarked for 
environmental development assistance.  The assessment focussed on 
(NAO 1999:43) 
- the overall strategy and its ability to give structure and direction to 
the programme (the control of aims) 
- the transformation of this overall strategy into operational regional 
strategies and country programmes 
- the planning of the country programme contents, in particular with 
respect to prioritisation and selection of specific projects 
- follow-up monitoring and review activities, in particular of the 
extent to which the support activities have had the intended effects. 
It is thus clear that a major concern of the NAO is the overall logical 
consistency and coherency of the environmental assistance 
programme.  This is particularly evident in the following statement  
"The NAO has investigated if objectives at the overall level have been 
clearly and adequately specified and if these objectives in turn have 
been adequately operationalised through the hierarchy of strategies and 
plans" (ibid:59).  This 'hierarchy of strategies and plans' clearly draws 
from the paradigm of strategic planning with its hierarchy of strategies, 
tactics, plans and activities. 
In the case of activities, in South Africa, four major 'areas of activity' 
have been defined in the regional programme: urban environmental 
management, pollution control and waste management, sustainable 
energy, and natural resource management.  (Danida and Danced 
1999:65)  NAO criticises the lack of direction and operationalisation 
expressed in these four areas of activity, which constitutes "an 
insufficient basis for planning" at the country level.  Country 
programmes should be formulated in a manner, which specifies the 
intended results.  The NAO furthermore recommends that criteria for 
prioritisation of support activities be developed which include the 
'utility-value' of the Danish support. (NAO 1999:63) 
Measurability and accountability are cherished values 
The NAO also recommended that "country programmes shall include 
quantifiable goals, which in part will assure coherence in the 
[environmental] assistance and in part permit a subsequent evaluation 
if the support produced the desired effects.  Such goals could be e.g. a 
specification of the desired level of environmental expertise and 
administrative capacity within a particular area, or a measurable 
reduction of a particular environmental problem, and the impact of the 
Danish support on this problem." (ibid:65).   
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Interestingly, both Danced and Danida objected to the impracticability 
of this approach.  Danida observed, that the definition of detailed 
quantifiable goals at the country programme level would presuppose 
that all the individual projects in that country had been examined and 
listed in the programming phase, which the ministry felt was 
'obviously impossible' (ibid: 62).  In other words, Danida argued that 
the NAO recommendation was a logical contradiction.  
On the other hand, Danced argued that such indicators, while perhaps 
desirable, do not exist for certain types of projects.  A number of 
Danced projects had been aimed at increasing the administrative 
capacity of the public agencies dealing with strategy formation and 
other regulatory tasks.  For example assistance with the development 
of new environmental legislation such as the policy strategy paper 
"White paper on integrated pollution and waste management for South 
Africa" (DEAT 2000).  For such projects, Danced objected, specific 
and quantifiable result indicators of the type requested by the NAO are 
not available at present.  Danced furthermore objected that other issues 
also had to be considered and that planning at the country level never 
could be based on simple effect criteria alone.  
Danced had for this reason together with the World Bank embarked on 
a collaborative project "to develop indicators for capacity development 
within the environmental field, [with the purpose] to show, if a 
positive or negative development of human capacity and capability has 
taken place." (ibid:66).  The NAO report recommended that "this work 
should have high priority" (ibid:74).   
The immediate purpose of such indicators is to measure and describe 
the effect of support given.  Another obvious purpose of such 
indicators is to resolve conflicting assessments of project impacts on a 
more objective basis.  One such conflict is evident in a capacity 
development project in Thailand's Pollution Control Department, 
which was supported by Danced.  An external consulting company 
carried out a favourable evaluation of the project and it was generally 
identified as a highly successful one.  The NAO subsequently paid a 
visit to the Thai Department and interviewed an executive, who the 
NAO found to have "no particular knowledge of the project".  
Additionally, that he "demonstrated ignorance with respect to the 
series of seminars and workshops that had taken place during the 
project" (NAO 1999:110).  In other similar projects evaluated by the 
NAO, there were also difficulties with retaining staff in the public 
institutions, partly due to salary differences between the public and the 
private sector.  In one project, about one third of the seminar and 
course participants were no longer with the Department, half a year 
after project completion.  The NAO therefore concluded, that the 
lasting effects of this project may be put in doubt (ibid:136). 
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The NAO concluding remarks 
In its concluding section (ibid:150), the NAO evaluation report 
observes that  
- the experiences so far have not confirmed the need for both 
Danced and Danida to undertake the administration of 
environmental development assistance activities 
- Danida possesses the necessary competence to carry out 
environmental development assistance (but, interestingly, a similar 
statement cannot be found for Danced) 
- the costs of administration of the two agencies are similar  
(i.e. that the one organisation is not more administrative cost-
efficient than the other one, thereby refuting a Danced assertion 
that this organisation is more 'lean'), and 
- that the collaboration between the two agencies in general should 
be intensified. 
The NAO evaluation report, forwarded to parliament, is thus voicing 
substantial criticism of the desirability and expediency of the present 
division of labour between Danida and Danced questioning among 
others if the new organisation Danced has the necessary competence to 
fulfil its obligations.  In its summary statements the NAO expresses a 
general discontent with development assistance observing that   
"... a number of factors entail risks that the projects will not have 
lasting effects.  This is however, neither in scope nor in nature 
essentially different from other developments projects in the 
developing countries." (ibid:38, emphasis added) 
Various opposition political parties on the right wing are highly critical 
of development assistance activities.  Danced officials with whom I 
spoke felt that the evaluation was a political manoeuvre orchestrated 
by the right wing opposition to discredit and harass Danced.   
I will not go any further into the intricacies of NAO evaluation studies 
and the political play in ordering such evaluations to be carried out.  
Suffice to say, that the NAO study is indicative of a situation of which 
there is no broad political consensus about carrying out environmental 
assistance project and in particular about having an separate 
organisation (Danced) under the auspices of the ministry of 
environment and energy.  The general political support for Danced can 
thus be described as, at best, unclear, at worst, hostile.     
  
Chapter 6   Case studies on two cleaner production projects 
143
Hedlund 2002.doc 
How will an organisation act in the framework of 
accountability to NAO 
I will hypothesise that a situation of unclear political support will 
affect the behaviour of the Danced organisation in the following ways.   
First, there will be a tendency to follow formal rules, to 'go by the 
book' in order to shield itself from possible criticism from the NAO 
and the opposition.   
Second, a tendency to define objectives narrowly and a preference for 
objectives, for which measurable and verifiable indicators exist, rather 
than for objectives, for which softer means of verification are 
available, i.e. to prioritise rigour over relevance. 
Third, possibly a tendency for risk aversion, to set objectives with 
caution -- only those that can reasonably be attained. 
With these hypotheses in mind I will proceed with last case study of a 
Danced CP project, in which I followed the project planning and 
preparation phase.  
The metal finishing CP project  
General characteristics of the metal finishing sector 
Metal finishing operations are employed at some point during the 
manufacturing of essentially all metal products. They are intended to 
modify the surface properties, for example increase corrosion or 
abrasion resistance, alter appearance, add hardness, add specific 
electrical properties, or alter the product in some other way.  Metal 
finishing cover a potentially vast number of operations, in which 
metals are cleaned, prepared, treated and coated.  A wide range of 
processes are in use, for example galvanising, electroplating, 
anodising, painting, and coating.  Many are batch operations in which 
the articles are dipped into and then removed from baths containing 
molten metals or chemical reagents.  Typically, objects are moved 
through a series of baths. 
The toxic nature of many of the chemicals involved means that the 
sector is highly relevant to target, both from an environmental as well 
as occupational health and safety point of view.  There are many 'twin-
problems' of which problems in the external and the internal 
environment have the same underlying cause: the use of a toxic 
substance in the production process.  Many of the coat metals are toxic 
and some of the processes involve extremely toxic chemicals, for 
example concentrated cyanide solutions, a potent poison.  Some of the 
metals and chemicals are both acutely poisonous and have long term 
toxic effects of a cumulative nature. 
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There are essentially two types of operations.  In-line shops perform 
metal finishing operations on items that they manufacture themselves.  
Job-shops (or jobbing shops) are separate entities that do not 
manufacture parts, they provide metal finishing operations for products 
manufactured elsewhere. 
Particularly in the electroplating industry there are a number of very 
simple, low-cost, and highly effective CP options.  They typically 
involve improved drainage of items in order to reduce drag-over of 
chemicals from one bath into the next bath.  They also typically 
involve improved rinsing, for instance achieved if one large rinse tank 
is spilt into two or more smaller tanks, which run in counter flow.  
With these simple techniques it is "usually quite easy" to reduce rinse 
water consumption by "at least 50 percent and, in some instances, by 
as much as 90%" (UNEP 1989:14).   
Allowing sufficient dripping time for treated work pieces is the 
simplest and most cost-efficient method of pollution control.  Three 
simple low cost methods are shown in Figure 22.  The drip time may 
simply be increased as in a), or a drip collection tray may be installed 
as in b), that allows the fluid to be taken back to the bath.  In c) a 
sloping drain board takes drip fluids back to the tank.  Such methods 
are described in, for instance, EPA (1996), UNEP (1989), and UNEP 
(1998) 
 
 
Not all CP options are so simple of course.  In some cases, the entire 
process must be changed in order to deal with a specific problem, for 
instance shifting from cyanide zinc plating process to a non-cyanide 
alkaline process.  However, very substantial improvements are within 
reach employing simple methods. 
The initial problem analysis 
Danced subcontracted the job of designing the CP intervention and 
prepare a PD to a consultant, henceforth the planning consultant.   
Figure 22 Three simple CP techniques in the electroplating industry to 
reduce carry-over of chemicals from one bath to the next 
Source: UNEP (1989:13) 
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I joined him in a number of his activities, factory visits, meetings with 
industry representatives, service providers etc. 
The South African metal finishing industry is diverse and 
geographically widespread.  At a relatively early stage it was therefore 
necessary to limit the scope of the project to two industrial sectors in 
order to maintain focus:  It was decided to focus on the two industries 
of hot-dip galvanising and electroplating.  They were the most 
promising industrial sectors "where measurable improvements can be 
made in terms of cleaner production within limited timeframes and 
budgets" (Danced 1999:1). 
The hot-dip galvanising industry comprises around 30 companies, 
which are relatively easy to identify.  The process involves submerging 
the items in a bath of molten zinc.  A significant capital outlay is 
required to start a hot-dip galvanising business, around R 2.5m, and 
this tends to deter non-serious investors from entering the business.  
The economic environment is relatively good with the market growing 
at 6 percent a year. 
The companies are represented by the Hot Dip Galvanising 
Association (HDGA), which has nearly 100% membership coverage.  
The HDGA holds office in a Johannesburg suburb where it maintain a 
small but well run organisation comprising a few support staff and a 
director.  The organisation has been quite active in promoting the 
interests of its members and in helping to stimulate awareness of new 
opportunities for its members.  It has, for instance, liased with private 
specialist consultants in order to deal with a significant waste problem 
of spent concentrated acid.  In conjunction with the specialists, a new 
recovery process was devised and a central facility in Johannesburg 
built.  On commercial terms, acid waste is now collected and taken to 
the central treatment facility after which the recovered acid is resold to 
the industry. 
In stark contrast, the precise number of electroplating companies is 
shrouded in uncertainty but is estimated at about 500.  Electroplating 
companies come in almost all sizes, but the majority fall within the 
category of small and medium companies; i.e. with between 5 and 100 
staff.  More than 50% of the companies are located in the 
Johannesburg area, with the bulk of the remainder spread mainly in the 
Cape Town and Durban areas. 
Electro-plating is an easy business to get into.  Many of the processes 
are relatively simple, require limited capital outlay, and only modest 
technical knowledge.  Thus, the number of operators is considerably 
higher and the standards of business performance vary greatly from 
one company to another.  A number of small companies are active, 
some with only a few employees and operating from interim facilities, 
so-called back-yard operations.  The regulatory authorities may either 
be unaware of the existence of some of the small companies or of the 
activities they undertake.  The serious players are those with a long-
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term business mission and they probably represent around 25 percent 
or more of the total number of known companies.  The remainder are 
driven by short-term profit motives and plan only on a short-term 
basis.  Operators in the electroplating companies describe the domestic 
market as saturated and expect that the number of companies will 
decline as competition forces some of the more inefficient companies 
out of business. 
The industry is also highly disorganised.  There is a branch of the 
American Electroplating Surface Finishers (AESF) but membership is 
small and declining.  The head of the AESF estimated that less than 
20% of the electroplating companies in South Africa were with the 
association.  He lamented that many electroplating companies did not 
see any benefits in joining an organisation.  The fierce competitive 
situation created adversarial conditions within the sector and 
companies tended to view each other solely as competitors, not as 
potential partners for any sort of collaboration.  Nor were there any 
interests in meeting the authorities (environmental or other) as a 
unified industry.  Individual business owners felt that they would be 
better off with a 'duck and dive' strategy, which they had pursued so 
far. 
The head of the AESF expressed interest in the CP project, most likely 
as a means to bring new life to the association.  He felt that it would be 
beneficial if the strong ties with the American association could be 
broken and a purely South African association could be established.  
Much of the information from the American association was not 
relevant in South Africa, he observed.  Technology was too advanced, 
quality demands were stricter, the average business size was larger etc.  
However, he did not have the resources to form a new organisation on 
his own.  In the view of the planning consultant, the head of the AESF 
was a potentially important stakeholder in a CP projects because he 
was one of the very few means by which a larger group of businesses 
in this highly fragmented industry could be addressed. 
The head of the AESF was running a job-shop electroplating business 
of his own with about 20 employees.  I went to visit him together with 
the planning consultant to conduct an interview.  His operations, I was 
later to learn, was not so untypical of many jobbing shops.  A small 
cluttered factory area was located in a relatively old building.  We had 
to stride over piles of bags of finished and untreated goods that were 
stacked on the shop floor, creating an impression of disorganisation.  
The workplace was noisy, dirty and messy, the floor wet from spillage. 
Workers appeared to be of the low-wage low-skill kind.  The work 
performed appeared to be of the high-volume, low-profitability type.  
The business owner complained to us about his various types of 
obsolete equipment.  He was aware of a number of very simple CP 
techniques such as longer drip-off periods and more efficient rinse 
cycles but he could not spare the resources to modify his processes. 
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The in-line electroplating operations that we visited generally had 
superior operations to the jobbing shops.  A manufacturer of door 
handles and locks, which also served export markets, had tidy and 
orderly operations.  They had about two years earlier become part of 
an international conglomerate and their operations were quality 
certified according to the ISO 9000 series.  Specialist advice had 
become available to them through the new ownership structure and 
they not only knew about a number of CP production techniques but 
had also implemented some.  It could not help notice some 
conspicuous signs over the line of plating baths, such as "Do not wash 
hands or clothes in the hot soak – Disciplinary action will be taken".  
Company representatives told me that the company had abandoned an 
old practice where some workers at times during winter slept overnight 
in a back room where heating was available.  Fortunately the practice 
was ended before a fire the year before broke out, which would have 
killed any workers staying in that back room.  The same representative 
described worker productivity as "appalling".  
The three hot-dip operations that I visited with the planning consultant 
gave the impression of being well organised.  They generally had 
above 200 employees, managerial staff appeared professional and 
knowledgeable, and operations orderly and tidy.  Fumes and splashes 
of molten zinc were generally stated as major problems and they had 
all taken some preventive measures against this.  One company stood 
out for its upbeat enthusiasm and its emphasis on improving workers' 
skills.  The company had a history of poor worker relations, which 
were close to bringing the company to halt some years before.  Since, 
the main task had been to 'turn-around' the company into a profitable 
operation with lasting job opportunities.  It had launched Adult Basic 
Education and Training (ABET) initiatives as well as education into 
'life skills', which focussed on basic skills, and worker attitude and 
behaviour.  It had also invested in several 'basic productivity 
improvement' projects73.   
The company visits gave illuminating insights into the situation of the 
two industrial sectors. It is, however, difficult to judge if the 
companies were truly representative for their sector.  This was 
particularly evident for one hot-dip galvaniser, where the secretary by 
mistake had faxed us the driving instruction to an older facility located 
in a different industrial area.  While we did not see much of the 
operations there and were quickly redirected to the intended facility, 
operations at the first site clearly appeared substandard to the one we 
were shown in detail. 
                                                          
73
   The company was awarded a Silver Award in the 1998 National Productivity 
Institute's annual competition ('Monoweld leads the field in galvanising', BR 
19990611) 
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The cleaner production workshop in Pretoria 
An important activity in the project preparation phase was a national 
one-day workshop on cleaner production in the metal finishing 
industry held in Pretoria.  Participants were invited from industry, 
from the service providers (in particular chemical suppliers) and from 
the authorities.  In effect, this was an LFA workshop.  An extremely 
complex, if not messy, set of problems were evident from that 
workshop.   
First, there is no source of formal educational route into electroplating.  
Many platers said that they had learned the basic skills while servicing 
in the army.  Others had started their company with a basic knowledge 
of operations obtained during former employment and then learned 
additional skills as the need arose.  Most platers relied heavily on the 
chemical suppliers for detailed technical knowledge of process and 
process chemistry and, not the least, for maintaining the chemical 
composition in their process baths. 
Second, that industry perceived enforcement to be random and unfair.  
Authorities were perceived to go after 'easy targets', notably the larger 
and well known operators, which, in their own view, contributed 
relatively little to pollution -- and ignore the smaller and informal 
back-yard operations that were undertaken with total disregard to 
effluent and other standards.  One plater said that he was concerned 
about one such 'cowboy operator down-the-street with a few tanks and 
no effluent plant' because poor environmental performance enabled the 
competitor to undercut prices. 
Third, that authorities lacked the most basic resources to enforce 
legislation.  For example, a public servant from the DEAT told me, 
that there were only a single digit number of air pollution inspectors in 
the entire country.  I was later told by another public servant that while 
the Johannesburg environmental authorities had expensive equipment 
to analyse effluent streams for toxic metal compounds, they did not 
have the funds for the burning gas necessary to operate the equipment.  
As a result the expensive equipment stood idle and enforcement 
control activities were lax.   
Fourth, that the platers viewed each other with a great deal of mistrust.  
A speaker from Durban, John Danks74, who ran a jobbing 
electroplating business there, was invited to speak about the 
experiences of forming a so-called Waste Minimisation Club (WMC).  
The idea of the club was that business owners met on a regular basis 
and exchanged ideas and experiences on how to minimise emissions.  
He suggested that the platers in the Johannesburg area set up a similar 
arrangement.  This suggestion was met with loud scepticism.  
                                                          
74
   Mr. Danks has played a pivotal role in the Durban WMC.  He was invited to 
join a small team CP study tour to Denmark made possible by a small Danced 
grant.  This tour had a very large impact on Mr. Danks perceptions about the 
benefits of cleaner production.  I have conducted several interview with him 
which are covered in more detail in Chapter 8. 
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A Johannesburg plater stood up and asked why he, who had struggled 
for so many years to learn the tips and tricks of the trade, should give 
away this information to competitors.  Mr. Danks repeatedly told them 
that the Durban platers, and, indeed, himself as well, had had the same 
initial reservations when starting the Durban club, but that there was 
much valuable advice to be shared, which did not have an effect on the 
competitive situation.  If he felt that any information was sensitive, he 
would not share it, he said.  Still, his WMC suggestions met with no 
sympathy from the Johannesburg platers.  
The workshop ended with a voting exercise.  The participants were 
given a number of colour-coded adhesive round labels (votes) with 
which they could mark a list of pre-worded options.  The options fell 
within the three categories of barriers, drivers and support options.  A 
participant had four votes within each category, which could be cast 
with no restrictions.  If a business owner, for instance, felt that lack of 
finance was the crucial problem within the 'barriers' category, he could 
chose to cast all four votes on that single problem.  The options were 
phrased during the workshop based on the opinions expressed during 
discussions.  The colour-coding scheme was green for industry, blue 
for regulators, red for service providers, and yellow for 'others'. 
The results from the voting exercise are presented below.  They are 
sorted according to the number of votes from industry, the target group 
for the CP project.  Regarding barriers to CP (Figure 23) some of the 
answers were both predictable and amusing.  For instance that the 
majority of business owners felt that inconsistent enforcement of 
legislation was a major barrier, while only few legislators felt so.  
Likewise, that the majority of legislators felt that low prices of water 
and raw materials were a major barrier, while hardly any business 
owners voted for that option.   
Business owners generally identified barriers of lack of knowledge on 
CP options, lack of finance to implement them, and lack of compelling 
reasons to do something about it, either due to inconsistent or lax 
enforcement or due to unclear standards (customer requirements).  
Interestingly, few business owners felt that lack of time or working 
traditions were significant barriers.  Legislators identified lack of 
knowledge as major barriers, both in terms of lack of knowledge on 
CP options and on the industry's detrimental effect on the 
environment.  The voting pattern of the service providers (chemical 
suppliers) is particularly interesting as they provide the perhaps most 
unbiased and informed view on the issue.  They identify lack of 
knowledge, lack of pressure and then lack of finance as the 
predominant barriers to the implementation of CP. 
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Regarding drivers (Figure 24) there was general agreement amongst 
the workshop participants that the major driver to CP was cost savings.  
Service providers identified effective enforcement of legislation as the 
second most important driver.  Interestingly, few of the business 
owners and none of the (environmental) regulators felt that linking 
OHS issues with CP would be a significant driver. 
Concerning the last category, support options (Figure 25) there was 
consistent agreement amongst the workshop participants that training 
of the shop floor workers was the principal means of support.  An idea 
catalogue of CP techniques ranked high amongst business owners.  
Waste minimisation clubs were prioritised mainly by regulators and 
service providers but still ranked third amongst business owners.  Only 
regulators felt that an overseas study tour would be of much benefit.  
Interestingly, there was very little support from business owners to 
subsidies to CP audits.  
Figure 23 Voting results from the workshop:  Barriers against introducing cleaner production in the metal 
finishing industry 
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It is laden with difficulties to extract firm conclusions from such a 
workshop.  Various actors have been given the opportunity to present 
their divergent views on a complex situation but any kind of consensus 
on what the major problems are (here worded as barriers) is hard to 
identify.   
There is also the question if the actors are representative.  This is 
especially true for the electroplaters -- how many small business 
owners attend environmental workshops anyway?  The situation is also 
complicated by the uncommitting nature of the workshop arrangement 
-- it is possible, while perhaps not likely, that none of the workshop 
participants will eventually take part in the CP project.  Stakeholders 
are ill defined and their participation in the planning process is fluid. 
Logical inconsistencies in the voting patterns can also be identified, for 
instance that the massive voting for the support option 'Shop floor 
training' is not matched by a similar strong voting pattern for the 
barrier 'Working traditions'.   
Figure 24 Voting results from the workshop:  Drivers for introducing cleaner production in the metal finishing 
industry 
  
Chapter 6   Case studies on two cleaner production projects 
152
Hedlund 2002.doc 
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
Shop floor training
CP idea catalogue/manual/case studies
Water quality / waste min forums 
Study tours
Demostration subsidy
Techical info specific for SA
Workshops (overseas)
Detail stud of partic prob (and EIA)
Subsidy of CP audits
Develop better standards/regul/tariffs
Newsletters (incl www)
Subsidy detailed CP study
Industry
Regulators
Service 
providers
Others
Support options
 
Figure 25 Voting results from the workshop:  Support options to help 
introduce cleaner production in the metal finishing industry 
 
 
Concluding remarks on the workshop exercise 
Despite the difficulties and inconsistencies, the voting patterns 
revealed that while the workshop participants had divergent opinions 
about the underlying problems there was more general agreement 
about preferences for drivers and support options..  The top-score 
barrier only attracted 23 votes, less than the 33 votes for the most 
popular driver, and 29 for the most popular support option.  Direct 
numerical comparisons cannot be made.  There were fewer options to 
choose from in the 'drivers' category, and thus less dilution of the 
votes.  In addition, some attendees were apparently leaving the 
workshop during the voting procedure resulting in fewer total votes 
cast for support options, than for barriers.  Nevertheless, the overall 
impression is that the major driver to be pursued is cost savings and 
that support should focus on employee training and the provision of 
knowledge, either as a 'catalogue of ideas' or as an 'experience sharing 
forum' of some kind.  
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The workshop also underscored the highly heterogeneous nature of the 
potential participating companies of the CP project.  Many of the 
characteristics of the electroplating sector simply inverts those of the 
hot-dip galvanisers on major accounts (Table 10) 
 
Each of these characteristics of the electroplaters constitutes a major 
challenge to a CP project, indeed to any project targeted at this 
industrial sector. 
Is Danced really interested in OHS? 
I had briefed the planning consultant on the purpose of my study.  It 
was my impression that he perceived me as one of many actors on the 
playing field, as a representative of a special interest group, of the 
'academic OHS establishment'.  As such he invited me, as he did with 
other interest groups, to forward suggestions on which elements I 
would like to see in the project.  What should the project do to improve 
the occupational health and safety of the metal finishing industry? -- 
I was asked.   
The planning consultant was experienced, conscientious and observant 
of the rules of the game in an agent-principal (consulting) 
arrangement.  During the course of the project preparation he currently 
tried to keep the local Danced office informed of developments, also 
trying to find out what their expectations and preferences to the project 
were.  As such, I am convinced that he had secured some sort of 
Table 10 Heterogeneous nature of the metal finishing 
industrial sector 
 
 Hot-dip galvanisers Electroplaters  
(job-shops) 
Size Large Small 
Management Professional Business owner 
Structure Organised Disorganised anarchy 
Economic 
climate 
Relatively good, market 
is growing 
Talks of crisis, market is 
saturated and number of 
companies declining 
Barriers to 
entry 
Significant, substantial 
capital investment 
required 
Few, little capital outlay 
needed, basic technology 
is relatively easy 
 
Many of the characteristics of the hot-dip galvanising companies simply invert 
those of the electroplating companies 
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consent with Danced before taking me with him to the company visits 
-- ensuring that OHS issues indeed were legitimate project objectives.  
Still, at times he appeared perplexed about Danced's genuine 
commitment to OHS.   
As mentioned earlier (page 32) I also joined some of the activities in 
preparing the textile CP project.  A senior representative from the 
Danish EPA joined in on some visits to cotton production facilities.  
While travelling to one of those facilities we also discussed OHS and 
CP projects.  The senior representative expressed reservations if OHS 
should be a legitimate separate project objective.  There were other 
highly important issues, she argued, which were not being addressed 
specifically -- above all energy consumption; a truly global 
environmental problem.  So why should OHS claim a right for special 
treatment when other urgent issues of global importance were not 
given so? 
Danced offices are not overstaffed and it is not easy to get access to 
decision-makers.  Meetings are planned in advance, tend to be short, 
held in a business like atmosphere, and the representative generally 
appears visibly constricted in respect of time, eager to move on to the 
next meeting.  On one such occasion a Danced representative told us, 
in a slightly derogatory intonation, that the project, of course, should 
not address standard OHS issues like accidents, injuries and so on.  
Danced had a clear preference for interventions which were proactive 
and visionary.  I was left with the impression that OHS interventions 
were not generally believed possess these qualities.   
I my opinion, the planning consultant captured the Danced concerns 
quite precisely in this passage from the PD: "there is a risk that this 
[OHS] might become a main focus for companies rather than a 
measurable spin-off benefit of cleaner production.  Such an emphasis 
may place the focus onto protecting workers against present dangers 
rather than seeking to remove the dangers" (Danced 1999:27 emphasis 
added).  I believe that the passage captures the situation in a nutshell.   
First, for a number of companies the comprehension of environmental 
'problems' or 'responsibilities' may be vague and diffuse.  
Environmental issues may easily loose ground to problems within the 
OHS domain in which the target group is clearly defined, highly 
visible, and indeed, OHS issues may be a shadow battlefield for other 
conflicts lurking beneath the surface concerning power and control.  In 
this setting short term protective measures may drive out long term 
preventive measures in a kind of Gresham's Law equivalent75.  In this 
context the issue is a genuine risk.  For example, I spoke to a young 
self-employed consultant76 in Port Elizabeth who worked with ISO 
14000 environmental management systems (EMS) in industry, one of 
                                                          
75
  From the field of economics, Gresham's law states that: Bad money drives out 
good money.  People tend to spend to cheapest form of currency that sellers will 
accept, saving better money for other uses. 
76
   Interview with Rob Gardiner, Moorhouse Consulting June 9, 1999 
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the very few consultants in this field that I came across in South 
Africa.  He told me that he strode to keep OHS issues out of his EMS 
projects.  OHS issues kept surfacing "all the time" and were an 
impediment because he could not keep his project focussed on the 
topic of his contractual obligation with the company.  
Second, while it represents a risk, it at the same time also represents an 
opportunity, if the interest for OHS issues could be directed into 
strengthening the environmental cause -- in particular what concerns 
'twin-problems'.  The planning consultant identified this issue in earlier 
sections of the PD. 
Third, that Danced officials are torn between their desire to be 
visionary and innovative and at the same time to stay within the 
envelope defined by the rational efficiency discourse of visible and 
measurable results achieved in short timeframes for limited budgets.  
Danced is on a mission to fight global environmental problems in 
order to secure our common future.  They are on a mission to save the 
world, nothing less.  In this global perspective, the wellbeing of a few 
workers will inevitably be an issue of inferior importance.  Whilst they 
desire to spread the revolutionary concept of cleaner production and 
environmental responsibility, the rationality discourse forces them to 
focus on measurable water savings, and in the fish project, 
contradictorily to alleviate a strictly local environmental problem.  
Introducing OHS into the Project Document  
As was argued in an earlier section concerning the fish industry CP 
project it was imperative that OHS be addressed in the PD.  If not, the 
implementing consultant would have little clue that OHS was a 
legitimate project objective.   
I therefore sought to introduce OHS considerations wherever relevant 
in the PD.  In particular I felt that OHS should be integrated into the 
LFA matrix, identifying OHS issues as part of the objectives, the 
outputs, the indicators etc.  The main line of reasoning was that 
specific OHS agendas should not be pursued in the project.  Rather 
should opportunities be exploited to address issues where problems 
within OHS and environmental issues coincided.  However, for this 
objective to succeed OHS issues had to be visible, it had to remove 
any doubts that OHS was indeed one of several legitimate project 
objectives.  This section will shortly review the outcome of these 
efforts. 
The planning consultant noted that the lack of an OHS baseline 
situation was a major barrier against OHS issues to be considered at 
the indicator level in the LFA.  If the baseline was not known, how 
should the indicator be able to objectively verify if a project objective 
was attained, he questioned.  I had no immediate answer to that.   
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There are two major reasons that it is more difficult to quantify OHS 
performance than it is to quantify environmental performance.  The 
first one concerns mostly practical reasons.  Many environmental key 
figures are already registered somewhere in a company, in the 
accounting system, in the emission control scheme arrangement 
entered into with the authorities.  Many environmental indicators can 
therefore be obtained simply by mining data from existing sources 
elsewhere in the company.  This is not so for OHS indicator for which 
measurement programmes for instance regarding noise or chemical 
exposure in many cases will have to be established from scratch. 
Second, figures on accidents and injuries, which are the most widely 
used indicators for OHS performance, are essentially reactive.  They 
are not proactive and can only play a small role in a preventive 
program.  There are furthermore many methodological problems in 
establishing trustworthy accident and injury incidence data.  The topic 
is discussed in more detail in Chapter 7, in particular on page 180 on 
onwards. 
For these reasons, most of the indicators would have to be of the soft 
type, rather than of the objectively verifiable type. 
Finally, OHS was integrated in the Project Document in the following 
manner.  The first reference to OHS is in the executive summary, 
which states that both internal and external environmental issues will 
be addressed in the project.  Basic documentary analysis reveals that 
OHS issues are mentioned in relation to other issues at 31 other 
occasions throughout the PD (Danced 1999).  Visibility and legitimacy 
issues should thereby be reasonably addressed. 
In the section 'objective analysis', the PD identifies twin-problems as 
relevant for OHS interventions.  The PD states that the project "will 
need to address both the external and internal environment.  The 
internal environment is best addressed when improvements of a 
preventative nature have a dual impact on the internal and external 
environment.  At the very least the project should not result in a 
worsening of the internal environment.  There is also a lot to be gained 
from using internal environment as the starting point for upgrading 
worker and supervision skills as part of improved housekeeping and 
cleaner production practices"  (Danced 1999:18).  It is to the credit of 
the planning consultant that OHS issues are linked with changed shop-
floor practices and improved housekeeping, mainly through upgrading 
of skills, a very timely topic in the contemporary South African debate. 
OHS issues were then incorporated in the development and the 
immediate objective LFA level.  At the development objective level 
OHS is mentioned in the text, but not directly at the indicator level, as 
seen in Table 11. 
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The incorporation of OHS issues at the immediate objective level is 
shown in Table 12 overleaf. 
 
 
Table 11 Incorporation of OHS issues in the LFA development objective level 
 
Development objective Indicators 
A significant reduction in the 
environmental impact of the 
South African metal industry, 
within the electroplating and 
galvanising sub-sectors, largely 
due to a preventative 
approach.” 
 
The project has a focus on the electroplating and galvanising sub-sectors.  The 
Project has both quantitative and qualitative aims.  Water, energy and chemical 
savings and reduced effluent pollution can be measured and monitored.  
Increased environmental awareness (a changed mind set) which will ensure 
project sustainability and replicability is more complicated to monitor within the 
project period.  An integrated approach to internal and external environment 
should be pursued 
Overall Objective level indicator:    
Pollution reduced and environmental performance from the electroplating and 
galvanising companies improved. 
Source:  Danced (1999:29)  underline emphasis added 
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Table 12 Incorporation of OHS issues in the LFA immediate objective levels 1, 2 and 3 
 
Immediate objectives  Indicators 
Immediate Objective 1 
1. Cleaner production processes 
and practices implemented in 
the Metal Finishing companies, 
within the electroplating and 
galvanising sub-sectors, with 
sustainable results. 
a) An indicator of success is the reduction in overall water, energy and chemical 
usage (in the order of 20% as an average for the involved parties) and an 
equivalent reduction of pollution load in the related emissions.  
Improvements to the working environment should have taken place.  Brief 
reports on these figures from involved companies will be included in 
documentation material from the demonstration projects as routine. 
b) An absence of interventions that have a negative effect on the working 
environment       
Immediate Objective 2 
Sustainable and accessible 
capacity within the sector to 
further implement and develop 
cleaner production processes 
and practices. 
 
Immediate Objective 3 
Increased awareness amongst 
regulators and the electroplating 
and galvanising sub-sectors of 
Metal Finishing industry sector 
in particular on the current 
negative environmental impacts 
of the sector and the 
possibilities and opportunities 
to mitigate these impacts 
through the introduction of 
cleaner production processes 
and practices 
The achievement of objectives 2 and 3 can be monitored by more soft indicators 
such as: 
c) the number of participants in study tours and the percentage of metal 
finishing companies and others going on study tours. (both in South Africa 
and Denmark). 
d) the number of company employees taking the various CP training and 
awareness courses.  The development of training in each of the CP tools and 
techniques over time  
e) the number of CP trainers educated.  A formal exam and issuing of diplomas 
in the various CP tools should be considered and the number of trainers 
passing these exams accounted for.  Development of the CP training capacity 
over time expressed as capacity within each of the CP tools and techniques 
f) the number of company-supplier matches and company-company matches 
made and the development over time 
g) the number of demonstration projects carried out and the development over 
time 
h) the adoption and uptake of demonstration technology in factories as a result 
of the demonstration investments in other factories and the development over 
time. 
i) The percentage of audits that mention or take consideration of the internal 
environment issues.  
j) The degree to which companies have responded to and made use of working 
environment training courses and information. 
k) The percentage of demonstration projects that have led to improvements in 
the internal environment. 
l) questionnaires to monitor the CP awareness and attitudes of metal finishing 
companies can be developed and used at each of the periodic seminars 
throughout the project as well as at the end of the project period to follow 
development in awareness 
m) the establishment and membership development of waste minimisation clubs 
n) The number of changes to specifications made 
Source:  Danced (1999:29-30)  underline emphasis added 
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The project strategy  
The general project strategy approach took the same form as in the fish 
CP project with a phased implementation of four components: training, 
assessments and actions plans, physical investments, and, 
dissemination and monitoring77.  The approach is essentially similar to 
that in the fish CP project. 
Implementation of the project was laid with the HDGA, which would 
house the project management group.  The HDGA staff is very small 
and the project would therefore support the association on with the 
funding of a full-time project secretary and a part-time project co-
ordinator for the duration of the project.  While it would be extremely 
important to have the AESF on board, it was (rightfully, in my 
opinion) judged that this was simply not feasible.  As the PD observes:  
"The Electroplaters association [AESF] is too fragmented at present to 
provide much support – reliance is therefore placed on the HDGA" 
(Danced 1999:41).   
Any potential conflicts of interest between the two association were 
largely downplayed.  The PD says that: "In order for the project to be 
placed as close as possible to the two industrial sub-sectors in focus, it 
will be located at the offices of the Hot Dip Galvanizing Association 
(HDGA) in Johannesburg.  The project will work in very close 
collaboration with the American Association of Electro-plating 
Surface Finishers, and then its successor once the re-organization of 
the AESF is completed.  The two associations enjoy very close 
working relationships and this is found to be the most convenient and 
practical way to ensure smooth communication with both sub-sectors 
through a single agency." (Danced 1999:44) 
It is doubtful if his arrangement will work as intended in practice, 
resulting in the two agencies working in 'very close collaboration'.  
The AESF shows clear signs of dysfunction, being run in the spare 
time of a small business owner who has so many other pressing 
priorities to attend to.  However, it is entirely understandable in the 
framework laid out by Danced where CP projects must involve an 
industry association -- a requirement set up in order to raise the 
chances for successful knowledge transfer and dissemination, i.e. a 
guard against implementation failure.  
It is true, though, that the requirement also tends to exclude the needy 
(in this case the electroplating companies) and channel support to the 
well organised and, perhaps, less needy companies.   
                                                          
77
  For instance as reflected in Danced 1999, figure 4-1 p. 35 
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Conclusion 
The chapter has identified and drawn attention to some of the key 
criteria that characterise the framework for Danish environmental 
assistance.  They are 
• a focus on specific improvements 
• with measurable and objectively verifiable indicators 
• which are attainable within a short time frame  
• for limited budgets 
It has been argued that such criteria are a consequence of the political 
processes that determine parliament's support to the Danced 
organisation, which is a combination of a hostile political play between 
the opposition and the government together with an empiricist and 
positivist tradition within the National Audit Office.  Meeting the 
criteria above thereby becomes a method for the Danced organisation 
to shield itself from possible blame. 
It has been argued, that the development planning techniques, in 
particular the LFA, are not value neutral and benign tools that merely 
helps to focus the project and gently to assist in the problem analysis 
phase.  Rather, they twist and distort the project ideas.  In the fish 
project, the problem setting is forced into a framework of marine 
pollution, which may be ill conceived.  The project description invites 
to a narrow technology focus on water saving equipment although this 
was not the initial intention of the planning consultant.  The main 
quality of the focus on water savings appears to be the availability of 
measurable and objective indicators.  This enables an objective 
measurement of an ex-ante baseline and permits an objective 
measurement of ex-post performance, and hence, permits a 
quantification of project impact.  The main quality is thus its 
quantifiability (rigour) -- not its relevance.  
Regarding the metal finishing industry, the disorganisation of the 
electroplating sector makes it difficult to target for Danced.  Danced 
had laid down three criteria for support to cleaner production 
initiatives.  First, that the sector must be represented by a sector 
organisation.  Second, the sector must have a recognised service body. 
Third, there must be an expressed commitment by a number of 
individual industries within the sector78.   
The electroplating sector does clearly not meet the first criteria.  
Fulfilment of the second is doubtful because there is no tradition 
within SMSE industries to seek professional advice.  Only the last 
criteria may be met in full.  From both an environmental and OHS 
point of view, the electroplating sector is highly relevant to target.  
However, they do not meet the rigorous requirements for eligibility to 
receive support. 
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  Criteria are laid down in Danced (1997), repeated in Jensen et al. (1998) 
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On the other hand, about 30 companies are involved in hot-dip 
galvanising.  The companies in this sector are easy to identify, the 
capital outlay is high, and they are all organised in the HDGA.  
Compared to the electroplating sector, the hot-dip galvanising sector 
uses a more limited set of chemicals and those chemicals are generally 
less environmentally problematic.  There are, for example, no 
processes involving cadmium, cyanide, nickel etc.  The hot-dip 
galvanising sector may therefore be less relevant to target, but they 
meet the rigorous requirements laid down for support.  
This chapter has argued that unclear broad political support and rivalry 
with Danida entails that Danced adheres stringently to systematic 
planning tools.  Additionally, that Danced prefers projects with visible, 
measurable and objectively verifiable result indicators that are 
attainable within a short time frames for limited budgets.  The 
resulting emphasis on rigour leads the projects to sacrifice on 
relevance.  The chapter argues that this may constitute a special 
problem for the introduction of OHS issues, because of a shortage of 
easily available, quantifiable and, not the least, objective OHS 
indicators. 
The following conditions for integration OHS into CP projects have 
been identified in this chapter.  First, that OHS issues must feature in 
the Project Document (PD), that is, integration at the structures level 
in the terminology introduced in Chapter 3.  If the PD is silent on 
occupational health and safety issues, this can only be interpreted by 
the implementing consultant as evidence that OHS is not a legitimate 
project objective. 
Second, that for OHS to be integrated into the PD  it is necessary also 
to integrate OHS into the LFA planning tool, that is integration at the 
tools level 
Third, this entails that proper indicators for OHS outcomes which meet 
the standard requirements for LFA be established.  Indicators for 
preventive measures within the OHS domain are intrinsically difficult 
to define, an argument which will be examined in detail in the next 
chapter.  Nevertheless, in the metal finishing case study an attempt was 
made to introduce proactive OHS indicators in the metal finishing PD  
Fourth, that any ambiguity regarding if OHS is a legitimate Danced 
objective must be ruled out.  OHS must appear more prominently in 
Danced's strategy papers, and in particular in the Terms of Reference 
(TOR) that starts the process of planning a new project 
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Chapter 7. The management system 
study  
Introduction  
The previous chapter outlined how the implementing consultant from 
the Danish consultancy DTI intended to introduce cleaner production 
in the South African fishing industry.  The approach was, in keyword 
form:  pursue environmental management systems (EMS), adopt the 
Deming plan-do-check-act management circle, and motivate from 
economic cost-efficiency considerations.  That approach sets the stage 
for this chapter because attempts to integrate occupational health and 
safety (OHS) into cleaner production (CP) projects at the level of 
methodology (tools integration) would have to bear on a similar type 
of approach.   
This chapter is devoted to an examination of the question if a similar 
approach could be employed within the OHS domain. 
The chapter will explore two major themes.  The first theme concerns 
the effectiveness of systematic and preventive activities within the 
OHS domain.  The chapter will start with a review of early systematic 
approaches to accident prevention, which slowly took shape from 
about 1910 and onwards.  It will be argued that there is a remarkable 
similarity between those early approaches to accident prevention and 
present day approaches to environmental management.  However, sort 
of a paradox exists.  While the approach is considered successful 
(effective) within the environmental domain, its application within the 
OHS domain has allegedly been a failure.  This paradox bears further 
examination, because if true, there would be little prospect for 
integration of OHS and CP at the level of methodology.  The first 
theme therefore concerns effectiveness of preventive OHS approaches 
-- seeking to answer the question:  Do they improve firm's OHS 
performance?  
The second theme concerns the ability to measure the quality of 
preventive efforts within the OHS domain.  It will be argued that 
traditional measures of OHS are principally inadequate because they 
are reactive measures of failure, dealing only with undesired outcomes 
in terms of injury or illness.  They provide little, if any, guidance to the 
activities which firms could undertake to prevent those undesired 
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outcomes.  The discussion of the second theme therefore seeks to 
answer the question:  Can we find upstream indicators of the processes 
that determine these outcomes, so-called proactive OHS indicators, 
that are auditable and certifiable?  As the later discussion will show, 
earlier studies afford, at best, only guarded optimism in this respect. 
Answers to these two questions have relevance beyond this study's 
immediate research question of how to integrate OHS in Danced's 
cleaner production projects.  Companies increasingly address OHS 
issues in formal management systems, typically as an add-on to ISO 
series management schemes, or as stand-alone British Standards 
Institute OHS management schemes (OHSAS 18001), and others79.  
The question regarding effectiveness is crucial to the adoption of such 
systems.  Should it be true that they have no effect within the OHS 
domain, as some authors have suggested, there would be no reason for 
companies to embark on them.  Should the systems be effective, the 
question if companies' proactive efforts are auditable and certifiable is 
extremely relevant to ISO-type schemes.   
This chapter attempts to shed some light on these two themes.  First, 
the findings of earlier studies reported in the international literature are 
discussed.  Surprisingly few studies have been undertaken, and the 
empirical basis of those studies is limited.  The chapter then moves on 
to discuss the empirical work undertaken as part of the present study: 
a hypotheses testing comparative study evaluating the South African 
Nosa 5-Star OHS management system.  The empirical work, upon 
which this hypothesis testing activity is based, is, in terms of time 
spent, the major empirical activity of this Ph.D. study. 
The paradox, as it unfolded 
Objective - integration at the level of methodology 
A section in the previous chapter (see page 121) outlined how the 
consultant from DTI (a Danish consultancy) intended to implement the 
cleaner production projects in South African fishing industry.  The 
summary characteristics of the DTI  approach are,  
1. the major driver is economic cost-efficiency, epitomised in 
'pollution prevention pays' 
2. important milestones in the process are defined by the timely 
production of written documentation, in particular the production 
1) of an environmental report, 2) of a policy document, 3) of exact 
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  Typically, OHS issues could be implemented in existing ISO 9000 series 
quality management schemes or new ISO 14000 series environmental 
management schemes.  The British Standards Institute originally published a 
nonauditable standard (BS 8800) for an OHS management system, now available 
in an auditable version, Occupational Health and Safety Assessment Series, 
OHSAS 18001.  Mansdorf (2000), Hopkinson (2000), see also the proposed 
standard by ILO OHS-MS (2001)  
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environmental objectives, 4) of written responsibilities and work 
procedures, and 5) a manual.   
3. the approach is systematic, formal, and control is exercised though 
hierarchic and bureaucratic rule. The approach is of a top-down 
type, starting with management commitment and orders are 
assumed to cascade down through the organisational hierarchy in 
an autocratic manner 
4. the process is championed by an expert, who is usually located in a 
staff company position  
5. there is little involvement of the employees at the shop floor.  
Many activities are focussed towards improving established work 
practices.  The workers are requested to be co-operative, but they 
are generally not asked for their advice or suggestions in this 
process  
The least intrusive manner of integrating OHS into a CP project would 
be to introduce OHS issues directly into this framework, mimicking 
each of its characteristics.  That is, integration at the tools or 
methodology level in the terminology of Chapter 3.  The rationale 
behind this strategy hinges on the assumption that if either of the major 
characteristics of CP were challenged, for instance departing from 
cost-efficiency being the major driver, integration would be felt more 
disruptive and consequently would be less likely to succeed.  
Visits to fish processing industries 
As I visited some of the fish processing industries that were partaking 
in Danced's CP project, it came to my attention that several companies 
already had some sort of systematic approach to occupational health 
and safety in place.  This was typically witnessed by a board above the 
company entrance indicating that the company had a safety 'Star rating' 
of sorts.  For instance, a white fish company that I visited displayed 
such a board.  I spoke to the Occupational Health and Safety 
Manager80 who told me that the company was rated by CRM 
(Corporate Risk Management), a consultancy that was associated with 
the insurance firm of the fish company.  He was in charge of the 
company's safety program, which covered many typical insurance 
risks, for example fire, motor vehicles and security; but the safety 
program also comprised occupational safety elements.  The CRM 
audited the quality of the company's safety program and rated their 
efforts according to a scale from zero Stars (no program in place) to 
five Stars (flawless implementation of program).  The OHS manager 
had earlier been employed with the factory inspectorate.  He identified 
major problems as small cuts and bruises, slips, trips, in particular on 
stairs, knock body parts against hard objects etc.  The (temporary) 
flexiworkers were particularly vulnerable, not so much the permanent 
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   Interview with Occupational Health And Safety Manager Frank Hickley, Sea 
Harvest, June 10, 1999 
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staff, he said.  He battled to raise the safety awareness of people 
through small group activity, safety committees, 'info-com' forums 
where workers were involved in communication, but lamented that the 
safety committees did not contribute much, they did not "exercise their 
rights", he said.  Unions were mostly concerned with salary, in what in 
he attributed to be the result of a "mindset".  Yet, this was 
understandable, he said, since many workers were "under the bread-
line", hardly able to support their families.  
He ran safety campaigns and used training materials from the National 
Occupational Safety Association (Nosa) of which he spoke very 
positively.  A similar positive view of Nosa was also conveyed to me 
from another interviewee81, the person responsible for safety at a fish 
canning factory.  He told me that Nosa was a key provider of safety 
information, in part through courses and training materials, in part 
through their systematic and programmatic approach to OHS issues 
embodied in their proprietary 5-Star safety system.  Although the fish 
canning company was not audited by Nosa at that time, they used 
significant elements of the Nosa 5-Star system.  Consequently, they 
had been able to reduce their injury rate by a factor three, I was told.  
The paradox 
However, as I went further into the subject of 5-Star occupational 
health and safety management systems, I was truly intrigued by the 
contradictory nature of the evidence and assertions that were presented 
to me.  On the one hand, various industry representatives and safety 
professionals painted a positive picture of the 5-Star system's 
capabilities and the remarkable improvements in workplace safety, 
which it could bring about.  This positive view was, by and large, 
mirrored by academics at the University of Pretoria and at the 
University of Port Elizabeth, with whom I spoke.  On the other hand, a 
senior medical doctor at the National Centre for Occupational Health 
in Johannesburg told me, with eyes flaming of indignation, that they 
found people "dying from asbestosis inside the gates of 5-Star 
companies".  Furthermore, workers' unions were highly distrustful of 
the Nosa system, as were academics within the field of industrial 
relations at the University of the Witwatersrand in Johannesburg, with 
whom I spoke. 
From the workplace visits that I had undertaken, I had a general 
feeling that Star rated workplaces had a better occupational health and 
safety performance that those, which were not.  Star-rated workplaces 
were clearly more orderly and tidy, machinery appeared to be guarded, 
workers wore proper clothing etc.  In contrast, non Star-rated 
companies appeared more disorganised and unsafe situations could 
more easily be identified, for instance a worker moving jigs from one 
plating bath to another, involving aggressive chemicals, without proper 
clothing. 
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   Interview with Reduction Plant Manager Driko Maritz, St Helena Bay Fishing 
Industries, June 11, 1999 
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In summary, a paradox of sorts unfolded.  I had identified a major 
South African player actively promoting a systematic approach to 
OHS prevention.  One the one hand, companies, safety professionals, 
former factory inspectors, and some academics, praised this 5-Star 
approach for its ability to improve workplace health and safety.  On 
the other hand, occupational physicians, industrial relations academics, 
workers unions, and, as it would turn out, papers in major international 
scientific journals, were either highly distrustful or voiced a 
devastating critique of 5-Star systems.  In short, the critics claimed that 
5-Star systems were a sham, unable to improve workplace safety. 
The paradox could not be ignored.  The Nosa 5-Star system appeared 
highly relevant to my study in at least six respects.  First, that it 
allegedly represented a proactive and systematic approach to OHS, i.e. 
an view on prevention similar to CP.  Second, that it claimed to 
measure the quality of those proactive OHS efforts, holding promise of 
a number of sub-indicators which could find use as possible LFA 
proactive indicators.  Third, that implementation appeared to be of the 
top-down variety employing bureaucratic and hierarchic rule, similar 
to the CP approach championed by DTI.  Fourth, that the program had 
evolved in the face of high costs associated with accidents, i.e. a clear 
cost-efficiency driver similar to the CP approach.  Fifth, that Nosa 
management contemplated to expand the scope of the 5-Star system 
also to include environmental management, i.e. a similar agenda of 
integration as my own, but from a different starting point.  
And last, but not least, that the methodology in the 5-Star approach 
largely mimicked that of CP.  The 5-Star approach claimed to be risk 
analysis driven, starting with the identification of an inventory of OHS 
priorities, then setting priorities, intervening, and followed by an audit 
to check if the intervention had the intended effect.  This is essentially 
the plan-do-check-act (PDCA) circle in use in total quality 
management (TQM), on which the DTI approach to CP was based (see 
Figure 14 on page 118).   
One possible strategy of integrating OHS issues into a CP project 
would be to integrate at the level of methodology, i.e. addressing OHS 
issues at company level in a similar PDCA manner as environmental 
issues are addressed.  In Denmark, this type of integration was 
apparently emerging spontaneously.  In one survey, about half of the 
companies that implemented environmental management systems also 
included occupational health and safety in their management system 
(Christensen et al. 1997:23).   
However, the critique of the 5-Star system would imply that this type 
of integration would be futile.  It would be meaningless to explore the 
avenues of integrating CP and OHS from the point of view of 
integration at the level of methodology.   
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The following hypothesis therefore slowly took shape:  A top-down 
management approach to occupational health and safety within a 
predominantly cost-efficiency discourse, such as the one by Nosa, is 
largely ineffective in improving the occupational health and safety 
performance of companies.  Should this hypothesis be true there would 
be very little reason to embark on a methodology-level integration 
strategy in the Danced CP projects.   
The Nosa system 
The history of Nosa 
A South African government commission in 1948 investigated means 
of reducing workplace accidents, which it saw as a source of 
unnecessary human suffering and inefficient waste of manpower, 
materials and time.  This led to the establishment in 1951 of the 
National Occupational and Safety Association (Nosa) as a not-for-
profit organisation.  It was set up as a joint venture between the 
Workmen's Compensation Commissioner (WCC) and employers' 
associations and funded extensively by the State Accident Fund.  The 
overall purpose was to strengthen South African knowledge on 
occupational safety expertise. 
From a company perspective, the commission viewed accident 
prevention as a financially cost-effective activity that will reduce waste 
of resources and lower the contribution to the workmen's 
compensation system.  The commission therefore viewed accident 
prevention as a management responsibility.  Hence the inclusion of 
employers' associations on the Nosa board and the use of economic 
arguments to promote accident prevention. 
Nosa has over the years been a major actor on the OHS scene is South 
Africa.  It has developed a broad range of training courses offered to 
industry.  It has developed a curriculum for its own people, which was 
eventually taken over by the Department of National Education and so 
established the National Diploma in Safety Management.  It publishes 
two monthly safety magazines.  It organises an annual 3-day Noshcon 
safety conference, which serves as a focal point for safety 
professionals.  Nosa has thus exerted considerable influence over 
health and safety education and training. (Dekker 1990, 1996).  Public 
funding has gradually been reduced and the organisation now (2000) 
generates most of its own income through courses, seminars, and other 
services. 
Nosa has since the 1970s developed a 5-Star Safety Management 
System with the dual purposes of 1) directing companies' accident 
prevention activities, and 2) offering recognition of the extent to which 
excellence in safety management has been attained.  The 5-Star system 
is offered to companies on a completely voluntary basis.  At the time 
of the empirical study (2000) companies could purchase the system 
documentation, checklists and other written guidelines at a nominal 
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fee.  Should a company desire a Star-rating, auditing consultants were 
available at standard commercial rates.  Nosa would also provide a 
range of OHS training courses at standard commercial terms, should 
the company so desire.  The companies' motivation in the scheme is 
presupposedly  1) the cost-efficiency of preventive safety activities, 
and   2) the prestige and goodwill associated with a high Star-rating. 
Fundamentals of the Nosa 5-Star system 
Nosa has formulated 10 axioms or self-evident statements of 
occupational health and safety onto which their safety approach is 
based.  Some are (Dekker 1990:68) 
• The occurrence of an injury or damage to property invariably 
results from a completed sequence of factors -- the last one of 
these being the cost itself.  The accident in turn is invariably 
caused or permitted directly by the unsafe act of a person and / or 
mechanical or physical hazard. 
• For every accident causing serious injury there are numerous 
occurrences which cause property damage and / or business 
interruption 
• Management has the best opportunity or means to initiate the work 
of prevention; therefore it should assume the responsibility of 
setting a Management by Objectives system in operation. 
The Nosa 5-Star system comprises a Star rating audit procedure for 
assessing the quality of a company's accident prevention program.  "A 
one star grading would indicate that a rather weak accident prevention 
programme is in operation whereas a five star grading would indicate 
that it is one of the safest factories in the country" (Dekker 1990:70).   
Two numerical criteria determine the Stars score.  The first involves 
scoring of management's efforts to reach the safety objectives, the so-
called effort leg.  The second criterion is derived from the lost time 
injury frequency rate of the company, the so-called the experience leg.  
The experience criterion is determined from the company's so-called 
disabling incidence frequency rate (DIFR).  A 'disabling incident' (DI) 
is defined as one which disables the worker from working one day, or 
longer.  Finally, the effort score and the accident experience are 
combined to determine the Star rating according to criteria defined in 
Table 13.   
A typical audit lasts two days and involves a team of two auditors.  An 
audit team normally comprises a safety expert and an occupational 
health practitioner.  The first day of the audit is usually spent 
reviewing the elements of the safety management system.  Specific 
studies on OHS issues that have been undertaken at the site, for 
instance regarding ventilation, lighting, hazardous chemical substances 
(HCS), noise, fire, etc, are reviewed.  The auditors follow up on 
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recommendations of those studies to reveal if they have been 
implemented.  Auditors also carry out spot checks of the system's 
written procedures and controls.  This is essentially an audit of the 
paper trail of the safety management system.   
 
 
A substantial part of the second day is usually devoted to a detailed 
field inspection of the safety practices in use.  Both the system audit 
and the field inspection are guided by long checklists.  As the auditors 
encounter deficiencies in the management system or discrepancies 
during the field inspection, they deduct points from the relevant 
checklist item according to specific auditor guidelines.  At the end of 
the second day the total point score of the company is divided by the 
maximum points possible to produce the effort score.   
                                                          
82
   Note regarding NOSCAR Star-ratings:  Somewhat misleadingly, there is an 
additional top Star bracket, the so-called Noscar category, which for practical 
reasons can be considered a 'sixth Star' in the 'five-Star' system.  Rules are 
complex and have recently (2000) been modified.  In short, only 5-Star 
companies that have a very high effort score of 95+, and no fatal injuries, are 
eligible to enter a regional contest the coming year where they will be audited by 
a specially selected team of Nosa auditors.  The winner of the regional contest is 
awarded the Noscar recognition.  If awarded, the Noscar status can be retained 
for consecutive years, conditional that Noscar contest eligibility criteria remain 
fulfilled.  Whenever eligibility criteria are violated the Noscar recognition is lost 
and the company must win a new regional competition to regain it (Source:  Nosa 
internal document MR05, appendix 1, rev 01, copy obtained Jan 25, 2000, and 
personal communication with Nosa auditors) 
Table 13 Criteria for awarding Nosa Stars82   
 
Star category Effort 
(%) 
 Experience (DIFR) 
5 Star – excellent ≥ 91 and ≤ 1 
4 Star – very good ≥ 75 and ≤ 2 
3 Star – good ≥ 61 and ≤ 3 
2 Star – average ≥ 51 and ≤ 4 
1 Star – fair ≥ 40 and ≤ 5 
 
Effort -- management system point score, based on a system audit and field 
inspections -- percentage of maximum points possible.    
DIFR -- disabling incident frequency rate - the number of lost time (1+ days) 
accidents per 200,000 hours worked.   
Note:  There is an additional Noscar category -- essentially a sixth Star, see 
footnote 82 on this page. 
Source:  Audit Workbook, Nosa 1998 
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The 5-Star system originated in the 1970s as a comprehensive 
checklist (programmatic approach) but has over the time undergone a 
series of revisions.  The 1998 version, which was in effect at the time 
of this study, appears as a combination of a checklist and a risk 
analysis approach.  The system's checklist items specify a number of 
areas that must be attended to, but the actual activities are to a large 
extent risk driven, that is, the priorities as based on company specific 
conditions and not from a rigid check-list approach.  A few select 
examples from the Audit Workbook (Nosa 1998) will illustrate the 
workings of the system: 
Section 2.00  Mechanical, electrical and personal safeguarding 
 Element 2.17  Hazardous chemical substances (HCS) control 
  Component 2.17.1  Record of all HCS 
   2.17.1.a Risk analysis conducted on all HCS and record of 
all substances including by-products and waste from 
the manufacturing process available 
   2.17.1.b Inventory of raw materials and all intermediate 
mixtures available to OHS 
  Items for consideration under this component are:  How is the 
system managed to meet standards with regard to:   
1) identification and recording of all HCS,  2) risk 
identification,  3) identification marks/labels,  4) company 
and contractor transport. 
The examples illustrate the Nosa 5-Star system's mix of programmatic 
and systems approaches.  The checklist programmatic approach is 
evident in the large number of specific requirements structured into  
5 sections, 72 elements, approximately 300 components, and more 
'items for consideration'.  Component 2.17.1 for instance, requires 
(programmatic approach) that a survey be undertaken of hazardous 
chemical substances.  At the same time are risk analysis techniques 
(systems approach) employed and bureaucratic controls in use:  how 
have risks been identified, how have they been assessed and by which 
criteria prioritised, which control measures have been devised to 
handle the risks, who is responsible, is there an auditable paper trail, 
etc.  In this respect the 5-Star system has adopted newer systems 
theories, which focus on inputs, process, outputs, and feedback 
mechanisms.  
Because of the great number of system elements and the emphasis on 
bureaucratic controls, companies usually have to employ a full time 
Safety Officer to run the Nosa system, who will usually refer to the 
Site Manager or the CEO.  
There is a clear conceptual analogy between the safety audit activity 
that result in a Star-rating, and the control activities that companies are 
subjected to within the financial domain.  The safety auditor who 
checks the health of the company's safety management system is 
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likened to the certified public accountant who checks the soundness of 
its financial statements.  There is an analogy between a high Nosa 
Star-rating and a spotless endorsement of the company's income 
statement and balance sheet by a reputable accounting firm. 
Tracing the origins of the Nosa system to the Safety First 
movement of the early 1900s 
The Nosa system owes much intellectual debt to the Safety First 
movement, which evolved in the USA around 1910.  The movement 
pioneered new techniques to accident prevention in the workplaces of 
the newly industrialised society in which safety was abysmal.   
It was primarily the new safety practices developed in very large 
companies such as steel works and explosives manufacturers that laid 
the foundation for the Safety First movement.  This led to the 
emergence of a wholly new engineering discipline, the safety engineer, 
which advocated the idea that safety was integral to good management.  
Safety experts encouraged this view by trying to show that safety was 
synonymous with efficiency and by demonstrating that accidents were 
more costly than had been suspected.  The way to stimulate the interest 
of the 'big boss' was to show the correlation between safety and 
production.   
Safer machines encouraged workers to work faster, safety engineers 
argued.  The introduction of saw guards, it was reported, increased 
output.  The redesign of the punch press was a dramatic example of 
how safety also raised worker output.  August Kaems, a safety 
engineer, concluded that the way to prevent punch presses from 
removing fingers was to not to install guards but to redesign the press 
so that the worker never had to put a hand under the ram.  He installed 
an inclined press feeder, allowing it to be fed from the side, and 
installed a mechanical kick-out.   The results were startling.  In 1919, 
Kaems reported that his design not only eliminated injuries but also 
increased output by more than 100 percent83.   
                                                          
83
   Information on the Safety Movement is based on Aldrich (1997:148-150).  
The claimed link between safety and productivity is fundamental also today, for 
instance forming the basis for the ILO intervention method that I used in the 
small company setting in Durban, reported in the next chapter.  Figure 42 (page 
240) in that chapter shows precisely a punch press intervention, essentially 
similar to the one pioneered in 1919. 
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Whilst efficiency and increased output played an important role in 
justifying the existence of the newly institutionalised Safety First 
movement, Aldrich (1997) argues convincingly that the new safety 
professionals also felt a moral imperative to improve workplace safety, 
following the 'road to happiness' (Figure 26).  Maiming workers was 
not only inefficient, it was also immoral, and many early safety 
professionals felt a strong sense of social indignation. 
In 1931, Herbert W. Heinrich, a safety engineer, wrote the enormously 
influential book Industrial Accident Prevention, which was translated 
into several languages and remained a standard text within the OHS 
field for half a century.  
My own copy of the book is a revised edition published in 1980, 
eighteen years (!) after his death (Heinrich et al. 1980). 
Figure 26 Safety First -- The road to happiness 
Late in 1913, US Steel beckoned workers across the stream of ignorance, 
over the bridge of education, and onto the Safety First road to happiness.  
The wording indicates that the adherents of the Safety Movement pursued a 
broader (moral) agenda than just technical safety. 
Source:  Aldrich 1997:125 
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Heinrich estimated in 1928 that on average the indirect costs of an 
accident were four times higher than the direct costs.  Heinrich's 'rule 
of four', which became known as the iceberg principle of hidden costs, 
enabled safety experts to justify their efforts and solidify their 
corporate position. 
Heinrich also defined a so-called 'domino theory' of accident causation 
in which accidental injury was viewed as a series of propagating 
events.  If the series is interrupted by the elimination of one or more of 
these events, the accident sequence is interrupted and injury cannot 
occur.  The Nosa system's homage to the ideas of Heinrich is 
particularly evident in the Nosa axioms quoted above are almost a 
verbatim quotation from Heinrich's original axioms (Heinrich et al. 
1980:17). 
Figure 27 The indirect costs of accidents, 
the Heinrich iceberg of the 1930s 
Note the similarity to the chemical cost iceberg in cleaner production supply 
chain management, see Figure 17page 121.   
Heinrich established the 4 to 1 ratio in 1928.  The iceberg shown here is a later 
version (the so-called Bird iceberg) with higher costs, while true to the original 
iceberg principle of hidden costs of accidents 
Source: Heinrich et al. 1980:89 
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The 1980 edition reads:  "Accident prevention is both science and art.  
It represents, above all other things, control – control of worker 
performance, machine performance, and physical environment.  
...[...]...  accident prevention is a vital factor in every industrial 
enterprise, one which if ignored or practiced unskillfully, leads to 
needless human suffering and business bankruptcy." (Heinrich et al. 
1980:4, emphasis added).  Interestingly, the CP approach and the 
Deming principles of management in TQM are also concerned with 
control, see pages 118-120. 
In Heinrich's view, accidents were caused only by 1) unsafe acts of 
persons, or 2) exposure to unsafe mechanical conditions.  
Consequently, they should be prevented by encouraging safer work 
habits and by engineering revision.  However, in many interpretations, 
Figure 28 Fundamental approach to accident prevention 
Note:  There is a striking similarity between this approach taken from the 1980 
version of Heinrich and  
1. the recommended approach to environmental management and cleaner 
production (see Figure 14 page 118)  
2. the Deming plan-do-check-act (PDCA) management circle currently in use 
in total quality management (see Figure 16 page 120)  
Source Heinrich et al. 1980:12 
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the focus on safer work habits tended to overshadow the focus on 
engineering revision.  The 1980 edition reads that "... in the occurrence 
of accidental injury it is apparent that worker failure is the heart of the 
problem and that methods of control must be directed towards worker 
failure" (ibid:4, emphasis added) while at the same time also stating 
that "Whenever there is an opportunity to make a dangerous condition 
foolproof mechanically, this should be done whether or not personal 
unsafe action exists" (ibid:5).  
In newer times, an often raised criticism of Heinrich's ideas has been 
that they may lead to victimisation of the injured person.  Research in 
the 1930s, for instance, indicated that some workers seemed to be 
'accident-prone', another word for careless and negligent -- a first step 
towards an approach of fitting the worker to the task rather than fitting 
the task to the worker.  More generally, Heinrich's approach to 
accident prevention has been criticised for its Tayloristic approach to 
accident prevention, of its one-best-way approach to safety, and of 
dividing safety interventions into separate planning and an execution 
components.   
However, of particular interest to this study are the similarities 
between Heinrich's approach to accident prevention and the DTI 
approach to CP.  Adherents of both approaches rely heavily on cost-
efficiency considerations to advance their cause with industry whilst 
they at the same time also fight for a 'just cause' against social injustice 
(OHS) or future global environmental disaster (CP).  Both argue that 
only a fraction of the costs are immediately visible, that the hidden 
costs are far larger than the direct costs, employing an iceberg 
metaphor to visualise this relationship.  Both approaches strive to 
attain a larger degree of management control.  Their approach to 
systematic management is similar in nature, the only major difference 
being the concept of continuous improvement, which is a new concept 
from the quality management field, and absent from Heinrich's old 
approach to accident prevention.   
With so many similarities, claims that the approach should largely be a 
failure within the OHS domain, and at the same time a manifest 
success within the environmental domain, bears further examination. 
The critique of 5-Star safety systems 
Several authors have noticed that very little empirical research has 
been undertaken to evaluate the effectiveness of occupational health 
and safety management systems (OHSMS), for instance Gallagher et 
al. (2000:22).  The few studies that I have been able to identify have 
been highly critical.   
The only study reported in the international literature, which was based 
on own empirical data, was an examination of the safety performance 
of South African mining companies, published in 1988.  This study 
depicted 5-Star systems as a sham, finding no evidence that the system 
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was able to lower accident rates (Eisner and Leger 1988b).  In a recent 
book on OHSMS, two authors observe that:  "There is much 
testimonial support for the efficacy of OHSM systems from promoters 
[...] and business users [...], but what little available empirical 
evidence there is paints a less rosy picture." (Nichols and Tucker 
2000:304, emphasis added).  The two authors then refer to the old 
1988 paper on South African mining companies, to back their 
assertions. 
Eisner and Leger (1988a) examine accident statistics of South African 
mines classified in the top 5-Star bracket of the so-called International 
Mine Safety Rating (IMSR) scheme -- one of three Star rating 
arrangements in use in the mining industry at that time.  They observe 
that while lost-time injury frequency rates (LTIFR) have declined, 
fatality rates have not, casting doubts over the claim that a decline in 
the LTIFR are indicative of improvements in mine safety.  They refer 
to a study by Shannon and Manning (1979) in which modifications to 
the accident reporting system of a large company led to a significant 
decrease in the number of reported accidents.  When the modifications 
to the accident reporting system were reversed, the number of reported 
accidents rose and returned to their pre-change 'normal' level.  Lost 
time accident rates used as measures of safety performance should 
therefore be "treated with great caution"(Shannon and Manning 
1979:252).  Eisner and Leger (1988a:4) conclude that fatality rates and 
serious-injury rates are much better measures of changes in safety 
performance than LTIFRs. 
The claim that lost-time injury frequency rates (LTIFR) are simply too 
volatile to be used as reliable measures of safety, a point raised already 
by Lord Robens (1972:134-136), has very far reaching implications for 
OHSMS evaluation studies.  Most OHSMS will bring about some 
change in the company's accident reporting system.  According to 
Shannon and Manning (1979) this change will render impossible any 
before-after analysis based on LTIFRs produced by that accident 
reporting system.  If only the very rare occurrences of fatal and 
permanently disabling accidents are reliable evaluation measures, 
extremely large samples are required in order to produce statistically 
significant results.  Not even workplaces with tens of thousands of 
employees will have 'enough' fatal accidents to make a statistic 
analysis meaningful. 
In a key paper the same authors undertake a critical review of the ISR 
5-Star scheme in South African mining (Eisner and Leger 1988b).  
They note that without evidence to the contrary it must be doubted 
whether a comprehensive system of this kind "can genuinely be 
implemented and honestly audited by the average mine." (ibid:148).  
Auditing is a joint operation between mine management and external 
auditors and, arguably, biased.  They note that the very 
competitiveness between mining companies engendered by the Star 
awards can lead to anything from, at best, wishful thinking to, at worst, 
falsification of records.  The value of Star award schemes must 
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therefore be in doubt.  Most importantly, they find no correlation 
between the Star rating and accident rate.  "Thus, whatever the effect 
of the ISR on mine safety, it does not appear to manifest itself in 
relative accident rates" (ibid:156, emphasis added).  
In 1991, Guastello performed secondary statistical analysis in order to 
assess the effectiveness of the International Safety Rating System 
(ISRS) 5-Star scheme.  Data were from South African gold mines, 
Australian coalmines, North American companies and two New 
Zealand companies.  Guastello's analysis showed that "the ISRS 
program has no discernible effect on accident rates" (Guastello 
1991:253, emphasis added).  And he concludes that "there remains 
little support for the claim that the ISRS is an effective means of 
accident control" (ibid:259, emphasis added).  Finally, he observes 
that while "testimonial evidence" for the effectiveness of the ISRS was 
abundant, reasonably controlled experiments had not been published.   
Guastello's 1991 critique exhibits several common characteristics with 
other papers, for instance Leger and Macun (1990), Gallagher et al. 
(2000), and Nichols and Tucker (2000).  While the authors on the one 
hand lament that reasonably controlled studies of 5-Star systems have 
not been carried out, they make no attempt to remedy this situation by 
collecting new empirical data in a controlled manner.  Rather, they 
refer to older studies or evidence of an indirect nature. 
This study will not enter a discussion if the 5-Star systems of the 1980s 
were able to improve workplace safety or not.  Certainly, the 
exorbitant fatality rate amongst black workers in South African mines 
in the 1980s (see pages 88-89) would appear to indicate that safety 
management systems of that sector were not particularly advanced.  
This kind of common sense reasoning supports the critical studies.   
On the other hand, the critical studies themselves, particularly the ones 
raised by Eisner and Leger (1988b) and Guastello (1991) can be 
criticised for unsound statistical reasoning and for using data of poor 
quality (Hedlund 2001).  Whatever the case, now a decade later, the 
critical studies remain unchallenged and continue to inform the present 
debate, as will be show in the next section. 
Impact of the 5-Star critique 
The 5-Star critique has had a significant impact on the international 
debate.  The Eisner and Leger (1988b) paper has been quoted on a 
number of occasions.  Recent occasions include reports prepared for 
the Australian National Occupational Health and Safety Commission. 
Worksafe Australia, on positive OHS performance indicators (Shaw 
1994) and on the effectiveness of OHS management systems 
(Gallagher et al. 2000).  The paper was also quoted in a recent book on 
occupational health and safety management systems (Nichols and 
Tucker 2000) and in two recent OHS intervention studies (Chaplin and 
Hale 1998, and Alteren 1999:233)   
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Although not quoted specifically, the paper may have informed (and 
disadvantaged) some of the recent discussions concerning the 
development of international guidelines on occupational safety and 
health management systems.  Quoting from a recent ILO information 
note:  "The term 'OSH management certification' covers a variety of 
different activities with different scopes and objectives, and there is 
only limited proof of its positive results and value with regard to the 
prevention of accidents and diseases and the improvement of working 
conditions." (ILO 2001:18, emphasis added).   
The 5-Star critique has also influenced the South African Public 
Commission of Inquiry into Safety and Health in the Mining Industry 
(Leon Commission, 1995).  The Commission "... concluded that, 
although these [5-Star] safety management systems may have made 
some contribution to improving safety at some mines, they had 
become largely discredited in the eyes of those employed at the mines 
and in public perception, because of the very large disasters that 
continued to occur at mines with high star ratings, and their 
imperceptible impact on the overall level of fatal and major injuries in 
South African mines.  While mining companies and mines must be 
free to use these systems if they feel they will assist them in  
improving health and safety, the Commission finds no basis for 
encouraging the adoption of these systems." (Leon Commission 
1995:vol 1, p77).  In its closing submission to the Leon Commission, 
the National Union of Mineworkers, NUM, pledged that "No public 
funding should be made available to 'loss control' approaches, or 
operating safety rating systems" (ibid:vol 2, p8) -- a critique directly 
aimed at Nosa, which during the 1990s received funding from the 
Workmen's Compensation Fund.  
The 5-Star critique leads Lewis (1994) to conclude, that 'the fact' that 
Star ratings do not reflect how many deaths and serious injuries that 
take place "is a major source of their [worker unions'] dissatisfaction 
with Nosa's Star grading system" (Lewis 1994:17).  A union newsletter 
reporting from an OHS conference from the National Union of 
Metalworkers of South Africa (Numsa) reveals that claimed union 
dissatisfaction also has other reasons.  "Nosa's past is dubious.  There 
are allegations that it would pre-warn employers when it was going to 
do an inspection so that the factory was 'safe' on the day of the visit.  
For this reason, COSATU [the largest trade union confederation] and 
its affiliates have taken a resolution that we should have nothing to do 
with Nosa.  But Numsa safety reps [...] questioned 'who is going to 
train us if we throw out Nosa?' "  (Numsa News 1996) 
Whilst discredited amongst academia, commissions of public inquiry 
and trade unions, the Nosa 5-Star System appears quite popular 
amongst industry, as I first learned during the visits to the fish 
processing factories.  A literature search in the Index to South African 
Periodicals (ISAP) database from 1986-1999 revealed a total of 104 
articles that contain the word 'NOSA'.  Only two of those articles 
appear to be critical of Nosa, and that is the Lewis (1994) paper 
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published in two different journals.  The majority appear positive, like 
"Using scaffolding safely: life-saving information from Nosa" and 
"Safety must be implemented methodically, says Nosa", published in 
Martin Creamer's Engineering News, South African Sugar Journal and 
other industry journals. 
This divergence of opinion is intriguing and could by itself warrant a 
further study of the effect of 5-Star Safety Management Systems.  
However, the prime justification of the present study is rooted in 
considerations about integration at the level of methodology. 
OHS performance indicators 
The problem with traditional indicators of negative outcomes 
Any occupational health and safety management system (OHSMS) or 
OHS intervention will ultimately have to be evaluated against its 
ability to lower the number of accidents and occurrences of work-
related ill-health.  For sake of simplicity, let the following discussion 
be confined to the 'narrow concept' of workplace safety.  This excludes 
issues of workplace ill-health, where long latency periods between 
exposure and effect may obscure the illness being registered as work-
related and further distort registration.  This limitation of the concept 
also excludes issues of well-being at work, burn-out, stress, etc.  With 
the discussion so confined to the 'narrow concept' of workplace safety, 
the standard performance indicator is the number of lost-time accidents 
relative to the number of hours worked, commonly computed as the 
Lost Time Injury Frequency Rate (LTIFR).   
The are, however, a number of very serious problems with the LTIFR 
as a reliable indicator of safety performance.  First, there is the 
problem of the rare occurrence of accidents.  It is obvious, that the 
absence of a rare event is not by itself a good indicator for the 
performance of a safety management system.  A low accident rate is 
neither a guarantee that risks are being effectively controlled nor will it 
ensure the absence of injuries in the future.  In any particular 
workplace, only a few, if any, accidents may occur each year. 
Variations from year to year are therefore likely to be statistically 
insignificant, that is, it is impossible to tell if the variation is the result 
of chance fluctuations or the result of a real change in safety 
performance.  Changes in LTIFRs are therefore a poor guide to 
changing levels of safety (Hopkins 1994) 
Second, the LTIFR measure is volatile, susceptible to a range of 
conditions, which have nothing to do with safety.  One such condition 
is the nature of the accident reporting system, as observed by Shannon 
and Manning (1979) referred to earlier.  When the accident reporting 
system changed, so did the number of reported lost-time incidents.  
Another type of difficulty arises from social processes when accident 
reporting is linked to reward systems.  If, for instance, accident 
reporting is linked to insurance coverage, over-claiming behaviour 
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may be the result.  On the other hand, when accident reporting is 
linked to paid incentives for long accident-free periods, claims 
suppression may occur.   
In a study of a US saw mill, Grunberg et al. (1996) observed that team 
based awards often ended up creating substantial peer pressure not to 
miss work -- a worker who lost the tip of his finger in an industrial 
accident returned to work from the hospital on that same day saying  
'I don't want to lose my $50'  (ibid:230).  In Japan, peer pressure and 
the fear of losing face have led workers to hide broken bones and 
severe lacerations (Wokutch and Sandt 2000:381).  The very low 
accident rates reported for the Japanese auto industry have been linked 
to widespread under-reporting practices.  A US safety director for a 
Japanese owned auto production facility in the US doubted that pains 
and aches were recorded in Japan, as they were in the US auto 
industry.  He said  "You have to have a broken bone or some blood 
before it's recorded [in Japan]" (quoted in Wokutch 1992:192) 
Third, that the LTIFR is a fundamentally unsatisfactory performance 
indicator because it deals solely with negative outcomes, and not with 
upstream indicators of the processes that determine these outcomes.  
From a preventive viewpoint, the LTIFR is inadequate because it is a 
reactive measure, one of failure.  The LTIFR gives no guidance to 
efforts of a more proactive nature that may prevent accidents or 
improve the safety performance.   
Positive performance indicators for OHS ? 
A 1994 workshop sponsored by the Australian National Occupational 
Health and Safety Commission, Worksafe Australia, sought to explore 
if there are more useful indicators than the LTIFR and how such 
indicators possibly could be developed.  The concept of Positive 
Performance Indicators (PPI), capable of showing improvement in 
process rather than outcomes, were explored at length in the workshop 
proceedings (NOHSC 1994).  Relevant categories for positive 
measures of OHS performance were, for instance 'Workforce 
contribution', 'Internal Processes', and 'Innovation and Learning' 
Examples were given of generic indicators such as the role, status and 
effectiveness of hazard reduction programs, to more specific indicators 
of control procedures in place, action taken to meet agreed standards, 
the safety consciousness, morale, and the extent of workplace 
participation in safety issues.  The indicators themselves may take a 
number of different forms.  First, they may be relative, measuring a 
percentage increase or decrease in, for example, a positive indicator 
such as ‘safety audits completed with a satisfactory score’.  Second, 
indicators may measure an absolute level or amount, for example, the 
‘hours of training per employee with an OHS content’.  Third, they 
may record steps in the implementation of an agreed program, for 
example, ‘completion of Phase 1 of the XYZ hazard reduction 
program by [date]’.  The workshop participants emphasised that the 
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practical viability of a performance measurement system would often 
be determined simply by its relevance to the individual circumstances 
of the workplace.  The workshop participant eventually concluded 
that: "It is clear that amongst OHS professionals there is an 
understanding that PPI can be developed and there is awareness that 
because they are linked to processes at enterprise level, PPI need to be 
enterprise specific." (Blewett 1994, emphasis added).  In other words, 
positive performance indicators do exist, they are useful and viable, 
however at the same time also company specific.  Thus, universally 
accepted indicators cannot be defined, the workshop participants 
concluded. 
This conclusion of the workshop returns the focus of this study to the 
question, if it is possible for an independent organisation to verify, and 
possibly certify, the quality and adequacy of  'upstream' preventive 
OHS activities.  The answer to this question has two important 
practical applications.   
First, it was argued that tradition reactive measures of workplace 
safety (e.g. the LTIFR) had severe shortcomings and were 
fundamentally unsatisfactory and inadequate.  But if neither reactive 
nor proactive universal measures of OHS performance are available, 
on which basis should the adequacy of OHS preventive activities then 
be determined? 
Second, within the environmental and quality management domain, 
the ability of independent organisations to verify and certify that the 
management processes conform to a set of 'minimum standards' has 
been an extremely important factor in the large scale adoption of such 
systems.  If similar certification schemes could not be devised within 
the OHS domain, the prospects for widespread adoption of OHSMS 
could be gloomy. 
It has been unfolded at length above, that the 5-Star critique holds that 
there is no relation between a company's Star-rating and its accident 
performance.  In effect, the critique holds that a 5-Star system audit 
cannot determine the quality and adequacy of a company's accident 
prevention efforts.  The general problem is if an audit score can predict 
the accident performance of a company.  Surprisingly, and somewhat 
disappointingly, it has only been possible to identify 2 (two!) studies 
on this general topic in the international literature, despite its obvious 
relevance to OHS management and certification schemes.  
Intriguingly, they only offer limited optimism in respect of the 
viability of auditable and certifiable safety management systems.  
They are discussed in the following two sections. 
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United States motor carrier safety audits 
Deregulation of the United States interstate motor carrier industry in 
the 1980s brought worries of increased accidents.  It was feared if 
competitive pressures on trucking firms and the influx of new carriers 
would compromise existing levels of safety84.  In response, the US 
government enacted legislation that raised minimum quality standards 
and made more resources available to ensure compliance with the law.  
The 1984 Motor Carrier Safety Act, and the 1986 Commercial Motor 
Vehicle Safety Act established national standards for driver and 
vehicle licensing and provided for increased penalties for violations.85 
The US government also expanded enforcement activities.  This 
included, among others, an overhaul of the system of audits of the 
safety practices of firms.  In 1986, federally employed inspectors 
attempted to identify the estimated 185,000 firms, that had not been 
audited under the previous system, and conduct audits of their 
compliance with federal safety laws.  Many of the firms were small 
operators that had entered interstate commerce after deregulation had 
taken place. 
The inspectors visit the operating bases of firms and question 
managers about safety related procedures and policies, such as those 
governing maintenance, and driver hiring and training.  They do not 
actually inspect any equipment of test drivers.  The inspectors have a 
list of 75 questions, grouped under nine headings.  The inspector 
marks a 'yes' or 'no' answer to each question.  The inspector asks: 
• 13 general questions, for instance: 'Does the individual in charge 
of safety have authority to terminate drivers? 
• 6 questions on reporting of accidents, for instance: 'Can the carrier 
explain the definition of a reportable accident?' 
• 5 questions on drivers, for instance: 'Does the carrier have a policy 
for monitoring speed?' 
• 12 questions for hours of service, for instance: 'Can the carrier 
produce the prior 6 months records of duty status for a driver 
selected at random?' 
and so forth.  The inspector then rates the carrier as 'satisfactory', 
'conditional', or 'unsatisfactory' in each of the nine areas, and assigns 
an overall rating to the firm.  If a firm is found to be unacceptable in 
any way, a return visit is made to the carriers.  This visit is much more 
detailed, involving 28 staff hours against the 2-3 hours for the initial 
visit.  While the enforcing authority has a policy of not initiating 
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  A review of those concerns and actual (declining) accident rates is provided in 
Hunter and Mangum (1995) 
85
   Factual information in this section is from Moses and Savage (1992) 
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citations for violations found during the initial visit, the return visit 
may involve legal enforcement activities, collection of evidence etc.  
Additionally, some large shippers, such as Chrysler Corporation and 
the Department of Defence, have policies of contracting only with 
motor carriers that have been rated 'satisfactory' in the federal safety 
audit.  There are thus obvious incentives for companies to pass the 
safety audit during the initial visit with a good rating. 
The motor carrier audit system is similar in principle to the Nosa audit 
scheme.  An outside auditor arrives at the company gate armed with a 
comprehensive and objective rating system with which he intends to 
measure the preventive safety efforts of that company.  One would, 
however, be justified in presuming that a motor carrier audit would be 
easier to accomplish than an audit of a general company.  Interstate 
motor carriers exhibit many common characteristics; the risks of the 
companies are more or less similar, and so are the preventive 
measures.  On the other hand, an audit of a general company would 
presumably be far more difficult.  The target group is much more 
heterogeneous.  Different companies face different risks and the 
auditor would first have to assess if all major risk have been identified, 
and then, the extent to which the preventive measures in place are 
adequate.  It is therefore reasonable to expect that, ceteris paribus, a 
federal safety audit of a motor carrier is simpler and provides a truer 
picture of the preventive safety efforts, than a safety audit of a general 
company. 
Moses and Savage (1992) examine the results of a sample of 13,053 
safety audits of firms and compare the audit results with the firms' 
accident experience in the previous 365 days.  After correcting the data 
set for multicollinearity and making other adjustments, the authors end 
up with 45 safety audit questions, which they regress with the accident 
experience data.   
Their results afford little comfort for the viability of certifiable safety 
management systems.  A regression of audit question scores with the 
number of total accidents reveals that 17 of the 45 regression 
coefficients (38 percent) have counter intuitive signs.  That is, the 
better the company does on the audit questions, the worse is its 
accident record!  If the regression is carried out with the number 
fatalities and injuries as the dependent variable, the audit score 
performance is even worse;  24 of the 45 regression coefficients (53 
percent) have counter intuitive signs! 
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The Moses and Savage (1992) study shows that there are a number of 
issues strongly related to accident occurrence.  These include:  
• the appointment of a safety director with control over hiring and 
firing drivers, 
• obtaining independent verification of the background of new hires, 
• disciplining drivers involved in 'preventable' accidents, and 
• monitoring drivers' hours-of-service. 
These issues appear to be able to predict the safety performance of 
trucking, thereby offering some optimism for certification.  Yet, the 
overall conclusion is that the worse the firm does on a large part of the 
audit, the better is its accident record!   
Based on the audit results the inspector assigns an overall rating to the 
firm, as: satisfactory, conditional, or unsatisfactory.  The inspection 
authority repeatedly refused to reveal the exact formula by which the 
overall rating was computed from the audit item scores.  The extent to 
which inspectors use the 'good' or 'poor' predictors (item scores) in 
their overall assessment is therefore not known.   
But, by and large, inspectors appear to be able to rate firms correctly 
(Table 14).  Companies rated as 'satisfactory' indeed had a lower 
accident rate than companies rated 'unsatisfactory', although the 
difference is quite small.  It is worthy of note however, that many of 
the companies, which had not been audited under the previous system, 
were rated 'conditional'.  Yet, they have the lowest accident rate by far. 
The authors offer some explanations for these surprising conclusions.  
Many small firms are allegedly unaware of the federal regulations, and 
hence do not maintain the necessary paperwork to pass the audit.  Yet, 
they have good and safe business practices.  In contrast, there are 
larger firms that are familiar with the audit process and hence can 
arrange to have the documents to support a 'yes' answer to the 
questions in the audit, even if the relevant safety practices are not in 
place.  Allegedly, there are also consulting companies that will advise 
trucking firms in how to pass the audit. 
While these explanations offer insights into the difficulties of safety 
system auditing, the overall conclusion remains that safety audit scores 
are not very effective in predicting safety performance86. 
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   The authors expanded the analysis in a study on a larger data set involving 
audits of 75,577 firms (Moses and Savage 1994), which, by and large, confirmed 
the previous results. 
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Table 14 Relationship between overall inspector rating of audit and accident 
performance of motor carrier.  Firms rated 'conditional' in audit 
have the best accident performance! 
 
 Overall firm rating by inspector 
 Satisfactory Conditional Unsatisfactory 
Percent of total firms  43% 51% 5% 
Percent of total mileage 71% 23% 6% 
Accidents per million miles 5.28 3.13 5.63 
Fatalities and injuries per million 
miles (note) 
0.32 0.29 0.42 
 
Note:  Trucking companies rated as 'satisfactory' by the inspector indeed had a lower accident rate 
than companies that were rated 'unsatisfactory', although the difference is quite small.  Yet, firms 
rated 'conditional' in the audit have the best accident performance!  Safety audit scores are 
apparently not very effective in predicting safety performance. 
 
Detail:  Difference between numerators in line 3 ('accidents') and line 4 ('fatalities and injuries') is 
that one accident may result in multiple injured people 
Source: Moses and Savage 1992:483 
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Rating of US Navy shore facilities 
United States Navy shore facilities are principally staffed by civilians 
who are exposed to the full range of occupational hazards addressed by 
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) regulation.  
Although not subject to OSHA direct oversight and inspection, these 
facilities must comply with federal, Department of Defence, and Navy 
OSH requirements.  The Navy Inspector General Oversight Inspection 
Unit (NOIU) consequently inspects the facilities in order to evaluate 
compliance with those requirements.87 
A NOIU team of inspectors rates each facility in two areas:  program 
and workplace.   
1. The program rating evaluates and scores the degree to which 
records verify the successful implementation of a defined array of 
occupational safety and health programs, in effect an audit of the 
safety program's paper trail.   
2. The workplace rating evaluates and scores safety attributes and 
discrepancies observed during field inspections of work areas.   
The NOIU team produces two numerical evaluation measures: a 
program inspection score and a workplace inspection score.  Both are 
expressed as a percentage of the maximum possible point score.  In 
effect, the NOIU inspection and scoring procedure appears materially 
similar in nature to the Nosa system audit and the Nosa field 
inspection.  The only difference being that Nosa inspectors only 
produce one numerical effort score, and not two separate scores for 
program audits and workplace inspections. 
Lindell (1997) compares scores from NOIU inspections of 85 facilities 
with accident experience data for those facilities.  Two sets of injury 
rates were computed, one for all lost time injuries (LTIFR) and a 
second for severe injuries involving more than 45 days of lost time.  
He then computed correlation coefficients to assess the degree of 
association among inspection scores and injury rates.  
Results are rather disappointing (Table 15) in respect of prospects for 
viable certification schemes.  For instance, as expected, the program 
score is inversely correlated with the lost time injury rate (-0.03), that 
is, a high program score is associated with a low injury rate.  But the 
correlation is weak (close to zero) and not significant.  In fact, the only 
significant correlation is between the workplace score and the severe 
lost time injury rate, but only at the <0.05 level, a significance level 
normally considered only 'weak experimental proof'. 
The study by Lindell (1997) therefore confirms the conclusion of the 
previous study by Moses and Savage (1992), that safety audit scores 
are not very effective in predicting safety performance.  Only the 
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workplace score, based on field inspection of safety practices, has a 
significant inverse association with one of the measures of safety 
performance.  The program score, based on an audit of the 
management system paper trail, has no significant association with any 
measure of safety performance!   
Lindell (1992:568) offers an interesting explanation for this lack of 
association.  The program score is uniformly high, and the average 
score of 0.89 is only one standard deviation from the maximum 
possible score of 1.00.  Therefore, the program score is a poor 
predictor variable.  It may be possible that specific components within 
the program score have a greater variation and thus are more predictive 
of injury rates.  However, his data do not allow testing of this 
proposition.  This explanation may also be relevant for the Nosa 5-Star 
system, which also exhibits tendencies to 'Star-saturation', that most 
Star-ratings are within the top 4 and 5-Star brackets.    
 
 
Table 15 Correlation coefficients between program score, workplace score,  
and injury rates 
 
 Program 
score 
Workplace 
score 
All lost-time 
injuries rate 
Severe lost-
time injury 
rate 
Program score  1.00    
Workplace score 0.35 ** 1.00   
All lost-time injuries rate - 0.03 - 0.12 1.00  
Severe lost-time injury 
rate 
- 0.08 - 0.23 * 0.69 ** 1.00 
 
Note:  The program score is inversely correlated with the lost time injury rate (-0.03), that is, a high 
program score is associated with a low injury rate, but the correlation is weak (close to zero) and not 
significant.  Safety audit scores are apparently not very effective in predicting safety performance. 
Legend: 
Coefficients are of the Pearson's r type.  Significance level are denoted by  * p<0.05,  ** p<0.01 
Program score -- the result of system audit of paper trail.    
Workplace score -- the result of field inspection of workplaces 
Source: Lindell 1997:567 
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Comparative study on the accident experience of 
Nosa companies 
Hypotheses and methodology 
As argued at length above, two general hypotheses emerged as I 
reviewed the general literature on occupational health and safety 
management systems and earlier experiences with systematic scoring 
schemes that evaluated the quality of accident prevention efforts. 
1. The first hypothesis is that systematic safety management activities 
are able to prevent accidents and lower the injury rate of 
companies that embark on such activities.  That is, they are 
effective.  The safety management activities in question have the 
following characteristics:  They are of the top-down variety in 
which safety is a management responsibility, they employ 
bureaucratic and hierarchic rule, they employ a mixture of risk 
analysis techniques and checklist approaches, and the activity is 
embedded in a cost-efficiency discourse. 
2. The second hypothesis is that universal pro-active safety 
performance indicators can be devised, which show improvement 
in process rather than outcomes.  These indicators are so designed 
that they measure the quality of upstream preventive safety 
measures, thereby moving away from negative outcomes, which 
are essentially reactive indicators of failure. 
As described earlier in this chapter, the Nosa organisation has offered 
its 5-Star occupational health and safety management system to South 
African industry for more than 20 years.  Hence, the South African 
setting and the Nosa 5-Star system represented an obvious opportunity 
to test the two hypotheses based on extensive empirical data.  
Specifically, the testable hypotheses are: 
1. Companies that are committed to the Nosa system experience 
fewer fatal and seriously disabling accidents than other companies. 
2. The Nosa 5-Star rating is inversely correlated with incidence rates 
for fatal and seriously disabling injuries. 
A comparative study involving two cross-sectional surveys was 
undertaken to test the hypotheses.  The universe was defined as all 
companies in the South Africa manufacturing industry, which had 
been Star-rated by Nosa at least once during the 3-year period 1997-
1999.   
Raw lists of companies and audits were received from all ten regional 
Nosa offices creating a master list of 2,596 companies.  Some 
companies were only purchasing training, not auditing, services, or 
were on the lists for other reasons.  Purging companies with no audits 
in the 3-year period of interest reduced to the list to 1,037 companies. 
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Companies with a postal address outside South Africa were taken off 
the list.  Each list entry was then examined in order to determine if it 
was in the manufacturing sector, defined as categories 6-14 in the 
Workmen's Compensation Commissioner's (WCC) annual statistics.  
This process identified a universe comprising 399 companies.   
The first survey involved a two-page questionnaire, which was mailed 
to all 399 companies, attention the Safety Officer or the General 
Manager.  The questionnaire solicited their Star-rating, number of 
employees, and number of fatal and permanently disabling injuries for 
the period 1997-1999, and other information.  
This postal questionnaire method relies on the respondent's ability to 
correctly recall events 3 years back in time, and may consequently be 
biased.  The objective of the second cross sectional survey was 
therefore to seek similar data from an independent source, the 
Workmen's Compensation Commissioner (WCC), who, however, only 
have data available for the earlier period 1994-1995 (see Hedlund 
2000).  There are no direct means available by which to determine 
which companies were rated by Nosa in 1994-1995.  An indirect 
procedure produced a sample of 50 companies, which was forwarded 
to the WCC, who returned aggregate numbers of employees, fatalities 
and permanently disabling injuries for 1994-1995.  The procedure is 
described in more detail in Hedlund (2001).  The survey activity took 
place October 1999 - July 2000.  
The only available control group to compare against is the national 
accident statistics for manufacturing.  In principle, two sources of 
national accident statistics data are available, from the Department of 
Labour (DOL) and from the Workmen's Compensation Commissioner 
(WCC).  Nosa registration requirements for fatal and permanently 
disabling injuries match those of the WCC only, not those of the DOL.  
But unfortunately, the WCC data have serious shortcomings.  First, the 
most recent WCC data available in mid-2000 were from 1995, not 
covering the period surveyed in the postal questionnaire.  Second, the 
WCC accident data exhibit an unexplained high year-to-year variation, 
compared to DOL data.  
Figure 29 depicts the number of fatal accidents for almost 30 years 
according to DOL records and WCC records.  DOL figures are lower 
than WCC, principally due to the scope exclusion of traffic accidents 
occurring during the course of work.  DOL data also exhibit a far 
smaller year-to-year variation than WCC data, indicative that DOL 
data are more reliable.  Statistical analysis of accident and employment 
statistics for about 30 years involving multiple regression techniques 
was employed in order to obtain proper WCC accident and 
employment data for 1997-1999 to compare against.  This was a major 
task covered separately in Hedlund (2000). 
  
Chapter 7   The management system study 
191
Hedlund 2002.doc 
-
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
fa
ta
l a
cc
id
en
ts
WCC
DOL
 
 
In summary, two surveys were undertaken, each with its own set of 
limitations.  The first survey, a postal questionnaire, covers 1997-1999.  
The companies committed to the Nosa system are well defined, but the 
accident performance of the control group, the national average for 
manufacturing, has to be estimated indirectly.  The second survey, a 
sample of WCC records 1994-1995, allows a direct estimation of 
control group parameters, but the companies committed to the Nosa 
system have to be identified indirectly. 
Findings 
251 companies returned the postal questionnaire, equivalent to a 63 
percent response rate.  Seventeen companies indicated that they were 
not in the manufacturing sector or that they had not been audited, 
reducing the number of useful questionnaires to 234. 
Those companies reported that 592 audits had taken place during 
1997-1999.  The distribution of awarded Stars, presented in Figure 30, 
shows a 'Star saturation' effect -- the 5-Star category is the most 
prevalent closely followed by the 4-Star category.   
Figure 29 Number of fatal accidents in manufacturing 1970-1999, 
according to WCC and DOL data  
 
Workmen's Compensation Commissioner (WCC) accident registrations exhibit 
an unexplained high year-to-year variation compared to Department of Labour 
(DOL) registrations.  By mid 2000, when this data collection exercise was 
finalised, the most recent WCC data were from 1995, unfortunately not covering 
the period of study.  This complicates the use of WCC data in the comparative 
study. 
Source:  Yearly statistical reports from WCC and DOL  
as described in Hedlund (2000)  
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The accident performance of companies in different Star categories 
computed from postal survey data are shown in Table 16 and Table 
17.  Some companies reported the number of fatal injuries, but not the 
number of permanently disabling injuries, in particular for the early 
years in the period, perhaps due to inconvenience if it would require 
retrieval of old records.  There are therefore fewer employee man-
years for the permanently disabling injury category. 
The estimated overall incidence rates ('all categories') for Nosa 
companies 1997-1999 have been subjected to one-sided statistical 
tests88 in order to reveal if they are significantly lower than the 
incidence rates for the general industry.   
The fatality rate is significantly lower (p<0.01) than the estimated 
Workmen's Compensation Commissioner (WCC) rate for the 
manufacturing sector for the same period, which is 1.50.   
The permanently disabling injury rate, is also significantly lower 
(p<0.001) than the WCC rate for 1995 (the most recent), which is 25.  
Both WCC rates are taken from Hedlund (2000).  There is thus strong 
empirical evidence that manufacturing companies committed to the 
Nosa system have both fewer fatal and permanently disabling injuries 
than the national average for manufacturing. 
                                                          
88
  The following null-hypothesis is tested using a one-sided test for a Poisson 
distributed variable:    H0:   rateNOSA companies  >=  rateWCC.  The test is carried out 
computing the upper one-sided confidence interval for n injuries, which is  0.5 
Chi2(2(n+1))   
Figure 30 Distribution of awarded Stars exhibits a "Star saturation" effect 
There are most five-Star category companies, closely followed by four-Star category 
companies. 
Note:  The Noscar rating is sort of a sixth Star (see footnote 82 on page 170) 
Source:  Hedlund (2001) 
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Regarding the second survey, the Workmen's Compensation 
Commissioner was not able to identify all 50 companies, which had 
been rated 5-Star in 1997, in his records for 1994-1995.  One of the 
reasons is that a site in the Nosa system is defined by the physical 
premises "to the company fence", whereas the WCC records are based 
on employee identification numbers, possibly comprising more than 
one production site.  A total of 44 companies (88 percent) were 
identified in the 1994-1995 records.  Results are presented in  
Table 18. 
Using similar one-sided tests, the 1994-1995 fatal injury rate is 
significantly lower (p<0.05) than the general WCC rate for the same 
period, which is 1.91.   The permanently disabling injury rate is also 
significantly lower (p<0.001) than the WCC rate, which is 25.   Both 
WCC rates are taken from Hedlund (2000). 
Table 16 Results from postal survey -- 
fatal injuries in Nosa companies 1997-1999  
 
  Fatal injury 
   Incidence rate pr 10,000 employees 
per year 
Star  
category 
Employee  
years 
Number of 
injuries 
Estimate 
 
95 % confidence 
interval 
<=3* 43,040   4  0.93   0.25   2.38  
4*  96,523   15   1.55   0.87   2.56  
5*  105,650   9   0.85   0.39   1.62  
Noscar  45,256   0     0.00     0.00     0.82  
All categories  290,469  28   0.96 **  0.64   1.39  
 
Note:  The fatal injury incidence rate per 10,000 employees per year (0.96) for Nosa companies is 
significantly lower than the general rate for the manufacturing sector for the same period, which is 1.50 
 
Sample size is n=647 Star ratings from 234 companies 
Significance levels ('all categories') are denoted by  *<0.05, **<0.01, ***<0.001  (one-sided test) 
Note:  The Noscar rating is sort of a sixth Star (see footnote 82 on page 170) 
Source: Hedlund (2001) 
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The commitment to the Nosa system of the companies in the WCC 
survey is ambiguous due to the indirect manner in which the 
companies were identified.  Additional uncertainties were introduced 
during the process of data retrieval from the WCC records.  The 
results, however, support the findings of the postal survey.  It is 
therefore concluded that there is consistent empirical evidence that 
Nosa manufacturing companies have both fewer fatal and fewer 
permanently disabling injuries than the national average for 
manufacturing.  This finding supports the first hypothesis, that the 
approach is effective. 
 
Table 17 Results from postal survey -- 
permanently disabling injuries in Nosa companies 1997-1999 
 
  Permanently disabling injury 
   Incidence rate pr 10,000 employees 
per year 
Star  
category 
Employee  
years 
Number of 
injuries 
Estimate 
 
95 % confidence 
interval 
<=3* 27,040   25  9.25   5.98   13.65  
4*  71,295   28   3.93   2.61   5.68  
5*  97,732   45   4.60   3.36   6.16  
Noscar  32,256   8   2.48   1.07   4.89  
All categories 228,323   106   4.64 ***  3.80   5.62  
 
Note:  The permanently disabling injury incidence rate per 10,000 employees per year (4.64) for Nosa 
companies is significantly lower than the general rate for the manufacturing sector for 1995 (most recent 
estimate), which is 25 
 
Sample size is n=628 Star ratings from 229 companies 
Significance levels ('all categories') are denoted by  *<0.05, **<0.01, ***<0.001  (one-sided test) 
Note:  The Noscar rating is sort of a sixth Star (see footnote 48 on page 141) 
Source: Hedlund (2001) 
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It is interesting to examine if the Star rating is correlated to the injury 
rate.  Do companies with a high Star rating have significantly lower 
injury rates than companies with a low Star rating? 
Figure 31 and Figure 32 show plots of the injury rate estimates for 
different Star categories.  Vertical error bars represent their two-sided 
95 percent confidence intervals.  The fatal injury rate of Noscar 
companies is significantly (p<0.05) lower than that of 4-Star 
companies, their confidence intervals do not overlap.  Similarly, the 
permanently disabling injury rate of 3-Star (and lower) companies is 
significantly (p<0.05) higher than that of the other categories.   
Although the internal ranking on Figure 31 and Figure 32  are not fully 
consistent it is notable that any line drawn through all confidence 
intervals will, for both injury types, exhibit a negative slope89.   
                                                          
89
  Additional statistical tests were carried out.  A Chi2 test was used to test the 
null hypothesis:  Injury rates of the four Star categories are similar to the 
aggregate injury rate.  The null hypothesis was rejected (p<0.001) for 
permanently disabling injury injuries.  It was also rejected (p<0.05) for fatal 
injuries, but the low number of injuries (slightly) violated the test's limits of 
applicability and this result should therefore be interpreted cautiously, if at all.  
The number of Stars is a non-parametric variable and it is consequently not 
meaningful to undertake linear regression analysis.  If done, however, the slope 
of the regression line is negative, but it is not significant, not even at the 0.10 
Table 18 Results of Workmen's Compensation Commissioner 
survey 1994-1995  
 
   Incidence rate pr 10,000 
employees per year 
Injury type Employee  
years 
Number of 
injuries 
Estimate 
(*note) 
95 % confidence 
interval 
Fatal   67,925   5  0.74 * 0.24  1.72  
Permanently disabling  67,925   111  16.3 *** 13.4  19.7  
 
Note:  Both the incidence rates for fatal injury and for permanently disabling injury per 10,000 
employees per year for Nosa companies is significantly lower than the general rate for the manufacturing 
sector for the same period  
Sample size is n=44 companies from the Workmen's Compensation Commissioner database 
Note: Significance levels are denoted by  *<0.05, **<0.01, ***<0.001  (one-sided test) 
Source: Hedlund (2001) 
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significance level - similar to the findings reported by Eisner and Leger (1988b).  
This is possibly a Type 2 Error situation, that a linear regression analysis on only 
4 data points will only show significance in cases with minimal scatter. 
Figure 31 Fatal injury incidence rates per 10,000 employees pr year (dots) 
with 95 percent confidence intervals (bars) for various Nosa Star 
categories for 1997-1999. 
Although the internal ranking is not fully consistent (discussed in text) it is notable that 
any line drawn through all confidence intervals will exhibit a negative slope 
Note:  The Noscar rating is sort of a sixth Star (see footnote 48 on page 141) 
Source: Hedlund (2001) 
Figure 32 Permanently disabling injury incidence rates per 10,000 employees 
pr year (dots) with 95 percent confidence intervals (bars) for various 
Nosa Star categories for 1997-1999. 
Although the internal ranking is not fully consistent (discussed in text) it is notable that 
any line drawn through all confidence intervals will exhibit a negative slope 
Note:  The Noscar rating is sort of a sixth Star (see footnote 48 on page 141) 
Source: Hedlund (2001) 
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It is thus concluded that the NOSA Star rating is a significant, although 
imperfect, predictor of injury rates.  This finding is supporting the 
second hypothesis of the comparative study. 
Discussion  
There are severe methodological complications when evaluating the 
effect of safety management systems.  First, the choice of evaluation 
measure must be determined.  Part of the 5-Star critique concerned that 
the Nosa system encourages aggressive monitoring of accident claims 
rather than addressing basic accident causes.  This type of critique can 
only be addressed if the evaluation measure is confined to serious and 
fatal injuries.  However, using the occurrence of serious injuries as a 
proxy for the less serious ones implicitly presumes an accident 
causation model in which identical causes precede minor and major 
injuries.  It deserves mention, that this model has been contested on the 
grounds that the types of circumstances that produce fatalities are 
essentially different from those producing minor injuries (Salminen et 
al. 1992).  If true, statistics on fatal injuries become less suitable 
evaluation measures.  We may thus end in a cul-de-sac, that neither 
lost-time nor serious injuries are suitable evaluation measures!  This 
survey study, however, focus on fatal and serious injuries, precisely 
because earlier studies, critical of 5-Star schemes, pointed to a 
discrepancy between lost time incident and fatality rates. 
The second complication arises when determining the design of the 
evaluation study.  The ideal evaluation study is one in which 
companies are allocated at random to either treatment or control 
conditions (Shannon et al. 1999).  In the face of the considerable time 
and costs involved in setting up a Nosa system and the very large 
sample size required, the ideal design is clearly beyond reach.   
The present non-experimental design differs in two important respects.  
First, that the allocation of treatment (i.e. implementation of the Nosa 
system) is not random.  Causal inferences can therefore, strictly 
speaking, not be made.  It may be the case that only the safer industries 
are attracted to the Nosa system and that this select group has a lower 
accident rate than the national average regardless of whether a Nosa 
system is in place or not.  The possibility therefore remains, that the 
relationships reported here simply reflect some factor not controlled 
for.  Second, that there is no well-defined control group.  The Nosa 
companies will by virtue of their lower accident rate lower the national 
average, against which they are eventually compared.  Using the postal 
survey data, the fraction of employees in the South African 
manufacturing sector that is with Nosa can be estimated to around 12 
percent.  However, the fraction of employees that are with other 
proprietary safety management systems of a similar type is unknown90.  
                                                          
90
 Several safety rating schemes are in use in the South African manufacturing 
industry, e.g. Corporate Risk Management (CRM), which is affiliated to a large 
insurance company, International Risk Consultants Africa (IRCA), and possibly 
others.  The market shares of those systems are unknown. 
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It is safe to conclude that the accident rate of the Nosa companies in 
principle should be compared against a rate, which is higher than the 
national average, although that this rate cannot be determined.  
The Star rating is inversely correlated with the injury rate.  There is, as 
noted earlier, statistical significance against the hypothesis, that the 
injury rates of the four Star categories be the same.  Furthermore will 
any line drawn through the 95 percent confidence intervals exhibit a 
negative slope.  But for both types of injury, one of the Star categories 
deviates from the ranking pattern.  The fatal injury rate for the 3-Star 
category is lower than that for the 4-Star category.  A possible 
explanation could be that 3-Star companies are less committed to the 
Nosa system and simply opt to abandon it if they experience a fatal 
injury.  Those fatalities will therefore escape registration in the postal 
survey.  Similarly is the permanently disabling injury rate for the 4-
Star category lower than that for the 5-Star category.   
The most prominent source of error may be associated with the fact 
that auditing is an entirely voluntary activity.  For example, it may be 
speculated if companies with mediocre safety activities are more likely 
to opt to abandon or pause the auditing scheme in the event that they 
experience a (rare) serious injury.  Assuming that they will generally 
be rated a low Star rating due to a low score on the "effort leg" they 
will as a group have a (biased) low number of injuries, thus distorting 
the predictive validity.  This type of behaviour may be difficult to 
handle in a voluntary system without also setting strong negative 
incentives for mediocre bona-fide companies to embark on the system.   
In the light of the mixed experiences with the US motor carrier audit 
scheme and the US navy facilities rating system, one could be justified 
in assuming that the Nosa system would perform poorly.  Nosa 
companies constitute a far more heterogeneous group than the trucking 
firms audited in the motor carrier audit scheme.  Above all, the two 
other audit schemes were mandatory while Nosa audits are voluntary.  
The voluntary element opens for various types of company 
opportunistic behaviour, for instance, including abandoning or pausing 
the Nosa system if injuries occur.   
In this light, the Nosa system is not doing badly at all. 
Conclusion 
This study finds empirical evidence in support of the two hypotheses 
set up earlier.  Two surveys studies were undertaken and both find 
empirical evidence that South African manufacturing companies, 
which were committed to the NOSA system in its 1997-1999 version, 
experienced fewer fatal and permanently disabling injuries than 
companies generally did in this sector.  Overall, it appears plausible 
that this is due to the systematic prevention programme of the Nosa 
system.  This supports the first hypothesis, that systematic safety 
management systems reduces the injury rate. 
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I will repeat the comment of two authors in a recent book on 
occupational health and safety management systems (OHSMS): 
"There is much testimonial support for the efficacy of OHSM systems 
from promoters [...] and business users [...], but what little available 
empirical evidence there is paints a less rosy picture." (Nichols and 
Tucker 2000:304, emphasis added).   
Findings from the present study refute this negative portrayal of 
OHSMS.  Previous empirical evidence has been scanty and some of 
the statistical reasoning in earlier critical studies is open to criticism.  
Returning to the overall purpose of this PhD study, it follows from this 
conclusion that integration of OHS issues in CP projects at the level of 
methodology is a viable approach.  
The postal survey study also finds an inverse correlation between the 
Star rating and the accident incidence rate.  Companies with high star 
ratings have lower fatal and permanently disabling injury rates than 
companies with low star ratings.  The fact that auditing is an entirely 
voluntary activity is, however, likely to distort the Star rating to some 
extent.  For example, it is speculated that some companies may 
abandon or pause the auditing scheme if they experience too many 
injuries.   
However, the finding support the second hypothesis that safety 
performance indicators can be devised, which show improvement in 
process rather than outcomes.  The implication of this conclusion is 
that it is a viable approach to define proactive OHS process indicators 
in the Danced project document (PD) as part of the LFA activity. 
Methodological problems in evaluating accident prevention 
programmes abound.  However, the major conclusion of this 
comparative study is that there is more and better evidence for the 
position that 5-Star safety rating systems lower the accident rate, than 
for the position that they have no discernible effect on accident rates.  
Participant observation of the Nosa audit activity 
After my attention had been brought to the Nosa system during the 
visits to the fish industries, I wished to gain further insights into the 
workings of the Nosa system.  I therefore took contact to the Nosa 
branch office serving Greater Johannesburg, an area with an extensive 
and highly heterogeneous industrial representation.  I asked the branch 
manager if I could join some teams of auditors as an observer during 
the audit session.  The branch manager was forthcoming and after an 
introductory meeting where I presented my study, he arranged for me 
to join some of his auditing teams.  This participant observation 
activity eventually convinced me that it would be worthwhile to carry 
out the quite time consuming activity of running the two surveys, 
documented above.   
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I sat in as a participant observer during four audits carried out by four 
different audit teams.  The auditing team generally consisted of two 
persons, a lead auditor dealing with occupational safety, and an 
occupational health practitioner, auditing the company health records.  
On one occasion, a third person joined the audit team.  This was an 
experienced lead auditor who should evaluate the performance of a 
newly trained auditor candidate.  On another occasion, a small 
company was audited by one auditor only.  Three of the audit sessions 
took two days, the audit of the largest company took three days.  The 
four companies being audited employed from 50 to 500 employees, the 
average size was 275.  They were producers of foods and chemicals.  
Three of them were five Star companies, one was four Star.  Prior to 
the audits I signed a letter of confidentiality, that the identities of the 
companies would not be disclosed. 
Participant observation is a rich source of information gathering.  It is 
outside the scope of this report to discuss this activity in detail and 
only one issue will be covered here.  Why do companies chose to be 
audited by Nosa?  What benefits do they perceive, and how do they 
use their Star rating?   
Earlier critique, in particular the one by Eisner and Leger (1988b), had 
suggested that some sort of collusion took place between management 
and the auditing team, and that this biased the audit in favour of the 
company.   
I was therefore somewhat surprised to discover, that in several 
instances the Nosa auditors were not particularly warmly welcomed by 
the company anchor representatives, principally the Safety Officer.  It 
was not just due to the audit activity being disruptive, stealing two or 
three days out of their otherwise busy working schedules.  On several 
occasions during the audit activity the company safety officers 
complained that the Nosa requirements were unreasonable, rigid, 
unnecessary, or bureaucratic.  Some complaints concerned 
requirements to written documentation, others concerned whether 
additional studies were necessary, 'you didn't require that study last 
year, so why penalise us now?'.  However, most complaints concerned 
how to register the number of disabling incidents (DI).  All companies 
had experienced 'freak' incidents, which they contested if should be 
included in the DI count.  In one instance, an employee injured his 
knee in an informal soccer match during the lunch break.  In another 
incident, an employee sitting in the cargo area of a pick-up truck 
lacerated a finger, having it trapped when closing the flap.  He was off-
duty, on his way home, the incident happened outside company 
premises but on a truck provided by the company.  His injury was 
treated by the company nurse.  It was my impression that sort of a 
game played itself out: if we whine and moan will you rate us more 
favourably?  However, it was obvious that the Star-rating mattered to 
them.  The Nosa audit was requested, not by the safety officer, but by 
top management, and the safety and the operating departments were in 
fact having kind of an unpleasant yearly safety 'exam'.   
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In one instance, the audited firm was part of a large company group, 
and it was the board that requested that all its production sites were 
Nosa audited.  The general manager for that site attended the audit 
meetings for the two full days.  He told me that if they experience a 
Nosa DI, he must answer in person to the board what happened and 
what corrective action have been taken to prevent recurrence.  He 
looked disturbed when telling me so.  His full two days attendance 
shows that the outcome of the Star-rating was important to him.  
On two occasions, it came to my attention that company 
representatives attempted to hide issues from the Nosa auditors.  At 
one company, I learned that two contractors had been killed in an 
accident about 15 months earlier.  The Nosa auditors are only looking 
at the accident history of the last 365 days, hence they were not 
formally entitled to be informed about this accident.  That this 
information was not disclosed to the auditors indicates that the safety 
officer feared that the information might influence the audit result 
unfavourably.  The general manager attended the debriefing session on 
the last day of the audit.  His opened the debriefing session with some 
general remarks on the importance of high safety standards, referring 
to 'the earlier very unfortunate events, as you know'.  The general 
manager's statement shows that he was not part of the plot to conceal 
this information from the auditors.  The auditors did not follow up on 
his vague remarks, and the safety officer's chancy plot concluded 
successfully.  
On another occasion, the auditor suspected that some records were 
fabricated, he told me after the audit.  He also suspected that 
'something was wrong' with certain parts of the safety management 
system, while unable to point to specific evidence.  I generally shared 
those suspicions.  He had therefore penalised the company on some of 
the point scores, he told me.   
Observations during the participant observation activity therefore 
suggest that a major motive for undertaking a Nosa audit is that 'upper 
management echelons', be it a distant board, or be it top management 
at the site, desire an independent assessment of the OHS performance 
of that site.  Hence, the major role of Nosa auditors is to provide 
independent auditing services of OHS performance, providing 
information that eventually finds use in standard corporate superior-
subordinate control and accountability mechanisms.  In addition to 
provide a methodology for OHS prevention, the Nosa system also 
serves to establish a legitimate auditing framework.  Ideally, 
companies are audited according to a standardised protocol in which 
requirements are fair, objective, transparent and the audit result is 
expressed in an easy to comprehend Star-scale, which is comparable 
across companies and time. 
For all the companies I have visited in South Africa, I only found one 
instance where the Nosa system was used to control the safety of 
suppliers and subcontractors.  This was in the case of Sasol, a very 
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large chemicals-from-coal conglomerate, which had recently 
undergone a major organisational change, involving restructuring and 
downsizing of the organisation.  I interviewed the safety manager91 of 
Sasol, in an activity not related to the Nosa auditor participant 
observation activities.  Many of the services such as cleaning, 
maintenance, repairs, and small construction activities were being 
outsourced to a swarm of newly formed small companies, he said.  
There were fears that outsourcing would compromise safety.  Sasol 
consequently requested that all subcontractors had to maintain a 3-Star 
Nosa rating in order to be eligible for business.   
Whilst many Nosa officials claimed that a 'satisfactory' Nosa Star-
rating (three Stars) was a common business relation requirement, they 
could not name any specific instances where this was the case, and I 
only found one instance of such a requirement.  Consequently, the 
motive for seeking a Nosa certification appears to be essentially 
different from what is the case in ISO quality management 
certification schemes. 
Attitudes and Star-rating 
Introduction and methodology 
Participant observation is a method often used to gain new insights and 
to generate hypotheses.  In this study, the principal objective of the 
participant observation was to make a decision whether or not to 
initiate the much more time consuming task of undertaking a 
quantitative survey study.  However, as a side benefit, the participant 
observation activity also led to the formulation of a number of broadly 
worded hypotheses.  For instance, although one company92 had 
suggested to me that they were surprised with their recent Star-rating, 
which took them from four to five Stars, because they felt they really 
weren't that safe, I generally had the impression (hypothesis) that 
companies felt that the quality of the audit was fundamentally sound 
and that they accepted Nosa's rating of their preventive safety efforts 
as being fair.  A second hypothesis was that strategies, which 
emphasised safety through behavioural modification, were quite 
widespread.  A third hypothesis was that companies with good safety 
performance appeared to have better relationships with the workers 
that those with poor safety performance. 
While it would be a major task to test the hypotheses empirically in a 
rigorous manner, a postal questionnaire survey could a least give a 
preliminary indication of the relevance and bearing of these 
hypotheses.  In any case, the carrying out of a major postal 
questionnaire survey is a very time consuming task in itself.  The 
                                                          
91
   Interview with Safety Manager Hennie Kruger, Sasol Chemical Industries, 
June 20, 2000. 
92
  For sake of completeness, this information does not originate from of the 
participant observation activity, but from an interview with the production 
manager during one of my other factory visits.   
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marginal effort in including a small section of attitude questions would 
be small, but the marginal benefit could be large, easily outweighing 
the additional effort.   
The prime concern guiding the development of the questionnaire 
instrument was the response rate.  Postal questionnaires can have 
appalling response rates, 20-30 percent are not uncommon, which 
directly threaten the external validity of the study.  In the case of this 
particular study, it would further threaten the main objective of testing 
the two major hypotheses regarding the effectiveness and auditability 
of systematic safety management system, because a large number of 
accidents (i.e. a large sample) was required if the statistical tests 
should have a reasonable chance of attaining significance93.  The pilot 
test phase of the questionnaire had clearly indicated that the 
questionnaire had to be short if the respondent should not feel the task 
of completing it insurmountable.  The front page of the postal 
questionnaire was therefore devoted to information regarding the 
companies' Star-rating and accident experience.  On the questionnaire's 
back page, 25 attitude statements could be crammed in, still keeping 
the entire questionnaire on one single sheet of paper, which was 
considered an essential requirement.   
The attitude statements were worded as concise assertions, for 
instance, one statement reads "Safety works until we are busy, then 
other things take priority".  The respondents would mark the extent to 
which they agreed or disagreed with that statement using a four-point 
Likert scale: disagree, mostly disagree, mostly agree, and, agree.  A 
"Don't know" option was provided for all questions and statements in 
the questionnaire. 
Due to space limitations this discussion will be confined to the 
following 15 questionnaire items, grouped into six general categories. 
                                                          
93
   The general problem of type-2 errors in hypothesis testing is a key issue 
unaccounted for in the earlier studies, critical of 5-Star systems (see Hedlund 
2001) 
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General variables 
SIZE Average number of full-time employee 1997-1999  
(computed value) 
STARS Average Nosa Star-rating 1997-1999 
(computed value) 
YEARS How many years have you been with this company? 
(tenure of respondent) 
Familiarity with systematic management techniques 
ISO9 Is your site certified to the ISO 9000 series? 
ISO14 Is your site certified to the ISO 14000 series? 
Relationship with safety representatives 
Q10 It is difficult to find employees who will elect for safety 
rep 
Q16 One of the Safety rep's tasks is to enforce safety rules - 
e.g. the use of PPE94. 
Q27 Safety reps mainly communicate issues to the shop 
floor, they don’t convey much information back from 
the shop floor 
Attitude to Nosa system 
Q12 We could hide a sensitive safety issue from a Nosa 
auditor, if we wanted to do so 
Q15 Compared to other companies with a similar number of 
Stars, we are in the better half 
Q21 Our customers want to know our number of Nosa Stars 
Q28 Top management would take serious action if we were 
to lose a Nosa star 
General workplace relations 
Q32 At our site, relations between management and workers 
have improved over the last 3 years 
Q33 The relation between management and labour at our site 
is an us-and-them relation 
Overall attitude to safety 
Q34 Safety works until we are busy, then other things take 
priority 
                                                          
94
   PPE – personal protective equipment 
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Results 
The distribution of average number of full-time employees in the 
responding Nosa companies peaks at about 100 employees.  The 
median computes to about 210 employees (Figure 33).  
 
 
 
Median tenure of the respondent is 10 years (Figure 34).  Less than 20 
percent of the respondents have a tenure of 0-4 years, which is 
reassuring.  A large number respondents with a low tenure could 
compromise the validity of the injury figures reported in the 
questionnaire, as the respondents would have no personal knowledge 
of incidents that had happened early in the three years period. 
SIZE Average number of full-time employees 1997-1999 
Histogram 
 
Cumulative histogram 
 
Figure 33 Size of Nosa companies 
Median= 212, Mean=.431  Histograms exclude 17 companies with more than 1,000 employees. 
Source: Postal survey questionnaire results (n=234 Nosa companies) 
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The companies are quite familiar with systematic and formal 
management systems (Figure 35).  About two out of three companies 
are certified according to the ISO 9000 series quality management 
standard.  About one out of seven companies are certified to the ISO 
14000 series environmental management scheme, a quite high number. 
 
 
YEARS How many years have you been with this company? 
Histogram 
 
Cumulative histogram 
 
Figure 34 Tenure of questionnaire respondent (most likely the Safety Manager or Officer) 
Median= 10 years, Mean=.12.6 years 
Source: Postal survey questionnaire results (n=234 Nosa companies) 
ISO9 Is your site certified to the ISO 
9000 series? 
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Figure 35 The use of other systematic management techniques by Nosa companies 
Source: Postal survey questionnaire results (n=234 Nosa companies) 
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In the brief discussion of the responses to the attitude statements that 
follows below the four response categories have been collapsed into 
two.  The two 'agree' and 'mostly agree' response categories have been 
aggregated into one single 'agree' category, and likewise for the 
'disagree' categories.   
Answers to statements related to the attitude to safety representatives 
and to the nature of workplace relations (adversarial or co-operative) 
are shown in Figure 36.  In statement Q10, slightly less than half 
(46%) of the respondents agree that it is difficult to find employees 
who will elect for the safety representative position.  Difficulties in 
finding employees for this task may reflect that management are not 
genuinely interested in safety, i.e. indicative of poor safety 
performance, or it may simply reflect an overall poor working relation 
between management and labour.  It could however, also be 
hypothesised that difficulties in finding employees who will elect for 
the safety representative position could result if they were given the 
burdensome role of policing compliance with company specific safety 
rules.  Statement Q16 deals with this policing issue, if one of the safety 
representative's tasks is to enforce the use of personal protective 
equipment (PPE).  Answers to this statement may also indicate the 
extent to which companies rely on a behavioural approach to safety.  A 
68% majority of the respondents state that safety representatives are 
indeed given this wearisome task.  Statement Q27 deals with the issue 
of poor communication, here defined as one-way relaying of 
information from management to the shop floor.  If communication 
were bi-directional, safety representatives could be expected to have 
some influence in decisions.  A 67% majority of the respondents stated 
that communication is bi-directional, that the safety representative also 
conveys information from the shop floor and up to management.  Yet, 
a considerable minority of 33% conceded that the flow of information 
is mainly a one-way affair, from management to the shop floor. 
Answers to statements Q32 and Q33 indicate that workplace relations 
are becoming less adversarial in the post-apartheid era.  Close to 3 out 
of four respondents acknowledge that relations between management 
and workers have improved over the last three years.  In addition, two 
out of three companies disagree with the statement that the type of 
interactions between management and labour are an us-and-them 
relation. 
Statement Q34 was intended to probe the overall attitude to safety.  
Companies with a superficial or a non-genuine commitment to safety 
would be expected to answer affirmatively to the question "Safety 
works until we are busy, then other things take priority".  The majority 
(67%) of respondents disagree with this statement.  Still, a 
considerable minority of one out of three respondents concede that this 
is the case, perhaps reflecting a sizeable element of cynicism on the 
part of the respondent. 
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then other things take priority. 
78
68
52
34
0 20 40 60 80 100
Disagree
Mostly disagree
Mostly agree
Agree
 
Figure 36 Attitude statement regarding safety representatives, workplace relations, and 
general attitude to safety. 
Source: Likert scale answers to attitude statements in postal survey questionnaire results (n=234) 
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The respondents generally appear to have a positive view of the 
diligence and thoroughness of the Nosa 5-Star system (Figure 37).  A 
majority (72%) of the respondents disagree with statement Q12 that 
they could hide a sensitive safety issue from a Nosa auditor, if they 
wanted to do so.  This interpretation is supported by the answers to 
statement Q15, which reads: Compared to other companies with a 
similar number of Stars, we are in the better half'.  If a high Star-rating 
were perceived difficult to achieve, companies would consistently feel 
that they were under-rated relative to their actual performance, and 
consequently, that they would be in the 'better half''.  Close to 90% of 
the respondents believe that they are in the better half.   
Several Nosa officials claimed to me that a satisfactory Nosa 
certification was a major requirement in some business relations, 
similar to the kind of supply-chain pressure that drives ISO 
certifications.  Answers to statement Q21 offer some support to this 
view.  A narrow minority (44%) of the respondents state that their 
customers do enquire about their Nosa rating.  This is not necessarily 
Q12 We could hide a sensitive safety 
issue from a Nosa auditor, if we 
wanted to do so 
102
57
30
33
0 50 100 150
Disagree
Mostly disagree
Mostly agree
Agree
 
Q15 Compared to other companies with 
a similar number of Stars, we are in 
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Figure 37 Attitudes to the Nosa system 
Source: Likert scale answers to attitude statements in postal survey questionnaire results (n=234) 
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contradicting the information gathered during the participant 
observation, in which the key driver to certification was upper 
management interest.  Requesting information about a company's Star-
rating does not necessarily imply that the information will influence 
business relations.  But the responses indicate that there are some 
customer pressures for embarking on the Nosa system.   
Is the Nosa Star-rating important to top management?  Answers to 
statement Q28 suggest that this is the case.  Almost four out of five 
respondents expect that top management would take some sort of 
'serious action' if they were downgraded one Star.  
Correlation coefficients were computed to reveal significant 
associations between postal questionnaire variables.  Likert scale 
answers are non-parametric variables, its makes no sense to do 
arithmetic on them -- an 'agree' answer compared to a 'mostly agree' 
answer does not represent '25 percent more agreement' with that 
statement.   
Consequently, non-parametric (Spearman) correlation coefficients 
were computed based on a ranked data set.  When the rank of the data, 
rather than the absolute value, goes into the statistical computations, 
the absolute value of the correlation coefficients have no longer any 
meaning.  Only the correlation coefficient's sign value and the extent 
to which it is significant, matter.  That two variables have a significant 
positive correlation coefficient means that respondents tended to 
provide answers in tandem, i.e. if a respondent marked an 'agree' 
answer to the one statement, the answer to the other statement was 
probably also an 'agree'.  Likewise, if the coefficient is negative, an 
inverse association exists: i.e. an 'agree' answer to the one statement is 
likely followed by a 'disagree' answer to the other. 
Computed Spearman correlation coefficients are presented in Table 19 
overleaf. 
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 SIZE  STARS  ISO9  ISO14  YEARS  Q10  Q12  Q15  Q16  Q21  Q27  Q28  Q32  Q33  Q34 
SIZE 1.00                             
STARS 0.11  1.00                           
ISO9 0.14 * 0.07  1.00                         
ISO14 0.20 ** 0.20 ** 0.09  1.00                       
YEARS -0.04  0.26 *** 0.11  0.01  1.00                     
Q10 0.02  -0.08  0.03  0.01  -0.09  1.00                   
Q12 0.07  -0.03  0.02  0.08  -0.05  0.05  1.00                 
Q15 -0.05  0.13  0.03  0.03  0.16 * -0.15 * 0.06  1.00               
Q16 -0.14 * -0.17 ** 0.05  -0.03  -0.16 * -0.08  -0.03  0.07  1.00             
Q21 0.14 * 0.07  0.10  0.17 * 0.07  -0.24 *** -0.13  0.05  0.12  1.00           
Q27 0.03  -0.13  -0.11  0.01  -0.14 * 0.24 *** 0.23 *** 0.01  0.11  -0.01  1.00         
Q28 -0.03  0.15 * -0.08  0.09  -0.02  -0.07  -0.15 * 0.12  0.03  -0.02  0.02  1.00       
Q32 0.00  0.08  -0.10  0.07  0.00  -0.28 *** -0.19 ** 0.24 *** 0.01  0.19 ** -0.20 ** 0.25 *** 1.00     
Q33 0.05  -0.03  0.05  -0.13  -0.04  0.27 *** 0.24 *** -0.06  -0.13 * -0.19 ** 0.23 *** -0.08  -0.44 *** 1.00   
Q34 0.06  -0.19 ** 0.04  -0.09  -0.18 ** 0.29 *** 0.28 *** -0.02  -0.04  -0.17 * 0.29 *** -0.20 ** -0.29 *** 0.38 *** 1.00 
Answers were coded  disagree=1, mostly disagree=2, mostly agree=3, agree=4,  or,    no=1, yes=2,   i.e. affirmative answer coded with the higher value.  Noscar was coded as 6. 
Significance levels are denoted by   *<0.05 (weak empirical evidence),   **<0.01 (empirical evidence),  ***<0.001 (strong empirical evidence) 
Note that this is the result of a Spearman non-parametric correlation analysis based on a ranked data set, therefore the numerical value of the coefficients has no absolute meaning. 
Two examples of interpretation:  1)  STARS*YEARS coefficient is +0.26***  , this means that a high Star rating is associated with a high tenure of the respondent (safety officer),  
and that this association is significant at the <0.001 level.    2)  STARS*Q16 coefficient is –0.17**  , this means that a high Star rating is inversely associated with an 'agree' indication 
to Q16 (One of the Safety rep's tasks is to enforce safety rules), that is, a high Star rating is associated with a 'disagree' answer to Q16.  The association is significant at the <0.01 
level 
Source:  Likert scale answers to attitude statements in postal survey questionnaire (n=234 Nosa companies) 
Table 19 Correlation coefficients (Spearman) between Size of company, Star rating, and answers to attitude statements in postal questionnaire. 
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The correlation analysis reveals that a high Star-rating (STARS), and 
hence a better accident performance, is  
• positively associated with  the company also being certified to the 
ISO 14000 environmental management certification scheme 
(ISO14), the association is significant at the <0.01 level 
• positively associated with a high tenure of the respondent 
(YEARS), the association is significant at the  <0.001 level.  Safe 
companies appear to have experienced staff in safety positions 
• inversely associated with the companies' use of safety 
representatives to enforce safety rules (Q16), the association is 
significant at the  <0.01 level.  It appears that high Star companies 
are less inclined to view safety as a behavioural issue, focussing 
more on safe systems 
• positively associated with the company's overall attitude to safety 
(Q34), the association is significant at the  <0.01 level 
Respondent who state that it is difficult to find employees who will 
elect for safety representative (Q10), also state that  
• communication is poor, the flow of information is mainly a one-
way affair, from management to the shop floor  (Q27, <0.001)  
• the general relation between management and shop floor  is 
adversarial (Q32 and Q33), both associations are significant at the  
<0.001 level 
• the overall attitude to safety (Q34) is poor, safety only works until 
they are busy, then other things take priority.  The association is 
significant at the  <0.001 level 
• interestingly, the association with responses to the Q16 statement, 
that safety representatives should police compliance with company 
specific safety rules, is inverse, as was expected, but far from 
being significant (P=0.25) even at the <0.05 level  
The significant minority of respondents (28%) that claim that they can 
deceive the Nosa auditors by hiding sensitive issues (Q12) broadly 
exhibit the same pattern of associations as just mentioned, with poor 
communications (Q27), adversarial labour relations (Q32 and Q33) 
and overall poor attitude to safety (Q34).  All associations are 
significant at the <0.01 level, or better.  The association with the 
number of awarded Stars (STARS*Q12) is slightly negative, but not 
significant.  In short, companies that state that they can cheat the Nosa 
auditors also score low on safety attitude, indicative that indeed they 
should have a motive to try to hide things.  Yet, they do not appear to 
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be penalised on their Star rating for their poor attitude to safety.  The 
data therefore offer some credibility to their claim, that they are indeed 
able to deceive auditors. 
The considerable minority of companies (33%) with poor 
communications with their safety representatives (Q27) show highly 
significant associations with a number of other questionnaire 
statements, mostly at the <0.001 level, suggesting that this subgroup is 
markedly different from the rest of the companies.  Their answers 
exhibit the following special characteristics:   
• They have a higher propensity to report that they have difficulties 
finding employees who wish to be safety representatives (Q10, 
<0.001),  
• they appear to be in that 28% minority that believe they can 
deceive Nosa auditors (Q12, <0.001), hiding sensitive issues 
• they appear to belong to that 17% minority of companies that state 
that relations with the labour force have not improved over the last 
three years (Q32, <0.01),  
• they are also apparently in the 28% minority that indicate their 
workplace relations are adversarial, the relation between 
management and workers is an us-and-them relation (Q33, 
<0.001),  
• and they are, last but not least, associated with a low score on 
overall safety attitude (Q34, <0.001).   
The answers from this last subgroup exhibit an inverse association 
with at high Star-rating, that is, those with poor communications also 
have low Star scores.  Strictly speaking, the inverse association is not 
significant, but it is very close (P=0.053) to attaining significance at 
the <0.05 level. 
Discussion and conclusions 
High validity and reliability are essentials of a good Likert scale 
(Bourque and Clark 1992:72-73).  A scale is valid if it measures what 
it is supposed to measure.  This can be assessed in several ways, for 
instance by seeing if scale score can predict behaviour that is assessed 
separately from the scale (criterion related validity), or by determining 
the comprehensiveness of the items of the scale relative to the universe 
of content which is thought to be important (content validity).  
Likewise, a scale is said to be reliable if it produces the same results 
across time (test-retest reliability) and across the order of items 
(homogeneity or internal consistency). 
For the questionnaire instrument in use here, issues of validity have 
not been rigorously evaluated.  Nor have reliability issue been 
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addressed as it would require administrating the scale to different 
sample groups prior to its use.  With these important limitations in 
mind some general conclusion may be drawn from the data. 
The participant observation activity led to the formulation of three 
broadly worded hypotheses.  The first hypothesis was that companies 
generally felt that the Nosa audit was thorough and diligent, and that 
they consequently accepted the Nosa rating of their preventive safety 
efforts as being fair.  The empirical data from the attitude survey 
generally support this hypothesis.  Corroborative evidence for this 
hypothesis is also provided by the empirical data from the two surveys 
on the accident performance of Nosa companies.  They found that the 
Star rating is inversely associated with the accident rate, suggesting 
that, by and large, the rating is fair.  A minority of companies 
expressed that they felt they could deceive the Nosa auditors, hiding 
sensitive issues.  The same minority appear to have a poor safety 
attitude score, indicative that their preventive safety efforts are lacking.  
Yet, their Star rating does not appear to be negatively influenced by 
their lacking safety efforts.  The correlation analysis findings therefore 
offer some credibility to their claim, that they are able to deceive 
auditors.  Hence, intentional and successful deception of auditors by a 
minority subgroup is a possible explanation for the imperfect 
relationship between the Star-rating and the accident performance. 
The second hypothesis was that safety strategies emphasising 
behavioural modification were quite widespread.  The data generally 
support this hypothesis.  It appears, however, that companies with 
higher Star-ratings have a lower propensity to employ behavioural 
safety practices, than companies with lower Star-ratings. 
The third hypothesis was that there was a positive association between 
safety performance and workplace relations.  The data support this 
hypothesis, companies which score high on safety attitude also score 
high on non-adversarial management-labour relations. 
Finally, it deserves mention that the association between Star-rating 
and number of employees is not significant.  As mentioned in the 
chapter on the empirical field (page 16), it is generally assumed that 
systematic management techniques, like the Nosa 5-Star system, are 
attractive mainly to large companies, not small companies.  The survey 
data largely support this assumption: the median size of Nosa 
companies was slightly more than 210 employees; these are certainly 
not small companies.  There is, however, no significant association 
between Star-rating and company size.  The correlation coefficient is 
positive (+0.11), as would be expected, but quite far (P=0.097) from 
attaining significance, even at the <0.05 level.  A careful interpretation 
of that data indicates that above a certain threshold size, company size 
is a less important predictor for the interest in systematic management 
techniques. 
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Concluding remarks 
This chapter has examined top-down systematic management 
approaches to OHS prevention.  The immediate reason for doing so 
was that such approaches are extensively championed within the 
environmental domain.  However, a paradox unfolded.  While the 
approaches are generally considered effective and successful within 
the environmental domain, their application within the OHS domain 
has allegedly been a failure.  In the pursuit of possibilities for 
integration of OHS and environmental issues, this paradox was an 
obvious candidate for closer examination. 
This chapter therefore explored two themes.  The first concerned the 
effectiveness of top-down systematic management approaches to OHS 
prevention -- seeking to answer the question:  Do they improve firm's 
OHS performance? 
The second theme concerned the ability to measure the quality of 
proactive efforts within the OHS domain.  It was argued that 
traditional measures of OHS are principally inadequate, being reactive 
in nature and focussing on undesired outcomes.  In contrast, proactive 
indicator would focus on upstream indicators of the process that 
determine these outcomes.  The question was -- Can we find upstream 
indicators of the processes that determine these outcomes, so-called 
proactive OHS indicators, that are auditable and certifiable?   
Answers to these two questions have relevance beyond this study's 
immediate research question of how to integrate OHS in Danced's 
cleaner production projects.  Companies increasingly address OHS 
issues in top-down formal management systems, for instance in ISO 
series management schemes.  In addition, there are ongoing 
discussions regarding the development of international guidelines on 
occupational safety and health management systems.  Both 
developments are adversely affected by this paradox.  Repeating an 
earlier quote from a recent ILO information note:  "The term 'OSH 
management certification' covers a variety of different activities with 
different scopes and objectives, and there is only limited proof of its 
positive results and value with regard to the prevention of accidents 
and diseases and the improvement of working conditions." (ILO 
2001:18, emphasis added). 
Two quantitative surveys were carried out in order to evaluate the 
effect of a South African OHS management system.  The results of this 
empirical work refute the negative portrayal of failure of top-down 
formal management systems within the OHS domain.  The two 
surveys find consistent empirical evidence that companies that 
implement top-down formal OHS management systems have a 
reduced incidence of injurious accidents.  Overall, it appears plausible 
that this is due to the systematic prevention programme of the 
management system.  The empirical findings of this study therefore 
affirm the first question above:  such systems improve firm's OHS 
performance.  Returning to the overall purpose of this PhD study, it 
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follows from this conclusion that integration of OHS issues in CP 
projects at the level of methodology is a viable approach. 
The study also finds an inverse correlation between the audit score and 
the accident incidence rate.  Companies with high audit scores have 
lower fatal and permanently disabling injury rates than companies with 
low audit scores.  However, the audit score ranking pattern is not fully 
consistent with accident rate ranking pattern, indicative that auditing is 
an imperfect activity, susceptible to distortion.  Some distortion of the 
audit scores is likely the result of auditing being an entirely voluntary 
activity.  For example, it is speculated that some companies may 
abandon or pause the auditing scheme if they experience too many 
injuries.  Also, the results of an attitude survey point to the existence of 
a minority subgroup of companies, which claim that they can deceive 
auditors, hiding sensitive issues.  The same minority appear to have a 
poor safety attitude score, indicative of poor preventive safety efforts.  
Yet, their audit rating does not appear to be negatively influenced by 
their lacking safety efforts, an issue which offers some credibility to 
their claim, that they are indeed able to deceive auditors.  Hence, 
intentional and successful deception of auditors by a minority 
subgroup is a possible second source of distortion, which may explain 
part of the imperfect relationship between the audit score and the 
accident performance. 
In summary, the answer to the second question is more complex.  The 
answer to the first part of the question is affirmative.  Overall, 
empirical evidence support that proactive safety performance 
indicators can be devised, which show improvement in processes 
rather than outcomes.  Returning to the overall purpose of this PhD 
study, it follows from this conclusion that it is a viable approach to 
define proactive OHS process indicators in the Danced project 
document (PD) as part of the LFA activity.   
The answer to the second part of the question is cautiously affirmative.  
It is plausible that such proactive indicators are certifiable although 
they seem unable to handle partial disclosure of information or wilful 
deception on the part of the audited entity.  The audit procedure of the 
South African OHS management system under study has, in theory, 
several complementary layers of review.  In practice however, it is 
undermined by a lack of resources, a few persons auditing complex 
systems of large companies in only a few days.  Nor can it be ruled 
out, of course, that some auditors may make improper compromises, 
not to upset clients.   
Seen in a broader context, also taking into consideration the mixed 
experiences with other auditing systems, notably that of US trucking 
firms and of US Navy shore facilities, the South African system is not 
doing badly at all.  In particular, if taking into account that the South 
African system deals with a far more heterogeneous group of 
companies, and especially the fact that the system is voluntary, lacking 
formal authority and enforcement powers. 
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It has been argued at length in this chapter, that there is a striking 
similarity between present day rhetoric and approaches to 
environmental management, and early (1910-1930) approaches to 
safety management.  The driver is a combination of a just cause and 
sound economic cost-efficiency.  The methodology is top-down goal 
setting and implementation.  The rhetoric is about improving 
management control over work processes.  The organisational 
instruments are hierarchic rule and bureaucratic control.  The only 
major difference is the concept of continuous improvement, which was 
only recently developed by the quality management movement. 
It is therefore surprising, and intriguing, that the management system 
debate has been so different within the environmental and OHS 
domain.  Within the environmental domain, there is a swell of success 
stories.  But within the OHS domain, academics have discredited 
management systems, claiming that they have no discernible effect on 
accident rates -- conclusions that have been based on surprisingly little 
empirical evidence, unsound statistical reasoning, and remained 
unchallenged for over a decade.   
A possible explanation may be that the top-down management systems 
have no particular provisions for employee participation, which for 
decades has been a key OHS strategy in a number of countries.  This 
study will not enter further speculations regarding participation.  The 
South African setting represented a unique opportunity to test the 
effect of top-down management systems empirically.  Due to South 
Africa's troubled recent past, the setting is less ideal to test empirically 
the effect of participation.  A discussion of issues that have not been 
covered should also mention that the issue of efficiency of top-down 
management systems has not evaluated.  That is, the outcomes seen 
relative to resources spent.  This study has only dealt with 
effectiveness, that is, the ability to achieve a desired outcome.  While 
obviously relevant, the issue of efficiency is only of secondary 
importance, only meaningful of study if effectiveness has been 
demonstrated.  
The earlier chapter gave extensive consideration to whether behaviour 
and outcomes should be interpreted in a rational context, a context of 
bounded rationality, or both.  While slightly outside the scope of this 
chapter, this dichotomy can also be applied to (rational) top-down 
management systems.  In short, the question is:  What processes, 
initiated by the management system, are responsible for the outcome in 
terms of improved OHS performance? 
A rational interpretation would focus on processes of identification of 
inventory of problem, problem selection, identification of range of 
solutions, selection of solution, and implementation.  For instance, a 
survey of machinery could identify a problem of unguarded moving 
mechanical parts in the workshop.  Management might therefore 
decide to embark on a machinery guarding program for the workshop 
lathes.  Mechanical safeguarding of lathes has been shown empirically 
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to reduce the number of occupational accidents with lathes (Varonen 
1995).  Hence the safety program's positive impact on the accident rate 
could be explained in terms of this rational choice series of events. 
However, an alternative explanation invoking the model of bounded 
rationality is offered by Gray and Scholz (1993:199-200).  They note 
that even the best-intended citizens have difficulty of learning the 
multiple demands that socially desirable laws impose on them amid 
the 'boomin-buzzin' complexity of modern life.  Safety demands 
compete with a cacophony of other demands and persuasive 
communications that attempt to change the citizen's behaviour.  In this 
context, an external safety auditor or a company internal safety officer 
may help managers or decision makers by interpreting their duties.  In 
concrete situations they can point out discrepancies between actual 
safety prevention efforts and prescribed ones and suggest behaviour 
that is more consistent with beliefs and obligations.  In this manner, 
the safety auditor or the safety officer may help focus (or refocus) the 
attention of managers on OHS problems that have been overlooked or 
ignored.  This attention may even trigger a broader review of 
performance that goes beyond the initial discrepancy 
This alternative view lends heavily from March's ideas of bounded 
rationality and of satisficing and rationing of attention (see page 64).  
In theories of bounded rationality, attention is the scarce resource.  
There are more things to do than there is time to do them.  There are 
more claims on attention than can be met.  In this framework, 
behaviour and decisions are best understood from the processes of 
allocating scarce attention and of the conditions under which the 
search for solutions is triggered or stopped.   
The company will usually have a safety officer to run the Nosa system.  
The safety officer may influence the way a manager's attention is 
allocated to OHS problems and hence the priorities of safety work.  
The effect of the Nosa system may in this framework be from the 
activities of this person.  This would be consistent from the finding 
from the US motor carrier audit scheme in which Moses and Savage 
(1992) found that the appointment of a safety director was strongly 
related to accident occurrence (see page 185).  It may also be part of 
the explanation for the positive association between a high Nosa Star 
rating and a high tenure of the respondent, which was in found in the 
attitude statements analysis above.   
The implication that follows from the recognition of attention as the 
key scarce resource is that part of the effectiveness of safety 
management may stem from the allocation of time and attention to a 
specific set of issues, that it entails, rather than the more concrete 
nature of the tasks and issues of the safety management system. 
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Chapter 8.  
The Durban Club study  
Introduction 
The previous chapter examined top-down systematic formal 
management approaches to OHS prevention.  These formal 
approached tend to have appeal mostly to the large companies with 
professional management.  'Large' companies are here characterised as 
those companies where the equity holder has contracted with an agent 
to run the company on his behalf.  Management structures in these 
large companies tend to be hierarchic and bureaucratic with well-
defined areas of responsibility compartmentalised into a number of 
staff functions, for instance a general manager, a production manager, 
etc. 
This is in contrast with small companies, here characterised as those 
where one individual, usually the owner, handles the majority of the 
day-to-day issues of the business.  In this chapter, this person is often 
referred to as the 'owner-manager'.  This chapter will argue that lack of 
time on the part of this individual and the large number of very 
different issues that constantly compete for his attention are important 
features that help to explain and understand the behaviour of this group 
of companies.   
Top-down systematic formal management approaches to OHS 
prevention have little or no appeal to owner-managers of small 
companies.  A considerable body of literature suggests that owner-
managers of small companies generally view authorities and 
consultants with mistrust, that they perceive systematic methods to be 
overly complex; written material is often not read and has generally 
little impact.  Interventions in this segment of companies are therefore 
generally considered to be complex and difficult95.   
Yet, the ability to effectively target precisely this segment is becoming 
increasingly important.  There is rising evidence of a large-scale, 
perhaps global, restructuring taking place in which large companies 
downsize, outsource and subcontract.  This restructuring has 
contributed to a substantial increase in the proportion of small and 
                                                          
95
   Sacob (2000).  Tait and Walker (2000). Limborg and Hasle (1996), Gombault 
and Versteege (1999) 
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medium-sized enterprises96.  Discussion in an earlier chapter (page 
100) pointed to evidence that a similar development is currently taking 
place in South Africa.  Competitive pressures can lead to corner 
cutting of OHS standards.  Small and medium sized enterprises may be 
particularly vulnerable as they often lack the resources, sophistication 
and motivation to attain minimum legal standards97.   
There is a large turnover of small firms every year and the average 
small firm may expect its life-span to be short..  In the UK, the average 
life-span is about 5 years, up to 400.000 new businesses start out and 
similar numbers cease operations each year; hence longer-term 
planning, investment and staff training has a lower priority.  Evidence 
in the UK is that small firms experience much higher accident rates 
than large enterprises.  A study of injury rates in manufacturing shows 
that the rate of fatal injury and of amputation injury in small 
manufacturing workplaces double those in large workplaces98. 
This chapter discusses and reports some findings of an intervention in 
small and medium sized companies.  It hereby complements the 
discussion of the previous chapter, which dealt with large companies.  
The different empirical field has lead to a different research strategy 
bearing more on the action research tradition.  Reference is made to 
Chapter 2 for a discussion of research traditions, the underlying 
epistemological considerations and methodological implications.  The 
choice of research tradition has influenced the descriptive and 
narrative form of this chapter, which holds many references to my 
personal impressions and judgements, often worded in the first person, 
singular, grammatical tense. 
This chapter will first describe a cleaner production intervention in the 
metal finishing industry of Durban, South Africa, an industrial sector 
in which small companies prevail.  The intervention was of an 
experimental nature, set up to examine if a networking approach 
developed in Europe in the 1990s could be successfully transferred to 
the South African setting.  The intervention concept is that a limited 
number of companies form a Club in which they share information and 
experiences regarding preventive approaches to pollution.   
Much in the same vein as the previous chapter, this chapter will then 
identify and describe an earlier OHS intervention concept, developed 
                                                          
96
  UK figures illustrate this development.  By the late 1990, 99 percent of all 
firms employed fewer than fifty people.  These firms accounted for 44 percent of 
total private sector employment, compared to 35 percent in 1979. (Gunningham 
1998:204).  In the United States almost 98 percent of businesses have fewer than 
100 workers with 56 percent  of the workforce employed in those businesses.  In 
fact, 86 percent of US business establishments have fewer than 20 employees and 
employ about 26 percent of the private sector workforce Jones (1999). 
97
   A good discussion is provided in Mayhew and Quinlan (1997), Quinlan and 
Mayhew (1999), and Quinlan (1999).   
98
  The factual information is from Clifton (2000).  Nichols et al. (1995) voice 
similar concerns, small is not beautiful, they say -- small firms have worse 
accident rates and-worse industrial relations. 
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in the 1980s under the auspices of the International Labour 
Organisation.  The main argument of the chapter is that those two 
concepts share so many similarities that the conditions are met for a 
successful integration of environmental and OHS issues.  It is also 
argued, however, that the two concepts share the same vulnerabilities.  
The experiences of the Club intervention, as I view them, are finally 
examined in the perspectives of two competing theories, that of 
rational choice and that of bounded rationality99.  Both the Club 
concept and the ILO concept are informed by rational choice theory.  
But this chapter argues that valuable insights into company decision-
making behaviour can be gained if it is assumed that attention is the 
key scarce resource, and if the decision making process is viewed as a 
strategy of satisficing.  The main implication of this, the chapter will 
argue, is that the effectiveness of the interventions is greatly enhanced 
if they are backed regulatory action, or a credible threat of regulatory 
action. 
Finally, I wish to stress again that the term 'non-professional 
management' refers to the management structure, not to the aptitudes 
or competencies of the owner-managers of small firms.  Running a 
business with, say, 50 employees is an extraordinarily complex task.  
The owner-manager must deal with a diverse range of issues from 
production planning, personnel management, customer relations, 
product quality checks, strategic market decisions, investment and 
financing decisions, and others.  Doing this is no small task, doing it 
successfully is no small achievement.  The owner-managers that I met 
were clever, charming, sly -- in short, unique characters of great 
capacity. 
 
                                                          
99
  The reader is referred to an earlier section on page 61 and onwards for a 
discussion of rational choice and bounded rationality. 
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The Waste Minimisation Club  
Events leading to the formation of the Club 
There are about 90 electroplating operations in Durban, many of them 
small operations, the owner typically having an artisan background.  
They are operating in a competitive jobbing market and are not 
organised in any type of industry association.   
In the late 1990s the Durban municipality had a problem with the 
sludge from its waste water treatment works.  The concentration of 
heavy metals in the sludge exceeded the limits set by the central 
government in Pretoria for bringing the sludge to grassland.  This non-
compliance created administrative and other problems for the 
municipality's sludge disposal practice.  Alternatives to the grassland 
disposal route were not attractive to the municipality, partly because 
the costs would be higher.   
The municipality undertook an analysis of the possible sources of the 
heavy metals that ended up in the sludge.  This analysis identified the 
metal finishing industry as a significant contributor of pollution, in 
particular were companies with electroplating operations singled out.  
In order to curb those emissions, the municipality embarked on a 
campaign in which effluent standards were tightened100.  The new 
effluent standards would effectively require that companies install 
advanced effluent water treatment plants with a chemical precipitation 
of dissolved metals process step. 
The new effluent standards outraged business owners who felt that the 
requirements were so stringent that they could not be complied with, 
even if costly effluent treatment plants were installed.  Business 
owners with electroplating operations therefore feared that they would 
be forced either out of business or out of town.  Business owners were 
also angered with the autocratic and unilateral manner in which the 
municipality had acted.  No consultation with the industry had taken 
place.   
In an unusual step for this highly fragmented industry (see page 148), 
some company owners organised a mass meeting inviting all affected 
companies and the municipality to attend.  The purpose of the meeting 
was that the industry should protest and challenge the municipality's 
                                                          
100
  Actual effluent concentration limits are defined in bylaws by the local 
authorities that operate the local sewage treatment works.  This provides some 
decentralised decision-making, permitting local authorities to consider special 
local conditions.  Examples:  For the New Germany industrial area, which is 
located some 20 kilometres inland and discharges to river systems, the new 
general concentration limit for metals (Cu, Ni, Zn, Pb, Cd, Hg) is 5 mg/l.  For the 
Durban area, which is much closer to the Indian Ocean and has larger treatment 
works with a higher proportion of non-industrial sewage water, the new limit for 
Cu, Ni and Zn is 50 mg/l; the limit for Pb and Cd is 25 mg/l, and for Hg it is 1 
mg/l (Durban Metro 1999, table 1) 
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decision in a unified manner.  At this meeting, which was described to 
me as being "stormy", Prof. Buckley from the Pollution Research 
Group of Chemical Engineering, University of Natal, Durban, stood up 
and spoke in favour of starting a Waste Minimisation Club (WMC) 
project.  The main argument for the WMC was that a swift legal move 
to mandate end-of-pipe (EOP) effluent treatment measures was likely 
to be not only premature but also excessively costly; both to the 
industry of which some would be forced out of business, and to the 
society in terms of lost employment.  Mr. Buckley believed that there 
was a considerable potential for pollution prevention at the source and 
argued that, for sake of overall efficiency, mandated EOP measures 
should only be considered after source reduction through pollution 
prevention techniques had taken place.  The WMC concept had been 
applied successfully in UK industries, he argued, and it deserved to be 
tested in South Africa as well.   
At the same time, but unrelated to the municipality's sludge quality 
problems, another serious problem to Durban's metal finishing 
industry evolved.  Due to heavy rains and perhaps aggravated by 
improper construction practices, Durban's only hazardous waste 
landfill site experienced a landslide.  The landslide immediately closed 
the landfill operation and there was no available estimate of when the 
site would re-open, if ever.   
Several of the metal finishers, who were disposing off sludge and other 
solid waste streams to the landfill site, now had to look for alternative 
means of disposal.  The only immediate option was bringing the waste 
to an inland hazardous waste landfill site near Johannesburg, some 700 
km away, in another Province.  Transportation costs were, however, 
prohibitively high.  Some business owners also felt that bringing 
hazardous waste across provincial borders would be impossible in the 
longer run due to expected public protests, if the transports became 
known in wider circles in the receiving Province.  With no attractive 
solution to these disruptions within immediate reach, many of the 
metal finishers simply started to accumulate solid waste at their 
premises.  The situation was clearly unsustainable. 
The closure of the Durban hazardous waste landfill site also interfered 
with the municipality's plans of mandating effluent water treatment 
plants.  All effluent treatment plants produce waste streams, notably 
sludge from the chemical precipitation of dissolved metals.  Some of 
those sludges were classified as toxic or hazardous, either due to the 
nature of their metal contents, or due to the nature of the upstream 
chemical electroplating processes.  This is a particular problem for 
companies with cyanide electroplating technology, where toxic 
cyanide compounds can find way into the sludge.  Company owners 
felt it was unfair if the municipality on the one hand mandated effluent 
treatment plants, and on the other hand did not provide a disposal route 
for the sludge that these effluent plants generate. 
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Eventually, a quid pro quo arrangement was outlined.  The 
municipality should delay its mandated effluent treatment campaign 
for one year.  In return, the industry should start a Waste Minimisation 
Club (WMC), embark on a waste minimisation programme and 
generally prepare themselves for tightened effluent standards to come.   
The WMC concept and its origins 
The idea of a Waste Minimisation Club (WMC) is that a group of 
companies work together to reduce their environmental impact.  The 
Club members meet on a regular basis where they exchange 
information and experiences related to waste minimisation.  This 
information is often of a practical or specific nature related to financial 
savings from cost reductions.  The social interaction in the Club is also 
expected to encourage club members to improve their operations, for 
example through reporting of the financial savings achieved since last 
meeting.   
In short, the WMC approach aims to encourage companies to organise 
in an information sharing network type organisation, for which they 
themselves feel ownership for, driven by self-interest.  The Club also 
provides a convenient forum for companies to 1) exchange ideas on 
waste reduction by networking with other companies; 2) receive 
training in waste minimisation methodologies; 3) in some cases, gain 
access to subsidised consultancy for expert help; and 4) keep up to 
date with new legislation (UK-DTI 1998).   
The United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) recognises 
Waste Minimisation Clubs as a policy instrument for promoting 
cleaner production (UNEP 2001). 
The mid 1990`s saw the development of the Wastes Minimisation 
Project Clubs, a Dutch approach for industrial waste minimisation that 
was adopted and developed for the UK.  The UK Waste Minimisation 
Project Clubs generally work by; linking waste minimisation goals 
with resource efficiency; emphasising environmental and economic 
benefits; using a range of cost saving measures; encouraging energy 
management, clean technology, process modification, re-use & 
recycling, and the use of alternative materials; and by disseminating 
practice and ideas amongst the widest possible community.  As a low 
estimate101, there have been around 60 such clubs across the UK, 
which have received support or guidance from the Environmental 
Agency and other UK organisations.  The primary objectives of the 
UK Clubs have been to demonstrate the benefits of waste minimisation 
by linking waste minimisation goals with resource efficiency, 
emphasising both environmental and economic benefits.  (Read 1999, 
2000). 
                                                          
101
  Estimate provided in year 2000.(Read et al. 2000). 
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Experiences gained with the UK Club arrangements indicate that the 
participating companies are generally unaware of their waste related 
costs and that they largely underestimate them.  For example, in one 
Club with ten companies, their initial perception of their waste cost 
was in the region of £0.5m.  Yet, audits eventually showed that actual 
costs were 25 times higher, close to £13m, comprising almost 5% of 
the companies' total turnover (Read 1999).  Many clubs have reported 
substantial waste reductions and impressive financial savings.   
The success of the UK Clubs has been attributed to a number of 
factors.  The more significant ones include the benefits of pooling and 
sharing practical experiences and problems, that the companies help 
each other, and that they feel obliged to keep to waste minimisation 
targets agreed to in the Club.  Yet, it is also clear that the key 
motivating influence has been the cost savings, not the environmental 
benefits.  (Read et al. 2000). 
The Durban Club initiated 
Eventually, the Durban Metal Finishing WMC was formed in mid 
1998.  The WMC was set up on an experimental basis, backed and 
anchored by researchers at the Pollution Research Group from the 
University of Natal (Durban).  The Club project was funded by the 
South African Water Research Commission with the dual objective of 
determining the feasibility of the WMC approach in South Africa102 
and establishing the necessary criteria to replicate the Clubs in other 
regions.  Co-funding was provided by the European Union, which 
allowed for the involvement of two European consultants, namely 
Enviros March (UK) and Cowi (Denmark).   
The Club consisted of 29 companies, which included 23 electroplaters, 
3 powder coaters, and 3 galvanisers.  More than half of the companies 
have less than 50 employees.  The majority (60 per cent) can be 
classified as jobbing shops, while the remaining 40 per cent are 
manufacturers where metal finishing operations form part of their 
production process (Barclay and Buckley 2000).  
A consultant from Enviros March's UK office ran technical training 
courses at some of the Club meetings.  The training course package 
comprised seven or eight modules for instance covering savings on 
energy and raw materials, and techniques for monitoring and targeting 
environmental performance.  Students from the Chemical Engineering 
Department of the University of Natal, Durban, assisted Club members 
in carrying out environmental audits at the companies, including a list 
of recommendations for actions.   
The WMC concept comprises self-sustained networking activities in 
which Club participants exchange ideas and experiences, combined 
                                                          
102
  In fact, two pilot clubs were formed as part of the project.  One involving the 
metal finishing sector in the Durban and Pinetown areas, and one involving 
mainly textile industries in the Hammarsdale area.(Barclay and Buckley 2000). 
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with externally provided training activities, in which Club participants 
have access to expert advice.  Different interpretations may emphasise 
the relative strength of either element.  The Durban case employs both 
elements: Club members were, at least initially, clearly exposed to a 
substantial input of external expert knowledge.   
The developments as seen from one Club member 
Mr. John Danks and his partnership business 
The Saayman Danks Electroplaters business has two owners, Mr John 
Danks in a partnership with Mr Noël Ferguson.  The business is 
operating out of relatively modest premises in an industrial area in 
Durban and employ approximately 50 employees.  It is a jobbing shop, 
providing metal finishing operations for products manufactured 
elsewhere.  The business has a couple of volume plating lines, in 
particular zinc and chrome, and a diverse range of small speciality 
plating lines, of which many appear to have been started on an ad hoc 
basis in response to new customer requirements.  In their own words, 
they can coat a product with 'any metal the customer wants', except 
cadmium, which they have recently abandoned.  
Mr Danks has been in the electroplating business for more than 35 
years103.  He has received formal training into electroplating 
technology and has attended the Johannesburg Technicon, a college 
for technical education.  He started his first plating shop in 
Johannesburg in 1964.  Over the years he has had his own business, 
been a consultant for a chemical suppliers company installing effluent 
plants, he has sold chemicals to other platers, "that gives you a good 
opportunity to see the competitors factories", and is now a partner in 
the Saayman Danks electroplating business.  In summary, Mr. Danks 
is an experienced plater who, unlike the majority of platers, also has 
considerable technical knowledge about electroplating technology.   
He contends quite openly that he too has been involved in doubtful 
environmental practices in the past, which he says are in so widespread 
use in that industrial sector.  According to Mr Danks, simple dilution 
of effluent streams to meet the municipality's concentration based 
effluent standards is a widespread industrial practice.  So is dumping 
of chemicals and obsolete process baths directly to the storm water 
sewer system during heavy rains. 
Mr. Danks has played a pivotal role in the functioning of the Durban 
WMC, and he has been instrumental in the wider promotion of CP in 
South Africa.  He was a guest speaker at the LFA workshop in 
Pretoria, held as a part of the project preparation phase of the Danced 
metal finisher project  (page 148) and he has spoken before audiences 
                                                          
103
   Self reported information.  I have spoke with Mr Danks on a number of 
occasions, although much of the following information is from a larger interview 
on Oct 8, 1999. 
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in Cape Town, Bloemfontein, and other places.  He usually speaks as a 
converted industrial polluter -- one who has abandoned the 
electroplating industry's problematic environmental practices in favour 
of green CP practices.  He likes to reiterate the point that he would 
have gone out of business had it not been for the financial savings 
achieved though new CP practices.  According to Mr Danks, the 
savings potential is considerable.  Water savings of up to 50 percent 
are easily within reach simply stopping the widespread dilution 
practice to meet effluent standards.  
Changing perceptions about CP 
It was the event taking part in Durban WMC and a study tour to 
Denmark, which eventually changed Mr. Danks' negative perceptions 
of environmental issues -- the negative view that better environmental 
performance always comes at increased costs.  This change of 
perception is interesting and will be described below. 
At the first mass meeting where Mr. Buckley presented the idea of 
forming a WMC, Mr. Danks was highly sceptical about the idea.  But 
he decided to enter for two major reasons.  First, the WMC might be 
instrumental in gaining time, to argue for postponed intervention from 
the municipality.  He felt that a membership of the WMC was similar 
to a statement of due diligence; it was an important signal to the 
municipality that the industry was prepared to bring order to own 
house.  Eventually, he also hoped that the municipality's effluent 
demands could be softened to 'more reasonable' concentration levels 
through negotiation.   
His second reason for entering was to be well informed and possibly to 
influence the process.  Tightened effluent standards, which in effect 
would make effluent treatment plants mandatory, were not necessarily 
disastrous to him.  His plating business was well established and 
financially relatively mature, probably capable of absorbing the cost 
from an effluent treatment plant.  Many of his competitors, he 
reckoned, were financially in a worse condition.  If new tightened 
effluent standards were enforced consistently across all industries in 
the Durban area, the net result might be a shake out of the weaker or 
less sincere operators, leaving him with less competition.  It was this 
mix of strategic considerations, partly defensive negotiation and 
softening of the municipality's proposals, and partly offensive use of 
new environmental demands to strengthen own business, that informed 
his decision to enter the WMC. 
His initial scepticism resulted from a perceived lack of professional 
benefit from joining the club.  The most likely outcome, he thought, 
was that some of the more inexperienced platers would scavenge some 
of his plating expertise.  While he would seek to limit this, he felt that 
it would not hurt him too much anyway, and after all, he could control 
the amount of information disclosed.  He already ran a highly efficient 
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plating business, he had certainly nothing to learn from these sessions, 
he felt. 
Not so long after the WMC was started, Prof. Buckley was able to 
secure a small grant from Danced for a study tour to Danish metal 
finishing industries that had implemented CP practices, travel and 
living expenses paid.  Prof. Buckley asked Mr. Danks to join the small 
group of people comprising Prof. Buckley, Mr. Steenveld who is a 
senior representative from the national water research commission, 
Mr. Danks and possibly one or two others.   
Mr Danks refers to this tour as an eye opener, a professional turning 
point.  With a mixture of surprise and thankfulness, he said that this 
was first time ever that somebody had offered him "something for 
nothing".  When he described the tour events to me, his account was 
particularly vivid when he recalled the visit to the Danfoss facilities in 
Nordborg, Denmark.  The Danfoss facilities had an effluent treatment 
plant comprising four tanks, each tank so large 'it could hold a 
minibus'.  The effluent plant was built before Danfoss embarked on CP 
practices.  At the time of the visit, however, only one tank was in 
operation.  The remaining three tanks stood idle, unnecessary because 
CP practices had so greatly reduced the amount of wastewater being 
generated.  
This situation was highly relevant to Mr. Danks because he might face 
a similar situation at home.  The Saayman Danks production site was 
already congested and expansion was difficult due to neighbouring 
businesses.  New premises were needed for a new effluent plant, he 
believed, the only possible option being a plot across the road and 
uphill, requiring complex and costly piping and pumping 
arrangements.  Perhaps CP practices would allow him to shrink the 
effluent plant keeping it on existing premises? 
Innovative CP practices at Saayman Danks 
The study tour to Denmark spurred a period where a number of 
innovative, simple, yet highly effective CP practices were introduced 
at the Saayman Danks electroplating production facilities.  In the 
beginning, the new practices mostly involved better housekeeping 
techniques.  For instance, installing water meters, logging and 
monitoring water consumption, installing small reducer valves on 
water taps, and checking bath conductivity to optimise rinse flows.  
Simple changes were also introduced to the plating process lines, for 
instance were wooden boards installed in existing rinse tanks to give 
extra rinse steps, and some counter-flow rinse procedures were 
implemented.  While highly effective, these changes are simple and 
rather straightforward, and they are covered in standard CP guidelines, 
for instance UNEP (1989 and 1998), se example in Figure 38.   
Another example of a self-invented simple housekeeping practice is a 
reduction in up-time of the trichloroethylene degreaser unit.  This 
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production planning change saves energy and reduces the evaporation 
losses of the trichloroethylene chemical.  New piping has been 
installed that permits the recovery of waste heat when the degreaser is 
in operation. 
 
 
The innovation at the Saayman Danks facilities went further.  One 
example is an innovative solution to waste problems generated in the 
initial acid pickling process step.  Before electroplating can take place, 
metal oxides (rust) must be removed from the product surface.  This is 
accomplished in a 'pickling' process step in which the product is 
submerged in an acid bath.  Traditionally, the acid of choice is 
hydrochloric acid.  Mr. Danks decided to switch over to sulphuric acid, 
which pickles slower, but is cheaper.  As a side benefit it does not give 
off obnoxious fumes as hydrochloric acid does, even when heated, 
alleviating an OHS issue as well as problems with corrosion of the 
roof structure above the bath.  However, the real CP benefit arises 
when the bath must be disposed off because the iron concentration has 
become too high.  Mr. Danks found a fertiliser producer who can use 
the spent pickling bath as a raw material in the production of a 
sulphate fertiliser, conditional that the bath has only pickled iron 
products.  Mr. Danks has therefore introduced a separate tank in 
dedicated iron-pickling service.  The waste exchange scheme is 
beneficial to both parties.  Mr. Danks saves the cost of chemicals to 
neutralise the acid and the load on his effluent plant is reduced, 
permitting a smaller (and cheaper) effluent plant.  The fertiliser 
producer obtains a valuable raw material at its transportation cost only.  
Mr. Danks has made a similar arrangement with a producer of copper 
Figure 38 Schematic design of cascade rinse with three tanks as 
implemented by Mr. Danks 
Product flow is from left to right as shown by shaded arrows (q).  Rinse water (Q) 
runs counter flow from right to left.  Note the weir arrangement that guides rinse 
water from the top of one tank to the bottom of the next.   
The arrangement shown can dramatically reduce water consumption (up to 90 
percent) while not changing the rinsing effect. 
Source UNEP (1989:15-17) 
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sulphate who is willing to take his spent sulphuric acid pickling bath 
conditional that it has only been used for pickling of copper products.   
Other examples of simple yet highly effective innovative practices are 
found on the nickel and the chrome plating lines.  On the nickel line a 
small additional rinse step has been introduced, in which the hangers 
are soaked in spent rinse bath solution.  With this small change, an 
expensive rinse bath solution can now be used for up to 3-4 weeks 
before it must be disposed of due to build-up of nickel.  The excess 
nickel on the hangers is now dissolved in the spent rinse bath solution; 
which has a too high nickel content to be used for rinse, but is fine for 
stripping excess nickel off the hangers.  Previously, the expensive 
rinse bath solution lasted for only one week.   
 
 
 
Good drip-off of bath chemicals is essential in limiting the volume of 
chemicals being transferred from one bath to the next, the so-called 
drag-over, see page 144.  Drag-over consumes chemicals, reduces bath 
life, requires higher rinse flows and produces more sludge in the 
effluent treatment plant.  On the chrome plating line, which is a 
volume plating line, good drip-off is difficult to achieve due to the 
viscous nature of one of the baths.  Mr. Danks has enhanced drip-off 
simply by installing a slow hoist made out of a spare motor and an old 
gear (Figure 39).  Lifting the jigs slowly out of the bath provides 
additional drip-off time.  This modification has improved drip-off over 
the earlier practice where the jigs were lifted out of the bath manually.  
The hoist was also beneficial to the operator, reducing muscle strain, 
because the jigs, according to Mr. Danks, are "jolly heavy". 
Figure 39 A slow hoist enhances drip off and reduces lifting strain 
This example shows how an innovative, yet simple, modification improves both 
the environmental and OHS performance  
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However, in the subsequent rinse steps, the jigs are still lifted in and 
out of the rinse baths manually (Figure 40), indicative that OHS issues 
(lifting strain) have either not been considered or do not command the 
same attention as environmental issues do. 
 
 
On the zinc plating line, a new cyanide-free alkaline zinc process has 
replaced the traditional cyanide zinc process.  Mr Danks claims to be 
one of the first platers in South Africa (if not the first one) who has 
introduced cyanide-free zinc plating.  The alkaline process is more 
sensitive to deviations in the chemical compositions of the baths and 
demands more attention and plating skills.  The transition was not easy 
but the rewards have been more benign effluent streams that no longer 
contains cyanide, a potent poison.  The environmental impact of this 
change has been significant, as the zinc line is a volume plating line.   
The Saayman Danks shop has moved away from cadmium plating.  
The decision was not trivial, as it has meant that they forego business.  
The profit margin on cadmium plating is also higher than for zinc 
plating.  They have successfully convinced some customers that a 
special 'heavy duty' zinc plating process with chrome-6 passivation 
was as good as cadmium, for the intended purpose of that product.   
In summary, the Saayman Danks site scores quite high on a scale 
measuring the extent to which the philosophy of prevention embedded 
in the concept of cleaner production has been embraced.  Ranked on an 
arbitrary scale of 'increasing level of prevention' the changes involve: 
1 better housekeeping (fixing water leaks, trichloroethylene unit 
production planning) 
Figure 40 No hoist is installed in the subsequent rinse steps 
Had OHS issues commanded more attention, a runner (rail) arrangement to the 
rinse section might have been considered.   
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2 process changes (e.g. cascade rinse) 
3 technology changes (cyanide-free process) 
4 convincing customers to modify their products (cadmium) 
5 entering into industrial symbiosis arrangements104 (e.g. waste 
exchanges of spent pickling baths) 
And... occupational health and safety? 
It is clear, however, that no particular attention has been paid to OHS 
issues.  They may have the fortune of piggybacking on environmental 
issues but are not considered separately.  For instance, the change from 
hydrochloric acid to sulphuric acid did also improve the working 
conditions (fumes) in addition to solving a waste problem (the initiator 
of change) and a problem with corrosion of the roof structure.   
It is also clear that the technical guidelines offer little help in that 
respect.  Figure 41 shows an example from one of the guidelines on 
how rinse efficiency can be improved by air agitation of the rinse 
water.   
The release of compressed air at the bottom of the rinse bath will, 
however, also increase aerosol formation above the bath, in effect 
making small droplets of rinse liquid airborne and breathable.  While 
this technique may improve the rinse efficiency, it may also expose 
nearby operators to new risks or to more intense chemical exposure.  
The technical guideline gives no mention to this side effect.105 
                                                          
104
  A note on terminology:  In a strict sense, the definition of cleaner production, 
for instance that of the United Nations, specifically excludes off-site waste 
recycling arrangements and possibly also industrial symbiosis arrangements, as 
they do not prevent pollution at the source.  However, this thesis takes a 
pragmatic approach and treats industrial symbiosis as a further development of 
cleaner production, in accordance with the chronology outlined on page 12. 
105
  This example is provided to make a point about sub-optimalities in general.   
I did observe some air agitated rinse baths in the plating shops of Club members.  
They were old and had been installed for technology reasons.  To my knowledge 
no plater installed air agitated rinse bath because of the Club activities, as a 
cleaner production practice. 
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Benefits -- and the price paid 
Mr. Danks reckons that they have only picked the low hanging fruits.  
Most changes have been small and simple, except the process change 
from the cyanide zinc process to the cyanide-free alkaline zinc process, 
which is a technology change of a more fundamental nature.  Most 
changes have also been inexpensive.   
Yet, the financial savings have been substantial.  With roughly the 
same production volume, the water consumption is now only 25 
percent of what it used to be and the consumption of chemicals (raw 
materials) has been reduced by about 10-15 percent.  Effluent 
concentrations have stayed more or less the same, perhaps slightly 
higher.  Mr. Danks reckons that the effluent load is now about 40 
percent what it used to be before CP practices were in place106.  This 
substantial reduction in effluent load in turn permitted a smaller 
effluent treatment plant, which eventually could be built on the 
existing premises.  The smaller effluent treatment plant was also less 
demanding on capital outlay. 
 
                                                          
106
  The environmental load after precipitation of metals in the newly constructed 
effluent treatment plant is off-course even lower. 
Figure 41 Rinse efficiency improved with agitation of bath with 
compressed air 
Blowing compressed air through a bath is likely to create aerosols, in effect 
making small droplets of the rinse bath airborne and breathable.  This example 
has potential for media-shifting, that improved environmental performance may 
lead to a deterioration of occupational health and safety performance. 
Source: illustration provided in UNEP (1989:14-15) 
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What, then, has the price paid been for this significant improvement in 
environmental performance?  Direct monetary costs have generally 
been modest, bar the effluent plant, both in terms of initial down 
payments (investment cost) and the running (operating) costs.  The 
major price paid appears to be of a less tangible nature.   
First, we can identify a 'cost' resulting from less flexibility and 
increased complexity of the production process.  Instead of only one 
pickling tank, there are now several in dedicated service: one tank only 
pickling iron items, another tank only copper items, etc.  Spent 
pickling baths are no longer just disposed of when the need arises.  
Disposal must now be planned and co-ordinated in advance with the 
third party production facility that takes the spent baths contents, safe 
transportation must be arranged etc.  Rinse procedures have been 
modified, additional rinse steps introduced, etc. that require more work 
on the part of the operator.  Mr. Danks openly wonders if the new 
procedures and practices are adhered to in full when he is not present, 
for instance during night shifts.  Of importance to the discussion in the 
next sections, we can identify a possible deterioration of 
productivity107 as an undesired side benefit from the CP practices. 
Second, we can identify that the introduction of many of the CP 
practices has been demanding on managerial time.  Those changes that 
have been of a more or less standardised nature, for instance cascade 
rinse arrangements, may have been less demanding because the 
solution has been known, only the implementation had to be arranged.  
This is not so for many of the low-cost innovative practices.  The idea 
concerning the slow hoist at the chrome plating line, for instance, is 
specific to that production facility and can only have been devised 
after a fair amount of creative thinking.  The waste exchange schemes 
are also likely to have consumed much time, primarily in identifying 
the exchange partner, but also in making the practical arrangements for 
each shipment.  The cost of managerial time is unlikely to have been 
included in any cost-benefit feasibility estimate.  The issue of demands 
on managerial attention will be taken up again in a later section. 
                                                          
107
  Note that this claimed deterioration depends on how productivity is defined.  
If in its standard definition as business revenue per employee, or number of bolts 
plated per employee hour, it may have deteriorated.  If defined more broadly as 
'value added' or 'profit' per employee hour, which also takes the savings into 
account, productivity may not have deteriorated. 
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Waste minimisation achievements of Club 
members 
By May 2000, some two years after the Club was formed, about half of 
the Club members were actively implementing waste minimisation 
programmes in their factories, resulting in varying degrees of financial 
savings (Table 20) and reduced environmental impact.  
The reported total savings achieved by the club members was in excess 
of R1.9 million per year due to savings in water, energy, chemical and 
metal use; and effluent treatment costs.  For several companies the 
yearly monetary savings per employee computes to several thousands 
of Rands (Table 20, last column).  To provide perspective to this 
figure, a skilled worker in a unionised workplace will earn roughly R 
3,000 per month, or less.  A handful of companies are saving one 
month's payroll per year, or more -- these savings are significant. 
The waste minimisation programmes have also resulted in a reduced 
environmental impact.  Less effluent water is being generated and the 
consumption of chemicals, oil, and other raw materials has fallen.  The 
water consumption, for instance, has been reduced by over 64,000 m3 
per year.  Barclay and Buckley (2000) therefore conclude that the club 
concept has thus been successful in promoting waste minimisation.  
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Table 20 Self-reported savings by Waste Minimisation Club members 
(after 2 years) 
 
Company  Size 
index 
Ownership 
index 
Preventive 
efforts index 
Participation 
in Club index 
Savings pr year 
pr employee (R) 
 1  1  1  3  3  20,350 
 2  5  3  3  3  5,779 
 3  3  2  4  3  3,903 
 4  3  2  3  3  2,735 
 5  3  1  2  2  2,640 
 6  1  1  2  2  1,256 
 7  2  3  1  2  1,100 
 8  4  1  2  3  469 
 9  5  3  3  2  121 
 10  3  3  1  1  114 
 11  5  3  2  3  110 
 12  1  1  2  3  96 
 13  1  1  1  2  37 
 14  5  3  1  2  26 
 15  5  3  3  1  - 
 16  2  3  2  1  - 
 17  2  1  1  2  - 
 18  1  1  1  2  - 
 19  1  1  1  1  - 
 20  5  3  -  1  - 
 21  2  1  -  1  - 
 22  4  2  -  -  - 
 23  4  1  -  2  - 
 24  2  -  -  -  - 
 25  3  -  -  -  - 
 26  2  1  -  -  - 
 27  5  1  -  -  - 
 
Legend  
     
 "-" (dash)= zero, not reported, or unknown    
      
 Size index  
 
 Preventive efforts index (1=simple, 4=extensive)  
 1:  1-10 employees   1:  mainly better housekeeping, e.g. fixing leaks  
 2:  11-25     2:  process changes, e.g. cascade rinse   
 3:  26-50      3:  technology changes, e.g. eliminate cyanide  
 4:  51-100      4:  product impact, e.g. substitute Cd with Zn  
 5:  100+         
  
 Participation in Club index (0=none, 3=high)  
 Ownership index 
 0:  little or no attendance    
 1=single owner   1:  attends regularly    
 2=two owners,    2:  reports back on savings achieved   
 3: prof. mgmt    3:  shares information and experiences   
 
Source: Susan Barclay, University of Natal (Durban), email dated Jul 4, 2000.  
I am grateful to Ms. Barclay for helpful discussion in setting up and scoring the indexes 
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About 25 percent of the Club members account for about 95 percent of 
the total financial savings.  The companies with the higher saving have 
generally made more extensive preventive cleaner production efforts.  
A small number of companies have obviously benefited much more 
from the Club than other members have done.  It has sometimes been 
difficult to call the attention of companies and Barclay and Buckley 
(2000) speculate in the quote below if the Club concept bears on a too 
simplistic set of assumptions to motivate companies: 
"It was clear that in order for waste minimisation to become a 
priority in an industrial organisation, both the carrot and the stick 
approach needs to be used.  The stick, in terms of effluent 
requirements and charges, and the carrot, the financial and 
environmental benefits. Especially in South Africa, where resources 
are so inexpensive, it is felt that there needs to be a stronger 
motivating factor to implement changes than only the financial 
benefits to the companies.  (Barclay and Buckley 2000, emphasis 
added) 
Besides the highly visible monetary savings and the reduction in water 
consumption there are a range of benefits, which are less tangible, but 
unlikely are less important.  First, while some Club members are not 
visibly making changes on site, they are at least more aware of the 
pollution caused by their processes and have access to information on 
methods to reduce their waste.  They may also be motivated to do 
more when they realise the savings achieved by the more active Club 
members. 
Second, the Club has established a means of communication with the 
electroplating industry.  The Club members used this newly 
established channel of communication to negotiate a relaxation of the 
original stiff effluent water requirements.  But the authorities also 
benefited from this communication and the emerging sense of trust.  A 
plater told me, for instance, that he had informed the authorities about 
simple tricks and cheats commonly used by the industry to deceive the 
pollution inspector and defeat effective environmental inspections.  In 
an interview, representatives from the environmental authorities did 
not appear to recall that, but acknowledged that their understanding of 
the metal finishing industry had improved, both technically and as a 
social group108.   
                                                          
108
  Some Club members expressed disrespect for the technical proficiency of the 
pollution inspectors, claiming they "can't tell the difference between a bath tub 
and a rinse bath".  Ironically, these views were somewhat mirrored by the 
enforcing authorities, who felt that some of the platers only had a superficial 
technical knowledge about plating operations.  I was unable to ascertain how 
widespread either views were.  In interviews, both platers and regulators said that 
they used to hold enemy pictures of each other but that communication through 
the Club improved the relations.  The first meeting between Club representatives 
and authorities was described to me as resembling "an angry divorce procedure".  
Later, key individuals went scuba diving together in their leisure time; indicative 
of a new sense of trust.  Again, I was unable to ascertain how widespread and 
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Third, key Club members eventually formed a Metal Finishing 
Association for the KwaZulu Natal region109.  There was some 
discussion if members of the association should adhere to some 
minimum environmental standards, i.e. signs that mutual regulation 
was emerging, in which the industry, in an act of self-interest, 
disciplines itself.   
The metal finishing industrial sector is notorious for being fragmented 
and disorganised, sometimes anarchistic, with backyard and 
moonlighting 'cowboy' operators.  Mutual regulation holds significant 
potential because the disorganisation of this industrial sector makes 
traditional command-and-control regulation and enforcement difficult.  
There are large potential conflicts of interest within the industry, which 
may serve to strengthen processes of mutual regulation.  An 
industrialist who has invested in an effluent treatment plant and 
struggles with the sludge that it generates is unlikely to show any 
tolerance and solidarity with competitors that do not meet costly 
environmental requirements and therefore are able to undercut prices.  
A small plater who meets environmental requirements will be outraged 
by unfair price competition from cowboy operators.  The industry 
monitors competition fervently and is the first to know about rule-
breakers.  It is essential that authorities tap into this source of 
information and mutual regulation may provide just that. 
These developments took place when I was leaving South Africa and I 
do not know the later developments.  In my view, the formation of the 
metal finishing association may be the most important outcome of the 
developments in Durban. 
 
                                                                                                                                   
deep-seated this was.  Another active Club member, for instance, maintained a 
clear us-and-them attitude towards the authorities and dismissed notions of trust.   
What remains, though, is that the Club improved relations between key 
individuals representing the authorities and the electroplating industry, and that 
this relationship improved the authorities' ability to undertake effective 
inspections.  The ability to undertake more effective inspections is a side benefit 
of a broader nature, that reaches out also to non-members of the Club. 
109
  By mid-2000, the Danced cleaner production project for the metal finishing 
industry was about to be launched.  Some Club members, notably Mr Danks, 
worried if the Danced project's limited investment subsidies would ever reach the 
industry in Durban.  It was felt that the hot-dip galvanisers in Johannesburg were 
in a far better position to enter agreements with Danced because of their better 
organised structure.  In response to these concerns, a Metal Finishing Association 
was formed in the KwaZulu Natal region, which will promote waste 
minimisation as one of its core activities.  The newly formed association would 
enable the Durban industry to approach Danced in a unified manner, hopefully 
becoming a more attractive cleaner production partner.  In the perspective of 
project planning and control, it is ironic that this major, yet completely 
unforeseen, development took place before the (delayed) Danced project even is 
started.  This Danced project is covered in more detail in a previous section. 
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The WISE concept -- an opportunity for 
integration? 
The hypothesis 
The metal finishing Waste Minimisation Club in Durban had aroused a 
good deal of interest within South African environmental circles by 
mid 1999.  The Club concept was presented at a conference in Cape 
Town in 1999.  Mr. Danks presented the idea at the Danced metal 
finisher LFA workshop in Pretoria in 1999.  And there were several 
other calls for Mr. Danks as a public speaker where he would present 
the views of an environmentally responsible industrialist and tell about 
the WMC arrangement and the benefits that he had experienced. 
With the club concept apparently gaining increasing momentum, an 
opportunity emerged for integrating OHS issues into the WMC 
concept.  The working hypothesis was that in integrated approach in 
the Club, dealing with adverse conditions within both the OHS and the 
environmental domain, would strengthen the overall process.  Earlier 
research (Rasmussen 1995:245) had indicated that in particular the 
small enterprises did not maintain a clear distinction between 
environmental issues and working environment issues.  A unified 
approach to root problems which have detrimental effects within both 
domains could benefit the entire process, very much the sort of 
arguments for integration laid out on page 40. 
The WISE concept 
By chance, Mr. Limborg of CASA, a Danish consultancy, alerted me 
to an OHS intervention program developed by the International Labour 
Organisation (ILO).  The so-called Program for the Improvement of 
Working Conditions and Environment, known as PIACT after its 
French name, was first launched in 1976, more than two decades ago.  
During the 1980s, elements of the PIACT program had been refined 
into a ready-to-use ILO training package specifically targeted at small 
enterprises in developing countries (Kogi 1990:242).  This training 
program eventually became known as the Work Improvement in Small 
Enterprises (WISE) concept.  The program comes as a package 
comprising a Trainer's manual, an action manual, and checklists 
(Thurman et al. 1988, 1994) and was easily available from the ILO 
Pretoria office. 
The WISE concept is in many respects both conventional and 
pragmatic, yet innovative.  The conventionality stems from the 
concept's key assertion that better working conditions lead to higher 
productivity.  This argument reflects a long-established strategy to 
persuade business owners that they should pay more attention to OHS 
issues.  The clear documentation and emphasis on positive links 
between preventive OHS and financial cost-efficiency was a major 
strategy already at the times of the US Safety First Movement in the 
early 1900s (see page 172).  The elements of the WISE concept are 
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also traditional and time-tested, for instance comprising: materials 
storage and handling, work-station design, and machine  
safety (Figure 42.)   
 
 
 
While these areas of intervention may not be new, not breaking any 
new ground, evidence indicates that they are still extremely relevant to 
address110.   
The WISE concept focuses on simple, efficient and low cost methods 
to improve working conditions, reflecting a highly pragmatic approach 
to OHS improvements.  The objective is to improve the existing 
situation, of making changes to the better; not necessarily to attain 
some distant ideal situation in which all standards are adhered to.  Or 
quoting from the first page of the trainer's manual:   
"Throughout [this training event], the emphasis is placed on starting 
a process of improvement rather than on the specific improvements 
                                                          
110
  In Australia, there is a high incidence of injuries due to mechanical equipment 
and the injuries are generally quite severe.  Mechanical equipment injuries 
account for a major proportion of traumatic injuries in Australian industry, 
representing 28 percent of all compensation injuries.  It was found that machinery 
in small Australian manufacturing firms was generally old, damaged and not well 
maintained.  Most of the machines assessed had poor or non-existent safety 
features particularly relating to guarding and emergency stops.  Lack of safety 
features was related to the age of the machinery: older equipment was often 
manufactured without safety features, and as machines become older, guards 
were more likely to be lost or damaged (Gardner et al. 1999). 
Figure 42 Guarded power press with simple feeding and ejection devices 
The use of feeding and kick-out devices may increase productivity dramatically 
while at the same time greatly reduce machine hazards.  Figure shows a power 
press with plunger and magazine feed (left) and one with inclined chute feed 
(right).  The two examples are provided in the WISE action manual.   
This approach to accident prevention has unmistakable roots in the Safety First 
Movement of the early 1900s.  See the discussion of August Kaems 1919 
contribution to power press safety  (page 172). 
Source: Thurman et al. (1994:45) 
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that are to be made.  This is because initiating an improvement 
process is especially difficult in small and medium sized 
enterprises.  The success of efforts to improve working conditions 
will often depend more on the costs and benefits for the employer 
than on the severity of the problems themselves.  It should be 
clearly understood that nothing in this approach is intended as a 
substitute for legal standards, the work of inspectorates ...  Instead it 
is hoped that the approach can complement other efforts towards 
the improvement of working conditions" (Thurman et al. 1988:1).   
The WISE approach is candidly pragmatic. 
The problem - addressing owners-managers of small 
companies is a complex and difficult affair 
While the elements of the WISE concept are conventional, the 
implementation strategy is innovative.  It builds on action oriented 
learning and emphasises participatory methods and group discussion.  
Above all, it is built on the spread of positive ideas and practices from 
one enterprise to another, rather than on criticism.  Owner-managers of 
small enterprises that are interested in participating in the WISE 
program are envisaged to organise in a group in which participants 
will exchange ideas and experiences and programmed training 
activities undertaken.  Group participants are encouraged to visit each 
other's enterprises and bring forward suggestions.  While the term 
'Club' is absent from the WISE manuals, this is effectively what is 
going on.  
The Trainer's manual (Thurman et al. 1988) observes that the training 
of owners-managers of small companies is a complex and difficult 
affair.  Correctly identifying and recognising the special needs and 
characteristics of this group of people is crucial for a successful 
outcome of the intervention.  This entails recognition of key 
constraints as well as opportunities, and adapting to them. 
Key constraints are that, generally, owners-managers of small 
companies will not look actively to outside help, particularly 
professional help, in formulating improvements.  This is especially 
true for working conditions.  They may be hostile or at best lukewarm 
towards approaches from training or assistance institutions, consultants 
and professionals.  Even those entrepreneurs who have an interest in 
learning may have prejudices against formal training: they are unlikely 
to be interested in education and training for its own sake.  The 
owner's main concern will usually be to maintain the business and 
solve routine problems.  They will have limited time and resources for 
activities, which are not linked with short-term profit.  The owner 
considers that he is the business, and may therefore take any criticism 
as a personal slight.   
Key opportunities are that the owner-manager is the prime decision-
maker in the business, indeed maybe the sole decision-maker, who is 
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in a position to make and implement decisions swiftly.  They are likely 
to have more respect for advice from other independent owner-
managers than from external specialist or formal training programmes.  
While they often are autocratic towards their workforce they usually 
have a paternalistic interest in helping them and may even feel 
personally responsible for their well being.  They are likely to be 
closer to the shop floor and their workforce than the manager of a large 
company; they are therefore more likely to understand technical 
problems and to be capable of taking informal, flexible approaches to 
solving them.  Also, praise of the business is likely to accepted very 
warmly as personal praise of the owner.  
The solution -- action oriented training principles  
Recognition of these issues has lead the WISE training approach to 
hinge on group (Club) activities.  This is especially true with regard to 
the independent owner-manager's perceived mistrust towards the 
normal conveyors of professional assistance: experts and authorities.  
The WISE concept presumes that an independent owner-manager of a 
small enterprise will only genuinely respect the advice of other owner-
managers of small enterprises.  Therefore, the group (Club) is essential 
as a vehicle for owner-managers to train other owner-managers.  This 
analysis leads the WISE approach to be based on the following core 
training principles: 
• Build on local practice.  Change is best stimulated by starting from 
the real problems of the company instead of the priorities of 
outsiders.  Approaches designed should be flexible and informal, 
and carefully geared to the company's capability for action.  
Generally this means emphasising simple improvements which are 
already in use in some local companies 
• Focus on achievements:  It is necessary to identify praiseworthy 
achievements and to avoid criticism.  This improves 
communications with owners-managers and helps to get them 
involved 
• Link working conditions with other management goals.  The 
identification of low cost solutions to problems of working 
conditions is not usually a sufficient inducement to change.  
Managers need to understand that solutions to their everyday 
production-related problems are tied to improvements in working 
conditions 
• Use learning-by-doing.  Al learning should be linked with action 
directed at solving problems.  This means concentrating on areas 
where immediate action can be taken.  It also means using the 
managers' existing knowledge and promoting self-reliance. 
• Encourage exchange of experience.  Local self-reliance and 
enthusiasm are encouraged by opportunities for discussion with 
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other business managers and visits to other small business 
premises.  It is necessary to build support groups of small business 
managers and to provide incentive for these groups to continue to 
work together.  This helps to reinforce action and to increase the 
feeling that the content of the training programme belongs to the 
group. 
While the WISE concept is purposely developed for use in developing 
countries it is probably more correct to characterise it as targeted 
specifically towards owners-managers of small enterprises, 
irrespectively of whether those small enterprises are located in 
developing or industrialised countries.  Mr. Limborg, for instance, had 
used the WISE training concept in a small company setting in 
Denmark, with success (Limborg and Hasle 1996). 
The opportunity for integration 
An analysis of similarities and difference between the WMC and the 
WISE concept is favourable to integration.  The concepts share the 
following similarities: 
• Both concepts identify the firms' owner-manager at the focal point 
for the intervention.   
• Both concepts rely on a Club (or group) setting, in which the 
activities take place.   
• Both concepts rely on the provision of expert knowledge in 
combination with more informal activities and social interaction in 
which sharing of information and experiences takes place 
• Both concepts rely heavily on improved cost-efficiency as a major 
driver to influence the decision making behaviour of companies. 
With so many similarities and no obvious differences, there would 
appear to be an clear opportunity for a successful integration at the 
level of methodology. 
Enter WISE into the Durban WMC 
Preparation and intervention method 
The empirical work took place in the period September 1999 – June 
2000.  I first contacted Prof. Buckley, who is formally responsible for 
the metal finishing WMC pilot club study to the Water Research 
Commission, and Ms. Barclay, who organised and ran the activities of 
the WMC.  Both are with the University of Natal, Durban.  They were 
positive to the idea of bringing OHS issues into the Club setting, 
conditional, however, that the Club participants were interested.  They 
therefore suggested that I contacted some of the business owners to 
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hear their reaction.  Acting on Ms. Buckley's advice, I visited six 
participating businesses, which were felt to be major informal opinion 
formers of the Club.  If I could secure their support of the idea, the rest 
of the Club members would likely back the idea as well, she felt.   
Having visited the six participants and outlined my ideas, I then made 
a more formal presentation at a Club meeting on Oct 19, 1999.  At this 
point in time the Club had existed for over one year.  In my 
presentation I outlined how integration may limit sub-optimisation and 
I briefly presented the WISE concept, emphasising the concept's link 
between productivity improvements and OHS improvements.  The 
owner-managers that I had visited prior to the meeting then expressed 
support of my proposal, after which all Club members, as expected, 
agreed to it. 
The training program, outlined in the WISE guidelines, naturally 
presumes that the WISE activity is the main activity that takes place.  
This is not the case in the WMC setting, in which the threat of strict 
environmental regulation was the main concern of the participants.  
Consequently the WISE training programme had to be modified quite 
extensively, however still being true to the core training principles, 
which are to build on local good practices, emphasising positive 
achievements, avoiding criticism, and seeking to link OHS prevention 
with other management objectives. 
In practice, this meant that I would visit participating enterprises on 
the lookout for simple and effective practical solutions already in place 
to, what I believed, were common problems to the enterprises.  My 
search for solutions and problems was guided by the examples 
provided in the WISE action manual.  Whenever I found good local 
practice, I would seek to document it by taking a photograph.  The idea 
was that the presentations at the Club meetings should be based, as far 
as possible, on local good practice, reinforcing and spreading positive 
achievements.  A substantial part of the training material therefore had 
to be developed specifically for that Club setting, only little of it could 
be of a more general nature.  Presentations at the Club meeting would 
therefore comprise slides demonstrating a good solution to a common 
problem, that one Club member had already implemented.  I was 
careful to be open about all camera work and securing explicit 
permission from the business owner prior to displaying any 
information on a Club meeting. 
Over the entire period September 1999 – June 2000, fourteen factory 
visits were undertaken and many unstructured interviews conducted.  
Two presentations were given at Club meeting.  On two occasions was 
a presentation first given on the premises of a business, seeking to 
involve a broader audience than the single representative that attended 
the Club meetings.  
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The two presentations given 
The first presentation was given at the following Club meeting, which 
was on Feb 23, 2000.  The presentation comprised a combination of 
two of the training manual's headlines, control of hazardous substances 
and effective ventilation of premises.  The reasoning for combining 
these two subjects was that excessive heat was a common complaint at 
the business premises that I had visited.  Many of the production 
processes gave off waste heat and the visits had taken place in January 
and February where the summer temperatures in South Africa peak.  
While the ventilation topic was highly relevant to the Club 
participants, it was not immediate appropriate in a cleaner production 
context, as it would often link more to mitigation, than to prevention at 
the source.  I therefore decided to link the ventilation topic with the 
control of hazardous substances topic.  The latter is relevant not only 
for ventilation, but also as a good vehicle to illustrate the principles of 
prevention at the source.  Hazardous substances are furthermore often 
fine examples of twin problems, causing problems both in the OHS 
domain and in the external environment. 
The fist part of the presentation focussed on various means of low-cost 
chemical hazard control, emphasising substitution to a less dangerous 
substance, and reducing source strength by means of covers and lids.  I 
tried to use every opportunity to emphasise how the various means 
applied the CP principle of prevention at the source.  The second part 
focussed on simple means to improve ventilation.  Topics covered 
included: normal air flows in a room, not confusing recirculation for 
ventilation, simple applications of push-pull ventilation, means of 
protecting the factory from outside heat and cold, and letting natural 
air-flow improve ventilation. 
I gave this presentation twice in a company setting. Approaching the 
companies directly was an effort to involve the employees on a 
broader scale, and not only the company owner-manager.  The 
presentation covered a relevant nuisance topic, the high indoor 
temperatures, as well as the core CP principles of prevention -- issues 
which I felt would be relevant also to lower ranking employees. 
The second presentation was given at the next Club meeting, on May 
15, 2000.  It comprised three parts.  The first part was a follow up on 
the principles of hazardous materials control and ventilation, 
presenting additional practical examples of local good solutions which 
I had come across on visits to other participants sites since the last 
meeting.  The second part covered productive machine safety because 
several Club participants had a production of metal items, using power 
presses, punches, grinders and other types of machinery, which may 
constitute a hazard to workers.  Emphasis was given to eliminating the 
hazards by installing automatic feeding and ejection devices, or 
alternatively by guarding the moving machine parts.  The third part 
covered various techniques to improve materials storage and handling, 
emphasising better organised storage, the value of well laid-out and 
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tidy workplaces, and various types of racks, containers, bins, cabinets 
and trolleys. 
Over the period September 1999 – June 2000 fourteen factory visits 
were undertaken and numerous unstructured interviews conducted.  
Some factories were visited more than once.  It is clear that there are 
multiple and complex interactions between the researcher (me) and the 
business owners, who's behaviour is the subject of my attention, and 
which I actively seek to modify.  The interaction is very much of a 
person-to-person type, which is difficult to standardise, and sometimes 
difficult for oneself to be completely cognisant of.  This research 
activity thereby clearly positions itself in the action research tradition, 
actively attempting to bring about change, and where hypotheses are 
generated and tested on a continuing basis.  In this process, the 
researcher actively interferes with the subject of the research thereby 
departing from standard positivist quality criteria to research.  The 
major quality criteria within this research tradition is not objectivity, 
but whether change has been brought about or not. 
Discussion 
The Club members did express interest in OHS issues.  When 
undertaking factory visits, I felt that they were genuinely interested in 
hearing what I had to say, both concerning productivity improvements 
and OHS issues.  There was also a general consensus that good 
working conditions were an important element in having good 
industrial relations with the workforce.  I also felt that the 
presentations were well received, the participants were genuinely 
interested in the problems and the practical solutions that were 
presented.  In particular the second presentation had a good audience 
response, when the principles of preventive effort within the OHS 
domain were emphasised, pointing out similarities to prevention 
achieved through waste minimisation. 
However, the WISE concept is action oriented and should as such be 
evaluated against the actions and changes the intervention produced.  
An assessment of this type is not favourable to the successfulness of 
the intervention.  Within the limited time that I was following the 
Club, very little change took place.  At an evening meeting, one of the 
Club members enthusiastically told me how he had improved the 
ventilation at his premises.  After he had heard my presentation on 
gross airflow patterns, the push-pull principle, and how to enhance 
natural ventilation, he had simply taken part of an internal wall down 
in the production hall.  I am not aware of other changes that have been 
initiated as a result of the presentations given.  In a narrow sense, the 
intervention was therefore not a success. 
There may be several reasons for this, which are discussed in the 
sections below.  First, some reasons arising out of the practicalities of 
the intervention will be discussed.   Second, I will discuss a failed 
attempt to introduce new actors onto the scene, notably the employees.  
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Third, I will discuss whether some fundamental assumptions of the 
WISE concept are flawed. 
The practical setting less than ideal for WISE 
Three practical issues concerning the WISE intervention can be 
identified, which were less than ideal.  First, and most obvious, that it 
was only possible to give two presentations over the course of the 8-9 
months of my involvement.  Much time was consumed from making 
initial visits, securing the necessary approval from Club participants, 
and preparing training material.  It can thus be questioned if this 
intervention at all reached critical mass.  At the extreme, it may be 
argued that the WISE concept has not been genuinely implemented, 
that only a discount version has.  
Second, it may also have played a role that the WISE presentations 
were a latecomer activity, which took place when the initial 
enthusiasm of the Club members had begun to level off.  Perhaps 
members would have been more motivated for WISE if the activities 
had taken place right from the start.   
Third, it is possible that OHS issues simply have not been a priority to 
the Club members.  Both the WMC and the WISE concepts assume 
that some initial screening and selection procedures of companies take 
place to ensure that only genuinely motivated companies participate.  
This important screening activity has obviously not taken place with 
regard to WISE, only with regard to WMC, possibly jeopardising the 
intervention.  
Observations from the company visits -- frustrations, 
economic worries, and uneasy industrial relations 
Many club participants expressed frustrations over the massive 
changes that were facing their companies.  The threat of tightened 
effluent standards was taken seriously, as it was felt to have the 
potential to threaten the survival of the firm.  Consequently, most 
companies were reviewing plans for effluent treatment plants, and 
some were in the process of installing equipment (primarily large 
holding tanks).  
Some companies were moving away from the traditional cyanide zinc 
process to a new cyanide-free alkaline zinc process.  In one of the 
larger companies (Company A) this change gave rise to massive 
quality problems with rejection percentages going as high as 20 
percent (Figure 43).  Eventually these problems led Company A to 
outsource some of the plating operations to 'jobbing' companies (of 
which some were continuing with the cyanide process), at increased 
costs.  Company A was unwilling to return to the traditional cyanide 
process.  When using a cyanide-free process, they could declassify the 
toxicity rating of their sludge, and dispose it off as industrial waste.  
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This solved an acute waste disposal problem, which was created by the 
closure of Durban's hazardous waste landfill site.  
Besides frustrations with new more environmentally friendly process 
technology, many Club participants also expressed worries over the 
troubled economy and a bleak economic situation of the company:  
That they increasingly had to compete with imported goods from the 
Far East that were both cheap and of good quality.  That the demand 
for their products was slumping, and that high interest rates made most 
investment projects unfeasible.  In the larger companies, white 
personnel in middle-management positions were also concerned about 
trends to downsize and worried about the prospects of affirmative 
action policies, which would likely endanger their employment 
security.   
 
 
 
Add to these frustrations and worries a dose of troubled labour 
relations and conflicts about distributive issues.  Wages are still 
divided along mostly racial lines.  Almost all the companies that I 
spoke to claimed to have fine, although perhaps slightly complicated, 
labour relations.  However, I was sometime unsure about what the 
company owners meant, when they referred to 'fine' labour relations.  
To some, I suspect, it meant that there was no immediate threat of 
strikes.  
Figure 43 The change to a cyanide-free zinc plating process created 
severe quality problems. 
The picture shows the supervisor of the plating operations (left) and an operator 
inspecting the quality of freshly plated product coming from the cyanide-free 
zinc barrel plating process line.  The company experienced rejection percentages 
of up to 10-20 percent, eventually forcing the company to outsource some of its 
plating work. 
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In a medium-sized company, I was given an intriguing and detailed 
account of clandestine subcultures of organised workers that bore 
remnants of what I had read about apartheid's shop floor  
ungovernability phenomenon.  Management would suddenly notice 
that something is wrong on the shop floor.  Suddenly, without apparent 
reason, nobody wants to do overtime, seriously disrupting production 
schedules.  Management suspect that it is the result of a power play 
between rival shop floor factions, but have no clear idea of who they 
are.  Scared employees call management representatives in the 
evenings telling tales of intimidation and fears of violence if they do 
not support the unofficial 'work-to-rule' (that is: work slowly) decree.  
Management believe that the claims of intimidation and fears of 
reprisals are credible and authentic because workers, probably scabs, 
from a neighbouring company were once shot dead on the road just 
outside their fence.  I have not sought for independent verification of 
these stories.  But regardless of whether they are real or imaginary, 
they are indicative of troubled and mistrustful labour relations. 
Communication between management and workers appears to be 
troubled by language barriers and it is not uncommon for 
communication to take place through middlemen.  For instance, one 
owner-manager of a company with 50-100 employees, told me that 
about half of his staff did not understand English, except very simple 
phrases such as "put it down" and "fetch that".  He did not speak Zulu 
himself.  He recalled a situation where poor communication led to 
problems.  At that time, he kept an attendance bonus system to 
motivate employees to show up on time.  Sometimes he had to talk to 
the shopsteward (the middleman) -- "Listen, if those latecomers don't 
improve, you will lose the bonus.  I don't know what he tells the guys 
out there, but then suddenly some of them show up at the office, 
extremely cross.  Why do you want to fire us?  Then I must explain to 
them that I just want them to show up on time."111 
In summary, the business owner-managers face a turbulent and 
kaleidoscopic reality.  Frustrations over new legislation, worries about 
the economic situation and the survival of the firm, severe production 
disruptions due to the introduction of new technology, uneasy and 
mistrustful labour relations, communication problems with the 
workforce, the list goes on.  Each of these issues compete for the 
attention for the owner-manager.  But not all claims for attention can 
be honoured.   
For OHS issues, environmental issues, and, indeed, any type of issue, 
this means that they may be bumped down in priority, if other acute 
threats appear.  Owners-managers may find OHS improvements 
morally appealing and perhaps also rationally attractive from cost-
benefit considerations.  They may even show upbeat interest in OHS 
issues.  However, if they face other bigger problems or if they perceive 
                                                          
111
  Quoted from memory and notes taken immediately after meeting.  Interviews 
and conversations were generally not recorded. 
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it as a nice-to-have, and not a must-have, little action may take place in 
practice. 
Involving lower-level employees of the companies 
As noted earlier, the presentation on control of hazardous substances 
and ventilation was given twice in a company setting, trying 
specifically to involve lower ranking employees.  My initial requests 
for involving employees were politely turned down.  When I kept 
pushing in one company, the manager (politely) closed the issue with 
"... you must understand, that although we now officially have 
democracy in this country, this is not the case in industry".   
The presentations were therefore given to the supervisor level.  At the 
first company the presentation was well received and we had a good 
discussion when walking around at the premises, looking for the types 
of issues that had just been presented.  I had a clear feeling that the 
presentation had inspired the participants and provided them with new 
knowledge.  They now looked at their premises with fresh eyes.  
However, it is unclear if the WISE presentation spurred any immediate 
improvements or if the supervisors were quickly absorbed by pressing 
routine tasks when returning to their regular duties. 
At the second company, the presentation was less well received.  It 
was my impression that one of the supervisors was nervous, 
intimidated by the simultaneous presence of the owner-manager and 
me, perhaps fearing to loose face.  As a result, he was more interested 
in defending the present state of affairs than in bringing up suggestions 
for improvements.  
In summary, the attempt to involve shop floor  personnel in the WISE 
concept was a failure.  The attempt to involve the supervisor level was 
a partial success.  If, however, evaluated from the ability to bring about 
change, this attempt was unsuccessful, at least in the short run. 
Information sharing amongst firms -- a naïve assumption? 
Both the WMC and the WISE concepts assume that owner-managers 
are willing to meet on a regular basis and exchange ideas and 
experiences on how to prevent pollution, save money, or improve 
productivity.  At the CP workshop in Pretoria (page 148) an owner-
manager of a Johannesburg electroplating business questioned 
precisely this assumption.  He asked, why he, who had struggled for so 
many years to learn the tips and tricks of the trade, should give away 
this information to his competitors?  This basic contention is that fierce 
commercial competition and selfish business behaviour are simply 
incompatible with (naïve) information sharing arrangements.   
Indeed, there was some evidence in support of this view.  For instance 
in the case of Company A, that experienced serious quality problems 
when switching over to the cyanide-free zinc process.  Eventually 
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these problems led Company A to outsource some of the plating 
operations to jobbing companies.  I was told that Club members had 
entered a gentleman's agreement.  When outsourcing took place, 
jobbing shops of other Club members should have preference over 
non-Club members.  In particular Company B, a medium-sized 
jobbing shop, appeared to benefit financially from this arrangement.   
This outsourcing arrangement, however, gave rise to obvious conflicts 
of interest, which impeded the exchange of experiences in the Club.  
On at least two occasions, I felt a marked unwillingness of a jobbing 
shop owner-manager to share too much information about how to 
properly control the process parameters of the cyanide-free process.  
Knowledge about CP plating technology had suddenly become a 
competitive parameter.  
There was, however, also evidence of the opposite situation, that 
companies did exchange ideas and information in the Club.   
I overheard a Club meeting where Club members discussed how to 
construct floors properly.  Floors in plating shops take a heavy toll 
from spills of acids and other aggressive chemicals and the platers 
discussed their experiences with concrete floors, epoxy coatings, 
asphalt membranes etc.  They also discussed the pros and cons of 
turning off their rectifies over weekends to save electricity 
consumption.  One company informed that an employee operating the 
trichloroethylene degreaser had tested positive for excessive 
occupational exposure to that chemical and that they were considering 
various options, including finding alternative degreasers.  Owner-
managers also exchanged sketches of effluent treatment plant designs.   
Some Club members were not enthusiastic about having other Club 
member visit their factory.  In-line shops, that perform metal finishing 
operations on items that they manufacture themselves, were generally 
positive to company visits.  But jobbing shops were not.  It appears 
that this was not so much to guard sensitive or effective technology but 
because of fears that competing jobbing shop could figure who their 
customers were.  Visits amongst Club members were thus partly 
hampered, not by production secrets, but by shielding sensitive 
customer information. 
In summary, there was no empirical evidence of altruistic behaviour.  
Only some members contributed and only certain types of information 
were disclosed.  Yet, the overall conclusion is that information 
exchange did take place.  There appears to be much valuable advice 
that can be shared, which do not have an effect on the competitive 
situation. 
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Productivity -- a driver for OHS improvements? 
It is a key assumption of the WISE concept that productivity is a major 
motivating factor when approaching companies.  Productivity is also 
assumed to have a certain appeal to most business owners.  
Productivity is assumed to make most business owners listen to what 
you have to say.  The WISE concept candidly uses productivity 
improvements to leverage OHS improvements.  
However, at the factory visits, I was increasingly puzzled if 
productivity, in practice, was an issue of major importance to the 
companies.  For instance, one of the Club members was the owner-
manager of a medium sized company with 50-100 employees 
(Company C).  The company was manufacturing ornamental items, 
primarily using two zinc die casting processes.  The zinc items are 
polished in a 'grinder' in order to remove imperfections (fins) from the 
casting process before they can be coated or electroplated.  The grinder 
vibrates the zinc items with small polyester balls in a water/detergent 
slurry -- a process which produces substantial amounts of waste waster 
contaminated with fine zinc and polyester particles.  On the 
environmental authorities' request, a filter press had been installed to 
take out the solids before discharging the wastewater to sewer.  The 
company owner-manager had also modified the piping, in order to 
recycle the filtrate water back to the grinder.  This modification 
reduced the water consumption considerably and took place while the 
owner-manager participated in the WMC.   
However, the zinc/polyester filter cake still had to be disposed of.  
With the Durban hazardous waste landfill site closed, drums 
containing filter cake were accumulating on the premises -- an 
obviously unsustainable situation.  This unresolved waste disposal 
issue was the main concern of the owner-manager in Club discussions. 
I paid Company C a visit while searching for good local practice for 
my Club presentations.  The company owner-manager and his son took 
me around on the premises.  It was my clear impression that the owner 
manager was genuinely interested in hearing what type of advice I 
could give.  
I made four major observations:  1) little attention was paid to OHS, 2) 
there were several examples of inefficient operations,  
3) in those examples would productivity improvements through better 
design also improve the OHS situation, and 4) productivity did not 
appear to be a priority issue to the owner-manager.  They are detailed 
below. 
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ad 1)  The layout of the production facility had been planned with 
minimal attention paid to OHS issues.  For instance, three noisy power 
presses were placed in the middle of the largest production hall, most 
likely from product flow considerations (Figure 44).  However, with 
this layout, a considerable fraction of the workers in the production 
hall suffered from high levels of noise.  I also observed a similar 
layout pattern in other companies, supporting my hypothesis that OHS 
considerations are largely absent when the layout of (new) production 
equipment is determined.   
ad 2 and 3)  Several cases could be identified, in which work 
operations were not organised and executed efficiently.  In one 
example, a female worker was operating a plastic injection moulding 
machines.  The pressing tools were either not aligned properly or were 
defective; causing the automatic ejection mechanism to jam.   
 
Figure 44 Noisy power presses located in the middle of a 
large production hall 
Nearby workers doing silent fine assembly work are exposed to high levels of 
noise when the power presses are running, which they do about three days a 
week.  A major OHS problem could have been eliminated when this layout was 
planned at little or no additional cost, simply locating the power presses where 
the noise can be confined.  Once located however, a resolution of the noise 
problem becomes expensive.  In another large company I observed an identical 
situation with two continuously operating power presses located in a production 
hall where otherwise mostly silent work operations took place.   
It appears that, in general, little attention is paid to OHS issues when production 
layout is planned. 
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The operator then had to open the protective hood and reach in near 
the hot pressing tools, manually release the jammed plastic item, and 
restart the machine cycle (Figure 45).  The operator had to intervene 
once a minute or more; an obviously inefficient operation as the many 
stops caused the moulding machine to operate far below its maximum 
production capacity.  It also involved OHS dangers, reaching in near 
hot surfaces, bad work postures, and others. 
The WISE manual repeatedly emphasises the value of the positive 
example; the need to identify praiseworthy achievements and to avoid 
criticism.  This is particularly true for owners-managers of small and 
medium sized enterprises, who may easily perceive any critique of 
their business as a personal critique.  The manual therefore states that 
there shall be no mention of problems during the visits, unless the 
owner-manager raises them.  The visit shall concentrate on picking up 
the achievements of the company, even if some seem to have little to 
do with working conditions112. 
 
                                                          
112
  The Trainer's manual also states that during the visits any notion of 
'inspecting' or 'auditing' the company must be avoided  
(Thurman et al. 1988:14-15). 
Figure 45 Operator intervenes frequently in order to release 
jammed item in injection moulding machine 
The frequent stops caused the injection moulding machine to operate below 
maximum production capacity.  At the time of my visit, this appeared to be of 
minor concern to company management representatives.  A resolution of this 
situation will improve both productivity and OHS conditions (hot surfaces, work 
posture) 
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Occasionally, I found it difficult to adhere strictly to these guidelines.  
In this case, I mentioned to the owner-manager's son (the owner-
manager had just left to answer a phone call) that the frequent jams 
caused the moulding machine to operate well below full capacity.  He 
told me that the pressing tool probably was worn, and I was left with 
the impression that this was an issue of minor concern to management. 
There were other examples of inefficient planning and execution of 
work operations.  Figure 46 shows the spin die casting operations area.  
Moulds are produced from a silicone compound and the casting takes 
place by pouring molten zinc into the mould while it spins in a 
centrifuge.  The production area appeared well equipped with 
machinery.  The work station design in this particular production area, 
however, appeared to have received less than its fair share of 
investment resources and consideration.  The arrangement of tables 
and chairs was not optimised, and tools and work items were not kept 
in bins within easy reach.  It also appeared that no particular 
consideration had been given to inefficient work postures.  In short, 
there appeared to be a large and quite obvious potential for 
productivity improvements through better work station design; a 
workstation redesign that would also improve the OHS situation.  
Some of the other work stations in that factory were more efficiently 
designed, indicative that lack of knowledge was not the cause. 
ad 4)  It was my impression, that productivity was not a priority issue 
to the owner-manager.  When encouraged to tell about his business 
concerns he preferred to mention market related problems, the general 
Figure 46  Productivity can be improved with better design 
of the work stations. 
Productivity did not appear to be hampered by lack of machinery.  But the work 
station design had clearly received less than its fair share of investment resources.  
A minor investment would improve productivity dramatically.  This would also 
improve OHS conditions (work posture, lighting). 
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slow-down of the South African economy, the problem with cheap 
imports, etc.  I had the impression that he was running on less than full 
production capacity because the market could not absorb more.  The 
factory appeared to be overstaffed113. 
The owner-manager appeared to be highly interested in savings, but 
less so in investments, in which an initial cash outlay is needed in order 
to generate higher future cash flows.  Times were difficult, the cost of 
investment capital high, the future uncertain, etc.   
Over and again, I was presented to such claims by business owners.  
At face value the claims sound plausible, as they resonate well with the 
general gloomy mood in the business sections of major South African 
newspapers.  Yet, I sometimes had my doubts if they were wholly 
genuine.  Business owners may have an interest in presenting an 
exaggerated dismal picture of their economic state of affairs.  This 
may serve not to raise undue expectations amongst employees, for 
instance concerning pay rises.  If public servants believe that the 
company's survival may be threatened by new regulatory 
requirements, such demands may be delayed or relaxed, not to put 
community employment in jeopardy with that range of negative social 
consequences this will have.  It is worth mentioning that none of the 
business owners was willing to share financial information, to 'open 
the books', with the employees or with the researchers from the 
University of Natal.  As one business owner observed, while it might 
be tempting to open the books in a 'bad year', he would not be prepared 
to do so in a 'not-so-bad year'.  (I sometimes wondered if the phrase 
'good-year' is absent from the vocabulary of owner-managers of small 
firms.) 
The strategy of using productivity improvements to leverage OHS 
improvements could thus turn out to be an uphill battle.  Not only 
could productivity be perceived as an issue of less importance relative 
to other business objectives, but the scope for productivity 
improvements would be seriously limited if the restructuring process 
was starved for investment capital.  As an extra possible complication, 
if employees perceive productivity improvements to conflict with their 
employment security prospects, they may contribute less than 
wholeheartedly or seek to spoil the efforts. 
                                                          
113
  The situation reminded me of the fish canning factory that participated in the 
Danced cleaner production project (page 124).  The production manager of that 
site said that rationalisations were postponed and excessive staff levels were 
maintained for political reasons in order to obtain fish quota concessions.  The 
point is that major business decisions, for instance regarding staffing levels, may 
not be informed by standard business rationale. 
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The key points of this section can therefore be summarised as follows:  
In theory, there are compelling arguments for linking OHS 
improvements with productivity improvements, as the WISE concept 
prescribes.  In practice however, it appeared that productivity was not 
a high priority issue, at least not high enough to effectively call the 
attention of the owner-manager.  This view on attention will be 
developed further in the section that follows. 
These observations are quite consistent with earlier experiences 
reported in the literature.  Much evidence exist in support of monetary 
savings resulting from workplace interventions that optimise work 
station design.  For instance, Aarås (1994:1693) reports that an 
investment of NOK 0.34m resulted in order-of-magnitude higher 
savings of NOK 3.2m (NOK: Norwegian Kroner).  The investments 
went into more efficient work station design and the savings resulted 
from productivity improvements and improved occupational health 
and safety.  Yet, another author observes: 
"No sensible organization can afford to ignore for 40 years a 
contribution which could potentially improve both its productivity 
and its safety.  Yet it appears that the vast majority have done 
exactly that.  Given that this is the case, we are forced to conclude 
either that the vast majority of organizations are not sensible, or that 
they simply do not know what they are missing.... We must ... 
conclude that they simply do not know what they are missing." 
(Simpson 1990, quoted in James et al. 1994:954, emphasis in 
original). 
Mystified and puzzled by this failure of industry to react to cool 
rational arguments, experts in ergonomics organised a conference 
'Marketing Ergonomics' which was reported in the 1990 issues of the 
international journal Ergonomics -- yet, to little avail.  
Still, it is important to note that my empirical observations support 
major assumptions of the WISE concept.  First, productivity issues are 
effective when contacting business owners and make them spend time 
listening to what you have to say.  Figuratively speaking, productivity 
may open the door.  Second, there were many obvious instances where 
productivity improvements would indeed go hand in hand with 
improvements in OHS conditions.  Third, that the process must be 
driven from the top, by the owner-manager or his direct representative, 
in order to be effective.  Not only because the owner-manager has 
narrow control over all significant business decisions; but also simply 
because there is no immediately available alternative actor on the 
scene.  Workers are traditionally only involved to a limited extent in 
decisions regarding their own OHS conditions.  Several workplaces 
were unorganised, and workers generally appeared to be in a weak 
bargaining position due to low levels of formal education and high 
unemployment levels in the surrounding society.   
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Club performance analysed from the perspective of bounded 
rationality  
The discussion so far has mostly taken place within the bounds of the 
Rational Choice paradigm.  Within this framework of analysis, the 
decision-making behaviour of a firm (or owner-manager) is assumed 
to be the product of a process in which problems, alternatives, and 
outcomes are revealed in a systematic manner; after which decisions 
are assumed to be informed by cost-benefit evaluations of alternatives.  
The process is assumed to be linear and sequential starting with 
defining an inventory of problems.  The Club activity (and indeed the 
Danced CP projects), are initiated with an environmental survey in 
which university students (or consultants) systematically identify and 
quantify emissions.  Options to limit emissions are then identified and 
ranked according to estimated payback periods.  The survey 
component can also be identified in the WISE concept.  A group of 
business owners carries out informal 'audits' of each other's premises 
after having received a series of short lectures/presentations.  The 
outcome of the audit is a list of improvements, loosely prioritised 
according to profitability.  Both the Club and the WISE concepts 
assume that business owners act in a manner consistent with rational 
decision making, reviewing investment options in terms of financial 
and technical feasibility, implementing those where the return-of-
investment exceeds a certain criterion114. 
However, decision making behaviour may also be examined in a 
competing analytical framework, that of bounded rationality in which 
attention is a scarce resource.  The allocation of attention affects the 
information that is available, and thus the decision.  The core ideas are 
that information has to be discovered through search and that the key 
scarce resource is attention.  Theories of bounded rationality assume 
that there are more things to do than there is time to do them; that there 
are more claims on attention than can be met.  If attention is rationed, 
decisions can no longer be predicted simply by knowing the features of 
alternatives and desires.  
Theories of bounded attention therefore analyse and understand 
decisions in a framework of attention and search.  Satisficing specifies 
the conditions under which search is triggered or stopped.  Search is 
controlled by a comparison between performance and targets.  If 
performance falls below a target, search is increased.  If performance 
achieves its target, search is decreased.  In this context, decision 
making is understood in a framework of search, and of limited 
attention.   
Theories of bounded rationality offer an interesting perspective on 
some the Club experiences.  It is noteworthy, for example, that two of 
the most active Club members and most successful implementers of 
CP practices had similar ownership structures.  The Saayman Danks 
                                                          
114
  In principle, when the return-of-investment (ROI) is higher than the cost-of-
capital.  However, other decision rules are commonly applied with much higher 
cut-off points, for instance demanding pay-back periods of less than one year.  
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Electroplating business, described earlier, had two owners.  It was my 
clear impression that Mr. Danks would have been unable to spend that 
much time (attention) on acquainting himself with the new principles 
of prevention and on innovatively putting them into practice -- for 
instance devising waste sharing schemes with firms that could use his 
wastes as raw material -- had it not been for the other partner, Mr. 
Ferguson, to run the more mundane day-to-day business activities.  
Mr. Ferguson, I believe, never took part in a Club meeting, and he 
quickly left the room when I discussed CP issues with Mr. Danks. 
The other Club firm, Metal Protection Services, had a similar division 
of managerial responsibilities.  The one owner, Steve Cody, was 
highly involved in debating the new effluent requirements with the 
municipality and was Primus Motor in the firm's CP restructuring 
efforts115.  The other owner of Metal Protection Services took little or 
no part in these activities.   
The successful implementation of CP practices in these two firms may 
thus be explained in terms of excess managerial capacity, of the 
availability of a surplus of managerial attention, rather than in terms of 
availability of information, of attractive cost-benefit ratios, or some 
other input to a rational decision-making process. 
If a firm's behaviour is understood in terms of conflicting demands on 
managerial attention, which is assumed to be the key scarce resource, 
factors apparently unrelated to CP and OHS improvement must be 
included in the picture, if they make claims for managerial attention.  
In April-May 2000, shortly before I was leaving South Africa, the 
Durban municipality seemed to be in a process of re-thinking its 
effluent demands, perhaps relaxing on some requirements.  To several 
companies the threat of environmental closure was perceived as being 
less acute.  Several company owners were in the process of solving 
their longer-term sludge disposal problems.  Some had shifted to non-
cyanide electroplating processes, which permitted the sludge to be 
declassified in terms of toxicity and opened new low-cost sludge 
disposal routes.  The firm with the zinc/polyester sludge problem 
(Company C) had found means to dispose off the sludge as regular 
industrial waste.  A specialist waste handling company was actively 
investigating new ways to treat wastes, possibly converting sludge 
metals to their natural inert mineralogical states, thereby possibly 
permitting new disposal routes. 
The environmental 'threat factor' and the perception of 'urgency of 
action' therefore lowered, and company owner-managers could direct 
their scarce attention to other pressing business issues.  The attendance 
                                                          
115
  There may have been additional but unrelated reasons for the change in 
environmental practices in this company.  Steve Cody had fallen victim to an 
unpleasant hijacking at gunpoint, which he cited as the prime reason why he 
desired to emigrate, possibly to Australia.  He told me that many of the 
improvements in his factory were meant to make the business more sellable.  He 
had put his life savings in that business, he said. 
  
Chapter 8   The Durban Club study 
260
Hedlund 2002.doc 
to Club training sessions was declining.  Prof. Buckley spoke of a need 
to revitalise the Club.  With the notable exception of Mr. Danks, many 
business owner-managers appeared to believe that they had 'done 
enough'.   
This behaviour can be explained in the framework of bounded 
rationality and satisficing.  There was, in my opinion, still an 
unexplored potential for CP practices and techniques in many 
companies, which would lower the sludge production.  Some of these 
options would likely be cost-effective from a narrow rational economic 
viewpoint.  However, they were not explored because the companies 
felt that their present solutions were 'good enough' (satisficing).  The 
search for solutions was halted and scarce managerial attention was 
directed elsewhere, to other problems of higher perceived urgency.   
In the perspective of bounded rationality, it is possible to identify 
important limitations in the implementation process, which the Waste 
Minimisation Club (WMC) concept shares with the Work 
Improvements in Small Enterprises (WISE) concept.  While the 
provision of information and other types of expert input is a necessary 
precondition to initiate the change process, it is not a sufficient 
precondition.  To accomplish the first step, which is to obtain access to 
the decision-maker, it may be essential to demonstrate that improved 
environmental performance is economically attractive, 'pollution 
prevention pays' and it may be crucial to emphasise that improved 
OHS conditions go hand in hand with productivity improvements.    
Yet, this conceptual framework is intrinsically deficient in explaining 
actual company behaviour and in predicting the outcomes of the 
intervention.  At the extreme, even the most compelling financial 
arguments in favour of improved environmental or OHS performance 
may vanish if other and stronger claims for managerial attention arise.   
In short, it is not a question of whether a new practice pays, it is how 
do owner-managers want to spend scarce resources (primarily their 
attention).  
The bounded rationality perspective is, in my opinion, consistent with 
the standard economic notion of opportunity costs.  According to this 
concept, the costs of a certain course of action is determined, not from 
the course of action itself, but from the opportunities foregone because 
an alternative course of action cannot be taken.  Consider, if scarce 
managerial attention is absorbed by environmental or OHS issues and 
therefore cannot be directed towards an urgent customer request.  The 
opportunity cost of that course of action is the possible loss of business 
income resulting from the neglect of the customer request.  It may well 
be that improved environmental or OHS performance contributes 
positively to company earnings.  Nonetheless, if the alternative action, 
attending the customer request, would result in a higher contribution to 
earnings (the opportunity cost), the company has suffered a financial 
net loss. 
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The implication -- cost efficiency is an important, though 
inadequate, driver 
It is therefore concluded that favourable financial cost-benefit 
arguments, which play major roles in both the WMC and the WISE 
concepts, are too narrowly conceived.  Theories of bounded rationality 
identify managerial attention as the key scarce resource.  And the 
standard economic notion of opportunity costs explains why certain 
courses of actions may be unattractive even if they have favourable 
cost-benefit ratios.   
A focus solely on favourable financial cost-benefit arguments ignores 
both managerial attention and opportunity costs, and is therefore, 
although important, inadequate to predict and explain company 
behaviour.   
The success of the WMC in promoting waste minimisation may more 
adequately be explained as a combination of regulatory intervention 
(new effluent standards), a freak landslide closing the sole hazardous 
waste landfill site, and the Club related activities.  In the same vein 
may the failure to initiate OHS changes be explained as a combination 
of lack of regulatory intervention, an absence of feelings of urgency, 
competing demands from the threat of environmental closure, and, of 
course, the less than ideal practical circumstances that this particular 
intervention was carried out in. 
Conclusion 
The research activities reported in this chapter have taken place in a 
complex empirical field comprising a group of companies that are 
suddenly burdened with new and difficult environmental demands and 
consequently decide to organise in a Club.  Some of the demands arise 
from public authorities announcing stricter environmental legislation 
and enforcement.  Others result from freak external events, notably a 
landslide closing an important means of solid waste disposal.  Each 
company faces a unique situation and enters the Club for different 
reasons.  Their unique situation, their reasons to enter, and other major 
parameters are difficult for an outsider to reveal, cannot be 
exhaustively described, even less be controlled as a research setting. 
The sections in this chapter have reported, discussed, and concluded 
on issues ranging from a series of specific developments in one 
company to topics of a more general nature.  They have ranged from 
the reporting of a sudden upsurge of innovative cleaner production 
practices in one company, to a discussion of how owner-managers 
more generally may perceive and react to new demands, and to 
speculations about limitations and shortcomings of two general 
intervention methodologies.  The research setting has been complex, 
the interactions fluid and sometimes ill-defined, and many of the 
impressions subjective.   
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In summarising and concluding on the major points of this 
kaleidoscopic subject, it is therefore useful to make a first distinction 
between reflections that are backed by empirical evidence and 
inferences that arise out of considerations at the theoretical level.  This 
distinction is maintained in the sections below.  
Lack of integration leads to sub-optimisation 
The opening chapter of this thesis identified empirical evidence in 
support of the sad hypothesis that environmental interventions may be 
undertaken with little attention paid to workplace health and safety.  
That chapter argued that a narrow focus on environmental concerns 
can overlook problems created or missed with regard to occupational 
health and safety.  Two types of sub-optimalities were identified that 
could result if integration was not pursued consciously:  1) media 
shifting, which occurs if the 'resolution' of an environmental problem 
gives rise to new, and unforeseen, problems for worker's health and 
safety;  2) missed opportunity, which occurs if an opportunity exists 
for improving both environmental and OHS performance, but a less 
optimal solution is chosen that only addresses environmental 
performance. 
• The empirical evidence support the hypothesis that environmental 
interventions may be undertaken narrowly, with little or no 
attention paid to workplace health and safety.  Many of the 
companies had not identified their present OHS performance 
systematically and were consequently unaware of many of their 
OHS problems.  Awareness is a major precondition for companies 
to be able to consider possible adverse OHS issues that may arise 
from new environmental practices.  Empirical evidence support 
that other major business decisions, for instance regarding layout 
of production equipment, had been taken with little or no regard to 
how this may impact on OHS, indicative that this would also be 
case for environmental decisions.  None of the small companies 
indicated that they had given consideration to OHS issues when 
they introduced new environmental practices.  Available empirical 
evidence therefore support that environmental projects may be 
executed narrowly, largely ignoring OHS effects. 
• It is noteworthy, however, that I found no empirical evidence of 
media shifting.  Many of the cleaner production practices that have 
been promoted in the Club have addressed problems of the 'twin-
problem' variety in which problems in the external and the internal 
environment have the same underlying cause: the use of a toxic or 
obnoxious substance in the production process.  Even that the 
decision to renounce cadmium electroplating or the decision to 
move away from cyanide process technology is taken strictly on 
environmental grounds, it is also beneficial to workers.  If the use 
of trichloroethylene becomes less appealing strictly on OHS 
grounds, possibly leading to discontinuation of its use, this 
development is also beneficial to the environment.  But I did not 
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observe any instances where OHS had deteriorated because a 
waste minimisation practice had been implemented116. 
• There were however examples of missed opportunities.  A hoist 
installed to improve drip-off (an environmental issue) may also 
alleviate lifting strain (an OHS issue).  However, with a little extra 
effort the hoist arrangement could likely be expanded to alleviate 
lifting strain also in the subsequent rinse steps, which was not done 
(missed opportunity).  If a cadmium plating line is completely 
overhauled in order to introduce cascade and counter-flow rinses, 
and OHS issues are largely ignored in this process, then missed 
opportunities are extremely likely. 
Major assumptions of the WMC concept confirmed 
empirically 
There is consistent empirical evidence in support of the major 
assumptions of the Waste Minimisation Club concept.   
• Interviews with owner-managers unanimously confirm that cost-
savings is a major motivating factor for them to consider 
preventive strategies to waste minimisation.   
• The intervention strategy of linking cost-savings with improved 
environmental performance is successful.  The Club companies 
have reported significant monetary savings together with 
significant reductions in the amount of wastes generated.  The 
environmental performance is largely achieved by preventing 
pollution at the source and through more efficient usage of raw 
materials.   
• The club concept has been a successful organisational vehicle.  
The Club was instrumental in giving the metal finishing industry 
voice and influence in negotiations with authorities.  Other actors 
utilised the club structure to gain access to the industry: 
authorities, providers of environmental expert knowledge, 
chemical suppliers, waste disposal companies.  It is my clear 
impression that the social interaction amongst Club member also 
was an important motivating factor 
                                                          
116
  It is true that new OHS hazards may arise when workers handle toxic sludge 
from the new effluent treatment plants.  It can furthermore be speculated if the 
large holding and settling tanks that some companies erected to hold large 
quantities of effluent water for treatment and neutralisation purposes have 
introduced new hazards to the surrounding community.  In particular regarding 
the risk of accidental release of larger quantities cyanide gasses in a scenario 
where pickling acid is first dumped to the holding tank, followed by a large spill 
of cyanide.  Effluent treatment is, however, not a cleaner production practice, it 
was not a Club priority, and therefore not a topic of direct interest here. 
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• Information sharing amongst Club members did take place in the 
Club.  Information and experiences regarding waste minimisation 
and effluent treatment practices were pooled at Club meetings and 
discussed amongst members.  There was no empirical evidence of 
altruistic behaviour -- only some members contributed and only 
certain types of information were disclosed.  Yet, the alternative 
view, that fierce commercial competition and selfish business 
behaviour are simply incompatible with (naïve) information 
sharing arrangements cannot be supported empirically.  
Information sharing is a viable strategy. 
• There is consistent empirical evidence that the provision of 
financial subsidies for cleaner production is highly attractive to 
small companies.  In interviews, owner-managers mentioned lack 
of own capital, difficult access to foreign capital, and high interest 
rates, as major obstacles hindering the introduction of cleaner 
production practices through process modification.  Gaining access 
to financial subsidies from Danced was a major reason for 
initiating the Metal Finishing Association.   
This conclusion comes as a surprise to me.  I would intuitively have 
thought that small companies would expect to find the bureaucratic 
procedures and formal requirements of a large development assistance 
organisation (Danced) too cumbersome, and too demanding on 
managerial attention to be worth the effort.   
• Last, that there have been significant intangible benefits from the 
Waste Minimisation Club arrangement.  A channel of 
communication has been established with the authorities, the usual 
adversarial relations have given way to dialogue and compromise.  
A sense of trust has emerged, at least amongst key platers and 
regulators.  The Club established a forum where chemical 
suppliers and waste disposal firms (i.e. industry service providers) 
could address the industry and discuss issues of broader interest, 
for instance the feasibility of future waste handling schemes. 
Major assumptions of the WISE concept confirmed 
empirically 
Interviews and observations provides empirical evidence in support of 
several major assumptions of the WISE concepts. 
• Empirical evidence support that improved productivity is an issue 
of major interest to owner-managers.  Productivity issues are 
effective when contacting business owners and make them spend 
time listening to what you have to say.  Figuratively speaking, 
productivity may open the door and pave the way for OHS 
acitivities.   
• There were several obvious examples where productivity 
improvements would in fact go hand in hand with improved OHS 
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conditions.  There were examples of inefficient work station 
design or inefficient usage of machinery in which productivity 
improvements were possible.  Those improvements would also 
alleviate a number of OHS problems.  Empirical evidence 
therefore support that it is a viable strategy to use productivity 
improvements to leverage OHS improvements.  This confirms the 
important assumption of the WISE concept of linking working 
conditions with other management goals. 
• The WISE concept emphasises the need to build on local practice.  
In practice, this presumes that some companies already have 
simple and effective practical solutions in place to problems that 
are general to a larger group of companies.  The idea is that the 
training session material should be based, as far as possible, on 
local good practice, reinforcing and spreading positive 
achievements.  Empirical evidence support the viability of this 
approach.  It was relatively easy to identify praiseworthy local 
practices, and companies generally permitted them being 
photographed and shown to a wider audience.   
• Finally, empirical evidence support that there is no alternative to 
driving the process from the top, by the owner-manager or his 
direct representative.  Two attempts to involve worker 
representatives failed.   
Integration at the level of methodology is viable and beneficial 
The first general conclusion of this chapter concerns the viability of 
integrating an environmental intervention and a workplace 
intervention.  The Waste Minimisation Club (WMC) concept and the 
Work Improvement in Small Enterprises (WISE) concept are 
methodologically very similar: 
- They employ the same type of driving strategy, which is to link up 
with broader management goals.  The WMC concept links waste 
minimisation with monetary savings.  The WISE concept links 
better working conditions with productivity improvements.  Both 
concepts thus rely on improved cost-efficiency as a major driver to 
influence the decision-making behaviour of companies. 
- Both concepts identify the firms' owner-manager at the focal point 
for the intervention. 
- Both concepts rely on the same organisational structure (a Club or 
group), in which the activities take place. 
- Both concepts rely on the provision of expert knowledge in 
combination with more informal activities and social interaction in 
which sharing of information and experiences takes place. 
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- The concepts employ roughly the same methodology and use 
actions plans as instruments for change.  The WMC concept use 
environmental reviews and surveys, mostly undertaken by third 
party experts, which form the basis for a written list of 
recommendations (the action plan).  The WISE relies on group 
activity, in which owner-managers 'audit' the facilities of each 
other.  The notes taken during this audit constitutes the action plan. 
Compared to the WMC concept, the WISE concept is more elaborated 
in at least two regards.  First, it has more structural content.  The 
action manual is structured and extensive, logically divided into ten 
sections with many pedagogic easy-to-comprehend illustrations and 
suggestions.  This comprises a rich catalogue of ideas that can aid the 
search for local good practice when training material for the specific 
intervention is produced.  The trainer's manual is in a similar manner 
thoroughly prepared with example course programmes, checklist 
exercises, and suggestions on how to carry out the presentations, 
highlighting potential pitfalls, etc.   
Second, it has more political content in its recognition of roles and 
potential conflicts of interest.  The difficult and challenging life of an 
owner-manager of a small enterprise is given quite extensive coverage, 
in particular emphasising that the business activities often absorb the 
owner, that the owner becomes the business, and that critique of the 
business may be perceived as a personal critique of the owner.  
Precisely this recognition of roles, and the identification of mistrust 
towards authorities and 'experts' more generally, are extremely 
important as they guide the training approach with its emphasis on 
peer activities and action learning.  These differences may simply 
reflect that the WISE concept is older and that more concerted efforts 
have gone into its development compared to the more recently 
developed WMC concept.   
The second general conclusion of this chapter therefore concerns the 
range of potential synergies that an integrated approach may benefit 
from 
- That the concepts contribute with complementary strengths.  The 
WMC concept can contribute with the charm of novelty and the 
general goodwill associated with environmental interventions.  The 
WISE concept can contribute with a tested intervention strategy 
based on principles of action learning. 
- Earlier discussion (on page 234) led to the conclusion that many 
CP practices came at a cost in terms of a deterioration in 
productivity resulting from less flexibility and increased 
complexity in the production process.  An interesting synergy 
could therefore arise if this productivity deterioration was 
counteracted by productivity improvements achieved through 
WISE activities.   
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- Finally, that synergies may arise because an integrated approach 
focus the attention on root causes that give rise to both 
environmental problems and adverse working conditions (twin 
problems).   
The core conclusion of this chapter is that key preconditions are met 
for a successful integration of the WMC and the WISE concepts.  The 
two concepts are methodologically very similar.  They may 
furthermore strengthen each other.  The chances for a successful 
integration at the level of methodology are therefore high.   
This general conclusion is based on analysis and inferences at the level 
of theory.  The empirical evidence presented in this chapter support 
that all major preconditions for an integrated approach are met but the 
research did not produce empirical evidence that integration actually 
took place.  This is attributed to the practical circumstances that were 
less than ideal.  It is highly plausible that the WISE intervention never 
reached critical mass.  Moreover, there is no empirical evidence in 
support of the opposite hypothesis:  suggesting that integration should 
not be feasible. 
Too simplistic assumptions about drivers 
Finally, this chapter argues that favourable financial cost-benefit 
arguments, which play major roles in both the WMC and the WISE 
concepts, are too narrowly conceived.  Theories of bounded rationality 
identify managerial attention as the key scarce resource.  And the 
standard economic notion of opportunity costs explains why certain 
courses of actions may be unattractive even if they have favourable 
cost-benefit ratios.  This analysis, at the level of theory, leads to the 
following conclusions: 
• A focus solely on favourable financial cost-benefit arguments 
ignores both managerial attention and opportunity costs, and is 
therefore, although important, inadequate to predict and explain 
company behaviour.  The intervention becomes far more effective 
if supported on a broader front, notably if backed by regulatory 
action (or a credible threat of regulatory action) in the form of 
stricter requirements or tightened enforcement of existing 
legislation or financial instrument in the form of water levies or 
waste charges. 
• A more benign way of improving intervention effectiveness, not 
wielding a stick, could be to set up better incentives, sweetening 
the carrot so to say.  Subsidies were highly attractive to the small 
enterprises and could be an effective encouragement.  In particular, 
attractive subsidies could be made conditional that both OHS and 
environmental issues are considered. 
Raising intervention effectiveness through the stick approach, 
involving more regulation or higher financial charges, are probably 
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unrealistic, however.  Many of South Africa's contemporary problems 
regarding poverty and crime are perceived as inseparable from high 
unemployment rates.  Job creation is a major priority to the 
Government and small and medium sized enterprises are seen as the 
most realistic, perhaps the only, providers of those new jobs.  
Regulatory action or financial charges that would conflict with the 
objective of encouraging growth of the small business sector are 
therefore unlikely to be implemented117. 
This leaves the carrot (subsidies) as the most realistic option to 
improve implementation efficiency. 
 
 
                                                          
117
  For an overview of the Government's priorities, see for instance President 
Mbeki's State of the Nation Address (Mbeki 2000) or 'Labour laws killing small 
business, says Mbeki'  (MG 20000216).  The broader role of small and medium 
sized enterprises in industrial development is an extremely interesting subject that 
unfortunately falls outside the scope of this thesis.  A good review is given by 
Nanjundan (1987) 
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Chapter 9. Conclusion 
The initial chapter introduced a hypothesis, which has informed most 
of this work -- that environmental interventions may be pursued 
narrow-mindedly with little or no attention paid to occupational health 
and safety.  The chapter then identified two potential negative 
outcomes from this narrow-minded approach, essentially leading to 
sub-optimal solutions.  The first was the potential for media-shifting -- 
that the 'resolution' of a problem within the environmental domain 
creates a problem in the occupational health and safety domain, 
leading to a deterioration of workplace conditions.  The second was 
the potential for opportunities foregone -- that an environmental 
intervention fails to address occupational health and safety problems 
that are in principle unrelated but which could have been resolved at 
little or no additional cost.  
This study finds ample empirical evidence supporting the hypothesis 
that environmental objectives are pursued quite narrow-mindedly.  In 
the case of Danced's cleaner production projects, they do not 
specifically address occupational health and safety issues.  Workplace 
conditions are therefore largely ignored.   
This study argues that this state of affairs is regrettable -- in itself an 
opportunity foregone.  An analysis of the developments of 
environmental paradigms identifies cleaner production as the most 
obvious candidate for integration of environmental and occupational 
health and safety interventions.  Cleaner production is the only 
environmental paradigm that is concerned with detailed analysis of the 
production process, being the only environmental paradigm that shares 
this focus with occupational health and safety.   
Chapter 3 introduced a model for analysing possibilities for 
integration.  The model identified three main areas: tools, actors, and 
structure integration.  Each level represents different understandings of 
organisational behaviour which in turn implies different strategies for 
accomplishing integration.  The two case studies reported in Chapter 6 
lead to the following two general conclusions: 
• First, that OHS issues must feature in the Project Document 
(PD), that is, integration at the structures level.  If the PD is 
silent on occupational health and safety issues, this can only be 
interpreted by the implementing consultant as evidence that 
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OHS is not a legitimate project objective.  In turn, this entails 
that OHS must appear more prominently in in the Terms of 
Reference (TOR) that start the process of planning a new 
project. 
• Second, that it is important to integrate OHS into the 
methodologies that the implementing consultant uses, when he 
pursues a CP intervention.  This is integration at the tools level.   
This type of integration was then the subject of detailed empirical 
examinations in the following Chapter 7 and Chapter 8 -- one 
regarding interventions in large companies, the other regarding 
interventions in small companies.  Both empirical studies are 
independent of Danced CP projects.  And both concluded that 
integration at the level of methodology was a viable approach. 
Returning to the purpose of this thesis, it has been argued that 
integration at the structures level and the tools (methodology) level 
should be undertaken.  What about the actors level?   This type of 
integration would call for the introduction of an actor that can 
safeguard OHS interest while the project is being implemented and 
who can seize unexpected opportunities for integration as they arise.   
The keyword here is unexpected.  This thesis has consistently argued 
that planning tools in use in development planning have a number of 
inherent deficiencies.  In both case studies of CP projects, the LFA 
planning tool twisted project objectives and favoured rigour over 
relevance.  The planning tool forced the problem description and the 
stakeholder dialogue to appear more logically consistent and less 
ambiguous than they really were.  This influence was not benign, 
merely helping to structure and streamline a project.  Rather, there is a 
real risk that the LFA planning tool will distort a project due to its 
obsession with quantifiable indicators.  Planning entails perils.   
In the fish project, the plan was re-interpreted during the 
implementation phase.  In the metal finisher project, a major, yet 
completely unforeseen, accomplishment took place118 even before the 
(delayed) project was started.  It appears that not too much reliance can 
be laid on the effectiveness of integrating OHS into plans. 
                                                          
118
   The formation of an association of small industries, as described on  
page 238.  In the perspective of project planning and control, it is ironic that this 
major, yet completely unforeseen, development took place before the (delayed) 
Danced project was even started. 
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This Ph.D. project cannot escape the reality of unpredictability either.  
Despite the best of planning efforts, the plan of this project was not 
executed according to the plan.  In fact, the plan was soon obsolete due 
to unforeseen external events.  The textile CP project, which, 
according to the plan, was the major research object, i.e. the major 
source of empirical data, was delayed for over a year and did not 
materialise until after I had left South Africa.  Alternative avenues had 
to be explored or the Ph.D. project would sink.  The two intervention 
studies for large and for small companies were excellent opportunities, 
yet completely unforeseen in the plan. 
Allocation of attention has been a key theme pervading this thesis.  
Attention is a scarce resource -- there are simply more things to do 
than there is time to do them; there are more claims on attention that 
can be met.  Information has to be discovered through search and 
attention -- the allocation of attention therefore affects the amount of 
information that is available, and thus the decision (and organisational 
behaviour). 
A key conclusion of this thesis would naturally be to devise types of 
integration that focus attention on OHS issues.  One such effective 
means would be to introduce an OHS actor, partly during planning but 
especially during project implementation.  The idea is that this actor 
would identify and seize on unforeseen opportunities for integrating 
OHS issues with CP, as they emerge.  While effective, it is, however, 
unlikely to be efficient -- the cost of such actor being quite high. 
OHS professionals in Denmark and elsewhere may ask what happened 
to the employees -- why are they not considered in the actor 
discussion?  This project has considered integration of OHS into 
environmental intervention projects.  None of the environmental 
interventions have included even the slightest employee participation 
component -- they are all top-down managed.  Additionally, it has 
been argued that South Africa's past has created an industrial relations 
system in which consensus seeking and compromising have only 
recently emerged.  The study has not seriously sought to challenge this 
framework imposed by environmental interventions.  While employee 
participation is a major occupational health and safety strategy in 
Denmark and elsewhere, this study has not sought to impose that 
strategy onto environmental projects in South Africa.   
Danced's CP projects comprise a budget-line to subsidise investments 
in plant hardware that will improve the environmental performance of 
the firm.  The companies that partake in CP projects are expected to 
undertake feasibility studies after which they can forward investment 
proposals to Danced and apply for a co-financing subsidy.  Events 
have clearly demonstrated that this subsidy is highly attractive to both 
the large and the small companies.  In the fish project, the 
implementing consultant had to defuse a potential conflict over how to 
administrate the subsidy early in the project.  In the Club study, small 
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companies decided to form an industry association to increase their 
chances of winning subsidies from Danced. 
A strategy informed by theories of attention, which is both effective 
and efficient, would therefore simply be to favour applications for 
subsidies to investments that alleviate twin problems.  In this manner, 
the companies are informed that investment proposals that improve 
both OHS and environmental performance will have preference over 
investment proposals that do not.  
In summary, the key conclusions on how to integrate OHS in CP 
projects are: 
1. It is a necessary precondition that OHS be established as a 
legitimate project objective.  This issue must feature in the TOR 
and in the Project Document.  The legitimacy of OHS issues must 
be reflected at all levels in the LFA matrix, from objectives to 
outputs. 
2. OHS issues should be integrated at the level of methodology in the 
implementation phase.  The methodology used by the consultant to 
promote CP in industry should be modified also to accommodate 
OHS issues.  The research undertaken in this study provides 
consistent empirical evidence in support of the viability of this 
approach -- both for large companies for which a formal 
management system approach may be attractive, and for small 
companies for which an informal network intervention approach 
may be more attractive. 
3. Positive incentive structures should be established that reward 
companies that address twin problems.  Twin problems are 
characterised as those in which problems in the external and the 
internal environment have the same root cause.  The most efficient 
manner of doing this is to target the physical investment subsidy 
element, simply giving preference to investment proposals that 
improve both OHS and environmental performance. 
4. It is likely to be effective to enlarge the actor system and introduce 
an actor that can safeguard OHS interest while the project is being 
planned and implemented and who can grab unexpected 
opportunities for integration as they arise.  This approach should 
be considered in the planning phase.  However, in the protracted 
implementation phase, the costs of such an actor are likely to be 
prohibitive.  While effective, this approach is unlikely to be an 
efficient means of integration in the implementation phase. 
The last comment will be devoted to emphasising the quite ambitious 
nature of the goal of integration.  This thesis has argued persistently 
that an integrated approach should be pursued, both from a rational 
point of view concerning efficiency and sub-optimal solutions, but also 
on ethical grounds.  It is morally repulsive if endeavours to improve 
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environmental performance disregard the environment of the workers  
-- potentially deteriorating workplace conditions, and probably 
overlooking opportunities to improve them at little or no additional 
cost.   
Yet, in practice, there are tremendous structural and administrative 
problems to overcome.  This thesis has examined methods to promote 
an integrated approach in a Danish development assistance agency's 
projects targeting South African industry.  The author is well aware 
that attempts to integrate environmental and OHS issues in the Danish 
public administration have failed and that earlier attempts in Denmark 
to stimulate an integrated approach at company level have been  
short-lived.  Denmark has not its own house in order in this respect119. 
While this study has identified several shortcomings in Danced's 
planning of environmental assistance projects, most notably tendencies 
to favour rigour over relevance, it is to Danced's credit that the 
organisation has been open to an enquiry of this type.  It is to Danced's 
credit that it has produced written statements in support of an 
integration attempt, that it has given the author access to planning and 
implementation activities, and generally has been open-minded to 
OHS issues. 
 
                                                          
119
  For instance, a recent report by the Danish EPA on reuse of domestic waste 
promises in its title that both environmental and occupational health and safety 
issues are considered.  Yet, there is not a single reference to OHS in the entire 
report.  (Miljøstyrelsen 1999, MP493) 
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